Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol Research Articles

Packet construction for secure conference call request in ad hoc network systems

In this paper, a packet construction mechanism using an ID-based factorial number structure (ID-based FNS) is proposed for a secure conference call system in an ad hoc network. We adopt the ID-based concept for a conference key generation in which each participant with one’s own public identity uses a pre-chosen secret-key to generate the exchange conference key for the conference call. Furthermore, due to the mobility of nodes in an ad hoc network environment, it is likely that some nodes quit or join during the operation of this conference. To solve these problems, we employ an information exchange table for each participant node in order to manage a secure conference call in an ad hoc network system. In addition, our scheme employs only one cryptographic algorithm of the secret-key system. The extraction of the secure sub-packets associated with each intended receiver is protected on the basis of the Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol with the trusted public-key exchange. Therefore, the subsequent message recovery is successfully accomplished. This provides a new and feasible solution for a secure conference call in an ad hoc network system.

An anonymous voting mechanism based on the key exchange protocol

In democratic society, elections and voting are always the most important hallmarks. However, there are plenty of problems in the traditional election such as inconvenience, unfairness, non-mobility, non-anonymity, and so forth. What is more, the cost of the traditional election often places a heavy burden on the nation. To solve the problems of the traditional election, the concept of “electronic voting” is introduced, where people are allowed to vote over the Internet and the government can save lots of money. The properties of mobility and convenience are the most significant reasons why people may adopt the electronic voting mechanism in the future. Although technologies for electronic voting have been developed for about 20 years, some problems, such as uncoercibility and completeness, still cannot be overcome. In this article, we are going to present an efficient and secure voting mechanism by employing Chaum's blind signature scheme and Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol. Our proposed electronic voting mechanism not only achieves lots of essential requirements of general electronic voting schemes but also possesses better efficiency such that it can be the practical one.

Scalable and fault-tolerant key agreement protocol for dynamic groups

With the widespread use of the Internet, the popularity of group communication-based applications has grown considerably. Since most communications over the Internet involve the traversal of insecure networks, basic security services are necessary for these collaborative applications. These security services can be facilitated if the authorized group members share a common secret. In such distributed applications, key agreement protocols are preferred to key distribution protocols. In the past two decades, there have been many proposals for key agreement protocols. Most of these protocols are not efficient and limit the size of the underlying group. In this paper, we consider the scalability problem in group key agreement protocols. We propose a novel framework based on extension of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. The efficiency of our protocol comes from the clustering of the group members, where the common session key is established collaboratively by all participants. We present the auxiliary protocols needed when the membership changes. We show that our protocol is superior in complexity in both communication and computation overheads required to generate the session key.

Novel Public Key Encryption Technique Based on Multiple Chaotic Systems

Public key encryption was first introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976. Since then, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol has been used in developing public key systems such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman and elliptic curve cryptography. Chaotic functions, so far, have been used for symmetric cryptography only. In this Letter we propose, for the first time, a methodology to use multiple chaotic systems and a set of linear functions for key exchange over an insecure channel. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first Letter that reports the use of chaotic systems for public key cryptography. We have shown that the security of the proposed algorithm grows as (NP)(m), where N, P, and m are large numbers that can be chosen as the parameters of the cryptosystem.

A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols

Many authentication and key exchange protocols are built using an accepted set of standard concepts such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange, nonces to avoid replay, certificates from an accepted authority, and encrypted or signed messages. We propose a general framework for deriving security protocols from simple components, using composition, refinements, and transformations. AS a case study, we examine the structure of a family of key exchange protocols that includes Station-TO-Station (STS), ISO-9798-3, Just Fast Keying (JFK), IKE and related protocols, derving all members of the family from two basic protocols, In order to associate formal proofs with protocol derivations, we extend our previous security protocol logic with preconditions, temporal assertions, composition rules, and Several other improvements. Using the logic, which we prove is sound with respect to the standard symbolic model of protocol execution and attack (the Dolev-Yao model), the security properties of the standard signature based Challange- Response protocol and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol are estabilished. The ISO-9798-3 protocol is then proved correct by composing the correctness proofs of these two simple protocols Although our current formal logic is not sufficient to modulary prove security for all of our current protocol derivations. the derivation system provides a framework for further improvements.

Cryptography

This paper is concerned with two aspects of cryptography in which the author has been working. One is the Data Encryption Standard (DES), developed at IBM and now in wide use for commercial cryptographic applications. This is a “private key” system; the communicants share a secret key, and the eavesdropper will succeed if he can guess this key among its quadrillions of possibilities. The other is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, a typical “public key” cryptographic system. Its security is based on the difficulty of taking “discrete logarithms” (reversing the process of exponentiation in a finite field). We describe the system and some analytic attacks against it.

THE HISTORY OF NON-SECRET ENCRYPTION

Two of the most important techniques in public-key cryptography are the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and the RSA encryption system. These were discovered in the academic community in 1976 and 1978 respectively. It was widely rumoured that these techniques were known by UK government cryptographers prior to these dates, although this was not officially confirmed until December 1997. In fact these techniques were first discovered in the early 1970s at the United Kingdom's Communication-Electronics Security Group (CESG), the United Kingdom communications security group. Official confirmation came with the release of a technical paper by detailing the history of the discoveries.

Breaking generalized Diffie–Hellman modulo a composite is no easier than factoring

The Diffie–Hellman key-exchange protocol may naturally be extended to k>2 parties. This gives rise to the generalized Diffie–Hellman assumption (GDH-Assumption). Naor and Reingold have recently shown an efficient construction of pseudo-random functions and proved its security based on the GDH-Assumption. In this note, we prove that breaking this assumption modulo a so called Blum-integer would imply an efficient algorithm for factorization. Therefore, both the key-exchange protocol and the pseudo-random functions are secure as long as factoring Blum-integers is hard. Our reduction strengthen a previous “worst-case” reduction of Shmuely (1985).