Development Of Analytic Philosophy Research Articles

Еще один субъект? Логико-грамматические основания вишишта-адвайта-веданты

The article analyzes the aspect of the subject-predicative relationship, the actualization of which is superficially associated with the development of analytical philosophy in the West. This question has an important philosophical deepening (from grammar through logic to ontology) also in the history of Indian thought. In particular, the Sanskrit term sāmānādhikaraṇya, which is commonly translated as ‘correlative predication’, has be­come an important ontological principle in one of the vedānta schools (viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja). Previously, this term is found in the grammar of Panini and in the related philosophy of the Bhartirhari language In viśiṣṭādvaita, this term denotes (a) a logical and grammatical method of interpreting the sacred texts, according to which all texts of śruti, despite their inconsistency, should be considered by the interpreter as equally authori­tative; (b) the principle justifying and explaining the viśiṣṭādvaitic model of ontology; (c) and the resulting only possible paradigm of liberation of the soul (bhakti, or devo­tional love of God, which is based on karma and jñāna, as a way of salvation). The analy­sis of the material of Indian philosophy is carried out in the context of the developments of Western European philosophy, in particular, Porphyry and a number of analytical philosophers (Frege, Russell, Wittshenstein). Using the example of sāmānādhikaraṇya, a different logical model of the structure of the world is presented, which makes the on­tology proposed in viśiṣṭādvaita understandable and convincing.

Эйно Кайла: логический эмпиризм в Скандинавии

The paper is devoted to the personality and philosophical views of Eino Kaila (1890–1958). The paper contains a brief biography of the Finnish philosopher, de­scribes his relationship with representatives of the Vienna Circle, gives an overview of his philosophical position. The ideas of E. Kaila are closely related to the ideas of the proponents of neopositivism. However, he resolutely rejects the phenomenalism and criticism of realism proposed by M. Schlick and R. Carnap, and also critically evaluates the principle of verification, the possibility of translating any given single sentence of a scientific theory into the language of experience and the possibility of final verification or falsification of scientific theories. Thus, E. Kaila in a sense an­ticipates the holistic point of view in the spirit of W.V.O. Quine and a number of I. Lakatos ideas. One of the main ideas of the thinker consists in the adoption of structural realism, according to which structures exist before objects, appear in regu­larities and invariants, and are grasped by researchers by means of abstraction and mathematization. The professional activity of E. Kaila played a significant role in defining the philosophical atmosphere in the Scandinavian countries and served there as the beginning of the development of analytic philosophy, which later be­came the dominant philosophical tradition.

Oskari Kuusela, Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy

João Esteves da Silva James Conant has described Oskari Kuusela’s first book, The Struggle against Dogmatism (2008), in the following way: Rather than being framed around the assumption that the crucial difference between an early and a later Wittgenstein lies in their respective philosophical

Метод Вітґенштайна і сучасні студії з історії аналітичної філософії. Kuusela, O. (2019). Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy. Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Метод Вітґенштайна і сучасні студії з історії аналітичної філософії. Kuusela, O. (2019). Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy. Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford UP.

The Turn to Logic and the Transformation of an Ancient Quarrel

The development of an analytic tradition in philosophy is bound up with a newly intensified interest in logic, and Frege’s development of a new form of logical notation — an early form of what is now called predicate logic — is one of the conditions that made that tradition possible. At the same time, the development of analytic philosophy is also tied to a turn away from what had until that time been a natural and often mutually beneficial exchange with poetry, drama, and fiction. It is easy to assume that the turn away from literature is a necessary consequence of the turn to logic. This essay argues that in fact there are good reasons to think that if we follow the turn to formal logic through, it instead pushes philosophy back into a transformed and perhaps deeper kind of conversation with literature. The terms that organize this renewed conversation are those of a shared preoccupation not with certain ideas or content but with the power of form. The upshot is that the turn to formal logic returns philosophy to a transformed version of the “ancient quarrel” with which it began.

Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy, by Oskari Kuusela

Review of Kuusela, Oskari. Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy, by Oskari Kuusela

Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy, by Oskari Kuusela

OskariKuusela, Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re‐examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford, UK: University Press, 2019). xi + 297, £55.00 hb.

OskariKuusela, Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re‐examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford, UK: University Press, 2019). xi + 297, £55.00 hb.

