Dewey's Approach Research Articles

Students' Ability to Solve Story Problems on Systems of Linear Equations Using John Dewey's Approach

Students can study everyday mathematics with a story problem. Through this problem, students gain critical thinking experience in solving problems. The ability of students to solve problems through John Dewey's approach is also seen to deepen students' mathematical concepts in three-variable linear equation systems. Problem solving with John Dewey's approach consists of five stages. This method of research uses a qualitative descriptive approach with three persons as the subject of the research, with good, sufficient, and less as the categories of ability. The results of the research showed the subject's ability to solve a story problem with the John Dewey approach. Four given questions showed that the subject with a category of good ability can solve two problems with clear mathematical concepts. Whereas the student with sufficient ability can only solve one problem with an obvious mathematical concept, However, the subject with less ability is only able to solve a problem until the stage of inventorying several solutions, which is the third stage of problem solving with the approach of John Dewey.

The Value of Experience-Centered Design to Responsible Software Design and Engineering

Abstract In this conceptual article, we review experience-centered approaches to the design of personal digital interactive technologies, with a view to exploring how these approaches might be of value in understanding the experience-in-use and the responsible design of today's highly networked, data-rich, and ubiquitous software technologies. Experience-centered design research leans heavily on pragmatist philosophy for its conceptual underpinnings, particularly John Dewey's accounts of aesthetic experience and of inquiry. After reviewing this body of work, we argue that these foundations could be usefully extended to also include Dewey's approach to ethics as an empirical, situated act of moral imagination. In addition, we look to other researchers for perspectives that complement and extend Deweyan experiential pragmatics. In particular, we look to the ways in which Susan Leigh Star's account of socio-technical infrastructures and dialogical approaches to human relations together can provide important insights into the experience-in-use of today's digital infrastructure and can critically highlight issues of boundaries and privacy. We also offer pragmatic and methodological concepts that may be of value to the field of responsible software design and engineering.

How to Market the Arts: A Practical Approach for the 21st Century by Anthony Rhine and Jay Pension

Reviewed by: How to Market the Arts: A Practical Approach for the 21st Century by Anthony Rhine and Jay Pension James Filippelli How to Market the Arts: A Practical Approach for the 21st Century. Anthony Rhine and Jay Pension. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022; pp. 269. Anthony Rhine and Jay Pension's How to Market the Arts: A Practical Approach for the 21st Century complements Rhine's previous monograph, Theatre Management: Arts Leadership for the 21st Century (2018). This coauthored text provides the reader with valuable information on how to effectively market a theatre in the twenty-first century and will benefit a plethora of undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in performing arts, business, management, or leadership programs. The text is divided into five parts: Marketing versus Engagement, Education, Experience, Environment, and Ease of Access. Rhine and Pension begin each part with a brief overview of the chapters therein. They propose a new paradigm using visual models and case studies of several arts organizations to better explain how nonprofit arts marketing can and should work. They harmonize the four Ps (product, price, place, and promotion) of marketing with the four Es (education, experience, environment, and ease of access) of engagement. Theatre managers and producers will appreciate the importance of marketing and engagement. Rhine and Pension define the process of engagement "as one in which both parties mutually control the interaction and receive roughly equivalent benefits of value" (23). They elaborate on a need to develop a model that is sustainable and successful. Part I, "Marketing versus Engagement," strives to identify shifts in traditional marketing. Chapter 1 highlights researchers and practitioners incorporating different marketing mix concepts. According to Rhine and Pension, engagement is more closely associated with the nonprofit arts and their market exposure than aspects of the conventional marketing mix would suggest. In chapter 2, they discuss the concept of engagement and the connection within the arts and offer practical examples. One illustrative example of engagement is the "Talk Back," which the authors argue needs to be guided and structured. They suggest that a clear understanding of the difference between events that create involvement and those that create engagement is beneficial to arts leaders. In Part II, "Education," Rhine and Pension address the need for theatres to engage with and educate their audiences rather than merely to promote them. Chapter 3 discusses promotion and education. The authors indicate to the reader how important promotion is in the nonprofit sector. This chapter lays the foundation for chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 4, Rhine and Pension present a case study of an arts organization that followed strict promotional methodology without developing any engagement through education. Sadly, after twenty-four years, the arts organization closed its doors. In other words, what not to do! Chapter 5 concludes Part II with highlighting the need for education and the arts. Similarities between education and the arts exist in identifying targets and needs, objectives, and implementation. When one completes reading Part II, it is obvious that education is the key to understanding the audience and the arts organization. Part III, "Experience," explores the difference between experience and the physical product. Chapter 6 describes Jerome McCarthy's framework around the four Ps (product, price, place, and promotion). McCarthy's work demonstrates that both products and services satisfy the needs of individuals; however, Rhine and Pension argue that John Dewey's approach in Art as Experience is "more collaborative and beneficial" (103). Chapter 7 outlines the concept of product relative to arts organizations. The authors elevate experience over product; consequently, "art only occurs in the presence of participation" (138). Chapter 8 clearly and succinctly presents the importance of experience and its appropriateness to the arts. The authors emphasize customer experience, not product, as most important. Part IV, "Environment," investigates the ideas of "place" and "environment." Chapter 9 begins by contrasting the two, with Rhine and Pension arguing that "place has to do with the location where [the] product is being distributed," while environment is meant to convey the "places or surroundings in which arts consumers interact" (159). Though important, this chapter is somewhat dry. Chapter 10 discusses place from interaction to objective, arguing...

