Participation Of Developing Countries Research Articles

TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION OF THE EAEU WITH REGIONAL AND MEGAREGIONAL INTEGRATION ASSOCIATIONS: TRENDS, DIRECTION, BENEFITS AND THREATS

The article describes the reasons of participation of less developed countries in the world integration processes, initiated by developed and newly industrialized countries in conditions of intensification of geopolitical and geoeconomic risks in the modern world economy, possible directions of cooperation between them are determined. The assessment of mega-regionality of integration blocks, of their ability to carry out inter-block cooperation and economic integration is given. The state of trade and economic cooperation of the EAEU with integration associations (EU, ASEAN, APEC, SCO), mega-blocks (CETA, RCEP) and their participating countries for the period 2010-2017 is analyzed. On the basis of this features and tendencies of development of trade of the Eurasian Economic Union with the mentioned integration groups are distinguished, the potential benefits of the EAEU participation in the global and mega-regional integration processes initiated by the countries-leaders of integration agreements, as well as from trade and economic cooperation with them, and threats to the Union in general and to the participating countries is defined. The priority directions and algorithms of development of trade and economic cooperation of the EAEU with the considered integration blocks in the format «block – block» and «block – country» are noted, the basis of which is the determination of points of entry – countries and entry goods.

Lessons from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on inclusiveness across geographies and stakeholders

There have been many calls in policy and academia for more inclusiveness in science-policy interfaces, but there is as yet insufficient clarity as to what such inclusiveness means and how to achieve it in the context of international organisations. This paper analyses how inclusive the IPCC is across geographies and stakeholders. Building on the distinction between access and active participation, it examines the involvement of developing countries and NGOs in the Panel’s assessment process.The analysis shows that more inclusive institutional set-ups in international science-policy organisations do not automatically lead to greater credibility, salience and legitimacy of knowledge production processes (Mitchell et al., 2006). For instance, inclusive access does not per se guarantee active participation as the latter depends on a variety of factors including resources and the capacity of actors to engage. Furthermore, in institutional contexts the idea of inclusiveness is necessarily subject to operational interpretations. How these interpretations relate to the representativeness of those who participate in the process affects the relevance of knowledge to its users’ needs. Finally, there are political elements to inclusiveness as more powerful actors may be unwilling to renegotiate the balance of power to expand access to stakeholders.The paper concludes that these nuances should be taken into account in the IPCC and other international science-policy institutions. It also urges the Panel to address the developing country participation gap and explore institutional avenues for expanding access to non-state stakeholders in order to increase the credibility, salience and legitimacy of its processes and shift to solutions-oriented assessments.

BEPS Action Plan: Global Tax Cooperation

Given the dynamics of economic and financial globalization, national tax authorities often do not have adequate tools to effectively combat tax avoidance practices that exploit gaps in the existing tax rules. To address the global problem of tax base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Group of 20 (G20) have consolidated their efforts on an equal footing. Their joint BEPS Action Plan allowed to involve more than 100 countries, both developing and advanced, in designing and implementing rules aimed at aligning the generation of profits and their taxation and increasing the predictability, transparency and flexibility of the international tax environment for business.This article examines the history of the BEPS project, emphasizing the mode of OECD-G20 engagement in global tax governance, describes the key recommendations made by international institutions to tackle BEPS and forecasts further developments in the area. The author pays special attention to the mechanisms designed to stimulate participation by non-OECD and non-G20 members in the BEPS project and the stance of business on the proposed reforms. He concludes that the work on BEPS is far from finished. Different interpretations of standards, risks of strengthening tax competition between countries and potentially excessive tax burdens on businesses should be addressed. In this regard, OECD and G20 should strengthen their efforts to ensure the participation of developing countries and the private sector, which would stimulate other reforms in international taxation to support global growth and development.

