Dialectic Of Enlightenment Research Articles

Dialectics of Enlightenment, East and West

Dialectics of Enlightenment, East and West

A Dialética do Esclarecimento faz 70 Anos

O principal objetivo desta entrevista com o Professor Rodrigo Duarte é compartilhar com os leitores da revista Opinião Filosófica uma importante efeméride da filosofia mundial: os setenta anos da Dialética do Esclarecimento, de Theodor Adorno e Max Horkheimer, escrita na Califórnia em 1944, mas publicada em 1947 pela Editora Querido, de Amsterdam. Ainda que sete décadas tenham se passado, trazendo a emergência de novos tipos de vida social, o aparecimento de novos traços formais na vida cultural e a consolidação de uma nova ordem econômica mundial, a obra permanece atual. Duarte, pesquisador da obra de Adorno, mostra que os conceitos do filósofo alemão são instrumentos epistemológicos com os quais podemos fundamentar uma crítica da cultura contemporânea.

Book Review: Keith B. Kerr, B. Garrick Harden, and Marcus Aldredge (ed.), David Riesman’s Unpublished Writings and Continuing Legacy

Book Review: Keith B. Kerr, B. Garrick Harden, and Marcus Aldredge (ed.), David Riesman's Writings and Continuing Legacy. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2015. ISBN: 978-1-472-42848-6 (Paperback). 293 Pages. $97.60.[Article copies available for a fee from The Transformative Studies Institute. E-mail address: journal@transformativestudies.org Website: http://www.transformativestudies.org ©2017 by The Transformative Studies Institute. All rights reserved.]With a little effort, one could imagine the Institute for Social Research at the Goethe University Frankfurt establishing a school in the US, at some point in the early 1950s, at which David would have played a significant role. This imaginary school, perhaps a sibling of The New School for Social Research, would include some teachers and researchers who were not as clearly connected to Hegelian and Marxist philosophy as those from the German school. During the intense decades of the Cold War, members like would tread gently around such controversies as the grand stand-off between socialism and capitalism, at least as much as they could, and would-perhaps for that reason-never be distinguished as one of the school's most serious theorists. Michael Maccoby was right to point out in the collection here under review that Riesman characteristically exchanged theory for thick description (186).Nonetheless, Riesman's work is a major contribution in the trajectories coming out of post-World War II critical theory, and his most famous and influential book, The Lonely Crowd (1950), should always accompany Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) as the more US-centric social-psychological study of American society and culture. With the German critical theorists, shared a deep interdisciplinary interest in sociology, psychoanalysis, political-economy, and philosophy, although his research ultimately owes more to Freud and Fromm than to Hegel and Marx.David (1909 - 2002) was a sociologist, Harvard University professor, and influential writer. Before that, he attended Harvard Law School, and worked with the Harvard Law Review. After clerking for Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, went on to work at universities in New York, Chicago, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. But what properly established as a major figure in American social science was the publication and reception of his single-most influential work, The Lonely Crowd. This book offered Riesman's study of the variations of pervasive conformity in people with inner-directed and other-directed personalities. But did much more than his most well-known research, and most of that vast research remains relatively obscure within the social sciences today. That is one of the key problems addressed by the recent publication of David Riesman's Writings and Continuing Legacy (2015), hereafter Unpublished Writings.It would be inaccurate to say that is only known for The Lonely Crowd. His commentary on changing American higher education, particularly his The Academic Revolution (1968), co-written with Christopher Jencks, was also widely read and reviewed. However, is lesser known for his political-economic essays, which could be found in the massive collection of essays, Abundance for What? (1964), and also for his sociability studies research, and his more sharply political and psychological interests in American society and US foreign policy. Writings, edited by Keith Kerr, B. Garrick Harden, and Marcus Aldredge corrects many of these latter problems of neglect. This is a valuable book for anyone already-interested and wellread in Riesman's work, as well as for anyone looking for an introduction to his life and research. Indeed, it is a peculiar and significant accomplishment of this volume that it would be just as gratifying for either audience, and I would recommend it to both. …

Dialectics of Enlightenment, East and West

Critical theorists have argued that the concept of Enlightenment is paradoxical. While it designates the liberation from superstition through the use of reason, Enlightenment also sets up new forms of superstition. This article focuses on Gan Yang’s and Wang Hui’s rereading of the dynamic processes of Enlightenment in China and in Europe. It argues for a transcultural perspective on Enlightenment’s tendency to give rise to a deformation of reason. Only if the culturally varying forms of reason and unreason in Europe as well as China are being reflected might it be possible to continue pursuing the self-critical project of Enlightenment at a global level.

