Desert Shield Research Articles

Real-time APL prototype of a GPS system

The Global Positioning System (GPS) consists of a constellation of 24 high-altitude satellites with very accurate atomic clocks, along with a global network of satellite tracking stations and sophisticated ground processing stations, that together provide precise navigation coordinates to any user who possesses a small, readily available GPS receiver.The precision that is achieved depends on[1] the number of GPS satellites in view of the user and the geometries involved;[2] the design of the user's receiver (e.g., military or civilian);[3] the presence of nearby objects that may interfere with or degrade the reception of signals from one or more satellites;[4] and other factors.In most cases civilian users (whose receivers can read only unencrypted, intentionally corrupted GPS signals) can expect navigation accuracy on the order of 50-100 meters. The advertised accuracy for users with military receivers, which read the encrypted GPS signals, is 16 meters. Coalition forces in Desert Shield / Desert Storm relied heavily on GPS, and U.S. military authorities praised GPS effusively for its effectiveness as a force multiplier in that conflict.Loral Federal Systems (formerly IBM Federal Systems Division) in Gaithersburg, Maryland has been intimately involved with GPS from its concept validation phase through operations and maintenance. People in this group analyzed the physical dynamics, designed the mathematical algorithms and associated software, and performed the system integration work that culminated in the GPS ground control segment.APL was used over the years in most major aspects of GPS design and analysis. Early in the full-scale development phase, APL was used to model the initial GPS system design, to perform design tradeoffs, to model and test candidate algorithms, and to perform error analyses to estimate future system performance. In later phases APL was used to monitor and analyze actual GPS system performance, to compare it with theoretically achievable performance, and to analyze and isolate anomalies [Allan].

Perspectives on History: Army Dietetics in Southwest Asia during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

The Army dietitians deployed during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm exemplified the commitment, dedication, patriotism, and professionalism of their predecessors. Although some were continuously on the move and all dealt with the extremes of a desert environment, were frequently handicapped with equipment shortages, and coped constantly with the monotony of limited ration variety, throughout their experiences these professionals expressed pride in participating in this national undertaking. The purposes of this article are to familiarize members of The American Dietetic Association with the responses of their colleagues in the US military to another of their nation's calls, to relate some aspects of Army dietetics experienced in Southwest Asia, and to identify the lessons learned in that engagement. J Am Diet Assoc. 1996; 96:595-597.

A reusable Ada package for scientific dimensional integrity

Abstract -- Our recent experience in operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm has clearly demonstrated the criticality of software reliability end that truly reliable software Is indeed possible. One tool we can employ to enhance our software reliability is the classic scientific computational reliability technique of dimensional integrity, or unite checking. The Ads programming language makes it easy to implement units checking. A PHYSICAL_QUANTITY type Is declared which ham entries for both the floating point numeric value of s variable, and Integer entries for exponents of the fundamental physical unite of mass, length, and time. The Ads feature of "operator overloading" allows creation of symbols to porters arithmetic and relational operations on these variables . For example, the multiplication operation "*" ie overloaded eo that the numeric values of the two operande are multiplied, and the exponents of their fundamental units are added. An ASSIGN function Is then written to check that the units computed in an expression are equal to the units of the variable to which s new numeric value is assigned. Further reliability ie added by "information hiding" through limited private types, and reusability and modifiability are added by making the package generic. For scientific software, this generic package is as reusable as package Standard.

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: chronology and fact book

Illustrations Foreword by Major General John H. Admire, USMC Acknowledgments Introduction Operation Desert Shield Operation Desert Storm Maps, Charts, and Photo Essay Appendix A: Glossary Appendix B: Coalition Prisoners of War in the Persian Gulf War Appendix C: Coalition Service People Killed in Action Appendix D: Coalition Ground Forces in the Persian Gulf War Appendix E: Coalition Naval Forces in the Persian Gulf War Appendix F: Coalition Air Forces in the Persian Gulf War Appendix G: Iraqi Forces in the Persian Gulf War Appendix H: Key Personnel in the Persian Gulf War Bibliography Index

Partnership and Tension: The Army and Air Force Between Vietnam and Desert Shield

Partnership and Tension: The Army and Air Force Between Vietnam and Desert Shield

96/02325 The economic ripple effects of operations ‘Desert Shield’ and ‘Desert Storm’

96/02325 The economic ripple effects of operations ‘Desert Shield’ and ‘Desert Storm’

Combat Exposure and Posttraumatic Stress Symptomatology Among U. S. Soldiers Deployed to the Gulf War