The Governance of Climate Change Adaptation Finance—An Overview and Critique

At COP21 in Paris parties to the UNFCCC reiterated the goal of USD 100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020 and agreed to set a more ambitious target by 2025. A significant portion of these funds is intended to flow through the newly operational Green Climate Fund and will be dedicated to climate change adaptation in developing countries. Meanwhile, growing support for adaptation is already flowing through diverse channels. International debates continue, not only over the amount of adaptation finance, but also with regard to fund governance. In particular, developing countries are seeking greater country control through increased participation in high-level decision-making and ‘direct access’ to adaptation funds. This paper proposes an overview of the primary channels currently employed in the emerging adaptation finance field, with particular attention to governance characteristics relevant to international debates. This analysis suggests that while both developing-country participation in decision-making and ‘direct access’ to funds have increased in some cases, the vast majority of adaptation finance continues to flow through traditional development aid channels and does not respond to developing countries’ concerns regarding fund governance. If adaptation finance structures are not perceived as legitimate by developing countries, a global, coordinated response to climate change may be put at risk. Further, the implications, in terms of social justice and the effectiveness of adaptation, of conducting adaptation along the lines of development are currently under-represented in the literature. Given the goal of mobilising, for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries, USD 100 billion per year by 2020, there is an urgent need for empirical research in this domain.

Member Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Can Developing Countries

Reflections on the progress of the WTO over the last two decades highlights low developing country participation in its dispute settlement system as a fundamental failing of the multinational trading system. Recurrently, this low participation rate has been attributed to the cost of the WTO’s legalistic model in Panel and Appellate Body proceedings, creating a concern of bias. Yet, by focussing on the inherent costs of the system, critics ignore the real ways in which developing countries can and have used the WTO dispute settlement system to offset the costs. Therefore, this article argues that developing countries are more disadvantaged in their lack of internal capacity to identify and progress legitimate violations to the WTO. Only by addressing the capacity issue can an accurate cost and benefit analysis of the WTO dispute settlement system take place. NB: full text available here: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1493222/

Developing Country Success in WTO Disputes

Developing country participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) has been studied extensively in the literature, with many scholars concluding that developing countries are underrepresented due to a lack of domestic legal capacity. I expand study of developing countries in the DSM by looking at legal capacity's role in the panel stage of disputes. I consider the impact of newly available legal aid and create a novel measure for legal expertise that draws from domestic Supreme Court literature. I find that legal capacity variables are not the predictors of success; panel decisions are driven by strategic considerations.

Cooperation to Reduce Developing Country Emissions

Without effective developing country participation in climate mitigation it will be impossible to meet global concentration and climate change targets. However, developing countries are unwilling and, in many cases, unable to bear the mitigation cost alone. They need huge transfers of resources – financial, knowledge, technology, and capability – from industrialised countries. In this paper, we evaluate instruments that can induce such resource transfers, including tradable credits, mitigation funds and results-based agreements. We identify key constraints that affect the efficiency and political potential of different instruments, including two-sided private information leading to adverse selection, moral hazard and challenging negotiations; incomplete contracts leading to under-investment; and high levels of uncertainty about emissions paths and mitigation potential. We consider evidence on the poor performance of current approaches to funding developing country mitigation – primarily purchasing offsets through the Clean Development Mechanism – and explore to what extent other approaches can address problems with offsets. We emphasise the wide spectrum of situations in developing countries and suggest that solutions also need to be differentiated and that no one policy will suffice: some policies will be complements, while others are substitutes. We conclude by identifying research needs and proposing a straw man to broaden the range of “contracting” options considered.

Making Global Trade Governance Work for Development: Perspectives and Priorities from Developing Countries

