Dignitas Personae Research Articles

Why the Church Says "Yes" to Life and "No" to IVF.

This article presents the principal Church teachings regarding in vitro fertilization (IVF). Since the birth of Louise Brown, the world's first "test-tube" baby in 1978, around eight million IVF babies have been born. The Magisterium has pronounced her main teachings on IVF in Donum Vitae (1987), Evangelium Vitae (1995), and Dignitas Personae (2008). The Church says "no" to IVF due to the massive destruction of embryonic life, the assault on the meaning of the conjugal act and the treatment of the child as a product not a gift. She continues to announce a loud "yes" to life, endeavoring to take care of the human embryo, the least of our brothers and sisters (see Matthew 25:40).

An Overview of the Embryo Adoption Debate

In vitro fertilization (IVF) is opposed by the Catholic Church because it replaces the conjugal act. However, IVF has resulted in an ethical issue that the Catholic Church does not have a clear position on. What to do with the undesired cryopreserved embryos resulting from the IVF process? The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, in its 2008 instruction on certain bioethical questions Dignitas Personae, commented on three proposals on what to do with them and stated that the situation for abandoned embryos “cannot be resolved.” But what about those not abandoned but undesired? Even before the issuance of Dignitas Personae, a debate developed regarding the third proposal of embryo adoption, which continues unresolved. We will explore the embryo adoption debate from 2007-2018 through the arguments of fifteen authors, with eight of them arguing not in favor of it and seven arguing in favor.

The problem of the definition of abortion in Polish literature and reception of church teaching in this regard

The topic of abortion is still relevant in the social discourse. Therefore, the author analyzed the conceptualisation of the act of abortion (present in Polish literature), conducted a questionnaire to confirm or exclude the obtained theoretical results, and asked about possible causes of such a phenomenon. Research shows that the Catholic Church has presented the doctrinal concept of abortion (precisely enough) in such documents as Qauesito de abortu procurato, Donum vitae, Evangelium vitae, and Dignitas personae. However, its definition (in terms of the subject matter) quite often differs from that found in various publications or statements referring to the Magisterium of the Church. This is a harmful situation, which may translate into a difficult reception of the Church’s teaching, as well as into respect for innocent human life. The point is that if the cognitive process is characterized by “intentionality” (the relation of the mind to the object), its objectivity may be hindered by volitional, ideological, conscious, contextual acts, etc. goals by oneself: scientific, political, ideological, social, moral, canonical, etc.

A Catholic Moral Appraisal of In Vitro Gametogenesis

In vitro gametogenesis is the process of deriving gametes from embryonic stem cells or induced pluripotent stem cells. While not as well-known as in vitro fertilization, IVG could lead to more moral issues that would require corresponding responses from the Magisterium. Because IVG remains at the experimental stage, mainly using mice, the Magisterium has not issued any such responses in a document along the lines of Donum vitae and Dignitas personae. This essay situates IVG within Catholic moral teachings for those who are unfamiliar with the teachings of the Church but who are interested in forming their consciences and those of others on what is undoubtedly a peculiar medical technique with many moral ramifications.

Dignitas personae, HEK 293, and the COVID Vaccines

Using cell lines like HEK 293 or their products—like many of the COVID-19 vaccines—involves no cooperation with evil strictly speaking, but it does involve appropriation of the benefits of past evil. Applying M. Cathleen Kaveny’s framework for assessing the permissibility of appropriating the benefits of evil, the duty to avoid using cell lines like HEK 293 or their products is weak and defeasible. Proper interpretation of Dignitas personae requires recognizing the crucial moral differences between the use of these cell lines—which does not perpetuate the injustice of abortion, imply approval of abortion, or involve significant risks of corrupting moral character or provoking scandal—and the direct use of fetal tissue or human embryos in research.

Morally Illicit Cells in Medical Research

The Catholic Church missed an opportunity to be more proactive and change the course of secular biotechnology when unethical cell lines were first introduced several decades ago. No ethical alternative human cell lines to the HEK293, WI-38, and MRC-5 have been generally accepted by the scientific community. While some animal cell lines are used in creating safe alternative vaccines, no alternative human cell lines for producing vaccines, biologics, or gene therapy have met the scientific rigor of efficacy and safety of these cell lines. It is both possible and within reach to create ethical human cell lines to replace current morally objectionable lines used for producing biologics (proteins and vaccines), but it will take considerable research that requires financial support. Dignitas personae should be backed by leadership and supported by stakeholders.

