In 1997, Nobel Prize-winning novelist and critic J.M. Coetzee delivered the Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton University. Departing from the Lectures’ standard format of philosophical address, Coetzee instead read a work of fiction about an esteemed Australian novelist, Elizabeth Costello, invited to lecture at a fictional college in the USA. Stephen Mulhall begins The Wounded Animal with the suggestion that Coetzee's Tanner Lectures—which were published in 1999 as The Lives of Animals, and later as part of his 2003 novel, Elizabeth Costello—mark ‘a deliberate attempt’ to reopen the perennial ‘quarrel’ between philosophy and literature (p. 1), thus setting the scene for an assessment of both Coetzee's confrontation with philosophy, and subsequent philosophical responses to Coetzee, including those of Peter Singer, Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell. Mulhall's central claim is that Coetzee's writings about Costello illustrate philosophy's failure to adequately represent the reality it seeks to convey and understand. His argument is twofold. On the one hand, philosophers have failed because of their refusal to engage with the ‘difficulty of reality’ (a phrase gleaned from Diamond), a refusal symptomatic of ‘philosophy's capacity to be deflected from those difficulties precisely because of its characteristic ways of attempting to respond to the claims of reason’ (p. 69). On the other hand, philosophers have failed because reality, in its difficulty, resists such projects of understanding. In this respect, argues Mulhall, philosophy has a great deal to learn from literature's attempts (and in particular Coetzee's attempts) to come to terms with reality's resistance to that very understanding. It is this twofold picture—philosophy's failure to face up to reality and reality's resistance to philosophical understanding—that is the guiding thread of Mulhall's enterprise.