Introduction Carolyn Deere Birkbeck Part I. Enduring Development Challenges and New Agendas for Global Trade Governance: 1. Globalization, development, and democracy Jose Antonio Ocampo 2. The United Nations and the Millennium development goals: what roles in and beyond the governance of global trade? Laskhmi Puri 3. The interactions of trade, macroeconomic policies and sustainability: implications for global trade governance Alejandro Nadal 4. A sustainable development perspective on global trade governance Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz and Trineesh Biswas Part II. Roles and Responsibilities in Global Trade Governance: Diversity in Developing Country Priorities and Strategies: 5. New powers in the club: the challenges of global trade governance Amrita Narlikar 6. China's ascent in global trade governance: from rule taker to rule shaker and, maybe rule maker? Henry Gao 7. LDC priorities for improved global trade governance Atul Kaushik and Julian Mukiibi 8. Priorities for small states in global trade governance Edwin Laurent 9. Improving the participation of small developing countries in the governance of the multilateral trading system Richard Bernal Part III. Strengthening Multilateralism: Priorities for WTO Reform: 10. The WTO, democracy, and development: a view from the South Bhupinder Chimni 11. Reclaiming development in the world trading system revisited Yong-Shik Lee 12. Fostering developing country engagement in the dispute settlement system: outstanding challenges and governance implications Niall Meagher 13. Rethinking the governance of aid for trade David Luke and Luisa Bernal 14. Strengthening WTO surveillance: making transparency work for developing countries Arunabha Ghosh 15. Why not an Ombudsman at the WTO? A proposal for debate Felix Pena Part IV. WTO Decision-Making Processes: 16. Towards fair and inclusive decision-making in WTO negotiations Brendan Vickers and Faizel Ismail 17. Revisiting the single undertaking: towards a more balanced approach to WTO negotiations Miguel Rodriguez and Marie Wilke 18. Enhancing developing country participation in global trade governance through South-South coalitions in the World Trade Organization Vicente Yu 19. Inclusive trade governance: participation of stakeholders from the national to the multilateral levels Rashid Kaukab 20. Global trade governance and development: the WTO accession conundrum Carlos Primo Braga and Olivier Cattaneo Part V. Conclusion: 21. Development-oriented agendas for global trade governance: a summary of proposals Carolyn Deere Birkbeck.

Países em desenvolvimento em uma ordem internacional em transformação: coalizões e soluções de disputas na OMC

Este artigo analisa a atuação dos países em desenvolvimento (PEDs) no âmbito da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), bem como o impacto dessa atuação na dinâmica da organização. A análise é articulada a partir de dois aspectos: as coalizões envolvendo PEDs e a participação desses países no Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC). Os autores concluem que o recurso a mecanismos institucionais constitui a principal estratégia dos PEDs para aumentar sua capacidade relativamente aos países desenvolvidos (PDs). Nesse sentido, os PEDs têm atuado dentro da estrutura de comércio existente, buscando adaptá-la a seus interesses. Esses países lograram criar e manter coalizões na OMC, apesar de sua diversidade econômica e política. Quanto à sua participação no OSC, ainda que o número de painéis abertos por PEDs tenha aumentado, essas disputas ainda concentram-se em um número pequeno de PEDs - principalmente Brasil e Índia.

REDD+ and climate: thinking beyond carbon

Scientific research shows that deforestation can drive climate not only through changes in carbon stocks but also through biophysical feedbacks. These can alter the climate effectiveness of emission reductions and will thus have important implications for REDD+. Explored here are the implications for motivating tropical developing country participation, and for motivating efforts to measure integrated biophysical–carbon climate impacts of land use change. In the tropics, biophysical impacts of deforestation are found to enhance local warming, which suggests that REDD+ participants benefit from a locally concentrated good in the form of local climate impacts, in addition to the global public good in the form of emissions reductions. To capture the breadth of climate impacts of land use change, composite biophysical–carbon indices have been proposed, but are hampered by issues of scale and uncertainty. These issues must at least be acknowledged in policy discussions to allow land-based initiatives to move forward in a holistic manner.

Continuity and change in Russia's climate negotiations position and strategy

The positions and strategies of Russia in the international climate negotiations are examined. The shift towards a more integrated negotiation strategy and its use of rhetoric at the Copenhagen meeting reflected both a change in Russia's domestic elite and its bureaucratic politics, and a desire to appear to be a responsible global power. However, climate change is still an issue of only limited public salience, which allows Russia some leeway in formulating its negotiating positions. Indeed, Russia is still unpredictable in the negotiations and its primary concern remains advancing unconstrained economic growth. Russia's recent decision to abandon, along with Canada and Japan, the ‘Kyoto-2’ track of negotiations shows that its role in future climate negotiations depends on broadening developing country participation and the positions of the members of the Umbrella Group (most notably, the US) and China. The analysis thus lends support to negotiation theories that emphasize the two-level interplay between international and domestic politics and the relevance of contingent strategies and coalitions in shaping policy options.

China and India’s participation in global climate negotiations

In this paper, we discuss a range of issues concerning developing country participation in current global climate change mitigation negotiations, especially India and China. We argue that the problem of redefining ‘common yet differentiated responsibilities’ in a way which allows developing countries room to pursue their individual development goals while still achieving the necessary level of carbon mitigation is central to the debate. The choice of negotiating instruments, effective technology transfer and financial support, and other related issues have been raised principally by China and India, and may also be raised by several other countries. Kyoto non-compliance by Annex 1 countries will also greatly impact the negotiating power of China and India and other developing countries. We conclude that, once basic principles are clearly defined, the greatest incentive for China and India to participate in climate change negotiations is the prospect of future negotiating rounds that can be linked to a large number of climate change related issues, such as intellectual property, the potential for financial transfers and trade/market access.

