Deposit Insurance Research Articles

Banking for the Culture: Black-owned banks as cultural assets during the subprime lending boom

Today, black-owned banks are important financial resources challenging economic exclusion. Nevertheless, they do not associate strongly with building black wealth. Some scholars argue this signals black-owned banks are ornamental, or ineffective responses to legacies of economic exclusion in black segregated neighborhoods. To engage these critiques, I draw on the dialectical theoretical frames of cultural assets and structural deficits to examine the effectiveness of black-owned banks during the subprime lending boom—a period when bank practices exploiting a history of economic exclusion in black segregated neighborhoods intensify. Specifically, I analyze administrative data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to assess whether black-owned banks associate with access to mortgage credit when the subprime lending boom peaks in 2006. Using propensity score matching with inverse probability weighting, I find black-owned banks do not associate with mortgage originations in 2006; but neighborhoods with black-owned banks receive fewer subprime mortgage loans, compared to matched ones without them. As such, black-owned banks appear to effectively shield black segregated neighborhoods from the time period's predation. Overall, findings imply black-owned banks support protective credit markets during periods of intensifying economic exclusion and exploitation.

The rise and fall of Silvergate Bank: lessons for prudential regulation of crypto-sector banking

AbstractSilvergate Bank began to “wind down operations and voluntarily liquidate” its bank in March 2023. Whereas Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank would be shut down by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the following days, this “crypto-sector bank” was able to satisfy depositor withdrawals and enter into voluntary liquidation. This paper examines how Silvergate Bank managed its balance sheet in a manner that maintained liquidity and its ability to satisfy substantial and unpredictable outflows from depositor withdrawals by its “crypto-firm” clients. Its approach was consistent with the ethos of the Basel III liquidity requirements to which many banks—though not Silvergate Bank—are subject. Yet the Silvergate model went further by recognising the idiosyncratic depositor dynamics of “crypto-firms”. This paper argues that prudential regulation should apply this model to (i) any bank that sources a substantial proportion of its funding from “crypto-firm” clients, irrespective of that bank’s size, and (ii) all deposits related to crypto-asset market participants at all banks.

New US deposit insurance rules for trust accounts take effect

Abstract On 1 April 2024, new requirements for US bank deposit insurance coverage for trust accounts took effect. These requirements apply to insured depository institutions, which include the over 4,500 US banks and similar organizations that are chartered under US law and hold deposits that are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The new requirements apply retroactively to existing trust accounts, and some individuals may be entitled to more or less deposit insurance coverage than under existing requirements. Further, US-based banks that offer certificates of deposit (CDs), including structured CDs, to investors should be aware of how the new requirements affect their trust account clients’ deposit insurance and investment strategies and should update their program disclosures accordingly.

Juridical Factors Cause the Deposit Guarantee Institution for Insurance Customers to be Urgently Implemented

This research aims to analyze what juridical factors cause the Deposit Guarantee Institution for insurance customers to be urgently implemented. It is relevant to the legal aim of obtaining benefits for most people. This research is normative research. Research that uses primary and secondary legal materials as secondary data. Respondents as primary data were not used in this research. Data analysis techniques using qualitative descriptive data analysis techniques and deductive conclusion drawing were used in this research. The research results show that the juridical factor causing the Deposit Guarantee Institution for insurance customers to be urgently implemented is the existence of forms of legal protection for insurance customers protects at a normative level, but it is not concrete for customers to quickly implement it. From the perspective of the substance of regulations, the form of legal protection has not been able to benefit society. The Law has yet to substance

Perbandingan Bentuk Kelembagaan Program Penjaminan Polis Asuransi Antara Indonesia dengan United Kingdom dan Jepang

Insurance company defaults in Indonesia have a negative impact on policyholders. Suing the company for bankruptcy is the last resort for policyholders to obtain compensation from the company's assets, but the enforcement of court judgements is difficult due to obstacles such as abuse of receivership powers. Policyholders' rights are often violated as they do not receive insurance claim payments. Law No. 40 of 2014 requires insurance companies to participate in the Policy Guarantee Programme and establish a Policy Guarantee Agency within two years. However, such an institution has not yet been established in Indonesia. This research compares the Policy Guarantee Programmes in the UK and Japan to show the importance of establishing a similar institution to protect the rights of policyholders. This research uses normative research with a comparative approach and legislation. By studying the sustainability of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in the UK and the Life Insurance Policyholders Protection Corporation in Japan, the research recommends that the Indonesian government promptly establishes a Policy Guarantee Corporation, either as an independent institution or in conjunction with the existing Deposit Insurance Corporation for the banking sector.

