Deterrence Posture Research Articles

Reassessing NATO’s deterrence and defence posture in the Baltics: rebalancing strategic priorities to counter Russian hybrid aggression

ABSTRACT Russia's full-scale (re)invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 has energised longstanding security concerns of the Baltic states. To ensure their security, NATO implemented an enhanced Forward Presence to deter Russian military aggression. This article questions the utility of NATO's conventional deterrent posture rooted in Cold War thinking and argues that its deterrent function is limited, given Russia's different strategic outlook towards the Baltics in contrast to Ukraine. The following analysis explores Russia's strategic interests and why Moscow pursues different goals towards the Baltics in the geo-strategic realm, juxtaposing them with Russia's unflinching approach toward Ukraine. Further, the article argues that Russia relies more on active measures and unconventional tools of statecraft to exert influence on NATO member states such as sabotage, intimidation, cyber-operations, and malign influence. The implication is that Russia's hybrid approach requires a multifaceted strategy that should be updated from NATO's posture in the Baltics.

Japan’s potential assistance in South Korea’s nuclear deterrence and defense

As North Korea emphasized its “second mission,” the reunification of the two Koreas, with its nuclear weapons, South Korea has been mobilizing all potential resources to deter North Korea’s attempt. Indeed, it rapidly improved its relations with Japan as well as strengthened the U.S. extended deterrence through the “Washington Declaration” in early 2023. The United States, South Korea, and Japan even initiated their trilateral summit meeting to discuss their combined deterrence posture against North Korea. This article evaluates South Korea’s current nuclear preparedness, including preemptive/preventive strikes, missile defense, and civil defense, identifies weaknesses, and analyzes whether Japan can mitigate the weakness.

NATO's new front: deterrence moves eastward

Abstract Why has NATO taken so long in adapting its deterrence strategy to Russian revisionism and extending its military presence to the eastern allies? The setting up of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Poland and the Baltic states offers a critical case for examining the changing understandings of allied deterrence in the post-post-Cold War era. eFP is a story of negotiating the political acceptability and military credibility of NATO's modern extended deterrence strategy in the exposed eastern flank, and the navigation of the alliance security dilemma in relation to Russia while buttressing the eastern allies' physical and NATO's ontological security. This article traces NATO's extended conventional deterrence posture in the eastern flank from the adoption of the tripwire model shortly after Russia's annexation of Crimea to the commitment to defend ‘every inch of Allied territory’ via embracing the forward defence stance in 2022. Mapping the evolutionary curve of NATO's post-enlargement politics of deterrence through documentary analysis and interviews with diplomats and military representatives in NATO headquarters and national capitals, the article makes two contributions. Conceptually, it dissects the political rationalities and historical analogies underpinning contemporary allied deterrence strategy and posture in NATO's eastern frontline. Empirically, the study illustrates how allied deterrence is made to matter on the ground, and why this matters for deterrence credibility.

Sailing close to the wind: Japan’s forward deterrence posture toward the Taiwan Strait

ABSTRACT Some scholars claim that Japan’s 2022 documents mark a critical juncture in security policy. Is this the case? I argue for a positive answer but, based on deterrence concepts, not for the reasons advanced. Counterstrike capabilities and other aspects of the documents pinpointed by scholars are more adaptations of, than deviations from, past deterrence practices. An overlooked and more substantial evolution is taking place amid an intensifying deterrence-entrapment dilemma: the adoption of a forward deterrence posture aimed at preventing crises in the Taiwan Strait through the projection of general deterrent effects. This posture constitutes a critical juncture because it sets Japan on the path of becoming a potent regional security actor. It also raises questions about Tokyo’s ability to keep a balanced approach toward China.

As a Man Is, So Is His Company

Amid its confrontation with the West, Moscow faces the pressing need to reexamine its approach to alliance-building. Currently Moscow has to foster low-profile countersanction alignments. Meanwhile, the prospect of an armed clash with the United States and NATO makes one think about alliances that would strengthen Russia’s conventional deterrence. Formalizing defense commitments with China becomes an important prerequisite for addressing the increasingly reckless Western coercion. The traditional counterarguments against a Russia-China alliance appear obsolete now that the U.S. directly designates Russia and China as adversaries, openly expands its military presence at their borders, gears up military buildup, and mobilizes its allies. For Russia, an alliance with China would diminish reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation and increase flexibility of its deterrence posture.