A Deweyan Approach to Religious and Moral Education

Pragmatizmin öncü filozoflarından olan John Dewey, genel olarak felsefesinde insanın karşılaştığı problemlere çözümler sunmaya çalışmıştır. Bu çözümlerinde onun düalizme karşı olduğu, insanın çevresiyle uyumuna ehemmiyet verdiği ve insan deneyimini merkeze aldığı görülmektedir. Felsefesinin bu temel özellikleri başta eğitim felsefesi olmak üzere onun din ve ahlaka ilişkin fikirlerinde de öne çıkmaktadır. Dewey’in eğitim felsefesi, deneyime dayalı ilerlemeci bir karakter taşımaktadır. Literatürde Dewey’in eğitim felsefesiyle ilgili çok sayıda araştırma olmasına rağmen onun din ve ahlak eğitimine yönelik yaklaşımını ortaya koyan ikincil bir çalışmaya rastlanmamıştır. Bu makalenin amacı, Dewey’in eserlerinden yola çıkarak onun din ve ahlak eğitimine ilişkin yaklaşımını ortaya koymaktır. Bu amaca bağlı olarak bu araştırmanın sorusu şöyle belirlenmiştir: Dewey’e göre din ve ahlak eğitimi nasıl olmalıdır? Dewey’in din anlayışına bakıldığında, onun düşüncesinde din özel doğruluk iddiaları nedeniyle dogmatik bir alan olarak görülebileceği gibi insana sunduğu açıklıklar nedeniyle bir imkânlar alanı olarak da görülebilir. Bu bağlamda Dewey’in, kurumsallaşmış dinleri eleştirmekle birlikte dini insanın doğal bir eğilimi ve mahrem bir alanı olarak gördüğü anlaşılmaktadır. Buna bağlı olarak da onun, dinin, okullarda bilimsel bir anlayışla ve resmi bir şekilde öğretilmesine sıcak bakmadığı söylenebilir. Bunun nedenleri olarak şunlar sıralanabilir: 1. Herhangi bir dini, okullarda kanıta dayalı bilimsel bir yöntemle ele almanın onun doğasına aykırı olması. 2. Çok kültürlü toplumlarda öğretmek için hangi dinin nasıl seçileceği problemi. 3. Okullarda öğretmek için birden fazla din seçilse bile dinlerin kendilerine mahsus doğruluk iddialarının sosyal bütünlüğe zarar verebilme ihtimali. Görüldüğü gibi Dewey, örgün din eğitimine karşı mesafeli bir yaklaşım sergilese de genel olarak çocukların ve gençlerin din eğitimi almalarına karşı değildir. Bu, onun çocukların ve gençlerin gelişimlerine uygun bir din eğitimi almaları için disiplinler arası bir iş birliğine ihtiyaç olduğunu belirtmesinden anlaşılmaktadır. Dewey’in ahlak anlayışı incelendiğinde, onun düşüncesinde ahlaki eyleme yön veren soyut evrensel bir ilkeye yer verilmediği görülmektedir. Ona göre ahlaki eylemin doğasında belirsizlik ve çatışma vardır. Bunun nedeni ise ahlaki bir eylemde bulunurken çok sayıda farklı kaynaktan gelen etkilerin iç içe girmesidir. Kişi ahlaki bir eylem sırasında, bireysel ve sosyal amaçları dikkate alma, hak ve sorumlulukları gözetme, eylemin sonuçlarını hesap etme ve ahlaki ilkeleri deneyimde doğrulamaya tabi tutma gibi birçok hususu göz önünde bulundurmak durumundadır. Bu süreçlerde akıl ve deneyim iş birliği hâlindedir. Aklın aktif olduğu bir deneyim, ahlaki yaşamın bir rehberidir. Dewey’in bu ahlak anlayışı, ahlak eğitimine ilişkin bakışına da yansımaktadır. Ona göre okullarda, insanın doğasını ve deneyimlerini görmezden gelerek ahlaki ilkeleri teorik bir şekilde öğretmeye çalışmak doğru değildir. Zira ahlak bilgisi, insanı iyi ve karakterli yapmaz, insan ancak deneyimleri aracılığıyla iyiliğe ulaşabilir. O hâlde okullarda ahlak eğitimi verilirken, bu eğitimin insanın doğasına, deneyimlerine ve sosyal yaşamına uygun olmasına dikkat edilmelidir. Dewey’in din ve ahlak eğitimine ilişkin yaklaşımı birlikte değerlendirildiğinde kimi noktalarda benzerlik, kimi noktalarda da farklılık arz ettiği görülmektedir. Benzer noktalardan başlamak gerekirse, Dewey’in her iki konuya yaklaşımında da mümkün mertebe düalizmden kaçındığı, insanın bireysel ve sosyal uyumuna ehemmiyet verdiği ve deneyim temelli bir eğitimi savunduğu söylenebilir. Buna ek olarak o, hem din hem de ahlak konusunda teorik bilgileri insanlara öğretmenin onları daha dindar veya daha iyi yapmayacağı kanaatindedir. Bunun yerine Dewey, insanın doğasına ve deneyimlerine uygun bir din ve ahlak eğitimini önermektedir. Farklılıklara gelecek olursak, Dewey’in, insanın doğasını ve deneyimlerini dikkate alan bir ahlak eğitiminin okullarda bütün bir eğitimle birlikte verilmesinden yana olduğu ancak dinin okullarda öğretilmesine sıcak bakmadığı anlaşılmaktadır. Son olarak bu araştırmada, Dewey’in konuyla ilgili yazılı çalışmaları nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden doküman incelemesi yoluyla incelenmiş ve toplanan veriler içerik analizi ile yorumlanmıştır.