Among the most stressful experiences soldiers encounter during combat is exposure to dead and wounded soldiers and civilians. This article examines the early (9 months postcombat) psychological reactions of U.S. Army soldiers deployed from Germany who served in frontline combat units during the Persian Gulf War. In particular, the article focuses on stress symptoms associated with soldiers' exposure to death and wounding during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Those soldiers exposed to casualties, especially U.S. casualties, had greater distress scores as measured by the Impact of Event Scale (IES) and a tripartite measure of posttraumatic stress (PTS) symptomatology modeled on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed., rev. [DSM-III-R]; American Psychiatric Association, 1987) than did those without such exposure. Rank, type of casualty exposure, and current problems with coworkers and chain of command were additively related to explained variance in IES and PTS symptoma...

Comparative mortality among US military personnel in the Persian Gulf region and worldwide during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Comparative mortality among US military personnel in the Persian Gulf region and worldwide during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Comparative Mortality Among US Military Personnel in the Persian Gulf Region and Worldwide During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

To determine cause-specific mortality rates among US troops stationed in the Persian Gulf region and compare them with those of US troops serving elsewhere during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Retrospective cohort. US men and women on active duty from August 1, 1990, through July 31, 1991. Deaths occurring among all active-duty US military persons during the 1-year study period. Age-adjusted mortality rates among US troops stationed in the Persian Gulf region were compared with rates projected from mortality rates among troops on active duty elsewhere. A total of 1769 active-duty persons died during the study period, 372 in the Persian Gulf region and 1397 elsewhere. Of the 372 deaths in the Persian Gulf region, 147 (39.5%) occurred as a direct result of combat during the war, 194 (52.2%) resulted from injuries not incurred in battle, and 30 (8%) resulted from illness. Twenty-three of the deaths due to illness were considered unexpected or cardiovascular deaths. Based on age-adjusted mortality rates observed among US troops on active duty outside the Persian Gulf region, 165 deaths from unintentional injury and 32 deaths from illness (20 of which were unexpected or cardiovascular) would have been anticipated among Persian Gulf troops. Except for deaths from unintentional injury, US troops in the Persian Gulf region did not experience significantly higher mortality rates than US troops serving elsewhere. There were no clusters of unexplained deaths. The number and circumstances of nonbattle deaths among Persian Gulf troops were typical for the US military population.

The economic ripple effects of operations ‘desert shield’ and ‘desert storm’

This paper analyses the effects of the Persian Gulf conflict on the level of economic activity, employment and inflation in the United States. Impacts on other countries are not examined in this study. Many of the impacts are difficult to quantify objectively. One factor that can be subjected to analysis is the increase in United States government expenditures associated with Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The analytical results of the investigation suggest that the method of financing the increase does make a difference in how the United States economy is affected. In two of the three cases considered (i.e., deficit financing and 80% financing by coalition partners), output, personal consumption expenditures, and disposable income increase but these increases are partly associated with higher prices (i.e., inflation). In the third case (i.e., tax offset scenario), output, personal consumption expenditures, and disposable income decline but prices actually fall. Moreover, the magnitude of the changes are directly proportional to the size of the expenditure increase.

Assessment of Arthropod Vectors of Infectious Diseases in Areas of U.S. Troop Deployment in the Persian Gulf

Beginning in August 1990, approximately 800,000 coalition troops were deployed to the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. There was substantial concern about arthropod-borne diseases, particularly sand fly fever and cutaneous leishmaniasis, because of high morbidity rates in the Persian Gulf during World War II (WWII). In sharp contrast to WWII, there was no report of sand fly fever among coalition forces and only 31 cases of leishmaniasis among 697,000 U.S. troops. To further evaluate the risk of arthropod-borne diseases, an entomologic survey was conducted in 12 areas of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. A total of 1,556 arthropods was collected during four survey periods in 1992. The suspected vectors of cutaneous Leishmania major infection, sand fly fever, West Nile fever, Rift Valley fever, and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever were identified; however, there was no evidence of arboviruses or Leishmania among collected specimens nor from 51 trapped rodents. There are several possible reasons for the low risk of arthropod-borne infectious diseases among Desert Shield/Storm troops in an area where suspected vectors frequently were found: the use of insecticides and repellents, and the deployment of most ground troops to the open desert during the cooler, winter period--conditions least favorable for the transmission of arthropod-borne diseases.

