Diplomatic Interests Research Articles

Les droits de la personne et la politique étrangère canadienne : le cas de l’Indonésie

Margaret Doxey has argued that there exists a "rhetoric gap" between the lofty pronouncements of Canadian governments on the question of human rights violations by other governments in the international System and the actions of the Canadian government. This paper argues that specific external constraints will hamper any attempt by governments in Ottawa to transform the rhetoric of official statements into direct policy action. This paper examines Indonesian-Canadian relations during the 1970s as a case study, and concludes that economic, strategic and diplomatic imperatives and interests proved more compelling than concerns over the treatment of political prisoners by the government of General Suharto, or concerns over the Indonesian invasion of Timor. The specific case study suggests a more general observation about human rights and Canadian foreign policy : that where trade-offs must be made, economic and diplomatic interests will tend to prevail over concerns about human rights violations.

English Episcopal Acta. London: 1189-1228 (review)

Reviewed by: English Episcopal Acta. London: 1189—1228 Everett U. Crosby English Episcopal Acta. London: 1189—1228. Edited by D. P. Johnson . [English Episcopal Acta, Volume 26.] (New York: Oxford University Press for the British Academy. 2003. Pp. cx, 278. $65.00.) This is the second volume for London and the twenty-sixth in the series of episcopal acta which began publication under the auspices of the British Academy in 1980. The earlier volume, edited by Falko Neininger in 1999, dealt with the seven bishops from 1075 to 1187, while this one is concerned with only three, Richard of Ely, William de Ste. Mère Eglise, and Eustace de Fauconberg, from 1189 to 1228. Each of the collections contains about 250 charters, so that the same number for fewer bishops probably indicates both a greater loss of documents in the earlier period and a greater chancery production in the later. The format here is similar to the other volumes, beginning with a bibliography of manuscript and printed sources, followed by a general introduction to the bishops and their households, a note on the diplomatic of the acta, the critical catalogue of the printed texts, a set of episcopal itineraries, appendices, and indices. The chronological framework, which is based on pontifical years, rather than regnal years, offers a slightly different and useful perspective on the course of events in this important period. The bishops of London were prominent players, and their acta serve to illustrate some of the ways in which they were affected by such pressing questions as the controversy over the succession to Canterbury on the death of Archbishop Hubert Walter, and the consequences of the papal interdict under John. On the local scene, we learn something of the problems involved in the management of parish churches, the role of the bishops as judges in legal cases, and the development of episcopal property on a revenue-producing commercial scale. A section on the role of the bishop of London as dean of the province of Canterbury underscores the sense of hierarchy and the definition of rights fundamental to the exercise of authority at the time, but the lack of sufficient evidence leaves his precise status still obscure. For the same reason, there is not much information on the relation of bishop to chapter, either with regard to the issue of residency or to the division of church property. Nor is it clear to what extent the bishops promoted their own relatives to positions of importance. Since capitular independence was a growing concern for both sides in the cathedral church, it is surprising that the acta do not provide us with a better picture of the development. With regard to the knotty problem of dating, the editor discusses the use of witness lists and touches on the traps for the unwary in the inconsistent use of titles, such as [End Page 762] archdeacon, canon, or treasurer, for those who attest, and on the perennial problem of determining whether the people whose names are cited were actually present or not. Some of the dates proposed by Marion Gibbs in her 1939 catalogue of the London charters are here revised. The ideal edition, of course, would include a photographic reproduction of each actum from the manuscript for its palaeographical and diplomatic interest, and for comparison with the printed text. But a gesture in this direction is made by the inclusion of six plates of three charters and three seals, one for each of the bishops. Beyond that, we should be content that we have in hand a comprehensive and well-edited scholarly edition of fundamental importance for a much broader movement of English history in this period than the title of the book would suggest. Everett U. Crosby University of Virginia Copyright © 2004 The Catholic University of America Press

Jacques Chirac's ‘ non ’: France, Iraq and the United Nations, 1991–2003

This article narrates selected aspects of the background to France's threatened use of its UN Security Council veto in March 2003. The article suggests that, although far from inevitable, Chirac's ‘non’ of 10 March arose from a policy framework established by September 2002. Decision‐making therefore had a coherence and continuity largely ignored in English‐language reporting of French diplomacy in the run up to war. This framework was informed by principles long central to French foreign policy, including the primacy of the UN Security Council as a source of international legitimacy. The text examines the range of diplomatic and commercial interests behind the revival of Franco‐Iraqi relations during the 1990s. Ties with Baghdad are in turn related to aspects of France's broader Arab and Middle Eastern policy, with Paris both echoing and harnessing regional unease with and opposition to sanctions on Iraq by the later 1990s.