Recovering the Story of Pragmatism in India: Bhimrao Ambedkar, John Dewey, and the Origins of Navayana Pragmatism

Recovering the Story of Pragmatism in India: Bhimrao Ambedkar, John Dewey, and the Origins of Navayana Pragmatism

DEWEYAN EXPERIMENTALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF METHOD IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BY JOSHUA FORSTENZER

Reviewed by: Deweyan Experimentalism and the Problem of Method in Political Philosophy by Joshua Forstenzer Daniel Herbert Joshua Forstenzer Deweyan Experimentalism and the Problem of Method in Political Philosophy New York, NY: Routledge, 2019, xiv + 279 (incl. index) With his recent contribution to Dewey studies, Deweyan Experimentalism and the Problem of Method in Political Philosophy, Joshua Forstenzer delivers a timely and highly readable examination of Dewey's democratic ideal and its contemporary relevance. Outstanding in its scholarship and compelling in its argument, Forstenzer's fascinating study presents an extensive interpretation of Dewey's experimentalist approach to democratic politics, while highlighting its significant interdisciplinary value and practical interest. Focussing particularly upon its experimentalist character and renunciation of a priori idealisations, Forstenzer examines, over ten well-argued chapters, how Dewey's approach to political philosophy differs from the Rawlsian paradigm of recent Anglophone contributors, without abandoning its concern with tackling injustice. Above all, Forstenzer seeks to show how political philosophers might, by experimenting with a Dewey-inspired self-conception as responsible participants in a dialogue between democratic citizens, make an active difference in addressing some of the urgent problems which confront today's political communities and social groups. Forstenzer begins his compelling study with an unsparing account of the severe and urgent dangers threatening contemporary humanity. Few today, however, could seriously contest his stark assessment that our species finds itself teetering at the brink of a precipice, mired in uncertainty and hostile disagreement over how to proceed in the face of looming ecological disaster and political catastrophe. Under circumstances in which rational deliberation often appears to have little purchase within a political context marked by recently emboldened and increasingly conspicuous reactionary currents, to appeal to philosophy for direction may seem the height of naivety, and yet, as Forstenzer insists, there can be no route out of the present crisis without confidence in a philosophically-informed vision of future possibilities. Echoing realist criticisms of Rawlsian ideal theory, Forstenzer asks that political philosophy demonstrate its practical value without, however, abandoning its traditional moral mission of critiquing existing conditions and tackling injustice. Having established such desiderata in the first chapter, Forstenzer proceeds in the second to outline Dewey's pragmatist critique of the traditional preconceptions which he alleges to have limited philosophy's effectiveness [End Page 464] as a practical resource for addressing actual social problems. Chief amongst these, as Forstenzer understands Dewey, is the 'spectator' model of knowledge as the relation of a subject to an object unconditioned by the process of its coming to be known. Such an account of knowledge as a theoretical, rather than a practical, achievement naturally reinforces a host of dualisms (between mind and body, fact and value, subject and object, etc.) which collectively lend weight to a conception of the philosophical task as one of detached representation rather than active involvement. As Forstenzer explains, however, Dewey proposes quite another understanding of cognition, as the inherently situated activity of an organism seeking by intelligent means to overcome various kinds of obstacle. In chapter three, Forstenzer elaborates upon Dewey's alternative proposal for a socially active and politically engaged conception of philosophy. According to Forstenzer, Dewey offers an appealing conception of philosophy as a species of cultural criticism, eschewing a priori idealisations and directed towards concrete problem-solving within specific contexts. While denying that philosophy affords privileged access to a special fund of truths concerning, for instance, the ideal state, Forstenzer encourages philosophers to experiment with a Deweyan self-conception as mediators facilitating dialogue amongst the various sources of insight that a society might bring to the problems which confront it. The philosopher may most effectively address our current crisis, according to Forstenzer's Deweyan approach, not by persisting in a discredited 'quest for certainty', but by participating in a cultural dialogue within which she inhabits a role analogous to a competent chair to a meeting amongst community members gathered to discuss problems of common concern. Objections to Dewey's philosophical ideal are addressed in chapter four, in which Forstenzer defends philosophy's practical potential against possible Hegelian and Marxist critics. Contrary to conservative readings of Hegel's position, according to which philosophical understanding is fundamentally retrospective and...

A Deweyan Assessment of Three Major Tendencies in Philosophy of Consciousness

I suggest that John Dewey's approach to the problem of consciousness is both methodologically and metaphysically superior to those found in contemporary debates. Dewey advances a picture of consciousness that avoids the mistakes present in the three major tendencies in contemporary philosophy of consciousness, namely, David J. Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, and Daniel C. Dennett's A Priori Physicalism. I argue that Dewey's philosophy of consciousness shows that Naturalistic Dualism is wrong, that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy could be better, and thar A Priori Physicalism goes too far.

