Differential Integration Research Articles

Differentiated integration in Portugal: saliency and government positions

This article analyses the salience of and governmental positions on differentiated integration (DI) in Portugal in the 2004-2020 period. Employing quantitative and qualitative analyses, it first examines the salience and position of the successive Portuguese governments towards DI using documents such as government programmes, Prime-Ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and statements by the Prime Minister in European Council meetings. The results from the salience analysis demonstrate a low saliency of DI. Salience was enhanced by an increasing intersection between domestic and European politics during the euro crisis period, politicising the debate especially around DI instances of an economic nature. The position of Portuguese governments regarding DI during the period analysed was overwhelmingly negative. A wide consensus stood out among Portuguese political parties that DI models clearly go against both the European – by risking a disaggregation of the EU – and the national interest – by possibly pushing Portugal into an even more peripheral position.

Differentiated Integration - Views from Austria

This paper investigates the salience of and the position on Differentiated integration (DI) for the Austrian government. The analysis is based on both an analysis of government programmes, programmatic government speeches and parliamentary debates between 2004 and 2019/20. It shows that DI is overall not a salient issue in Austria, at least with regard to general DI concepts and models. Specific instances of DI were, of course, subjects of intense debates but, with very few exceptions such as the financial transaction tax as an instance of enhanced cooperation, rarely discussed with specific reference to DI. Overall, most Austrian parties are also not generally in favour of DI, quite the opposite. The dominant vision of the EU is that of a community of closely cooperating Member States with the same rights and responsibilities where opt-outs are seen as cherry picking. Only one party has forcefully supported the development of a core Europe, namely the right-wing populist Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ). In this case, however, DI is mainly regarded as a means to exclude groups of Member States (especially the financially more vulnerable or net recipients) from areas of integration.

Discourses on differentiated integration in Finland – Controversy over the Prüm Convention, credit-claiming for Pesco

This article discusses discourses on differentiated integration (DI) in Finland both from the quantitative and qualitative perspectives. It illustrates how salient DI has been in Finland between 2004 and 2019 and how government and opposition parties have approached DI, with special focus on the Prüm Convention and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in defence. It also examines approaches towards polity differentiation, i.e., the idea of multi-speed or multi-end Europe, as well as discourses on DI mechanisms, namely enhanced cooperation and opt-outs. The article concludes that the Finnish approach towards DI is pragmatic and generally positive, as the country has joined almost all instances of enhanced cooperation, unlike its Nordic neighbours Denmark and Sweden. This may be due to the lack of politicisation of DI in Finland, which has also allowed the country to join those instances.

The Risks and Benefits of Differentiated Integration in the European Union as Perceived by Academic Experts

AbstractThis article sheds light on how academic experts assess the benefits and risks of differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union (EU). DI denotes particular member states either being allowed to opt out of specific EU policies, or being excluded or exempted from participating in them until certain conditions are met. The findings of a novel expert survey (n = 95) highlight two key divisions amongst experts, namely, first a regional divide between scholars based in Western Europe and those based in Eastern Europe, with the former more favourable to DI than the latter; and second, a substantive divide between those, more numerous, who are favourable to DI, and those who are more critical. For the former, the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived risks. What drives the support of or objection to DI also differs between experts. Whereas supporters favour pragmatic reasons for DI, opponents mostly mobilize principled reasons against it.

Slovenia: a case of a small, relatively new member country

The concept of differentiated integration (DI) is practically invisible in Slovenian politics. The analysis showed that the key words associated with DI are seldom used in parliamentary debates, coalition programmes or prime ministerial speeches. This suggests that the issue of DI is more a topic of academic discussion than of daily politics. While the low salience of DI in Slovenian political debates makes it hard to establish governmental positions in detail, the common thread throughout Slovenian foreign policy from independence in 1991 onwards has been that a strong and united EU is of key importance for Slovenia. The few instances where wording related to DI models was used reflect a concern about a multi-speed Europe, especially a fear that a multi-tier EU would mean fewer opportunities for future Slovenian governments and in general, fewer opportunities for smaller and/or less developed countries.