Unbanked and impoverished? Exploring banking and poverty interactions over time

AbstractIn 2019, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) reported that 7.1 million households in the United States (5.4%) were unbanked and lacked a checking or savings account). Using three leading household surveys, this paper documents how the interaction between bank access and poverty has evolved over time. We present a historical time series of unbanked rates, showing high‐unbanked rates for those in poverty even with increases in financial access over time. In the 1980s, 49.6% of households in poverty were unbanked while 22.8% were unbanked in 2019. Unbanked rates were even higher for Black and Hispanic households that were in poverty. In the 1980s, these groups had unbanked rates of 73.6% and 66.5% which declined to 38.4% and 31.8% in 2019, respectively. To explain differences in banking rates by race, we use binary Kitagawa‐Oaxaca‐Blinder decompositions. Socio‐demographic characteristics explain less than half the difference in unbanked rates for Blacks and around half for Hispanics.

APPLICATION OF BANK DEPOSIT INSURANCE LEGISLATION: MAIN ASPECTS

The article highlights the special relevance of the legal study of the bank deposit insurance system. The authors have identified the main trends in the historical development of the bank deposit insurance system, which are generally of positive importance. The article also analyzes the main problems of legislation and law enforcement practice in the field of bank deposit insurance. The conclusion is formulated that the legitimate interest of depositors should be protected primarily, while the established judicial practice in some cases indicates the opposite. In addition, the legislation on insurance of bank deposits violates the principle of equality of subjects of civil law. This situation leads to a drop in the level of depositors' trust and is an obstacle to the effective implementation of the bank deposit insurance system.

STRATEGY AND IMPORTANCE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM IN GEORGIA

Georgia is a country that has chosen the path of development of European integration and, taking into account European practice and experience, introduced a deposit insurance system in the country at the cost of certain risks. From the point of view of socio-economic development in Georgia, the introduction of the deposit insurance system and its complete formation was related to the strengthening of the financial security system, the protection of depositors and the prevention of systemic crisis in the banking sector.
 The main goal of the paper is to study and analyze the strategy and importance of the deposit insurance system in Georgia and its economic and financial effects, both for the country and for the wide circle of users interested in this system. However, the problem lies in the fact that, despite the sharing of theoretical and practical experiences of various countries of the world, the mentioned issues still require refinement and formation as a final result.

Cancellation of an escrow account contract and liquidation of the bank as grounds for its termination under Ukrainian law

The article deals with the peculiarities of legal regulation of cancellation of an escrow account contract as one of the grounds for its termination under Ukrainian legislation. The author proves that unilateral withdrawal from an agreement is inadmissible, since it contradicts its nature and purpose. It is argued that the provision of an escrow account contract on the possibility of unilateral cancellation may be declared invalid by a court. The author examines the procedure for the parties to ensure the cancellation of an escrow account contract. If the parties agree on its cancellation, the account holder submits an application to the bank, and the beneficiary also provides his/her written consent to this. It is established that the agreement is cancelled from the moment the bank receives the last of the following documents: the account holder's application and the beneficiary's written consent to terminate the agreement, and if the account holder's application and the beneficiary's written consent are contained in one document, from the moment the bank receives such document. The next steps in the cancellation procedure are the transfer of funds from the escrow account to the account of the holder and/ or beneficiary (depending on the instructions in the application and written consent) and the closure of the account by the bank. The author argues that if the beneficiary does not consent to the cancellation of the contract, the account holder may initiate such cancellation in court. The contract may be terminated by a court decision in case of a material breach of the agreement by the other party, as well as due to a material change in the circumstances which guided the parties when entering into the agreement. The author examines certain aspects of termination of an escrow account contract based on liquidation of the bank in which it is opened, as well as termination of a securities escrow account contract in case of termination of activities of a depository institution. The author concludes that in case of liquidation of the bank in which the escrow account is opened, payments to depositors should be made on the basis of the Law of Ukraine «On the Deposit Guarantee System for Individuals».

Неявное страхование вкладов в России после пандемии

Implicit deposit insurance is the name given to the cases when citizens prefer allocating deposits within banks with state (government) ownership when the deposit amount exceeds the limit covered by the state deposit insurance system. Implicit deposit insurance has already gained the focus of research attention in Russia, but during the times of pandemics and limited to deposits for the region of Moscow. The current study uses more up-to-date data of 2023-24 and extends the regional coverage to 25 regions of Russia. We evidence that the earlier found U-shaped dependence of the deposit rate premium and the state bank size was inverted. Moreover, we argue that during the times of rising key rate the heterogeneity of implicit deposit insurance premium though present became more homogeneous in terms of sign of the premium than during the times of relatively low-key rate.