Pragmatists, Deliberativists, and Democracy: The Quest for Inclusion

Pragmatists, Deliberativists, and Democracy: The Quest for Inclusion

Dewey, Democracy, and Democratic Experimentalism

Dewey's approach to the problem of organizing reform of democracy focused on rethinking the ideal of democratic participation, or, backing up a step, the conditions of communication eventually shaping it. He left the design of institutions to advance joint problem solving and individual development to the outcome of this process. To the extent that he had concrete institutional plans they vacillated in focus between the society as a whole and the immediate local community. Democratic experimentalism looks to connect these levels to correct the defects of an exclusive focus on either.1. IntroductionDewey's enduring achievement was to present a compelling account of the mutual constitution of the individual and society, struggling together to extend the limits of their knowledge in response to surprising failures of what they thought they already knew, and to establish an ideal of democracy as that form of self-government which, under ever new circumstances, affords the greatest possible scope to the social intelligence of problem solving and the flourishing of individual character as its condition and product. Dewey shares with Marx the idea of the sociability of production and the deformation of the self through its denial, with Rawls the idea of recognition of the full, individual humanity of fellow citizens as the first and most fundamental constraint on political order. Yet he had a sense of the moral and political malleability of the technical world - a recognition that the organization of production conditions politics yet is also profoundly conditioned by it - and a congenital understanding of the individual in democracy alien to the former. He had an intellectually productive absorption in the lived interaction between individual and society alien to the latter. In an uncertain world, where innovations in production and changes in individual life courses and gender roles upend each other, settled forms of assuring social solidarity fail, and traditional representative democracy seems more an institutional casualty of these changes than an instrument for an effective public response to them, committed democrats will want to learn from Dewey.Yet when it came to questions of institutional design - of specifying how various domains of activity might be organized to advance joint problem solving and individual development - Dewey had, to the evident irritation of some of his most ardent admirers and closest readers,1 and apart from limited and ultimately vexed observations about schooling, next to nothing to say. His reticence in these matters is a puzzling double default. First there is the very general (but in debate infrequently remarked) absence in Dewey's work of discussion of what might be called pragmatist institutions. No one understood better than Dewey that habit, or experience accrued into unnoticed assumptions, enabled action by allowing the concentration of attention on troubling violations of (habitual) expectations; no one understood better than he that habit could also harden into routine, making unnoticed assumptions inaccessible to revision and trapping us in experiences only possible if we do not attempt to scrutinize them fully in the event. Dewey stressed as well the mutual dependence of individuals and institutions, and the way the stunting of the one impoverished the other. Institutions and individuals thus had to change together or not at all. Given all this it is puzzling that he did not pose the question of how to design institutions that reduce the chance of organizational habits congealing into limiting routines, or that can detect and dis-entrench routines that have become obstructive.Second, there is the more specific and more frequently noted absence of discussion of the design of democracy itself, of institutions of public choice serving the ideal of democracy as enabling individual flourishing, and adapted to the circumstances of the day. Dewey was nothing if not a fallibilist. …

