Abstract

This study analyzes the challenge of North Korea, which has managed to have a strategic level of nuclear weapons and suggests a few options for the United States and South Korea to address this challenge. For this purpose, it examines the theoretical backgrounds of the extended deterrence and minimal deterrence strategies, as well as the contrasting perceptions of North Korea's nuclear armament. Then, it analyzes the competition between U.S. extended deterrence and North Korea's minimal deterrence strategy and evaluates a few possible options to deal with the current strategic level of the North Korean nuclear threat. Through its analysis, this study ascertained that North Korea developed its nuclear weapons to make the United States leave South Korea and to reunify Korea on its terms. North Korea adopted a minimal deterrence strategy to counter-deter the U.S. extended deterrence and came to have considerable capabilities to implement the strategy, such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and potentially SSBNs. The United States and its allies in Northeast Asia should clearly recognize the opportunity cost of failed denuclearization negotiations and consider more options than strengthening the current U.S. extended deterrence posture. They need to seriously discuss the establishment of another nuclear-sharing system in Northeast Asia and should not exclude the nuclear weapons development option of South Korea.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call