SOME ETHICAL REFLECTIONS ON IN-VITRO FERTILIZATION

In-vitro fertilization is becoming a pressing issue in contemporary societies. The article considers it starting form the Polish debate but takes up its broader anthropological an ethical aspects. Dealing with the latter, it also employs some acute remarks from Dignitas Personae. Finally it considers an approach to in vitro against the background of European Convention on Bioethics. In its conclusion the paper offers a balanced pro-life stance, albeit critical of in vitro.

Moral assessment of frozen human embryo adoption in the light of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church

As the number of frozen human embryos continues to rise daily, with numbers not expected to fall, an answer must be found to this dilemma. Four possible solutions have been suggested: a) thaw the embryos and allow them to perish; b) thaw them and donate them for biomedical research; c) thaw them and donate them in adoption; and d) leave them frozen indefinitely. This paper will evaluate the morality of these four possible solutions, particularly frozen human embryo adoption in the light of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church, which in its Instruction Dignitas Personae, appears to have opted to consider this practice as illicit. We also review the various stances of expert moralists in favour of or against frozen human embryo adoption, and we reflect on the extent to which the doctrine contained in Dignitas Personae can bind the moral conscience of the Catholic faithful. Finally, we make a personal evaluation of frozen human embryo adoption, in an attempt to find moral reasons that substantiate the negative opinion manifested by the Catholic Magisterium on this matter. In conclusion, we suggest that the moral assessment of frozen human embryo adoption as set forth in Dignitas Personae might not be considered as settled. Therefore, we are of the opinion that there is no impediment to further research on the moral foundation of this adoptive practice; however, insofar as this occurs, we believe that the best attitude of the Catholic faithful is to follow the moral criteria presented in Dignitas Personae with respect to the adoption of frozen human embryos.

Embryo adoption: Some further considerations.

Recent discussions of embryo adoption have sought to make sense of the teaching of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) document Dignitas personae which appeared to provide a negative judgment on such a practice. This article aims to provide a personalist account of the process of fertilization and implantation that might serve as the basis for the negative judgment of the CDF document. In doing so, it relies upon the idea that a person, including an embryo, is not to be considered in isolation, but always in relation to God and to others. This approach extends the substantialist conceptualizations commonly employed in discussions of this issue. More generally, the article seeks to highlight the value of a personalist re-framing for an understanding of the moral questions surrounding the beginning of life. Lay summary: This article seeks to make sense of what appears to be a clear-cut rejection, set out in the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) document Dignitas personae, of the proposal for women to "adopt" surplus frozen embryos. It draws upon more recently developed modes of philosophical/theological reasoning to argue that, in human procreation, both fertilization and implantation represent constitutive dimensions of divine creative activity and so must be protected from manipulative technological intervention. Since embryo adoption requires this kind of technology, it makes sense for the Church document not to approve it.

Heterologous embryo transfer: Magisterial answers and metaphysical questions.

The debate regarding the morality of heterologous embryo transfer (HET) as a solution for the fate of cryopreserved embryos remains active. This paper endeavors to show that the magisterial instructions on bioethical issues can only lead to the conclusion that HET is always morally illicit. I begin by showing that the text of Dignitas personae recognizes HET as a procedure accomplishing a procreative function, and I indicate that it is through gestation that this procreative function occurs. I further show that the previous Instruction, Donum vitae, implicitly points to an ontological or spiritual consideration at play during gestation. This consideration is likely related to the procreative function identified in Dignitas personae. Finally, I place these two textual arguments in the context of the debate concerning HET and conclude that metaphysical questions must be clarified in order for the immorality of HET to be understood from a suitable anthropological perspective and gain more widespread acceptance.

Dignitas Personae Explained: The Catholic Church's Teaching on Reproductive and Related Technologies. By John I.Fleming. Pp. 82, Leominster, Gracewing, 2010. £6.99/$18.95 (AUS).

<i>Dignitas Personae</i> Explained: The Catholic Church's Teaching on Reproductive and Related Technologies. By John I.Fleming. Pp. 82, Leominster, Gracewing, 2010. £6.99/$18.95 (AUS).

Personhood and Embryo Adoption.

The morality of embryo adoption, or heterologous embryo transfer for rescue, remains controversial despite the issuance of Dignitas personae (2008). When evaluating such bioethical controversies, it is crucial to take account of the personal order. Personalism provides a fresh and heretofore underdeveloped perspective toward resolving this polarized issue in bioethics. I will argue that it is not discriminatory to oppose embryo adoption on the basis of the heterology between rescuer and embryo because the lack of genetic relatedness reflects a more profound lack of personal relatedness. The persons involved in embryo adoption are not meant for the bodily relationship of pregnancy because of the incommunicability of relationships that involve the total gift of the human body. From the perspective of biology, pregnancy is natural life support for the embryo. From the perspective of personhood, pregnancy is fundamentally a relationship of embodied persons, one that is irreplaceable and radically exclusive. The clinical implications of this analysis will be discussed.

