Gains for Soviet Policy in the Middle East

Abstract

Renewed and intensified superpower competition in the Middle East and Persian Gulf in recent months has come at a time when the region is in an era of historic transformation. On a profound level it is anachronistic to see two states contend for power and influence over a region neither understands, cares for, or is likely to be able to influence more than marginally. On another level the process and result of the competition could seriously affect the autonomy and prospects of the peoples of the region. The sense of powerlessness, lack of control, and susceptibility to manipulation by outside forces have of course been increased by the jockeying for position, solicitation of diplomatic support, and request for base and access rights of the great powers. This intensified pressure for alignment, according to which local actions are interpreted in terms of the East-West competition, increases the sense of impotence of the local states which watch the game being played out over their heads. The precise relevance of this game to their needs is as shrouded in mystery as the eventual outcome is a source of anxiety. The possibility of a superpower arrangement made at their expense worries the regional powers almost as much as more pressing and immediate security threats. As small states, the regional powers' interests are local while those of their patrons are global; the possibility that their interests may be sacrificed in a wider arrangement is therefore ever present. A related concern is the possibility of conflict in the region unrelated to the region itself; if Afghanistan was a Soviet breakout from potential encirclement, it was the Arabs and Iran, and not China, that paid the costs.' Even this regional theater thus can be an arena rather than a stake in great power rivalry.