Differentiated Integration: The case of the European Banking Union

The European Banking Union (EBU), a system of unified financial supervision, regulation and resolution, arguably represents the biggest transfer of national sovereignty in Europe since the launch of the euro. Participation in the EBU is mandatory for the Eurozone states and voluntary for the non-Eurozone states, which makes it an example of differentiated integration (DI). This article analyses the implications of DI in the context of the EBU. The central question is whether the current EBU arrangements are going to result in uniform integration or continued differentiation. After outlining the main pillars of EBU, the article discusses whether we can envision more non-Eurozone states following the examples of Bulgaria and Croatia by opting into EBU before adoption of the euro, or whether there is a risk of more division between the EBU members and non-members. The focus is on the main economic and political considerations that affect the EBU in the medium term. The article shows that only the non-Eurozone states willing to relinquish their national sovereignty in financial supervision seek to join the EBU and that in the post-Brexit EU the differentiated EBU can potentially move towards more integration.

Differentiated integration in the EU: What does Croatia want?

This article presents empirically substantiated answers on the salience of differentiated integration (DI) from the perspective of Croatian governments between 2004 and 2020. Considering DI’s relevance for the future of EU integration as well as the fact that DI was de facto adopted by the Croatian governments in order to maintain a healthy relationship with the EU, the main assumption is that DI – as a broad and multifaceted integration phenomenon – appears prominently in the domestic political discourse. By employing text mining and sentiment analysis on a corpus of 376 various governmental documents we answer, do governments talk about DI and specific DI mechanisms at a conceptual level? Which differentiated policy fields do they talk about most often? Our results show that DI has been – and remains – a low salience issue for Croatian governments over the last 15 years, which is surprising considering that over this period, Croatia consolidated its position in the EU in the shadow of the ‘polycrisis’, also thanks to DI.

Wilful Non‐Compliance and the Threat of Disintegration in the EU’s Legal Order

AbstractThis article focuses on the problem of wilful non‐compliance with EU law and the threat it poses of (partial) disorderly disintegration within the EU’s legal order. Taking the example of migration and asylum policy following on from the 2015 migration crisis, I positdifferentiated integration (DI), which occurs through processes that are formally mediated and collective, andnon‐compliance, which is unmediated and unilateral, as alternative strategies for member states which are unwilling to accept further integrative steps. While DI does carry costs, including the risk of legal fragmentation, I argue that it is a valuable tool for pre‐empting wilful non‐compliance – a phenomenon which both exposes and compounds the normative limits of EU law and is, consequently, more corrosive of the EU’s legal order. Thus, the article suggests that the EU ought to be more open to DI, especially when legislating in policy areas that are highly politicised.

Differentiated integration as a fair scheme of cooperation

Differentiated integration (DI), whereby some MS opt out or are excluded from certain common EU policies for sovereignty or capacity reasons, may be thought to undermine the EU’s functioning as what John Rawls called a fair scheme of cooperation, grounded in norms of impartiality and reciprocity. However, we argue that different forms of DI can be compatible with either fair cooperation between states on the model of Rawls’ Law of Peoples or cooperation among citizens on the model of Rawls’ two principles of domestic justice. Meanwhile, the EU has features of both, being an international Union of states and a supra- and trans-national Union of citizens. We defend the coherence of this combination and contend that DI can provide a justified mechanism for ensuring fairness between states remains compatible with fairness between citizens both within and across states. Indeed it offers a potential model for other forms of international cooperation.

Party views on differentiated integration

Research on differentiated integration (DI) has by and large ignored the views of political party actors on DI. Drawing on 35 semi-structured interviews with party actors from seven member states and situated across the political spectrum, we show them to regard DI as divisive and deeply political. We also identify two little explored dimensions affecting their views: namely the wealth of their member state (MS) and its prior experience of DI. Interviewees from richer MS generally favour DI more than those from poorer MS, and those from MS that have not experienced sovereignty or capacity DI welcome DI more than those from MS that have. While the former tend to see DI as allowing both opt outs for MS unwilling or unable to integrate further and enhanced cooperation for MS able and desirous of doing so, the latter fear their MS being excluded and relegated to a second-class status.

Autonomy or Domination? Two Faces of Differentiated Integration

AbstractWhen is differentiated integration (DI) of the European Union a source of autonomy and when is it a source of domination? Much depends on what collective goods member state democracies seek through integration. Club goods often require member state democracies to form DIs of their choice. Public goods and common resource goods may, in contrast, require limits on DI if member state democracies are to meet their own obligations to their own publics to secure rights, justice, non‐domination and democracy itself. Those differences are important to understanding how European democracies should be ‘internationally ordered’ if they are to sustain internal forms of political autonomy. They also demonstrate the importance of DI to the autonomy of member state democracies in associating together beyond the state; in defining obligations within the state; and in securing the greatest autonomy of each European democracy compatible with the greatest possible autonomy of all European democracies.