Dignity, marriage and embryo adoption: a look at Dignitas Personae

The Catholic Church’s 2008 Dignitas Personae discusses the moral implications of respecting the dignity of all human beings, regardless of the stage of development. In that text, the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith argues that respect for this dignity is incompatible with the conception of embryos outside marriage as well as assisted reproduction treatments and certain kinds of human embryonic research. Not only that, but the Congregation also rejects efforts at embryo adoption. As a matter of secular moral philosophy, this view of dignity is disputable and this article shows how an alternate view of dignity – one that depends on interests as against status – serves as a better foundation for decisions about ways in which to help people have children. This view of dignity is entirely compatible with a wide array of assisted reproduction treatments and research and is compatible with the conception of embryos for single parents or opposite-sex couples looking to have children. Using its notion of human dignity, the Congregation makes a case against embryo adoption, but that case is unconvincing given the permissible exercise of individual conscience and the presumptive importance of rescuing human lives where they can be rescued. The Catholic Church has issued several texts that describe the conditions under which it is moral for human beings to have children. Those conditions do not ordinarily include the use of assisted reproductive treatments. The 2008 document Dignitas Personae maintains that conceiving embryos outside of marriage and with assisted reproductive treatment violates the dignity of the children involved. That document also restates objections to research uses of human embryos because this church interprets embryos as persons from the moment of conception. I show that these interpretions are open to question. In particular the view of human dignity involved in this position is not well founded. I offer an alternate view of dignity, one that depends on interests as against status. This view of dignity is entirely compatible with a wide array of assisted reproductive treatments and research and is compatible with helping single parents or opposite-sex couples have children by means other than marital intercourse. Using its notion of human dignity, the Congregation makes a case against embryo adoption, but that case is unconvincing given the permissible exercise of individual conscience and the presumptive importance of rescuing human lives where they can be rescued.

The face of the other: why we treat the human person differently

It is the dignity of the human person that provides the foundation of bioethics. But what is it about this notion of human dignity that demands we treat persons differently than we treat non-persons? Where does the concept of human dignity gain its “moral traction”? Closely following John Crosby—and with the help of Thomas Mann—we will see that it is in our incommunicability [what the Instruction Dignitas personae refers to as that which “each one carries in an indelible way” (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Dignitas Personae on Certain Bioethical Questions, n. 6, 1)] that we find the “is” that demands the “ought” of being treated differently.

A Nobel Prize is Out of Order: “American Idol” vs. Hypatia of Alexandria

A Nobel Prize is Out of Order: “American Idol” <i>vs.</i> Hypatia of Alexandria

Ciência e religião

Neste artigo, exponho e analiso os debates em torno das pesquisas com células-tronco embrionárias no Brasil. Para tanto, me baseio, fundamentalmente, em fontes textuais coletadas em jornais e na internet, e no mais recente documento publicado pela Igreja Católica sobre as novas tecnologias reprodutivas a Instrução Dignitas Personae. De maneira geral, duas questões emergiram nessa controvérsia: a primeira refere-se ao estatuto do embrião e a outra ao embate entre a visão científica e a concepção religiosa de mundo. Procuro descrever esse embate com o auxílio teórico e conceitual da antropologia simétrica proposta por Latour e, a partir da reflexão sociológica e antropológica acerca do lugar da religião na modernidade, o que conduz necessariamente à exploração do tema da secularização e do secularismo. Sendo assim, enfatizo a intervenção de atores e valores religiosos nesta questão, e por sua vez, a luta de atores laicistas pela afirmação da autonomia do campo científico.

Bioethics and Public Policy

Part I of this note assesses recent developments in embryonic stem cell research and HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention in light of two recent magisterial texts: Dignitas personae on Certain Bioethical Questions of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and Pope Benedict XVI's encyclical, Caritas in veritate. Part II explores the implications of these developments for public policy in religiously pluralist societies.

Dignitas personae and Cell Line Independence

Dignitas personae and Cell Line Independence

Dignitas personae and the Adoption of Frozen Embryos

Dignitas personae and the Adoption of Frozen Embryos

Using Morally Controversial Human Cell Lines after Dignitas personae

Using Morally Controversial Human Cell Lines after Dignitas personae