A Comparative Machine Learning Survival Models Analysis for Predicting Time to Bank Failure in the US (2001-2023)

<p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:10.5pt"><span style="font-family:等线"><span dir="ltr" lang="EN-US" style="font-family:"Cambria",serif"><span style="color:black">This study investigates the likelihood of time to bank failures in the US between 2001 and April 2023, based on data collected from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's report on "Bank Failures in Brief - Summary 2001 through 2023". The dataset includes 564 instances of bank failures and several variables that may be related to the likelihood of such events, such as asset amount, deposit amount, ADR, deposit level, asset level, inflation rate, short-term interest rates, bank reserves, and GDP growth rate. We explore the efficacy of machine learning survival models in predicting bank failures and compare the performance of different models. Our findings shed light on the factors that may influence the probability of bank failures with a time perspective and provide insights for improving risk management practices in the banking industry.</span></span></span></span></p>

How do depositors respond to banks' discretionary behaviors? Evidence from market discipline, deposit insurance, and scale effects

We investigate how depositors respond to the U.S. bank's discretionary behaviors. We document higher deposit rates for banks that engage more in earnings management, suggesting evidence of market discipline. The quantile regressions, which dissect bank behavior at the right tail of deposit costs distribution, point out that the leveraged effect of earnings management is more significant in low- and high-deposit costs banks. Additionally, we note that depositors monitor banks' discretionary behavior to a greater extent before and during the crisis; however, they become less severe after the crisis. Interestingly, there is strong evidence of depositors monitoring large banks before, during, and after the crisis, suggesting the “too-big-to-fail” perception does not hold for our sample. The study also documents evidence of monitoring by insured and uninsured depositors over the sample period. After the crisis, we find a “wake-up call” for uninsured depositors, and more importantly, insured depositors remain sensitive to banks' reporting quality despite a weakening of incentives due to the increase of deposit insurance limit. The evidence is crucial when confirming that a deposit insurance scheme does not completely remove the deposit discipline. Our findings are useful for regulators and policymakers concerned about strengthening the market discipline.

Insuring deposits, ensuring stability: A critical evaluation of six decades of deposit insurance in the Indian banking sector

The deposit insurance system in India is one of the oldest in the world. Though deposit insurance is a well-researched area across the globe, it is relatively unexplored in India. This paper aims to critically evaluate some of the core aspects of the Indian deposit insurer, explicate the strengths and weaknesses of the system, highlight the risks that accrue to the system due to its features and the lessons learned from its 60 years of experience. The study suggests that the Indian deposit insurance system is marred by certain issues, such as irregular revisions of coverage limits, cross-subsidisation, delays in the recovery of settled claims, the restricted role of the insurer and the non-availability of a benchmark for the insurance fund. It further provides policy recommendations for practitioners to overcome these shortcomings and enhance the robustness of the deposit insurer by allowing better risk management under the scheme.

Alternative model of Islamic deposit insurance for the Islamic banking system

Purpose This paper aims to develop a novel approach to Islamic deposit insurance, specifically addressing the deficiencies in the current prevailing models of Islamic deposit insurance. Design/methodology/approach The analysis in this paper adopts a qualitative content analysis approach to review the existing literature on Islamic deposit insurance and propose a new model. Findings The proposed model includes a revised scheme. In the event of a bank failure, the funds used to reimburse depositors of the failed bank are divided into two distinct categories. The first category includes nonrepayable premiums that have been previously paid by the failed bank and managed by the Islamic deposit insurance agency or Islamic deposit insurance corporation. The second category comprises qard hasan, an interest-free loan provided by the Islamic deposit insurance agency or Islamic deposit insurance corporation using the deposit insurance funds from the collective pool of premiums of other banks. Practical implications The proposed model ensures that well-managed banks are not unfairly burdened by the failures of their poorly managed counterparts, thus preventing a sense of unfairness and inefficiency. Implementing the proposed model may result in higher business practices and risk management standards, ultimately leading to better depositors’ protection and banking system’s stability. Originality/value This paper offers a significant contribution to the limited literature on Islamic deposit insurance. The proposed model enriches the discourse and offers valuable insights for the future development of Islamic banking.

Moral Hazard Versus Adverse Selection On The People’s Business Credit Program In Indonesia

This paper discusses the behavior of providing bank credit to SMEs during the people’s business credit (KUR) program in Indonesia. Since it was launched in 2007, the average NPL for these loans has increased. This indicates the existence of moral hazard behavior in lending by banks. To prove this indication, this paper implements a threshold regression model. Data covers 38 participating banks, which were observed during Q1-2008 to Q2-2021. The results of data analysis show that moral hazard behavior is indicated when NPL below or equal to 5.87%, on the contrary, experienced adverse selection. Specifically, moral hazard behavior is dominant in the case of investment credit and local government- owned banks. In working capital loans and others, this behavior also occurs, but not as in the case of investment loans. Moral hazard and adverse selection behavior were not detected at all in stateowned banks, while in private banks only occurred at a low level. At the end of the analysis, we also consider the shock effects of the global financial crisis (2008), European crisis (2009), and the Covid-19 pandemic (2020-2021) on the threshold regression model, but the results are negative, thus strengthening our previous findings. In general, the factors that significantly determine the risk of non-performing loans in the people’s business credit program are the increase in credit growth, market share, deposit insurance interest rates, and economic growth as well as a decrease in the benchmark interest rate. However, the specifics are different, both in each type of credit and the type of participating bank.