A Deweyan Response to J. Baird Callicott’s Land Aesthetic

J. Baird Callicott suggests in Land that the environmental community would be well served to focus on the aesthetic value of natural ecosystems as a source of intrinsic value in nature. But Callicott's own Humean and biological account of aesthetic value is inadequate as a basis for understanding the aesthetic appreciation of nature. This paper argues that John Dewey provides a holistic and transactional account of aesthetic value that is easily tailored to fit the ecocentric requirements of a rich environmental aesthetics.1. IntroductionJ. Baird Callicott's work, In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, and his subsequent philosophical essays on ethical obligations to the environment have had a significant impact on philosophers and their approaches to the environment. His work has turned philosophers' attention to Aldo Leopold's seminal work, The Sand County Almanac. He has made a compelling case for attributing intrinsic value to ecosystems. Finally, along with Holmes Rolston III, Callicott has been a central figure in developing an ecocentric philosophical approach to the environment. His writings have become essential readings within ecocentrism.Despite this, critics of Callicott's approach have raised significant concerns about his land ethic. This paper will outline Callicott's holistic and Humean approach to environmental ethics and discuss criticisms of this approach raised by Rolston and Hugh McDonald. Because, for Callicott, the land ethic is critically and explicitly associated with aesthetics, this paper then turns to analyze Callicott's analysis of beauty as discussed in his article, Land Aesthetic,1 arguing that Callicott's analysis falls victim to similar criticisms raised of his land ethic. These criticisms have the most force when addressing Callicott's discussion of intrinsic value and in particular the criteria of beauty, stability and integrity taken from Leopold's work. Finally, this paper presents and develops a reading of the aesthetics of John Dewey that complements and frames Callicott's land aesthetic. Dewey's approach, like Callicott's, is holistic and non-dualistic, but he avoids the dangers of homocentrism in aesthetic experience. Dewey emphasizes that experience is not a subjective term. As such, a Deweyan approach can preserve an ecocentric account of the aesthetic value of land without making aesthetic experience derivative of ecological or evolutionary knowledge.Dewey shares with Callicott an appreciation of the close relationship between ethical and aesthetic values. He comments favorably on Greek philosophers' appreciation of this relationship, writing, Greek emphasis upon Kalokagathos, the Aristotelian identification of virtue with the proportionate mean, are indications of an acute estimate of grace, rhythm and harmony as dominant traits of good conduct. Callicott also connects aesthetic value and ethical value. In the introduction to Land Aesthetic, Callicott argues that private landowners may prefer a land aesthetic to a land ethic because it emphasizes assets and rewards. Yet is also fosters conservation. He argues that ethical values, which he characterizes as a set of duties and obligations to an environment, are not appealing because they primarily emphasize prohibitions. Aesthetic values, values of harmony, diversity and beauty are more compelling and rewarding to landowners. But these aesthetic values also solicit ethically appropriate conservation of ecosystems.2. Callicott's Land EthicBecause of these close connections between aesthetic and ethical value, and because Callicott's (and Leopold's) land aesthetic is, at least in part, a means to achieving ethically appropriate conservation of ecosystems, a brief outline of Callicott's land ethic is necessary before focusing on his land aesthetic. Callicott has made a strong case that an environmental ethics must be based upon the intrinsic value of environments. …