The Political Economy of United States’ Free Trade Arrangements

Far from being the leader, the US has been a ‘domino’ belatedly falling into line in the global rush toward bilateral and regional free trade arrangements. Often the initiative for negotiations has come from seemingly weaker trading partners. Once in the game, however, and aware of the asymmetries of market power and issue salience that enhance US bargaining leverage, the US has been aggressively pursuing a variety of commercial and diplomatic interests, both tactical and strategic, that include bolstering local democratic institutions and processes of economic reform, strengthening US security ties, accelerating region‐wide commercial liberalisation by allying with a regional leader, establishing new precedents to use as bench markers in future trade negotiations, and otherwise using free trade accords to advance its comprehensive global trade policy agenda. Bilateralism and regionalism have opened the door to an explicit introduction of political criteria, in contradiction to GATT/WTO apolitical universalism. While often reactive to the initiatives of other nations, the US has not been indiscriminate, deflecting the entreaties of suitors where US international political economy interests are not served.

Burgeoning Transnationalism of Taiwan's Social Movement NGOs

So far as Taiwan's foreign relations are concerned, in parallel to the state's diplomacy and state-blessed Track-II maneuvering, there has emerged a more natural and meaningful phenomenon: i.e. grassroots solidarity between Taiwanese activist NGOs and their foreign counterparts, as a result of the joint pursuit of common social justice goals. It is high time that voluntary transnational activism was studied for a more comprehensive understanding of Taiwan's foreign relations in the era of democratization and surging activism of transnational social movement campaigns. This paper discusses the internationalization of Taiwan's social movement NGOs: their background, motivations, activities, and roles in transnational politics. Special attention is paid to the fact that while Taiwanese NGO activities in the transnational NGO community by nature ignore and disregard the state's diplomatic interests, both the quality and quantity of such activities have been severely restricted by Taiwan's poor diplomatic status in the inter-state community. This is a unique paradox not studied in the mainstream discourse on transnational civil society.

U.S. and Japan’s trends in attitudes toward the Korean peninsula

This article argues that Japan would not only be concerned about the creation of a united Korea, which could be a serious economic and political rival in her own backyard, but would actively fear the prospect of the extension of Chinese or Russian military influence to the Straits of Tsushima through a Korean regime that leaned towards either of these powers. For the U.S., too, while there might be political advantages in the appearance of a serious economic rival to Japan, these would be greatly outweighed by the possibility of the same extension of Chinese or Russian military influence feared by Japan. This is evident in the strategic, economic, and diplomatic objectives and interests of the powers in the peninsula. This article concludes that the coexistence of the two Koreas will be not only inevitable for the time being, but ultimately desirable for the external powers.

A winning coalition of advocacy: climate research, bureaucracy and ‘alternative’ fuels: Who is driving climate change policy?

Anti-coal and some investment policies are widely justified with reference to global warming. Political analysis suggests that these policies are supported by the reinforcing interests of three powerful lobbies: scientific institutions engaged in atmospheric research and earth observation, energy corporations harmed by low fossil fuel prices or supplying ‘clean’ technologies, and numerous interlocking bureaucracies. Together they have succeeded in maintaining momentum in current climate negotiations. The scientific consensus which underpins the climate treaty is examined critically. It is argued that support for emission abatement policies is better explained with reference to diplomatic interest in the globalisation of energy related investments and trade than understood causality between average global surface warming and fossil fuel combustion.

Fall from Grace: U.S. Business Interests versus U.S. Diplomatic Interests in Peru, 1885?1890

A little more than a month before he was to leave office, Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard asked his minister to Peru, Charles W. Buck, to resign. With so little time remaining for Bayard and the likelihood that the incoming Republican administration of Benjamin Harrison would replace Buck anyway, one wonders why he took this drastic action. Had Buck damaged U.S.-Peruvian relations? If so, was the harm of such magnitude that dismissal was in order? The Peruvian government was in fact upset with the minister and had informed the U.S. government of its unhappiness in no uncertain terms. But this does not fully explain why Buck was removed. Buck himself admitted that his relationship with the Peruvian government had been less than cordial. But his demise resulted more from his conflict with members of the firm W. R. Grace and Company than from his disagreements with the Peruvians. During the late 1880s, Buck found himself trying to protect the economic interests of U.S. citizens while Grace and Company negotiated with the Peruvian government on the issue of Peru's foreign debt of some $250 million. The agreement eventually reached in early 1890 came to be known as the Grace Contract.1 The founders of the company, William R. Grace and Michael P. Grace, engineered Buck's downfall because Buck's actions threatened this contract, which benefited the Graces and British businessmen.

Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan's ODA

JN RECENT WORK on Japan's official development assistance (ODA), pollicy has been analyzed in terms of models of bureaucratic politics,' responses to a changing security environment,2 or responses to U.S. pressure.3 While these efforts have focused on interesting and important relationships, they have left the complex and difficult issue of governmentbusiness relations in Japan's ODA in a theoretical lacuna. Recent edited volumes on Japan's ODA suffer from the same tendency.4 This is understandable insofar as these efforts treated ODA as a traditional foreign policy area, and this approach naturally brings to the fore Japan's external political and security motivations in the formulation of ODA policy. There is no intention here to repudiate this foreign policy approach, but it can lead to mistaken assessments such as the following: [T] here is still a commercial element in some current aid programs, but such examples are now the exception rather than the rule.5 In fact, domestic structures in Japanese ODA policy making incorporate economic and commercial interests at least as much as purely diplomatic interests, and this article will draw attention to this point. Westerners who have noted the private sector role in Japanese ODA have focused on tied aid as the means of private sector inclusion.6 Tied aid is but one of a number of ways economic and commercial motivations can intrude into ODA policy, and it alone is not a reliable indicator of whether policy is strongly determined by commercial and economic interests. For example, donors such as the U.S. resort to aid tying, but this does

American Democratization Policy for Occupied Japan: Correcting the Revisionist Version

When the military occupation of Japan ended in 1952, not even a Cassandra could have foretold what lay ahead for United States-Japanese relations. Now, a full generation later, the problems that divided the two countries before the Pacific War are absent. With generally similar diplomatic interests, Japan subscribes not only to the American military strategy of preventing Soviet expansion but also the American goal of ensuring participation on an equal basis of most countries in the vast global exchange of goods and services. Americans and Japanese alike, mindful of the exceptional role Japan currently plays in world affairs, are sensitive to the fact that, if Japan became alienated from the United States, its foreign policy might take any conceivable course-from accommodation with the Soviet Union to a mas-

Canada and the International Telecommunication Union

Canada is an active participant in numerous international communications organizations. Yet, aside from periodic references to its role in a particularly controversial agency such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, little is known about Canada's work in these bodies. This lack of knowledge is unfortunate because developments in such organizations are increasingly vital to a variety of Canada's economic, diplomatic, and cultural interests. This is particularly true of the International Telecommunication Union (itu) which has operational authority over a valuable international resource the electromagnetic spectrum and the geostationary orbit (gso). An assessment of the significance of the itu for Canadian interests is timely for two reasons: the accelerating demands of the United States (backed by a threat to withdraw) that the organization be reformed to reflect more accurately the requirements of those whose need for and use of the spectrum is heaviest at the present time; and the demands of the Third World countries for reforms that would guarantee all nations equitable access to the spectrum and the gso. Although the itu, as currently constituted and run, serves Canada's interests well, changes in the organization's focus or role might alter that situation substantially.1

Response to Petras and Morley

The Petras-Morley reply to my review is useful in bringing out the basic issues between us. I think they come down to two: one is on the nature of U.S. foreign policy in general, and the other is on the relation of U.S. policy to the 1973 coup in Chile. On the first point, Petras and Morley describe U.S. policy as that of “the imperial state” autonomously formulating a policy that is “largely the product of an integrated body of aggregate interests of the corporate world as a whole,” and in the Allende case involved “the combined and mutually reinforcing efforts” of the multinationals, the U.S. government, and the international banks. I see a variety of interests at work, including those of the corporations, which may and did differ among themselves; U.S. strategic or diplomatic interests, which may or may not coincide with those of the companies; bureaucratic interests within the U.S. government and the international financial institutions; and personal motivations and ideologies, which may make an important difference in the content and purpose of policy (as our limited experience with the Carter administration is already demonstrating). There is now full documentation of the divisions among the companies and within the U.S. government, and of the saliency of personal, ideological, and strategic motives in the decisions of Nixon and Kissinger. Indeed, the very quote from a U.S. government official that the authors cite with reference to ITT: “No country should sacrifice its overall relations or interests or other groups in the country for the sake of one interest group,” makes my point rather than that of Petras and Morley—not as Petras and Morley would have it, the need to subordinate ITT's interest to that of the corporate world as a whole, but the priority of considerations of the national interest over those of the multinationals.