NATO at 75 Years: A Guide to the Past and a Roadmap for the Future

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reaches its 75th- year anniversary, it is important to reflect on the past, examine the present, and to imagine the future of the alliance. NATO has had periodic self-reflections in the past, including the influential 1967 Harmel Report. Importantly, the report laid out the rationale for a dual-track NATO policy that would retain a strong deterrence posture while moving toward a détente with the Soviet Union and later toward cooperation with Russia. While Russia’s war against Ukraine rages, it is impossible to return to a more cooperative relationship with Russia. Yet, NATO’s history demonstrates that conflict with Russia is not inevitable. In any case, only a strong NATO can prevent that conflict and provide stability to the transatlantic region.

The Linguistic Factor in the Deterrence Conversation between Russia and the West: If and How Russians Understand the Meaning of “Deterrence?”

Given Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine and its hostile remarks toward its NATO neighbours, the question of why the credible deterrence posture of the Alliance is not producing the desired results is becoming increasingly important. Either Russian political leaders do not want to comply with the Western credible deterrence posture, or they do not understand what is expected from them. Linguistic factors (e.g., the ‘lost in translation’ effect) affect the effectiveness of the conversation on deterrence between Russia and the West, including NATO. The Russian language does not have one unambiguous equivalent for the Western term “deterrence.” There are several possible translations for deterrence in Russian, including sderzhivaniye, ustrasheniye, sderzhivaniye putem ustrasheniya, sderzhivaniye prinuzhdeniyem, as well as others. These terms are not synonymous, with each having its own different meaning and some being used in Russian military-political theory, where they refer to different concepts. The current study focuses on the most visible linguistic complications in the deterrence dialogue between Russia and the West. Based on the current study, it would often be more reasonable to talk to the Russian political and military elite about containment or coercion, which are more common and have clear, specific meanings in Russian.

The US and South Korea: The Trouble with Nuclear Assurance

As US officials have grown more anxious about the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence, they have placed renewed emphasis on nuclear-assurance measures. The hope is that closer exercises and consultations can reassure allies, strengthen deterrence postures and reduce the risk that an ally could pursue their own nuclear weapons. However, recent developments in the US–South Korea alliance suggest that nuclear assurance is not only ineffective at reassuring Seoul but may also be fuelling proliferation risks. By raising the salience of nuclear weapons within the alliance, nuclear assurance reinforces the fiction that South Korea’s defence depends on nuclear use. Misunderstanding the risks and potential of nuclear assurance has fuelled calls for a South Korean nuclear-weapons programme and obstructed the alliance’s ability to adapt and improve its deterrence posture.

The Necessity to Discuss ‘Deterrence Failure’ Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Threat

This article introduces the ‘deterrence failure’ concept and applies it to North Korea’s nuclear threat situation. For this purpose, it selects five factors, including retaliation posture; credibility of retaliation; probability of the challenger’s success; challenger’s irrational leader; and situational desperateness, to evaluate the US–South Korea nuclear deterrence posture against North Korea. Except for the retaliation posture, most factors are very concerning. Therefore, to strengthen their deterrence posture against North Korea, the United States and South Korea should take a few practical measures to ensure the implementation of the US extended deterrence, including the forward-deployment of more US retaliation assets around the Korean Peninsula.

Ideology and the Red Button: How Ideology Shapes Nuclear Weapons’ Use Preferences in Europe

Abstract Does partisan ideology influence whether Europeans are willing to use nuclear weapons, and if so, how? The US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe have been at the core of European security since the Cold War, but we have still yet to learn what would make Europeans be willing to support their use. In this paper, we present the results of a survey, in which we asked citizens in Germany and the Netherlands about their views on the use of the US nuclear weapons stationed on their territory in four distinct scenarios. Our results indicate that voters of right-wing parties are more likely to approve of the use of nuclear weapons in both countries. There are, however, important differences between the two countries in terms of the degree to which the participants oppose the use of nuclear weapons. These results have implications for NATO's nuclear deterrence posture.

Investigating nuclear-armed North Korea's “strategic” challenge and options for the United States and South Korea

This study analyzes the challenge of North Korea, which has managed to have a strategic level of nuclear weapons and suggests a few options for the United States and South Korea to address this challenge. For this purpose, it examines the theoretical backgrounds of the extended deterrence and minimal deterrence strategies, as well as the contrasting perceptions of North Korea's nuclear armament. Then, it analyzes the competition between U.S. extended deterrence and North Korea's minimal deterrence strategy and evaluates a few possible options to deal with the current strategic level of the North Korean nuclear threat. Through its analysis, this study ascertained that North Korea developed its nuclear weapons to make the United States leave South Korea and to reunify Korea on its terms. North Korea adopted a minimal deterrence strategy to counter-deter the U.S. extended deterrence and came to have considerable capabilities to implement the strategy, such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and potentially SSBNs. The United States and its allies in Northeast Asia should clearly recognize the opportunity cost of failed denuclearization negotiations and consider more options than strengthening the current U.S. extended deterrence posture. They need to seriously discuss the establishment of another nuclear-sharing system in Northeast Asia and should not exclude the nuclear weapons development option of South Korea.

