In the Era of Scuttle, a Not So Special Relationship

Abstract

As the United States, the empire “in denial,” to quote Harvard historian Niall Ferguson, continues to flounder in a Middle East convulsed by political awakenings and vicious counterrevolution, the region’s century-old Western imperial pretense persists. The Americans inherited the mantle from the British, who reluctantly gave it up some forty years ago. Anglo-Americanphilia notwithstanding, the imperial hand-off did not proceed without disagreement, rancor, and bitterness. As Simon Smith, Professor of International History at the University of Hull, meticulously recounts in Ending Empire in the Middle East, the UK–U.S. relationship proved anything but easy and agreeable. Smith delivers a convincing narrative that correctly eschews the notion of a “special relationship” in favor of one premised on Great Power rivalry, cooperation, and expediency in an era of decolonization and the Cold War. After reviewing the literature on the Anglo-American “special relationship” in the Introduction and underscoring the mythical and hyperbolic qualities of that partnership, Smith proceeds with a thorough chronological narrative spotlighting the years 1945–1973. First, he examines the U.S.–British relationship following World War II, a seminal event for both countries. As the Americans surged to the pinnacle of global politics following their impressive display of economic and military prowess, their enervated and overextended English-speaking brethren sought to retain their Great Power position and privileges. While both sides opposed Soviet expansionism in the Middle East and elsewhere, they quickly differed on a host of issues. Washington privileged Project Alpha, for example, whereas London preferred the Baghdad Pact. Smith notes (p. 40) that “British disappointment at US failure to provide wholehearted support to Britain’s position and policies in the Middle East in the decade following the end of the Second World War was matched by US consternation at British unilateralism and tendency to prioritize imperial interests over Cold War ones.” Despite the waxing American role in the region, Smith opines (p. 41) that “what is perhaps more remarkable is not merely the survival of the British presence, but also Britain’s willingness to adopt policies at variance with Washington and even to act unilaterally.” Even when the allies agreed on ends (i.e., “stability” via “economic improvement” and “political development”), they often parted on means. British assertiveness and refusal to kowtow thus ensured disagreement and made for a difficult partnership.