Development Of Game Theory Research Articles

Algorithmic Graph Theory, Reinforcement Learning and Game Theory in MD Simulations: From 3D Structures to Topological 2D-Molecular Graphs (2D-MolGraphs) and Vice Versa

This paper reviews graph-theory-based methods that were recently developed in our group for post-processing molecular dynamics trajectories. We show that the use of algorithmic graph theory not only provides a direct and fast methodology to identify conformers sampled over time but also allows to follow the interconversions between the conformers through graphs of transitions in time. Examples of gas phase molecules and inhomogeneous aqueous solid interfaces are presented to demonstrate the power of topological 2D graphs and their versatility for post-processing molecular dynamics trajectories. An even more complex challenge is to predict 3D structures from topological 2D graphs. Our first attempts to tackle such a challenge are presented with the development of game theory and reinforcement learning methods for predicting the 3D structure of a gas-phase peptide.

Towards Security Joint Trust and Game Theory for Maximizing Utility: Challenges and Countermeasures.

The widespread application of networks is providing a better platform for the development of society and technology. With the expansion of the scope of network applications, many issues need to be solved. Among them, the maximization of utility and the improvement of security have attracted much attention. Many existing attacks mean the network faces security challenges. The concept of trust should be considered to address these security issues. Meanwhile, the utility of the network, including efficiency, profit, welfare, etc., are concerns that should be maximized. Over the past decade, the concepts of game and trust have been introduced to various types of networks. However, there is a lack of research effort on several key points in distributed networks, which are critical to the information transmission of distributed networks, such as expelling malicious nodes quickly and accurately and finding equilibrium between energy assumption and high transmission rate. The purpose of this paper is to give a holistic overview of existing research on trust and game theory in networks. We analyzed that network utility can be maximized in terms of effectiveness, profits, and security. Moreover, a possible research agenda is proposed to promote the application and development of game theory and trust for improving security and maximizing utility.

Game theory in supply chain management: Current trends and applications

As game theory continues to be a relevant approach in evaluating supply chain coordination and competition, this paper explores the various applications and current trends of game theory to supply chain management through an exhaustive review on the literature. This work reviews more than 200 papers which cover several supply chain formations, structures, environments, and decisions together with different game theoretic concepts and applications. First, the paper elaborates on the basic concepts of Nash and Stackelberg games to allow further understanding of their applications in supply chain analysis. The review is then presented and divided into three segments: 1) the development of game theory; 2) the use of Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts in analysing supply chain management; 3) the integration of game theory to different supply chain structures, decisions, and present conditions. Moreover, descriptive analytics are also provided to highlight the distribution of trending topics in the domain field. Finally, the paper provides a summary of the review and recommendation for future works in line with using game theory for supply chain analysis.

Game theory in supply chain management: current trends and applications

As game theory continues to be a relevant approach in evaluating supply chain coordination and competition, this paper explores the various applications and current trends of game theory to supply chain management through an exhaustive review on the literature. This work reviews more than 200 papers which cover several supply chain formations, structures, environments, and decisions together with different game theoretic concepts and applications. First, the paper elaborates on the basic concepts of Nash and Stackelberg games to allow further understanding of their applications in supply chain analysis. The review is then presented and divided into three segments: 1) the development of game theory; 2) the use of Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts in analysing supply chain management; 3) the integration of game theory to different supply chain structures, decisions, and present conditions. Moreover, descriptive analytics are also provided to highlight the distribution of trending topics in the domain field. Finally, the paper provides a summary of the review and recommendation for future works in line with using game theory for supply chain analysis.

Teoriogrowe modele bezpieczeństwa narodowego – podstawowe zagadnienia i przykłady

<p>Artykuł jest zwięzłym wprowadzeniem w problematykę wykorzystania modeli teoriogrowych w badaniach bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Podzielono go na cztery części. W części pierwszej omówiono podstawowe zagadnienia teoretyczne, tj.: podział na analityczną i behawioralną teorię gier, pojęcie racjonalności graczy, założenie o wspólnej wiedzy graczy o ich racjonalności, pojęcie równowagi Nasha, pojęcie efektywności w sensie Pareto oraz klasyfikacje gier. W części drugiej opisano pokrótce ewolucję teoriogrowych analiz bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Zwrócono uwagę na związki między rozwojem teorii gier a potrzebami militarnymi. W części trzeciej wskazano przykładowy sposób użycia modeli teorii gier w badaniach bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Szczegółowo omówiono stosunki handlowe przyjmujące schemat interakcji dylematu więźnia. W toku analiz przybliżono ogólny model dylematu więźnia, grę wyjściową definiującą rozpatrywany problem oraz jego rozwiązania w postaci gry iterowanej oraz metagry. Całość rozważań zwieńczyło podsumowanie.<br />Analizy wskazują następujące zalety stosowania modeli teoriogrowych w badaniach bezpieczeństwa narodowego: 1) modele teoriogrowe znacznie upraszczają analizowane interakcje, przez co pozwalają wniknąć w głąb procesów, wydobywając te cechy i związki, które do tej pory umykały badaczom; 2) stosowanie modeli teorii gier nie wymaga od badaczy znajomości skomplikowanych formalizmów matematycznych; 3) modele teorii gier umożliwiają identyfikację dylematów społecznych, czyli sytuacji, w których zachodzi sprzeczność krótkoterminowego interesu jednostki z długoterminowym interesem społecznym.</p>