Chad P. Bown. 2009. Self-Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press)

In Self-Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement, Chad Bown delineates the many complexities of developing country participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), from the multilateral trade negotiations for reducing commercial barriers to the “self-enforcement” mechanism of the global trade regime. As the WTO does not itself initiate or prosecute cases of violations but provides the neutral forum for the arbitration of trade disputes among its members, the rules of trade codified in the WTO’s agreements are “self-enforcing,” and it is incumbent on the member countries and affected firms to actively pursue their rights under the WTO agreements through legal recourse to the process under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). A consistent theme of the book, and one that would find wide agreement in the literature, is that developing countries face significant challenges in their ability to self-enforce market access commitments made by WTO members. Absent self-enforcement, Bown argues, enforcement is not possible and thus the benefits offered by the rules-based WTO agreements remain out of reach for the world’s poorer trading states. The book thus emphasizes this linkage between the WTO agreements and the self-enforcement needs of developing countries. It identifies the systemic weaknesses of the WTO’s dispute settlement process that make it difficult for firms and policymakers in developing countries to fully engage this process. The main obstacle, Bown contends, is the cost of self-enforcement, which determines the ease with which developing country governments and firms can navigate the legal labyrinth of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The central finding of this book is that developing countries lack the information necessary to identify WTO-inconsistent trade policies in other member countries and to self-enforce the latter’s WTO commitments. As information gathering requires technical information from economic analysis, legal knowledge of WTO agreements, and political analysis of compliance and reform in other WTO Rev Int Organ (2010) 5:497–499 DOI 10.1007/s11558-010-9083-4

Developing countries, dispute settlement, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law

Critical appraisals of the current and potential benefits from developing country engagement in the WTO focus mainly on the Doha Round of negotiations. This paper examines a different aspect of developing country participation in the WTO: use of the WTO dispute settlement system to enforce foreign market access rights already negotiated in earlier rounds of multilateral negotiations. We examine data on developing country use from 1995 through 2008 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to enforce foreign market access. The data reveal three notable trends: developing countries' sustained rate of self-enforcement actions despite declining use of the DSU by developed countries, developing countries' increased use of the DSU to self-enforce their access to the markets of developing as well as developed countries, and the prevalence of disputes targeting highly observable causes of lost foreign market access, such as antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards. The paper also examines how introduction of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) into the WTO system in 2001 has affected developing countries' use of the DSU to self-enforce their foreign market access rights. A first pass at the data indicates that developing country use of the ACWL mirrors their use of the DSU more broadly; the ACWL has had little effect in terms of introducing new countries to DSU self-enforcement. A closer look at the data reveals evidence on at least three channels through which the ACWL may be enhancing developing countries' ability to self-enforce foreign market access: increased initiation of sole-complainant cases, more extensive pursuit of the DSU legal process for any given case, and initiation of disputes over smaller values of lost trade.

Developing Countries, Dispute Settlement, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law

Critical appraisals of the current and potential benefits from developing country engagement in the WTO focus mainly on the Doha Round of negotiations. This paper examines a different aspect of developing country participation in the WTO: Use of the WTO dispute settlement system to enforce foreign market access rights already negotiated in earlier rounds of multilateral negotiations. We examine data on developing country use from 1995 through 2008 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to enforce foreign market access. The data reveal three notable trends: Developing countries’ sustained rate of self-enforcement actions despite declining use of the DSU by developed countries, developing countries’ increased use of the DSU to self-enforce their access to the markets of developing as well as developed country markets, and the prevalence of disputes targeting highly observable causes of lost foreign market access, such as antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards. The paper also examines how introduction of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) into the WTO system in 2001 has affected developing countries’ use of the DSU to self-enforce their foreign market access rights. A first pass at the data indicates that developing country use of the ACWL mirrors their use of the DSU more broadly; the ACWL has had little effect in terms of introducing new countries to DSU self-enforcement. A closer look at the data reveals evidence on at least three channels through which the ACWL may be enhancing developing countries’ ability to self-enforce foreign market access: increased initiation of sole-complainant cases, more extensive pursuit of the DSU legal process for any given case, and initiation of disputes over smaller values of lost trade.