Deweyan Democracy and Education About Religion

Québec's “Ethics and Religious Culture” curriculum shares many similarities with John Dewey's child-centered approach to education. The curriculum suggests how and why Dewey's approach of encouraging students to think critically and engage in sympathetic imagination can be integral to democratic citizenship and essential to the securing of respect for religious freedom in particular. Still, that a Deweyan education about religion is superior to the alternatives does not mean that it is flawless. If the Québec curriculum for the most part highlights the strength of the Deweyan approach, it also suggests that, at least in the case of religion, an education aimed at developing critical and imaginative skills can sometimes also violate democratic norms of religious respect. The article concludes by briefly considering how Québec's curriculum could be altered and supplemented to make its implementation practically feasible in the United States and consistent with widely shared views in the United States on religious freedom.

Dewey's Democracy as the Kingdom of God on Earth

John Dewey has been portrayed as a sort of villain in Rosenow's (1997) article which appeared in this journal, apparently because he was unfairly opposed to God and to religion, and also because he deliberately usurped religious language to ‘camouflage’ his secular ideas. By drawing mainly upon similar sources but with some important additions, I wish to challenge the four major concerns raised in Rosenow's article and in doing so aim to offer an alternative interpretation. It is understood here that Dewey's approach to religion was not so much religious as it was ‘spiritual’ and while developing and changing throughout his writings, his ideas on spirituality nevertheless were thoroughly entwined with his other views, especially those dealing with education, science and democracy.

Performative Somaesthetics: Principles and Scope

John Dewey's aesthetic has been invoked in recent discussions because many have realized that it resists the pull toward conceptualism that characterizes a great deal of aesthetic theory. Further, Art as Experience-Dewey's chief work on the philosophy of art-is rich with ideas that call for development. Richard Shusterman's work does just this as it suggests that Dewey's approach is a practical alternative to those that hinder a comprehensive understanding of art and/or ignore art's capacity to enrich the quality of lived experience. More specifically, Shusterman develops key Deweyan ideas by considering the aesthetic merits of popular music and by exploring Dewey's naturalism, that is, a naturalism that strives to understand the role played by the human body in aesthetic experience. Somaesthetics is the pragmatic discipline that explores somatic practices and ultimately demonstrates how they can lead to the attainment of fulfilling experiences. Shusterman argues that various disciplines can be taken up in order to improve the clarity of somatic functioning, perception, and thought as they help us reconstruct our attitudes or habits of feeling to give us greater flexibility and tolerance to different kinds of feeling and bodily behavior.1 Ultimately, Dewey's emphasis on the everyday origins of aesthetic experience is combined with his rejection of mind-body dualism in order to demonstrate how aesthetic experiences can be cultivated through such practices. One is not limited to going to museums and reading art criticism in order to have meaningful aesthetic experiences because somaesthetics shows how one's body can be transformed into a locus of aesthetic value. This said, we also find that similar techniques are used in the training of actors, dancers, and other performance artists. Performative somaesthetics explores the body disciplines that are instrumental to the performer's craft-that allow him or her to master the body and to enhance its expressive powers. In this article I would like to explore a few elements of this

What Is the Significance of John Dewey's Approach to the Problem of Knowledge?

John Dewey's early work is often a good place to turn to gain a foothold on his later, very complex philosophical ideas. His 1897 essay, "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge," is a clear, passionate statement of Dewey's concerns with the epistemology of his times and his views on how this epistemology should be redirected. In this article, we explore the concepts and theories Dewey develops in his essay and analyze some current educational discussions of knowledge in context of Dewey's thoughts. Although we caution against the tendency to cast different views of knowledge as dialectical oppositions, as Dewey does, we side with Dewey on the importance of careful reflection on experience and the necessity for justifying or warranting knowledge.