Giotto: artistic realism, political realism

The conventional view of Giotto is that he was a great narrative and dramatic painter. In addition his art was ideologically aligned with the Guelph party in Florence and its allies: the papacy, the Franciscan establishment and the house of Anjou. This can be traced in his paintings, especially the fresco cycles. Internal evidence suggests that in addition to his acknowledged cycle for the Scrovegni family in Padua he was the principal artistic deviser of many of the disputed frescoes in the nave of the Upper Church at Assisi, including the paintings of the life of St. Francis. There is also evidence that many of his frescoes in various parts of Italy (including cycles no longer extant) were undertaken at the behest of the Florentine commune as part of its diplomacy. He was in fact the first artist to become part of the bourgeois ruling class, and his spatial and plastic realism was in complete accord with their interests. The Scrovegni cycle is more complex than has been realised, involving a profound allegory which fulfils the needs of the patron, expresses Giotto's world view, and at the same time serves the diplomatic interest of Florence.

España y los sefardíes palestinos del siglo XIX

En 1793, España restableció las relaciones diplomáticas con el Imperio Otomano y creó consulados, entre los que destacan los de Palestina. Este estudio pretende llevar a cabo un análisis histórico de las fuentes coetáneas y de las referencias existentes sobre estos consulados para poder valorar la naturaleza de su vínculo con los judeo-españoles palestinos. El resultado indica que, debido a la situación política y económica en España, los peregrinos, los misioneros, los comerciantes españoles y los sefardíes no palestinos de nacionalidad española o protegidos por España fueron los que recibieron el interés político y el interés y la protección diplomáticos de los consulados.

Ayudhyā and the Rearward Part of the World

The Thai kingdom of Ayudhyā endured several periods of crisis during its long history from 1350 to 1767, but the crisis which will concern us here happened in 1592. During that year the king, Nareśvara, was well aware that he lived in a hostile world of unusually wide dimensions. His behaviour will be discussed as a basis for a brief consideration of Ayudhyā's attitude towards the world, a subject of more than diplomatic interest.

Trade Liberalization vs. Agricultural Import Restriction

Under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act the President has since 1935 had authority to impose quotas or fees upon agricultural imports if these imports were believed to be adversely affecting United States farm price and income support programs. Notwithstanding urgent demands from commodity interest groups to invoke this authority it has been used only on a few commodities. Constraints upon use have come mainly from two sources: lack of evidence that imports were adversely affecting domestic programs, and diplomatic interests. Nevertheless in its potential and actual use this authority has had a substantial trade inhibiting effect. Since the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 has ample general provisions to protect domestic groups and industries, the authors conclude that the special provisions of section 22 should be terminated and that the general provisions of the 1962 act should be utilized as justified for farm products. Termination of section 22 should improve the posture of the United States for obtaining concessions in counterpart restrictive devices applied against our farm exports, including EEC's variable import levy.

Sino-Indonesian Diplomacy: A Study of Revolutionary International Politics

Chinese diplomatic interest in Indonesia has been developing for three-quarters of a century. The past dozen years since the completion of the military phases of the revolutions in the two countries have heard both harmonious pledges of amity and, not altogether paradoxically, the grating sound of national purposes crossing. In most exchanges, the Peking Communists and the Djakarta nationalists have bubbled with friendship; on one occasion, however, this duologue became sensationally antagonistic. In South-East Asia, as in other regions, China has not yet worked out a diplomatic means for the full reconciliation of continuing national interests with the demands of revolutionary strategy. The survey to follow forms a fever chart recording a steady rise in Sino-Indonesian warmth, a plunge to racking chills, and, for the moment, convalescence.

Price Ceilings and International Trade Theory

In one of his many famous speeches, Mr. Churchill predicted “the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage.” Mr. Churchill was thinking presumably of the fields of public finance, administration, and war strategy—of quasi-political affairs. This paper is concerned with some of the ways in which the economic affairs of nations are “mixed up together.” Now the economic structures of trading nations are intertwined both in war and peace, and whether trade is administered by public officials or planned by a multitude of private individuals. The importance of the entanglement corresponds to the importance of trading relations in the economic structure of each country. However, when trade is not administered its importance is less direct and obvious to governments and government officials. As controls are extended in the domestic realm, international trading relationships tend more and more to become subjects of administrative and even diplomatic interest. Administrators in the domestic fields are always tempted to simplify their problems by insulating the domestic economy from unexpected or unpredictable changes elsewhere, without considering the total effects of their regulations on the domestic and foreign economies as a whole. Accordingly, international administrative co-ordination in war time must increase very rapidly if it is to keep pace with the increase in domestic regulation and prevent a rapid diminution in the extent and quality of international economic co-operation.

American Diplomatic Interest in Burma

American Diplomatic Interest in Burma

New Papyri concerning Incidents at Alexandria

The papyri edited by Bell and Crum in the volume Jews and Christians in Egypt are among the most important that have been published. Apart from their palaeographic and diplomatic interest they are of immediate concern to historians of the empire and of the early church.