INFINITE GAMES VIA COVERING PROPERTIES IN IDEAL TOPOLOGICAL SPACES

First, we propound a comment about the Meneger (X) game. We show that player TWO has a winning strategy always per contra that player ONE. So, we define a new game, say G(C), by using the same data of the Meneger (X) without any winning strategy for both players in general. In this paper, we are using the concept of ideal topological spaces with its covering prop- erties and I-compactness to introduce infinitely long games like: G(C,I),GD(C,I),GO(C,I) and G(C � ,C). So, we show some results that explain many conditions to make anyone of players have winning strategy. Also, the efficacies of some types of ideals on the strategies for players are studied. Finally, comparisons among player's strategies through the equivalent ideal topological spaces are showed. These have been important topics of research and have been crucial in the development of game theory especially of topological game theory.

Names for Games: Locating 2 × 2 Games

Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, Stag Hunts, and other two-person two-move (2 × 2) models of strategic situations have played a central role in the development of game theory. The Robinson–Goforth topology of payoff swaps reveals a natural order in the payoff space of 2 × 2 games, visualized in their four-layer “periodic table” format that elegantly organizes the diversity of 2 × 2 games, showing relationships and potential transformations between neighboring games. This article presents additional visualizations of the topology, and a naming system for locating all 2 × 2 games as combinations of game payoff patterns from the symmetric ordinal 2 × 2 games. The symmetric ordinal games act as coordinates locating games in maps of the payoff space of 2 × 2 games, including not only asymmetric ordinal games and the complete set of games with ties, but also ordinal and normalized equivalents of all games with ratio or real-value payoffs. An efficient nomenclature can contribute to a systematic understanding of the diversity of elementary social situations; clarify relationships between social dilemmas and other joint preference structures; identify interesting games; show potential solutions available through transforming incentives; catalog the variety of models of 2 × 2 strategic situations available for experimentation, simulation, and analysis; and facilitate cumulative and comparative research in game theory.

Wykorzystanie gier decyzyjnych/symulacyjnych w naukach społecznych. Wybrane problemy

The aim of the publication is to present selected forecasting problems in social sciences. The article focused on the method of decision-making/simulation games that, especially with the development of game theory and computers, have increasingly been used in many fields. Using examples of decision/simulation games - Poznan International Model United Nations 2013/POZiMUN; S.E.N.S.E - and the online game EVE Online, the author recognised the importance of such exercises in an accurate prediction of the future. He drew special attention to the element of chance and confounding factors that may destabilise the process of prediction. He also raised the problem of decision-making in the context of classical and quantum logic.

Decision-Making/Simulation Games in the Social Sciences – Selected Problems

The subject matter of the publication is presenting selected forecasting problems in the social sciences. The article focuses on the method of decision-making/simulation games that, especially with the development of game theory and computers, have increasingly been used in many fields. Using examples of decision/simulation games, in particular Poznań International Model United Nations 2013/POZiMUN, the author recognises the importance of such exercises in an accurate prediction of the future.

A new Drama-Theoretic Method for Conflict Resolution in Management

The management profession requires managers to deal with ongoing conflict at all levels. However, there seems to be a lack of effective and appealing tools and frameworks to assist managers in the process of conflict resolution in their immediate, daily environment. This paper proposes a new Method of Conflict Resolution for managers, consisting of a toolbox – Conflict Manager – and a delivery method. The toolbox is mainly based on Drama Theory, a recent development of Game Theory that offers a balance of rigour, wide applicability and flexibility to model complex human dynamics in a simple yet effective way. The toolbox is rounded with frameworks for decision-making and strategy evaluation to assist users in the creation of appropriate and effective strategies for conflict resolution. Experimental training showed that the Method was well accepted by managers and pointed at future developments to increase its effectiveness.