Response: Problematizing Dewey's Views of Problem Solving: A Reply to Hiebert et al.

n this response, I express concerns about the way Hiebert et al. (1996) characterize Dewey's approach to thinking and problem solving. The argument Hiebert et al. present is relatively straightforward: reflective inquiry is the key to intelligent action. The key to reflective inquiry, in turn, is to get students to the subject. This means, among other things, that students are to wonder about things, attending to issues lurking beneath the surface of the content they are being asked to master. should be allowed to make the subject problematic, they maintain. We argue that this single principle captures what is essential for instructional practice. Problematization sets in motion the process of actively searching for solutions to and the by-product or of this activity is increased understanding, often of a profound kind. As indicated, Hiebert et al. credit Dewey with providing the rationale for their approach to problematizing the subject. While basing some of the detail on their own work, they argue that they have tried to remain true to the Deweyan problem-solving model. Their goal in adopting a Deweyan approach is a worthy one: like Dewey, they are trying to do away with the insidious distinction between knowing and doing. Genuine inquiry, they argue, is the key to achieving this goal. In genuine inquiry, knowing slides over into doing, lessening the distance between the two. According to Hiebert et al., this process is set in motion by problematization. I argue that Dewey dealt with the distinction between knowing and doing in a different way from that characterized above. It might be helpful, as a way of highlighting differences between the Hiebert et al. view of Dewey and the one I present, to examine a teaching vignette presented in the earlier article. In the analysis advanced by Hiebert et al., emphasis is placed on the teacher's decision to let students problematize a simple subtraction problem (finding the difference in heights between two children, one 62 and the other 37 inches tall). This decision supposedly activates the problem-solving process, which in this case involves treating procedures as problems (p. 15). The benefits students realize from participating in the problem-solving exercise are thought to go well beyond learning how to solve the specific problem posed: When the second graders were finding the differences in heights, they were exploring relationships within the number system, not just finding an answer (p. 15). As indicated, Hiebert et al. view this outcome-increased understanding of the number systemas a kind of residue left over after the activity ends. In the second interpretation of Dewey's approach to problem solving, which I prefer, emphasis is placed on the ideas that give rise to the problem-solving process in students. This approach, in a sense, turns the Hiebert et al. model on its head. It assumes that problem solving is always guided by a set of ideational anticipations or expectations about outcomes, and that the worth of whatever idea or plan is settled on is judged relative to these anticipations. An obvious candidate for a guiding idea in the example presented in the article is the notion of additive composition-the notion that all quantities are compositions of other quantities. The students in the example had apparently developed this idea before the lesson. This is suggested by the fact that they had been working with base-10 materials (sticks with 10 dots on them) for some time, using these materials with hand-drawn dots to solve two-digit addition and subtraction problems. The additive composition notion, according to my interpretation of Dewey, creates the expectation about outcome that drives students' efforts to solve the probleni-that is, to develop a justifiable procedure for computing the difference in heights between the children. Students anticipate that they will be able to decompose or pull number apart in the specific situation presented to them, and that this will allow them to solve the problem. It is obvious from the comments made by students that, for many at least, the idea regulating the action of decomposing number bore fruit: it fulfilled the anticipations or expectations that they had entertained before undertaking the action. The fact that this idea fulfilled earlier anticipations is the key in determining how much students will invest in it in the future. The advantage in this interpretation of Dewey, which highlights the action aspect of ideas, is that it counters a notion which has been the Achilles heel of efforts to reform

Experiencing Mythology and the Bible: Reading, Writing, Looking, and Dancing

Oedipus Rex, the stories from Greek mythology, and books from the Bible such as Genesis, Exodus, and the Gospels have enduring significance. The trick is to enable high-school students to see this, to make meaning of their readings for themselves. I provide experiences which call upon the students to recreate the texts, in the tradition of John Dewey's approach to art. Dewey (1934, Art as Experience, New York: Putnam) said,

Intentionality: A Study of Mental Acts (review)