The fragility of general deterrence: The United States and China in maritime East Asia

The last decade has witnessed the gradual erosion of the maritime status quo in East Asia, as the United States proved unable to curb Chinese challenges in the East and South China seas. This article argues that this phenomenon is linked to the erosion of US general deterrence posture in the region. It examines the three main factors that have contributed to this erosion: an enduring imbalance of interests between Beijing and Washington, a rapidly evolving local balance of power, and the employment by China of strategies that have allowed it to efficiently circumvent US weak red lines.

Remarks by Emma Verhoeff

Questions surrounding the logic of nuclear deterrence (as well as the subtleties of signaling and risks of inadvertent escalation) are very relevant right now. In fact, the current crisis reveals the need to invest (and to keep investing) in knowledge and expertise in this field. Nuclear threats have not been on our mind for a few years but all of a sudden, it is at the forefront again. The nuclear threat is back and we have to work with that. Regarding deterrence, in my personal opinion, NATO and the United States have been quite understanding of what deterrence means. We have been pretty clear in signaling to Russia that we are closely following the steps being taken and that a nuclear war and/or attack would be totally unacceptable. At the same time, we have been reinforcing our defense and our deterrence posture. It is about striking the right balance between words and deeds. The United State has done a good job of not escalating the situation further. For example, they decided to postpone their test of Minuteman III, which was a really smart decision. However, what this crisis has made clear is that deterrence exists not only in relation to having nuclear weapons, but also in relation the credibility of using them—this is a balance that is really important and that has been going well so far. Though, nowadays, it is very difficult to “predict people who are unpredictable” and this is the current challenge we face.

Development and Transformation of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine

Indian rationale for developing nuclear weapons is embedded in Article 51 of United Nations (UN) Charter. After analyzing the changes in Indian defence procurements, a huge defence spending and public statements issued by the former and incumbent Indian government official authors presume India is changing its nuclear posture. New Delhi is discarding earlier publicly stated No-First Use (NFU) posture with ready or super ready status. It is replacing Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD) posture with overkill capacity. India revived earlier announced Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). The objective of this paper is to review changes in Indian nuclear doctrine and capabilities and implications for Pakistan security. However a qualitative method is used for the completion of this research. Paramount aim of nuclear signaling is to avoid outbreak of violence. The findings of this paper include dividing Indian strategic community into leftists/rightists. Further, abovementioned changes can result in Indian preemptive strike against Pakistan or inadvertent or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The region is ripe for nuclear exchange. South Asia is nuclear flashpoint. In conclusion, Pakistan needs to expedite its diplomatic efforts to highlight changes introduced by India. Islamabad should follow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy to solidify its conventional and nuclear armed force structure to deter militarily powerful enemy

MILITARY MOBILITY IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE

To ensure its defense and deterrence posture, NATO has to prove the ability to quickly deploy, reinforce and sustain its forces across the entire SACEUR Area of Responsibility. To ensure the end-state of free deployment of forces across Europe, the Alliance identified the need to abolish legal and administrative barriers and to improve the infrastructure status and transportations capacity. Both NATO and the European Union recognized the military mobility deficiencies as a strategic vulnerability for Europe in case of a peer-to-peer conflict scenario.

CHINA’S NUCLEAR POLICY: A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT

This research paper focuses on the development, management, and execution of nuclear policies and strategies in China. Chinese nuclear policy has always been a center of discussion for military officials and researchers worldwide. Considering its internal and external security situation and strategic perceptions, China has made some crucial adjustments in its nuclear deterrent to cope with future threats and maintain the diminutive stature among nuclear powers. The issue of Taiwan and ballistic missile defense systems(BMDs) of India and USA may raise China’s critical thinking in the coming future for which it must change its policy of No First Use (NFU) and must shift its nuclear intentions from narrow to limited nuclear deterrent posture. Due to changed cultural perspectives, China has its specific nuclear strategy that involves the minimum utility of nuclear weapons. Factors involved in the evolution of Chinese nuclear strategy are in line with technological modernization. However, China is not willing to leave adherence from its NFU policy. China possesses a limited capacity of nuclear experts, a comparatively lesser quantity of nuclear installations, and a relatively lower number of nuclear weapons because it mainly focuses on the “lean and effective” quality of its strategic nuclear approach. Keywords: Nuclear policy, strategic perceptions, China, security environment.

Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities

Abstract As a response to the Russian invasion of Crimea, NATO returned to the core military concepts of deterrence and collective defence. This NATO adaption has recently come to include attempts to integrate offensive cyber effects into NATO force structure and response doctrine. The article argues—counter to what is publicly declared—that such an integration does little to strengthen NATO's deterrence posture and is unlikely to deter non-military, hybrid cyber activity below the threshold of collective defence. The article identifies several practical challenges to the current integration effort, which include the temporal dimension of developing exploits, battle damage assessment and deconfliction. With these challenges in mind, the article suggests that deploying minor and less resourceful cyber effects that cause persistent ‘cyber annoyances’ holds an unappreciated potential as they can drain opponent resources, disturb vital IT-systems and complicate decision-making. The article ends by arguing that NATO should not adapt its collective defence clause to cyberspace. A more active NATO in cyberspace risks undermining the cyber-intelligence norm that so far has prevented escalation and thereby increasing the likelihood that Russia misinterprets intelligence and active cyber defence activities as military preparation, armament or an attack in the making.

Strengthening Resilience of Lithuania in an Era of Great Power Competition: The Case for Total Defence

Abstract In response to the power redistribution in the international system, the United States prepares for long-term Great power competition. It is aiming at strengthening America's network of alliances and partnerships in order to counter a rising China and revisionist Russia. The other states react to greater or lesser extent to the changing constraints and opportunities in the international system. The article examines how Lithuania, being a small state that belongs to the North Atlantic Alliance, is adapting to these systemic pressures. Current NATO's deterrence posture in the Baltic region is something akin to deterrence by the assured response – NATO is sending a signal that if the Russians attacked, NATO would respond in the Baltics. Lithuania, as well as other Baltic countries, has undertaken many legal, procedural, financial and technical measures to boost resilience and deterrence. However, there are not enough national or NATO military forces that would be able to counter conventional Russian forces deployed in the region. There are challenges such as air defence and control of the Baltic Sea. Also land forces are not present in adequate quantities. As a result, Lithuania has to strengthen its own capabilities with the help of the allied countries. It argued in the article that building up a total defence system in Lithuania would be a right effort in this regard.

The PLA army after ‘below the neck’ reforms: contributing to China’s joint warfighting, deterrence and MOOTW Posture

ABSTRACT After ‘below the neck’ reforms of operational units in 2017, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army remains the PLA’s largest service as China seeks to develop forces with increased joint capabilities in the maritime, air, and space/cyber domains. The Army is expanding its ‘new-type combat forces,’ such as Special Operations, helicopter, long-range rocket, and electronic warfare units, to contribute to maritime operations as well as to land missions. It has standardised the structure of group armies and formed new combined arms brigades and battalions. Reform has affected nearly every Army unit resulting in a short-term decline in large-scale training and operational readiness as newly organised units focus on individual and small unit functional training. Senior PLA leaders acknowledge numerous shortcomings in Chinese military capabilities and are cautious about initiating combat operations, preferring instead to achieve China’s objectives through deterrence or actions below the threshold of lethal military force.

SLOVENSKA VOJSKA 15 LET PO VSTOPU REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE V NATO

Abstract The Republic of Slovenia has been a NATO member for 15 years. Its NATO membership has significantly contributed to the quality development of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF), which has made a contribution to international security by taking part in international operations and missions. Before and after joining NATO, the SAF has adapted and transformed in view of the newly created settings and security challenges in a way to respond to them effectively. It has participated in and organized multinational military exercises, and has been operating within NATO representations, commands and units. NATO's deterrence posture strengthens the Alliance and requires an effective response to new sources of threat. The security environment is changing rapidly with hybrid and cyber threats becoming increasingly dangerous. NATO's long-term adaptation process requires members to respond to all potential sources of threat with a 360-degree approach. The Republic of Slovenia is also actively involved in the Smart Defence project, the Connected Forces Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept. The years-long decline in the defence budget has been reversed, which can, in the upcoming years, have a positive impact on the development of military capabilities for national needs and for the needs of the Alliance. For the Republic of Slovenia, NATO membership is still the most effective and rational solution to ensure its national security; however, the nation should lend solidarity by taking its share of the burden. Key words NATO, Slovenian Armed Forces, military capabilities, deterrence posture, adaptation.