Differentiated Integration and Europe’s Global Role: A Conceptual Framework

In a time of global challenges, rising geopolitical tensions and a weakening of the traditional trans-Atlantic security community, we can expect pressures for Europe to play a more important role in the world. Various initiatives have been taken to strengthen the role of the European Union (EU), but there are also tendencies towards a more complex European governance structure in the making, characterized by a combination of both EU and non-EU (but still European) initiatives. This introductory article presents a framework for studying a European role that includes initiatives taken within and outside the EU framework, but closely interlinked, indicating that the concept of differentiated integration (DI) may help to clarify Europe’s role in a changing and volatile global context. Differentiated Integration, Disintegration, EU as a global actor, EU foreign security and defence policy

Member state equality and procedural fairness in differentiated integration: A republican perspective

This research paper builds on (internationalist) republicanism and claims that differentiated integration (DI) must be designed in a way that honours the principle of freedom as non-domination. When implemented in such a way, DI ensures rather than threatens the principle of member state–and thereby citizens–equality. I argue that democratic member states through their EU membership self-bind themselves to associative obligations that call for respecting the other member states’ equality and freedom. However, associative obligations do not apply to non-member states; on this ground, an important difference between internal and external differentiation can be established. Finally, the research paper argues–and illustrates with selected examples–that procedural justice or fairness can assure legitimacy of DI.

Postfunctional differentiation, functional reintegration: the Danish case in Justice and Home Affairs

ABSTRACT Previous research shows that Differentiated Integration (DI) in areas of core state powers works according to a postfunctional logic, in response to concerns about national autonomy and sovereignty. Against this backdrop, scholars usually expect that the policies and practices ensuing from formal DI are equally differentiated. This article presents theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest otherwise. It argues that, while postfunctionalism explains the emergence of formal DI, its practical consequences are driven by functional pressures. The interdependencies produced by the integration process create functional incentives for states with opt-outs to work towards ‘reintegration’ by converging with EU policies. The result of this process is a decoupling between differentiated rules and similar practices. The plausibility of this argument is tested by applying process tracing techniques to the case of Denmark in Justice and Home Affairs.

Countering Democratic Backsliding by EU Member States: Constitutional Pluralism and ‘Value’ Differentiated Integration

AbstractConstitutional pluralism (CP) and differentiated integration (DI) have been criticised as potentially legitimising democratic backsliding within the EU. Critics contend that effective measures require strengthening the legal authority of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the political authority of the European Commission. We dispute this criticism, which rests on a federal conception of the EU at odds with its confederal features. We argue that the value of democracy for the EU derives from pluralism between as well as within states, thereby justifying CP and DI. While both prove incompatible with democratic backsliding, they challenge the legitimacy of the strong assertions of federal authority some advocate to tackle it. Drawing on CP, we propose four criteria for EU action against backsliding regimes, and suggest processes and penalties that meet them. We liken the latter to ‘value’ DI, whereby backsliding states can be excluded from EU funding and voting rights.

The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do Governments Want? Country Report - Portugal

This country report analyses the salience and position of differentiated integration (DI) in Portugal in the period between 2004-2020. Employing a quantitative and a qualitative analysis, it first examines the salience of DI models and mechanisms for the successive Portuguese governments using documents such as government programmes, Prime-Minister speeches, parliamentary debates, and statements by the Prime Minister in European Council meetings. Secondly, it reviews governments’ general positions on DI, while zooming in on four peaks of salience: the Lisbon Treaty, the debate on the Unitary Patent, the financial crisis and the discussions on the Financial Transaction Tax and the Fiscal Compact, and the White Paper on the Future of Europe. The results from the salience analysis demonstrate a low saliency of differentiated integration (DI) and, more generally, European integration in Portugal. DI models were more salient than DI mechanisms, while DI instances are the most salient. Salience was enhanced by an increasing intersection between domestic and European politics during the euro crisis period, politicising the debate especially around DI instances of an economic nature. The position of Portuguese governments regarding DI during the period analysed was overwhelmingly negative. In general, this stance was also shared by the opposition parties. Over the period of analysis, a wide consensus stood out among Portuguese political parties that DI models clearly go against both the European – by risking a disaggregation of the EU – and the national interest – by possibly pushing Portugal into an even more peripheral position. Notwithstanding this generally negative view of DI, mainstream parties – which alternated in government during the timeframe of the analysis – viewed the enhanced co-operation mechanism in a generally positive manner, recognising its potential to promote advances in European integration when the EU faced critical deadlocks.