Anthropology and Culture: Joseph Ratzinger in "Communio", vol. 2 by Pope Benedict

Reviewed by: Anthropology and Culture: Joseph Ratzinger in "Communio", vol. 2 by Pope Benedict Jeffrey L. Morrow Anthropology and Culture: Joseph Ratzinger in "Communio", vol. 2. By Pope Benedict XVI. Edited by David L. Schindler and Nicholas J. Healy, Jr. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2013. Pp. viii + 199. $30.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8028-6417-8. Joseph Ratzinger has proven one of the most insightful cultural critics of our time. One of the founders of the scholarly theological journal Communio, Ratzinger published a number of articles therein. The present volume is the second in the series dedicated to Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI's writings, Joseph Ratzinger in "Communio." This volume is devoted to Ratzinger's Communio essays regarding anthropology and culture. It contains fourteen essays originally published between 1972 and 2005. In what follows, I will cover some of the volume's highlights. One of the early themes that arises in the volume is the importance of conscience. This is a topic that Ratzinger has come back to again and again, as his slender 2007 volume On Conscience indicates. Using the example of Bartolome de Las Casas (20-26), Ratzinger reflects on how "the kernel of the necessary control and limitation of power in this world consists in the courage to follow conscience" (20). Going back to the New Testament and the early Christians, he likewise underscores how "Christianity does not begin with a revolutionary, but with a martyr" (23). He forcefully communicates the radical nature of the Christian vision of conscience, so necessary in our own times and in all times: It is part of the inherent greatness of the Christian faith that it can lend conscience its voice, that it can inexorably oppose the world which believers have built for themselves and which they justify on grounds of faith, that it has room for the prophetic No, and in general that it gives birth to prophets, men who are not the voice of some particular interest but the voice of conscience against chicanery. (25) [End Page 147] Another important theme which comes early in the volume is that of hope. There is a glimpse in the essay "On Hope" (28-41) of the seeds of Ratzinger's later papal encyclicals Deus Caritas Est (especially on 30-32) and Spe Salvi (throughout the essay, but especially on 28-29), as well as the apostolic letter Porta Fidei (especially on 32-35). As with so many of his other writings, he takes Nietzsche and Marx as dialogue partners. Here, Ratzinger finds insights and responses in 1 John, St. Bonaventure, and the Franciscan tradition. He emphasizes how hope is inextricably bound up with faith and love. In a passage drawing on St. Bonaventure, he writes, "We can remain people of hope only if our life is not contentedly grounded in the everyday but is solidly rooted in 'substance.' The more we recollect ourselves, the more hope becomes real and the more it illumines our daily work. Only then can we perceive the brightness of the world which otherwise withdraws farther and farther from view" (38). A small but important theme which comes up again and again in a number of Ratzinger's publications—for example, his 1994 A Turning Point for Europe? and his 2007 Spe Salvi—pertains to the "dialectic of Enlightenment." He here relies in part on a very interesting positive use of the agnostic, Jewish, neo-Marxist philosophers Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno and in particular their Dialectic of Enlightenment, which they penned as the Second World War was drawing to a close. These philosophers from the Frankfurt School help Ratzinger think through challenges to the Enlightenment from within, as it were. Within this context Ratzinger argues for responsibility and the value of human labor. In the end, as he makes crystal clear, "to be set free from morality is not freedom, but rather the unlocking of the forces of destruction" (51). Perhaps one of the most important essays in the volume is "Freedom and Liberation: The Anthropological Vision of the Instruction Libertatis conscientia" (52-69). It deals with the issue of liberation theology. Much of the essay pertains...