The Elusive Gulf War Syndrome

In 1990/1991, approximately 697,000 U.S. service members joined coalition forces in the Middle East for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (ODS/S). Following the military action, a number of service men and women reported a variety of signs and symptoms which they attributed to their participation in the operation; the term Gulf War Syndrome was proposed to facilitate evaluation of what was perceived as a possible new entity. Subsequent studies failed to identify a discrete syndrome, and a series of reports have raised questions as to whether or not Gulf War Syndrome exists or if indeed any of the reported disorders can be attributed to participation in ODS/S. This report reviews the history of U.S. participation in the Gulf War, the medical threats and exposures considered by the U.S. Armed Services, and the U.S. Government's approach to investigating the complaints of the returning servicemen. In the context of the reports from non-U.S. veterans with similar complaints, the elusive Gulf War Syndr...

Serum antibody to lipopolysaccharide antigens of Shigella species among U.S. military personnel deployed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, U.S. troops were at high risk of diarrheal disease due to Shigella spp., particularly Shigella sonnei. In order to better understand the serologic response to Shigella infection, 830 male U.S. combat troops were evaluated before and after the deployment to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for immunoglobulin A (IgA) and IgG anti-Shigella lipopolysaccharide (LPS) (antibody to S. sonnei form I and Shigella flexneri serotypes 1a, 2a, and 3a) in serum. Just before deployment, 10.3% of the subjects were seropositive for IgA and 18.3% were positive for IgG anti-Shigella LPS. IgA and IgG anti-LPS antibody levels in serum prior to deployment were significantly associated with nonwhite race and ethnicity, birth outside the United States, and antibody to hepatitis A virus and Helicobacter pylori. During the deployment, which lasted for a mean of 131 days, 60% of the subjects reported at least one episode of diarrhea and 15% reported an episode of diarrhea with feverishness; also, 5.5% of the subjects exhibited IgA seroconversion to Shigella LPS and 14.0% exhibited IgG seroconversion. A significant association between the development of diarrheal symptoms and either positive predeployment anti-LPS antibody or seroconversion was not found. These data indicate that in this population of U.S. Desert Storm troops who were at high risk of Shigella infection, there was no apparent relation between IgA or IgG anti-Shigella LPS in serum and diarrheal disease.

Analysis of air operations during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

This article discusses the role played by HQ USAF operations research analysts assigned to the Director of Operations planning staff at HQ CENTAF Forward (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) during operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. We describe the development of a prototype system to demonstrate the benefits of in-theater operations analysis, and the tasks associated with developing and maintaining a model of the Iraqi integrated air defense system. The model required the operations analysts to interact closely with theater-level and wing-level mission planners to accurately represent the unfolding operations plan. We describe the techniques and tools used to play out the initial stages of the allied air campaign. We also address (i) the estimation of attrition of Iraqi air defense units and Allied Air, (ii) the analysis of airspace congestion during air refueling operations, and (iii) how a simulation model (EADSIM) was used to help pinpoint the cause of Allied air losses. We conclude with a discussion of the impact of analysis on military decision makers at multiple levels of command, based on personal experience. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.1

The Impact of Infectious Diseases on the Health of U.S. Troops Deployed to the Persian Gulf During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

An assessment was conducted of the impact of infectious diseases on the 697,000 U.S. troops deployed to the Persian Gulf during 1990-1991 in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The incidence of nonbattle injuries, including infectious diseases, during this conflict was lower than during previous wars involving U.S. military personnel. The major reported causes of morbidity were generally mild cases of acute diarrheal and upper respiratory disease. The most unexpected outcome was the lack of arboviral infections, particularly sandfly fever, and the occurrence among U.S. troops of 12 cases of visceral leishmaniasis due to Leishmania tropica. The fact that infectious diseases were not a major cause of lost manpower, in sharp contrast to the experience among military personnel in World War II, can be attributed to a combination of factors: the presence of a comprehensive infrastructure of medical care, extensive preventive medicine efforts, and several fortuitous circumstances. Beneficial conditions that may not be present in future conflicts in this region include isolation of most combat troops to barren desert locations during the cooler, winter months, which provided the least favorable conditions for transmission of arthropod-borne diseases.