Trading Profiles and Developing Country Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System

It has been alleged since its inception that the WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) mechanism is biased against developing countries, as manifested in e.g. allegedly too low rates of dispute initiation. To shed light on this issue, this study analyses the determinants of developing country participation in the DS system, using bilateral industry-level trade data, and a data set on dispute initiation that is significantly richer than what has been employed in the literature. But the study also points to a number of fundamental conceptual and data problems that beset the whole empirical literature that seeks to draw policy conclusions based on country participation in the DS system. While perhaps appreciated by researchers working in this area, these problems appear to go unnoticed by practitioners drawing on this literature.

Justification of criticism of the international financial institutions

As more than half a century has passed since the establishment of the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank), this paper analyzes the opinion that these institutions have not accomplished their mission. They generally admit that they have not succeeded in the activities that they set out to accomplish, a propos of gathering funds for countries faced with economic gaps and helping them to maintain long term economic growth and development. We show that these financial institutions have done nothing to reduce poverty and financial disparities, to increase their own transparency, responsibility and management, especially with the public participation of developing countries, or to create a more effective loans system. In this paper the main goal of research is to explore the arguments pro and contra the strategic effect, policy, and working methodology of the international financial institutions in view of finding a solution to the global financial crisis and global prevalent financial problems, and also to consider the reasons for the justification or otherwise of their being part of the global financial system.

Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication

The potential for international law to reduce power asymmetries depends on weaker countries learning to navigate the legal system. This paper examines the use of courts by developing countries to defend their trade interests. Power relations and low capacity may prevent these countries from fully participating in the international trade system. Yet some developing countries have been among the most active participants in GATT/WTO adjudication. We argue that high startup costs for using trade litigation are a barrier to developing country use of the dispute settlement process. Analysis of dispute initiation from 1975 to 2003 shows that past experience in trade adjudication, as either a complainant or a defendant, increases the likelihood that a developing country will initiate disputes. As weaker countries overcome these initial capacity constraints they will increasingly benefit from the international legal structures they have joined.

An agenda for change in U.S. climate policies? Presidential ambitions and congressional powers

The U.S. membership in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) constituted an important element in the Bush administration’s voluntary and non-committing ‘soft-law’ approach to climate change. With the inauguration of President Barack Obama, the U.S. has embarked on a shift in its climate policy towards a legislative, ‘hard-law’ strategy. Obama’s approach implies that the distribution of interests in Congress becomes more significant. In this article, we assess the rules and procedures governing the relationship between the president and the Congress embedded in the U.S. Constitution and explore implications of a stronger congressional involvement in U.S. climate policies for President Obama’s ability to realise his climate policy ambitions at both the domestic and the international levels. We argue that the strong relationship between natural resource dependence (coal and oil) and opposition to climate policies is a constant feature of the U.S. climate policy debate. In order to succeed, Obama must break the enduring gridlock characterising congressional debate in this policy area by designing policies that, through compromise and compensation, can mobilise the support of oil- and coal-state representatives in Congress. The acceptability of an international climate treaty in Congress, moreover, depends inter alia on the resolution of the difficult issue of developing country participation. Success may be enhanced by using the APP and the Major Economies Initiative as informal arenas for negotiation and sector-based cooperation, thus providing a much-needed supplement to the UN-based negotiation process.

How far can developing country commitments go in an immediate post-2012 climate regime?

To point out the direction and focus of future international climate negotiations, this paper discusses how far developing country commitments can go in an immediate post-2012 climate regime. The paper argues that developing country commitments are most unlikely to go beyond the defined polices and measures in this timeframe. On this basis, the paper suggests that, rather than attempting the unrealistic goal, international climate negotiations may instead need to initially frame the post-2012 developing country participation in terms of certain policies and policies that I envisioned a decade ago. This conclusion does not change, as Barack Obama becomes the US President and the Democrats have regained control over both US House of Representatives and Senate. However, it should be emphasized that his stance on climate issues and how ambitious US commitments would be under his administration are going to be critical for developing countries to take bold steps themselves and to even agree to reflect those national commitments in a global deal.