Adorno's Theory of Philosophical and Aesthetic Truth by Owen Hulatt

Reviewed by: Adorno's Theory of Philosophical and Aesthetic Truth by Owen Hulatt Martin Shuster Owen Hulatt. Adorno's Theory of Philosophical and Aesthetic Truth. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016. Pp. xxii + 246. Cloth, $60.00. Owen Hulatt has written an exceptional book. As truth takes a beating at the hands of late capitalism, Theodor W. Adorno's assessment of the modern world and of truth becomes intimately relevant. There is a lot to recommend in this book, and it is a bold contribution to understanding Adorno. Following Adorno, Hulatt suggests that there is a connection between epistemology and aesthetics (x), that the objects of both admit of being true. As he puts it, "art is itself a kind of knowledge" (xiii). Hulatt's strategy is to begin with epistemology and focus on the emergence of conceptuality (chapter 1). Following Adorno and Max Horkheimer's account in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Hulatt develops a novel reading of that text that argues that human conceptuality emerges as a response "to our pragmatic commitment to self-preservation [End Page 743] and control of our environment" (27). The second chapter presents the notion of 'thin determination,' as a way in which human rationality develops and gets deformed by society. Hullat argues that "even though concepts are based on mere self-preservation, there are determining constraints at every social level that make conceptual arrays fall out as the same in each case" (71). 'Arrays' is Hulatt's term for a set of concepts with their specific internal relations. After these two chapters, the reader is presented with a grim view of things: our concepts arise from a drive towards self-preservation, they are warped and fitted by an all-pervasive social totality, and these two elements are further detailed to operate on both sides of the coin, as determining concepts by both "sociological structures (enforcing self-preservation as an ever-present concern) and reification (this self-preserving impetus translating into the identification of objects with concepts)" (66). And, lest the reader worry about these claims: Hulatt does a fine job of grounding them, offering an account of the nature and operations of reason, and of the relationship between transcendental and empirical standpoints, and between philosophy and other disciplines, notably sociology. Hulatt proceeds to see how both philosophy (chapter 3) and art (chapters 5 and 6) are able "to overcome these obstacles" (xviii). Hulatt does this by presenting a novel understanding of truth in Adorno, as dependent on a particular form—what Adorno calls Gewebe and what Hulatt rightly translates as 'texture'—as the site where "diverse epistemological categories and perspectives are exhaustively interrelated and interwoven, in order to demonstrate the incapability of any single form of conceptual discourse exhaustively describing its object" (116). This makes for a unique conception of truth, but one that Hulatt admirably details, showing—notably in conversation with both Anglophone and European philosophical traditions—how it is able both to solve certain problems in the history of philosophy and to relate to concrete problems in the world. What emerges is an account of philosophy (and, it will be shown, art) that is processual, that is, guiding "the reader through the enacted application of a concept or a set of concepts" (120). Such performativity is essential to the account and reveals a novel understanding of one of Adorno's most contested terms: 'nonidentity.' On Hulatt's view, "nonidentity is … produced wherever conceptual systems betray a want of pliability, and thereby create a failure of fit between themselves and the world" (133). There is a lot more that is going on Hulatt's book, namely, discussions of negation, of mediation, of language, and of specific instances of art; I end my summary here, however, to raise a critical point. In chapter 1, Hulatt stresses a connection to Kant. Hulatt's suggestion, on Adorno's behalf, is that in prehistory, experience was "discontinuous" (20), and that this elicited a particular "cry of terror" that set consciousness on the path to self-consciousness, that is, towards the use of conceptuality. Hulatt claims that "it would seem that the discontinuous experiential stage is pragmatically unsustainable. The subject is unavoidably thrust into the project of identifying...

Self-mastery and universal history

Horkheimer and Adorno make claims that imply a complete rejection of the idea of a universal history developed in classical German philosophy. Using Kant’s account of universal history, I argue that some features of the idea of a universal history can nevertheless be detected in the Dialectic of Enlightenment and some of Adorno’s remarks on freedom and history. This is done in connection with the kind of rational self-mastery that they associate with the story of Odysseus. Some claims made by Adorno in particular will be shown to imply that this self-mastery is a necessary condition of a better, freer society, especially in relation to this society’s material conditions. On the other hand, certain essential features of the idea of a universal history are clearly absent in virtue of the ultimate contingency of events and states of affairs that Adorno seeks to preserve. I show that the absence of these features and the preservation of contingency are, in fact, the means of saving the notion of the possibility of progress which informs the idea of a universal history.

