Scientism—the belief that social science and jurisprudence can discover universal and deterministic laws about the human world in the same way as natural science has about the physical world—carries enormous influence today. It is most evident in the “formalist” traditions of social science and jurisprudence, which have managed to occupy “mainstream” positions, despite an abundance of contrary evidence and “alternative” theoretical challenges. They have done so mainly by resort to deductive, even mathematicized, logic modeled after the axiomatic system of Euclidean geometry, which many consider the unique resource of Western civilization, absent in non-Western civilizations. In natural science, there has been a close and organic working together of deduction and induction, but that has not been possible in the much more complex and paradoxical social world, in which the subjective and the objective, the contingent and the necessary, the particular and the universal coexist and interact. The stubborn attempt to impose universal laws on the social world is what has driven formalist theories’ reliance one-sidedly on deduction over induction. To correct that tendency, this article argues for a social science that begins instead from induction based on empirical evidence, thence to apply deduction to draw out the logical implications and hypotheses, and then to return to the practical world to test the formulations, in an unending process, thereby to construct not universal and absolute theories, but theories and insights with delimited empirical conditions and boundaries. That, we argue, would be the genuine application of a truly “scientific method”—the essence of which is mutually propelling deduction and induction, not the insistence on defining deterministic universal laws to the disregard of contrary evidence.
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