I have argued1 that in order to feel concern for someone in a certain situation or to be moved by someone's plight, one has to believe that he is, or is more or less likely to be, in some parlous situation or desperate plight, and so, a fortiori that there is such a person. But Michael Weston points out2 that we are moved, at any rate in some of the ways I describe, by fictional characters, and asks why this fact, to which I had myself drawn attention, should not be used to show that the necessary condition is not one at all-at least, not in the cases of fictional characters? My reply is that, of course, nothing could prevent such a demonstration if being moved, feeling concern, or fear, or pride, which Weston also mentions, could only be defined in terms of their objects, i.e. those things, events, situations, etc., which move, concern, frighten or cause persons to feel pride. We could not then, non-paradoxically, maintain both that one can only be moved by actual or more or less probable suffering, and that persons are moved by the plights of persons that are neither actual nor probable. But it is this sort of definition which is mistaken and leads to paradox. For suppose members of two different cultures took pride in quite different things-then 'pride' in that last sentence would not have a single meaning and my supposition could not be made. Or again, if you and I took pride in quite different things, 'pride' would be a punning homonym in (true) remarks mentioning the differing things in which we took pride. I regard myself as a Wittgensteinian, but this view derives, I think, from Wittgenstein. I find it puzzling and obscurantist, and those who have employed it, e.g. Winch in demonstrating the rationality of the Azande, guilty of a curious fault in a philosopher, viz. the inability to be critical of the coherence and rationality of a belief or way of behaving which is institutionalized in a culture. Weston, who writes in his Part One, 'That sadness can take such objects (as Mercutio's death) is a fact about the consistency of our language of feelings, not a fact about the inconsistency of our behaviour' (p. 84) is however not quite so simplistic. He writes, 'What must be shown in order to substantiate his [my] claim [i.e. concerning the disputed necessary condition] is that only events we believe to have occurred or are likely to occur are proper objects of the feelings concerned. It must be shown, that is, that