Genealogy and Critical Historicism: Two Models of Enlightenment in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Writings

This article argues that two distinct concepts of Enlightenment coexist uneasily in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. According to the first, genealogical concept, Enlightenment is a bewildered form of self-preservation that has existed since the dawn of Western civilization. The second, critical historicist concept views Enlightenment as the critical and anti-authoritarian ideals articulated—most radically in eighteenth-century France—during the uneven development of modern bourgeois society. After examining the origins of these two concepts in Adorno and Horkheimer’s early writings, the article demonstrates why the former became dominant in Dialectic of Enlightenment, while at the same time pointing to significant traces of the latter that remained. The article contends that a reconsideration of the latter concept reveals of a model of early Critical Theory that can still provide a compelling alternative not only to Dialectic of Enlightenment, but also to more recent attempts to place Critical Theory on normative foundations.

On Thinking the Tragic with Adorno

This article seeks to provide a template for understanding the tragic dimension of Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy through a reading of his early collaborative work with Max Horkheimer, the Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944). While Adorno’s view has often been considered to be tragic, little has been done to reconstruct the tragic dimension of his thought. I argue that the view of the human condition, presented in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, is founded on metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical convictions that have structural similarities with the positions held by theorists and philosophers of tragedy and the tragic. Since traces of these tragic elements can be found throughout Adorno’s mature philosophy, the approach presented in this article may serve as a model for a more detailed mapping and examination of the tragic dimension of his thought in future research.

‘Childhood is measured out by sounds and sights and smells, before the dark of reason grows’: children’s geographies at 12

This Keynote essay argues for a supplement to existing studies in children’s geographies, one that explores the potential of a non-child-centric children’s geography alert to the work done by the figure of ‘the child’ in all manner of worldly situations. Taking a cue from the poetry of John Betjeman, notably his 1960 Summoned by Bells, the essay considers both the intimate spaces of childhood – ones gauged by the immediacies of ‘sounds and sights and smells’ – and the challenges posed by a wider world raddled by adult preoccupations and abuses, those characterised by Betjeman as stemming from ‘the dark of reason’. The essay builds from this foundation to address the ‘darkness’ in two sets of Nazi children’s wartime geographies, as well as engaging with the complexities of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s claims, in the horizon of WWII, about the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’. Within the latter – and also, notably, in Adorno’s later writing – the figure of ‘the child’ surfaces as one miniscule crumb of hope, of experiencing and knowing the world otherwise, set against the face of adult Enlightenment’s seemingly inevitable decay. At the close, Adorno’s own brief dalliance with imagining a small slice of children’s geographies allows the essay to arc back towards its original claims, and to a renewed sense of why childhood ‘sounds and sights and smells’ continue to matter far beyond just the domain of geographers researching children.

ROMANTIZOVANJE ILI ROMANTIČARSKO OSPORAVANJE PROSVETITELJSTVA?

<p>U članku se tvrdi da rani romantizam, artikulišući vlastito stanovište, upućuje prosvećenosti jednu „estetičku“ primedbu i da se ta primedba može protegnuti do duboko u dvadeseti vek. Autor rada je, posle Šlegela i njegove škole, pronalazi ne samo u Veberovoj dijagnostici institucionalizovane racionalnosti zapadne civilizacije, te u <em>Dijalektici prosvetiteljstva </em>Horkhajmera i Adorna i kritici ciljno orijentisanog ili instrumentalnog uma savremenosti koja je usledila, već i, na drugačiji način, kod Fukoa, braće Beme, pa čak i u filozofiji postmoderne i neopragmatizma. Zaključuje se da je svim tim orijentacijama zajednička detekcija manjka samoprosvećenosti prosvetiteljstva, izostanak njegove autoreferentne korekcije, neobračunavanje troškova ogrešenja o ono njegovo „drugo“, što onda bilo nepovratno ili ipak nekako još ispravljivo, potkopava njegov izvorni kritički i emancipatorski program.</p>