Review: Infamous Day: Marines at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, by Robert J. Cressman and Michael J. Wenger; First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal, by Henry I. Shaw, Jr.; U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The War That Would Not End, 1971-1973, by Charles D. Melson and Curtis G. Arnold; and U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st

Review: <i>Infamous Day: Marines at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941</i>, by Robert J. Cressman and Michael J. Wenger; <i>First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal</i>, by Henry I. Shaw, Jr.; <i>U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The War That Would Not End, 1971-1973</i>, by Charles D. Melson and Curtis G. Arnold; and <i>U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st

Orthopedic Casualties in an Activated National Guard Mechanized Infantry Brigade during Operation Desert Shield

From November 1990 to April 1991, the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), an Army National Guard unit, was activated under Operation Desert Shield and deployed to the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, for training in desert warfare. All casualties requiring care beyond the battalion aid stations were evacuated to the medical company organic to the 48th Brigade. Each of 727 orthopedic patient visits were grouped into one of eight etiologies: trauma, degenerative, overuse, infectious, neoplastic, congenital/pediatric, miscellaneous, and psychiatric. Each case was also classified according to anatomic region, severity, and disposition as well as need for a minor procedure, operation, or referral. Orthopedic casualties in a reserve mechanized infantry brigade undergoing intensive field training primarily arose from four common etiologic/regional presentations: wrist/hand trauma, knee/leg trauma, spine/pelvis degenerative, and ankle/foot overuse. Many of these injuries are predictable consequences of a particular soldier's military occupational specialty and unit mission.

Doxycycline treatment and Desert Storm

To the Editor. —If the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Technology Assessment Workshop report on Operation Desert Storm syndrome/illnesses was meant to address fears that these illnesses are not being taken seriously and to establish practical working case definitions for the chronic illnesses associated with Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, it was not an auspicious start. After listening to the health complaints of numerous veterans of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, including our stepdaughter and her colleagues who served in the US Army's 101st Airborne Division, and complaints about their inability to convince military hospitals and Veterans Affairs medical centers that they are suffering from a possible syndrome with the same major symptoms listed in the workshop report, we attempted to suggest that many of these symptoms can be explained by aggressive pathogenic mycoplasma infections, such as Mycoplasma incognitus or Mycoplasma penetrans , 2 and they should be treatable

Demonstrating the operational feasibility of new technologies: the ARPI IFDs

In the ARPA-Rome planning initiative, technology moves from researchers to users, and feedback is given by users to researchers. Integrated Feasibility Demonstrations are a vital part of this user-centered approach to software engineering: they demonstrate to members of the operational community how maturing technologies can work together to address real problems. ARPI has developed three Integrated Feasibility Demonstrations (IFDs) and a precursor to the fourth. These systems have showcased realistic prototypes that could be integrated into a military command and control infrastructure, and have taught valuable lessons on ensuring success in technology insertion. (The IFDs were developed for and tested by various joint commands of the US Armed Forces. A joint command is responsible for a specific geographical region- called a theatre of operations during an operation-and has elements from each of the military services.) IFD-1, the Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool (DART), was developed just before and during Operation Desert Shield, thereby predating the start of the initiative and setting the baseline for the subsequent program. DART successfully supported transportation planning and analysis for the deployment portion of military planning.< <ETX xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">&gt;</ETX>

Celebrating the New World Order: Festival and War in New York

New York City's ticker-tape parades are messy events, always organized at the last minute because they celebrate the news of the moment in a theatre of popular memory, on a stage we call the Public Sphere. They always reenact parades of the past, celebrating heroism of an often, though not always, military sort. A New York ticker tape also reenacts a periocular civic ritual. It is the mayor's privilege to announce one-and the business community's privilege to step in and fund the festivities. They are synthetic festivals, miniature collective portraits of a city at a particular moment in history, heavily documented time capsules awaiting the scholar with an eye for state theatrics and invented traditions. Officially the city's celebration of and gratitude, ticker tapes have always depended on a consortium of private-sector power brokers for sponsorship. For the Gulf War, like the Super Bowl or the Olympics, the sponsor's audience was global. Looking back at the final act in the Gulf War trilogy, following Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the details of New York's welcome home ticker-tape parade remind us that war and the festival atmosphere within which war is waged are inseparable frames for analysis. There are several stories to be told concerning New York City and the 1991 43-day war in the Persian Gulf. One concerns the collaboration between the office of Mayor David Dinkins, an official commission appointed to organize the welcome home celebration, big business, the fashion industry, and the mass media-a choreography of public opinion in a dance of state aesthetics, patriotism, and public relations. Another story concerns American flags and yellow ribbons, shop windows, and front yards-spontaneous festive displays throughout the urban environment right down to patriotic extensions of the body itself. Both stories converged in June 1991 when many people felt an impulse to dress up and mask themselves, to form the crowd witnessing New York City's Operation Welcome Home parade. Both raise questions about the origins of homogeneity: the impulse of people to lose them-