Liquidity Management and Profitability of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria: An Impact Analysis

This study empirically examined the impact of liquidity management on profitability of deposit money banks in Nigeria. The specific objectives were to determine the impact of cash management on banks’ return on asset, evaluate the impact of shareholders’ capital on banks’ return on asset and ascertain the relationship between loan to deposit ratio and return on assets of banks. Expost facto design was adopted. The data used for this study were collected from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporations (NDIC) covering the period 1995-2021. Data collected were analyzed using descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis. Findings revealed that cash management and shareholders’ capital have significant relationship with banks’ return on assets. It however showed that there is significant relationship between loan to deposit ratio and return on assets. Based on the findings, it recommended that the bank management device efficient cash management policies to enhance their profitability

The Effect of Job Loss on Bank Account Ownership

AbstractWe estimate the effect of job loss on households’ bank account ownership using novel data: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)‐sponsored biennial supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS), linked to respondents’ work history in surrounding months constructed from the Basic Monthly CPS. Leveraging differences in the timing of unemployment spells across households, we show that job loss leads to a large decrease in the likelihood of having an account among the lower‐income, renter households we study. Job loss also leads to increased use of other products and services that might substitute for a bank account, including prepaid cards, check cashing, and money orders.

Mutual insurance for catastrophe hazards: Case of deposit insurance

AbstractDeposit insurance involves catastrophe risk because bank failures spike during a banking crisis. Although mutual insurance is ill‐suited for catastrophe risk, the US government structures deposit insurance like a mutual company owned by policyholders. Furthermore, an intertemporal mispricing resulting from a dividend‐surcharge arrangement produces several problems. Most importantly, it worsens moral hazard. Through dividends and surcharges, deposit insurance transfers the premium burden from high‐risk banks to low‐risk banks and in effect erodes the charter value of low‐risk banks. In addition, high‐risk banks taking catastrophe risk can outperform low‐risk banks for many years in a row, putting pressures on managers of low‐risk banks. Owing to these factors, an underpricing of catastrophe risk before its realization can ratchet up risk‐taking by banks. Other problems with the intertemporal mispricing include making the banking business more procyclical, distorting the prices of banking products, and exposing taxpayers to asymmetric downside risk. To ensure fair competition and improve economic efficiency, the government should set the insurance premium based not on the realized loss but on the expected loss.

THE SMALL CLAIM COURTS DURING COVID-19: ANALYSIS OF INDONESIAN BANKS’ CLAIMS ON BAD CREDIT

The purpose of this study is to discuss the suitability of small claim courts to solve bad credit claims that are filed by banks as an alternative to dispute contract defaults. The study analyses the trend of banks’ small claims during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study employed an empirical normative approach. It combines a normative legal approach and additional empirical elements in the form of cases and decisions. The results show that some of the regulations that were released before the pandemic, such as the Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2019 on the Settlement of Small Claim Courts, provide benefits for banks to settle credit disputes because they allow various expansions. The Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 3 of 2018 on The Administration of Cases in Electronic Courts has introduced some electronic applications. Although business (bank) litigation remains dominant, the trend of bank claims in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic has dropped. In contrast, the trend of individual claims has increased significantly. The decline is influenced by countercyclical policies that are issued by the Financial System Stability Committee. The committee members consist of representatives of the Ministry of Finance, Bank Indonesia, the Financial Services Authority, and the Deposit Insurance Corporation. It aims to handle and cope with the banks’ crisis related to the pandemic.

Implementation of the mechanism of systemic risk internalisation in the deposit market (pigou tax principle)

The deposit guarantee fund’s rate cap mechanism was supplemented by a systemic risk fee based on the Pigou tax principle. The additional systemic risk fee was introduced to curb overly aggressive price competition in the deposit market by creating additional explicit financial costs that can offset the gains to individual banks from increasing their deposit market share. However, the existing inelasticity of the implemented mechanism, manifested by the lack of stable pressure across the entire range of rates, necessitates its reform. In this article the authors reveal the details of the implemented mechanism of internalisation of systemic risk in the deposit market, the reasons that prompted its implementation, assessment of its success and ways of further reform.