Marx's Ecology and the Left

One of the lasting contributions of the Frankfurt School of social theorists, represented especially by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's 1944 Dialectic of Enlightenment, was the development of a philosophical critique of the domination of nature.… Yet their critique of the Enlightenment exploitation of nature was eventually extended to a critique of Marx himself as an Enlightenment figure, especially in relation to his mature work in Capital.… So all-encompassing was the critique of the "dialectic of the Enlightenment" within the main line of the Frankfurt School, and within what came to be known as "Western Marxism"…, that it led to the estrangement of thinkers in this tradition not only from the later Marx, but also from natural science—and hence nature itself. Consequently, when the ecological movement emerged in the 1960s and '70s, Western Marxism, with its abstract, philosophical notion of the domination of nature, was ill-equipped to analyze the changing and increasingly perilous forms of material interaction between humanity and nature.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

Hegel’s dialectic of enlightenment and secularization of religion A critical answer to Habermas

Hegel’s dialectic of enlightenment and secularization of religion A critical answer to Habermas

Light in Germany: Scenes from an Unknown Enlightenment by T. J. Reed

T. J. Reed, Light in Germany: Scenes from an Unknown Enlightenment. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2015. xi + 284 pp.This lucid study aims to shed light on a ostensibly shrouded in obscurity. Yet in question is in fact mainstream thought: Kant, Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller, with briefer discussions of figures like Herder, Wieland, Georg Forster, Karl Philipp Moritz, Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, and Alexander von Humboldt. In Reed's understanding, this vibrant and vital corpus of thought remains to educated nonspecialists and historically literate people for many reasons (2). The first is a moral darkness that retroactively pervades Germany's history: the atrocities of twentieth century cast a long shadow over its whole political and cultural past (here Reed raises, but does not address in any depth, controversial concept of a Sonderweg [1]). The second reason that thought remains in dark, as it were, is impenetrability of its philosophical writing: It can be difficult for light to break through thickets of a sentence (1), Reed observes. No wonder, then, that Enlightenment, [i]f people have even heard of such a thing, has been outshone to point of invisibility by what went on elsewhere in Europe and America (2). Finally, there are attacks on from within culture itself: a right-wing rejection of and its thought in favor of a more profoundly German spirit, dating from Romantics; a neglect, and indeed erasure, of by certain historians of ideas (Friedrich Meinecke serves as an exemplar); and much overrated sniping from Left (Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment, which was directed at modern phenomena that have questionable connection to Enlightenment and which has licensed iconoclasm from any quarter [3]). Hence, Reed sets out to reclaim an unknown and demonstrate its profound relevance to present, maintaining that subtitle of his study is only a slight exaggeration (2).If Reed overstates his case in introduction, he succeeds admirably well in providing concise, instructive, eminently readable overviews of select seminal writings in their historical, political, and cultural contexts. Kant forms backbone of study. The opening chapters are largely devoted to excellent discussions of An Answer to Question: What Is Enlightenment? …

運動部活動における体罰の意味論

The purpose of this study is to confirm aspects of violence at school athletics clubs related to the use of corporal punishment, and to clarify the significance of corporal punishment in terms of how it is perceived by teachers and students. Recently, there has been a large volume of research on corporal punishment, under the premise that its use is questionable. Such a premise tends to encourage reasons for denying it occurs, or turning a blind eye to how it affects relationships between teachers and students at school athletics clubs. However, in order to clarify the significance of corporal punishment in school athletics clubs, it is essential to understand interpersonal relationships in this type of setting. The ethos of school athletics clubs is to impose the desirable norm on students (i.e., to make them good players). This means that students need to develop self-discipline in order to succeed at their sport, and corporal punishment is used to impose normalization of self-discipline in students. This leads to an association between pain and the perceived pleasure of success in the mind of the students. According to Butler, conscience is the means by which a subject can reflecting on oneself, and conversion of pain into the pleasure is a method by which this can be achieved. In other words, a panacea for preempting existential negation. On the other hand, for teachers, corporal punishment is deeply related to their existence and desire for self-protection. Adorno and Horkheimer's arguments on the reasons for the relation between reason and violence in Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments teach us that the desire for self-protection is expressed by using violence, for example corporal punishments, on others. Teachers regard students as a means for their self-protection to secure their role as a teacher, which is based on a pre-existing relationship with students. However, the role of teachers is threatened when a school athletics club achieves poor results. Thus, teachers employ corporal punishment as a means of maintaining their authoritative role. The findings of this study argue that corporal punishment in school athletics clubs deeply reflects the relationship between students and teachers. It is necessary to discuss this issue rather than ignoring it.