132 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY largely a reluctant bystander during World War !I, fearful both of Nazism and of fanning the fires of domestic chauvinism. Considering the enormity of this climactic impasse in Dewey's approach to the Second World War, it is given relatively short shrift. The most influential American philosopher found himself trapped in a double bind in which the historical consequences of either wholesale militarism or pacifism would crate conditions hostile to the aims of a liberal education for nonviolent social reconstruction. Regardless of our conclusions on the particulars of Dewey's pragmatic pacifism, the great merit of Howlett's book consists in the discussion it inspires in contemporary terms, for Dewey's struggle symbolically crystallizes that of all who ponder the fate of nonviolence in a world of seemingly growing irrationality which knows no national boundaries. JONATHAND. MORENO George Washington University Richard E. Aquila. lntentionality: A Study of Mental Acts. University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977. Pp. xi + 168. $13.50. Professor Aquila is concerned with the general nature of such cognitive facts as that a see (thinks of, imagines, etc.) O, or thinks (understands, imagines, believes, etc.) that 0 is red. Taking anything cognized to be an "object of a mental state," he supposes that: "To discuss the 'objects' of mental states is . . . ambiguous.... For I may--speaking 'de re' of some actually existing object---report that it is the object of some particular mental state; or I may--speaking 'de dicto' of some particular mental state---merely report that it is, or involves, an awareness or conception of some object" (p. ix). Aquila (quite wrongly, in my view) believes that there are two senses of "object" and "awareness" involved here; and he reserves the word "intentionality" for awareness in the de dicto case, where the "object" cognized may be nonexistent. Mental states exhibiting "intentionality" are then called "mental acts," of which the book is a study. The work progresses through an examination, in sequence, of questions concerning the ontological status of "objects" of cognizance, whether and how cognizance essentially involves relations to its objects, and the nature of mental contents insofar as they are neither objects nor relations to objects. However, the discussion is not simply a systematic one, determined by conceptual developments only. Rather it is primarily carried on through an examination of certain passages in, respectively, Hurne (pp. 2-6), Descartes (pp. 6-13), Brentano (pp. 13-24), Chisholm and Brentano (pp. 27-47), Meinong (pp. 62-73), Bergmann (pp. 73-78), Russell (pp. 78-85), Meinong and Findlay (pp. 95-102), Frege and Husserl (pp. 107-121), and Wilfrid Sellars (pp. 122-46). Closer examination reveals, it seems, a certain vacillation in Aquila's approach to his task. He states: "My purpose is to provide a critical and analytical survey of the major attempts, in modern philosophy, to interpret the phenomenon of intentionality" (p. ix; see pp. 87, 107). Yet he also claims that "it is . . . the aim of this book to arrive at a more positive characterization of the phenomenon of awareness and hence of the notion of an 'object' of awareness" (p. 26). Now these are by no means inconsistent goals and should, indeed, be mutually supportive. However it also is possible to be distracted by the dialectical elaboration of conceptual possibilities when the need is for thorough historical work, and by references to historical figures when the need is for thorough statement of a categorial framework of analysis. The result may be, as seems to me to be the case with Aquila, that somethihg useful is done, but that neither the goal of historical insight nor that of "positive characterization" is greatly advanced. The need for more thorough historical inquiry---not necessarily of great length and complexity --is shown, for example, when Aquila is led to "distinguish between the 'ultimate' object of an BOOK REVIEWS 133 act, toward which one's attention is directed in that act, and some other object of attention" (p. 99). This distinction (by no means an insignificant one for Aquila's viewpoint) is what, at bottom, was dealt with in the rich discussions of apperception in the eighteenth through the early twentieth...

Dewey, Maslow, and Consummatory Experience

John Dewey and Abraham Maslow do not hold similar philosophies. Dewey is a thorough-going pragmatist, while Maslow might be described as a naturalistic realist. Both place great reliance and faith in science as it bears on the problems of men and society, and a study of their writing reveals some notable similarities of thought and considerable similarity in outcomes. The most striking of these is their analysis of the best and highest in experience. Dewey's approach is through an examination of experience in general culminating in the aesthetic experience; Maslow's, through a study of human nature and psychology culminating in his examination of the peak experience. One throws light on the other, and both deal similarly with this important phase of human experience. Educators, at least practicing ones, have not been overly concerned with the place of the consummatory in the schools. It is understandable, perhaps, that they are too often bogged down with the everyday, the mundane, the troublesome. But they have exhibited an overriding preoccupation with the cognitive. Schools do not often admit the transcendent, the ineffable. If these aspects of experience are to be admitted, it behooves us first of all to explicate what these mean, to examine their characteristics.