Sex ratios and social evolution

Dusing's basic insight into how sex ratios evolve has been developed into a wide-ranging and successful theory that predicts both the conventional 1:1 sex ratios and numerous extraordinary ones. A surprising amount of the evidence has come from haplodiploid Hymenopteran insects, though many of these effects can also be found in other organisms, even where chromosomal sex determination mechanisms would seem to lock them into 1:1 sex ratios. Most important, this seemingly arcane topic has played very prominent roles in the development of game theory, in the debate over group selection, in supporting kin selection and parent-offspring conflict, and in the field of within-organism conflict. Many biological advances will require high tech instrumentation and deeper probing into molecular mechanisms of model organisms. But there remains room for a good theory, for adroit choice of non-standard organisms, and even for simple counting.

Introductory remarks on the history of game theory

I give some personal reactions to the development of game theory as it found application in economic analysis during the last half-century. I discuss which contributions have in fact found use and, in particular, what was the role of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in light of previous and subsequent developments.

Introduction to game theory

The basic ideas of game theory were originated from the problems of maximum and minimum given by J. von Neumann in 1928. Later, wars accelerated the study of game theory, there are many developments that contributed to the advancement of game theory, many problems of optimum appeared in economic development process. Scientists applied mathematic methods to studying game theory to make the theory more profound and perfect. The axiomatic structure of game theory was nearly complete in 1944. The path of the development of game theory started from finite to infinite, from two players to many players, from expressing gains with quantity to showing the ending of game theory with abstract result, and from certainty problems to random problems. Thus development of game theory is closely related to the economic development. In recent years, the research on the non-differentiability of Shapley value posed by Belgian Mertens is one of the advanced studies in game theory.

Théorie des Jeux et Analyse Historique des Institutions. Les institutions économiques du Moyen Age

Les institutions interviennent sur l'efficacité d'une économie puisqu'elles modifient la répartition des ressources et les relations d'échange que les agents ont entre eux. De ce fait, pour examiner leur nature et leurs effets, il n'est pas de meilleur moyen que de tirer parti de la diversité des environnements apparus dans l'histoire.Une première façon d'étudier les institutions hors-marché(non marketinstitutions)qui ont régi l'échange au cours du temps s'inspire de la théorie néo-classique qui les identifient avec les arrangements contractuels validés par le droit et les considèrent comme des substituts du marché. Une seconde — celle de l'histoire économique néo-institutionnaliste(neo-institutionaléconomie history[NIEH]) — les identifient avec les droits de propriété et les règlements qui ordonnent l'échange. Un point commun à ces deux courants est leur insistance sur le rôle de l'État et de son appareil juridique.

Deliberational Dynamics and The Foundations of Bayesian Game Theory

1. Introduction: There are two rationality concepts at work in separate areas of the theory of rational decision: EQUILIBRIUM, which is the dominant solution concept in the theory of noncooperative games and MAXIMUM EXPECTED UTILITY which is the central principle in the theory of coherent individual choice under uncertainty. In the development of game theory, the relationship between the two principles, and to a lesser extent the status of the equilibrium principle itself, has been less than crystal clear.2 This question is put in a new light if we regard deliberation as a dynamical process with informational feedback. We will take the expected utility principle as basic. One deliberates by calculating expected utility. In the simplest cases deliberation is trivial; one calculates expected utility and maximizes. But in more interesting cases, the very process of deliberation may generate information which is salient to the evaluation of the expected utilities. Then, processing costs permitting, a Bayesian deliberator will feedback that information and recalculate the expected utilities in light of the new knowledge.3 In such an interesting decision problem, deliberation can be modeled as a dynamic system. The decision maker starts in a state of indecision; calculates expected utility; moves in the direction of maximum expected utility; feeds back the information generated and recalculates; etc. In this process, his probabilities of doing the various acts evolve4 until, at the time of decision, his probabilities of doing the selected act become virtually one.

?Realism? and ?relevance? in gaming simulations

How useful are gaming simulations for the study of problems that interest human ecologists? Anatol Rapoport, a principal contributor to the development of game theory, raised this issue with the editors of Human Ecology,who in turn invited him to express his views in print. In brief, Dr. Rapoport calls into question the real-world applicability of gaming simulations, and explores its limitations. The educational function of simulation, he argues, should not be confused with the research aims of laboratory experimentation. The addition of “realistic” conditions in a gaming simulation merely complicates the experiment and reduces its theoretical significance. It does, however, have some pedagogical utility, whose implications have not yet been adequately taken into account. Dr. Rapoport considers this matter with reference to the problem of “social traps,” such as the “tragedy of the commons,” an issue which concerns many human-ecology researchers.