Enlightenment and the Unconditional Good: From Fichte to the Frankfurt School

In a series of lectures from 1804–05, Johann Gottlieb Fichte sets out a conception of enlightenment whose basic structure is, I argue, to some extent reproduced in two more famous accounts of enlightenment found in post-Kantian German philosophy: Hegel’s account of the Enlightenment’s struggle with faith in his Phenomenology of Spirit and the conception of enlightenment rationality presented in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. The narrative I offer serves to highlight, moreover, the critical role played by the notion of an unconditional good in Fichte’s and Hegel’s critiques of enlightenment. The lack of an explicit appeal to, and account of, this notion in Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of enlightenment will be shown to raise questions concerning how successful their critique of enlightenment can really be thought to be.

Reply to critics

The author of Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions discusses three major fields of objection against his outline of an evolutionary theory of public and international law. In the first part he discusses problems of action theory. There are at issue, first, the role of negation and moral resentment for the constitution of a normatively relevant social praxis, then the emergence of social systems within and from the context of the life-world, and the relation of revolutionary and gradual learning processes. The second part discusses the relation of his theory to postcolonial and feminist studies. Finally, the debate centers in part III on the dialectic of Enlightenment. The problem of alienation and negativity is at stake, closely related to the negative aesthetic of law and the intertwinement of repression and emancipation within the legal form. In the end, it is an open question if we today still can rely on the negative aesthetic and hidden utopian form of law, or if we have already fallen back to constitutional kitsch and façade.

(In)secure environments and the domination of nature: introduction to themed section

This editorial introduces a four-paper thematic section on ‘Insecure environments’, growing out of a conference session held in 2012. Through an excursion into Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment (1979), themes are identified to do with the dialectic of security and insecurity, as played out in humanity's modern dealings with nature. The four papers are then formally outlined and situated in relation to these themes of (in)secure environments, the domination of nature and its many repercussions.

Normative learning processes in evolutionary perspective: Remarks on Hauke Brunkhorst’s Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions

The basic thesis of this article is that with his book on legal revolution Brunkhorst rewrites a dialectic of enlightenment. According to Brunkhorst, learning processes, which lead to the revolutionary institutionalization of a new constitutional order, are triggered by negativity. This begs the following questions. What is the account of the belief in a concurrency of dialectics of enlightenment and the learning process? Why do extreme forms of exploitation and oppression still lead to the learning process?

Being “a Good Animal”

This article examines the potential contribution of the work of Theodor Adorno to the development of a posthuman analysis of international relations. Despite a recent blossoming of “Adorno studies,” his writings on nature, particularly his concerns regarding human relations with other species, have received comparatively little attention. This article argues that many of the central concerns driving the recent development of posthuman analyses of international relations overlap with some of Adorno’s core preoccupations. In Dialectic of Enlightenment in particular, much concern is directed at the perceived disenchantment with nature and the impacts of this disenchantment both on human relations with the rest of nature and with interhuman relations. Adorno’s focus on the attention to suffering being the “condition for all truth” is not restricted simply to the human and coincides with the ethical concerns of posthuman approaches. Finally, while it has been claimed that Adorno’s work, especially his notion of the totally administered society, leads to a political impasse, it will be suggested here that recent work by Fabian Freyenhagen on the practical elements of Adorno’s philosophy suggest that our priority, rather than living rightly, should be on “living less wrongly.”