The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do Governments Want? Country Report - The Netherlands

This report investigates the salience of differentiated integration (DI) in Dutch government discourse between 2004 and 2020. It also studies the positions of Dutch government and opposition parties on the issue of DI in selected peak-salience years (2008, 2012, 2017-2019). A multi-method analysis of parliamentary debates, speeches by the PM and government programmes demonstrated that differentiated integration (DI) is a low salience issue in Dutch politics. Our analysis of the positions of Dutch government and opposition parties demonstrated that, at first sight, both sides seem to share a position vis-a-vis DI. That is, they take a rather neutral position on multi-speed EU, leaning more to the negative side. The salience of DI somewhat increased from the European crisis onwards (after 2010). Then, Dutch representatives most commonly referred to a coalition of the willing (DI model), enhanced co-operation (DI mechanism) and Schengen (DI instance). Whenever enhanced co-operation was mentioned, it was commonly referred to in a unitary sense (i.e. all the MSs should increase co-operation). The Brexit referendum sparked another debate on DI which was particularly focussed on an a la carte EU.

The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do Governments Want? Country Report - Luxembourg

This report examines the politics of differentiated integration (DI) in Luxembourg between 2004 and 2020. It looks at the salience of DI in government discourse at the conceptual level and also in terms of more concrete references to DI mechanisms and instances. The report aims to define the position of the government of Luxembourg – understood broadly as the set of all political actors. The report relies on quantitative text analysis and qualitative analysis of the salience of DI and Luxembourg’s position on it. Overall, references to DI concepts are rare, although the idea of a multi-speed Europe has been debated. References to DI mechanisms (enhanced cooperation and opt-outs) and specific instances are more frequent than conceptual references in parliamentary debates. The government of Luxembourg generally adopts a neutral or positive position on DI (concepts, mechanisms and instances). Luxembourg supports DI when it refers to a multi-speed Europe in which the country can act as an example of European integration and incentivise other Member States to follow its path. In accordance, Luxembourg tends to reject opt-out mechanisms for Member States in EU law while supporting (and joining) most instances of enhanced cooperation. In general, Luxembourg participates in most mechanisms that can put the country at the vanguard of European integration. In stark contrast, Luxembourg opposed one important instance of enhanced cooperation which it considered would hurt its core financial interests (the Financial Transaction Tax).

The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do Governments Want? Country Report - Romania

This working paper analyses the salience of differentiated integration (DI) for subsequent Romanian governments between 2007 and 2020, and the positions that Romanian decision-makers took with respect to DI during this period. The salience analyses indicate that there has been a relatively low salience of DI models (i.e. multi-speed and multi-end EU) and DI mechanisms (i.e. enhanced cooperation and opt-outs) but a high salience of DI instances (i.e. twenty-one differentiated EU policies) in the official discourse emanating from the Romanian government during this period. The position of successive Romanian governments with regard to DI was strongly in favour of more integration, especially through accession both to the Schengen area and to the eurozone, but fervently against any type of DI models. This is explained in part by Romania’s pro-European electorate and decision-makers, and also by the desire of Romanian governments’ to be on an equal footing with other, typically older, EU Member States within the EU’s decision-making processes. It seems that this pro-European stance is not context-dependent but prevails across all DI instances, as Romanian decision-makers from across the political spectrum share the same general desire to strengthen the European project and to support its evolution towards ever-closer union.

The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do Governments Want? Country Report - Greece

Two main questions regarding differentiated integration (DI) in Greece are the focus of the report, how salient was DI for Greek governments and what positions Greek governments have on DI. First, the salience analyses show that differentiated integration (DI) was a low salience issue in Greece during most of the years in this analysis. Parliamentary debates were the most likely arena for discussions on DI. By contrast, references to DI in government programmes, prime minister speeches and European Council statements were sometimes relevant. Second, the positions of Greek governments with regard to DI were determined by considerations of how Greece was positioned regarding EU membership before and after the economic crisis. Before the crisis, as a member of the eurozone and following EU policies and directives in the fields of defence, taxation and justice and security, Greece belonged to core Europe. During the crisis, Greek governments, especially the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government, were concerned that this approach jeopardised the Greek path to recovery and would ultimately hurt the national interest. This dilemma made the Greek position highly context-dependent and pragmatic: the expressed desire to remain at the ‘core of Europe’ did not always correspond with actual policy choices.