Analysis as Translation

Different notions of analysis have been both theorized and put to use in early analytic philosophy. Two of them stand out: connective analysis and analysis as paraphrase. The latter played a central role in the development of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine and beyond. With the advent of formal semantics of natural language in the 1970s, paraphrase came to be characterizable as translation into a formal “target language”. While I claim that the method cannot achieve its original philosophical aims, I insist that, in spite of them, it is far from being a theoretically empty operation and that it lives on in some contemporary philosophical enterprises.

The reception of the western thought in contemporary Russian philosophy

The article comprises three parts. Part I contains an overview of the areas in the analysis of modern French philosophy that have been of the greatest relevance to Russian researchers over the last years. We conclude that numerous aspects of the French philosophical thought of the twentieth century are well represented in the research of Russian authors, who also point out the emerging trends in its development. Part II deals with the development of analytic philosophy in Russia within the framework of such areas as “critique of bourgeois philosophy”, a purely ideological stand only nominally related to philosophy, logic, and the history of philosophy and theoretical research. Part III contains a periodization of the history of phenomenology in Russia, pointing out the most important achievements of the contemporary Russian scholars of phenomenology as well as their understanding of the essence, the problems, and the aims of phenomenological philosophy. We also indicate the tendencies within the development of the discipline in the Russian Federation.

Philosophie, Logik, Naturwissenschaft, Geschichte

Abstract Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy – and its relationship to continental philosophy – if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength – since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity – and its weakness – since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”

Philosophy, Logic, Science, History

AbstractAnalytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”

Phenomenology and the Development of Analytic Philosophy

Phenomenology and the Development of Analytic Philosophy

Forgotten Vintage

Anyone interested in the development of analytic philosophy will likely find Russell's Theory of Knowledge a work of great importance in itself; but anyone who, in addition, is fascinated by scholarly mystery and the psychology of philosophers will certainly regard its publication at last, nearly three-quarters of a century after Russell abandoned it unfinished—principally because of the young Wittgenstein's virulent criticisms—as an event nothing short of momentous. Theory of Knowledge may well have played as important a role in Wittgenstein's early work (from the Notebooks to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) as the Tractatus itself did in his later writings—each representing for Wittgenstein an attitude, a philosophical method, and above all a theory of propositions, against which he was driven to react. But it would be a sad irony if renewed interest in Wittgenstein's early work were to eclipse all over again the very piece of writing which helped move him to creative rebellion. Unlike the two previous volumes in the Collected Papers (numbers 1 and 12), which broaden rather than deepen our knowledge of his philosophical growth, Theory of Knowledge deserves to become a standard text in Russell studies. It contains crucial material not found elsewhere in his writings and hence it fills a gap—ironically,, a gap Russell himself created—in what we know of his thought in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I, when his career at Cambridge was at its apogee.

I. Kanto apriorizmas ir analitinė filosofija

Straipsnio tikslas yra aptarti I. Kanto apriorizmo teorines prielaidas ir pasekti jų istorinį likimą analitinėje filosofijoje. Aprašoma I. Newtono natūrfilosofijos ir kosmologinių problemų sprendimo įtaka I. Kanto transcendentaliniam idealizmui ir transcendentaliniam metodui. Parodomas I. Kanto nekritiškumas I. Newtono mechnikos dėsnių ir Euklido geometrijos atžvilgiu: transcendentalinėje estetikoje dėstoma apriorinių jutiminės kontempliacijos formų koncepcija tėra seno požiūrio į geometrijos aksiomas, kaip intuityviai teisingas, sistematizacija. Istoriškai rekonstruojama I. Newtono mechanikos apodiktiškumo problema. Apžvelgiamas I. Kanto apriorinių pažinimo formų koncepcijos ir analitinės filosofijos santykis. Analitinėje filosofijoje I. Kanto sintetinis matematikos aiškinimas buvo kategoriškai atmestas. I. Kantas neskyrė matematinės geometrijos nuo fizinės, todėl jis supainiojo apriorinį matematinės ir sintetinės fizinės geometrijos pobūdį. Taip pat griežtai atmetama I. Kanto koncepcija, kad gamtotyros žinios yra apodiktinės. Analitinės filosofijos požiūriu, tik matematinės teorijos gali būti logiškai pagrindžiamos, o gamtotyros teorijos nepagrindžiamos, vadinasi, nėra būtinos.