Deontological Response Research Articles

Social context during moral decision-making impacts males more than females.

Moral judgments are often viewed as the outcome of affective and deliberative processes that could be impacted by social factors and individual characteristics. The purpose of this study was to examine the interaction between gender and social context on moral judgment. Participants included 315 undergraduate students (67.3% female). The participants completed the Moral Decision-Making Task while seated at row tables facing the front of the room or round tables facing other participants. The results indicated that males responded in a more utilitarian manner (harm one to save five) than females for moral impersonal (MI) and moral personal (MP) dilemmas regardless of seating arrangements. When seated at round tables, all participants were more likely to respond deontologically (cause no harm) to the moral impersonal dilemmas. In addition, we calculated a moral reasoning difference score for each participant as the difference between the MI and MP scores to represent additional reactivity due to the idea of taking direct action. The moral reasoning difference score was consistent for females but indicated a more deontological response from males at round tables and a more utilitarian response from males at row tables. These results suggest that males are more utilitarian than females and are more likely to be influenced by social context when responding to moral dilemmas. More broadly, the current results indicate that moral judgments are affected by social context particularly in males in ways that have not been incorporated in many models of moral decision making.

How Power Affects Moral Judgments: The Presence of Harm to Life Modifies the Association between Power and Moral Choices

Lammers and Stapel reported that high power increases deontological (rule-based) moral thinking, and low power increases utilitarian (outcome-based) moral thinking. However, the dilemmas were mild and did not involve harm to life. Here, we examined whether the presence or absence of harm to life affects the moral decisions of powerholders. To help establish the replicability and validity of the effects of power on moral judgments in the absence of harm to life, we first performed an exact replication of a study conducted by Lammers and Stapel, and this experiment was followed up by a similar study in an organizational context in China (Studies 1 and 2). Studies 3 and 4 investigated whether power and the presence/absence of harm to life interacted with preferences for deontological versus utilitarian moral judgments. Power consistently triggered deontological thinking. However, power differences in moral reasoning only emerged when there was no harm to life. Harm prompted deontological responses among control and powerless individuals, which nullified differences across the power conditions. The findings demarcate the generalizability of the association between power and a moral thinking style.

The Morality Game: Is the Evaluation of the Instrumental Utility of Moral Dilemmas Related to Decision Outcomes

This article investigates the relation of the evaluation of the instrumental utility of moral dilemmas to decision outcomes. The results indicate that nuances of dilemma perception assessed in the study (perceived realism of dilemmas, their plausibility, reflection of real behavior and an assessment of the extent to which responses to moral dilemmas can be used to judge moral maturity, empathy, level of intelligence and sense of humor) are not significantly related to objective behavior, as expressed in the number of consequentialist responses. Instruction about the nature of the study, however, may influence the moral choices made. Participants who were informed by instruction that their personality could be judged by their responses to moral dilemmas gave more deontological responses than others. An explanation is proposed that such instruction acts as a factor that provokes the adoption of the role of the apprehensive participant and, as a consequence, socially desirable behavior. This aspect highlights the importance of considering contextual factors in the study of moral behavior. It is suggested that moral dilemmas should not be viewed through the lens of ecological validity but rather as a tool that allows for a high level of experimental control, facilitating a more indepth study of behavior under specific stimulus conditions

A Kantian response to the Gamer’s Dilemma

The Gamer’s Dilemma consists of three intuitively plausible but conflicting assertions: (i) Virtual murder is morally permissible. (ii) Virtual child molestation is morally forbidden. (iii) There is no relevant moral difference between virtual murder and virtual child molestation in computer games. Numerous attempts to resolve (or dissolve) the Gamer’s Dilemma line the field of computer game ethics. Mostly, the phenomenon is approached using expressivist argumentation: Reprehensible virtual actions express something immoral in their performance but are not immoral by themselves. Consequentialists, on the other hand, claim that the immorality of virtual actions arises from their harmful consequences. I argue that both approaches have serious difficulties meeting the moral challenge posed by the Gamer’s Dilemma. They tend to confuse the morality of in-game actions either with the morality of their real-world counterparts or with the morality of games as objects. Following this critical analysis, I will develop a Kantian argument and defend it against two objections. So far, deontological responses to the Gamer’s Dilemma have been sought in vain. Yet, with Kant, its moral challenge can be met by looking at the gamer’s reasons. From this perspective, the Gamer’s Dilemma is based on a false assumption: the moral status of gaming acts does not derive from a normative equation with their real-world counterparts but only from their justifications.

Moral judgment under uncertainty: A CNI model analysis

AbstractPast research suggests that uncertainty reduces our preference for utilitarian over deontological responses in moral dilemmas. The objective of the current research was to disentangle the possible mechanisms through which uncertainty shapes moral‐dilemma responses. Using the CNI model of moral decision‐making, we examined if uncertainty influences moral‐dilemma responses via sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, or general action tendencies. Across four preregistered experiments (N = 1400), sensitivity to consequences was lower when the outcomes in moral dilemmas were uncertain than when they were certain. This effect emerged regardless of whether participants were asked to judge if they would perform the described actions or if they deem the described actions acceptable. The results are consistent with accounts suggesting that uncertain outcomes influence responses in moral dilemmas through discounting of cost‐benefit ratios. Implications for public policy and moral decisions in real‐world contexts are discussed.

Effects of Primary and Secondary Psychopathy on Deontological and Utilitarian Response Tendencies: The Mediator Role of Alexithymia.

(1) Background: The purpose of this study is to provide more nuanced insights into the effects of sub-dimensional levels of psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. To this end, this study examined the effects of primary and secondary psychopathy on utilitarian and deontological response tendencies. Moreover, this study also explored the mediating role of alexithymia as well as the moderating role of gender in these effects. (2) Methods: A total of 1227 participants were recruited through the online questionnaire service wjx.cn. After deleting unfinished questionnaires, the remaining 1170 participants were included in the final data analysis. Each participant completed a demographic information questionnaire, the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale, the Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20, and six pairs of moral dilemmas. Descriptive and correlational analyses of study variables were conducted in SPSS 22.0. Mediation and gender difference analyses were conducted in AMOS 23.0. (3) Results: Primary psychopathy was negatively correlated with deontological response tendencies and uncorrelated with utilitarian response tendencies. By contrast, secondary psychopathy also correlated negatively with deontological response tendencies, but it correlated positively with utilitarian response tendencies. Mediation analysis revealed that alexithymia only mediated the relationship between secondary psychopathy and deontological response tendencies. Multi-group analysis revealed that there was no difference between females and males in the indirect effect model. (4) Conclusions: People with high primary psychopathy are less likely to reject harm in moral dilemmas. By contrast, people with high secondary psychopathy have high alexithymia, which causes them to be less concerned about avoiding harm, and they are more likely to maximize outcomes in moral dilemmas. These findings shed new light on the moral dilemma judgments of individuals with primary and secondary psychopathy.

Awareness to utilitarian responses in later life: An ERP study with moral dilemmas

The current study aims to provide the first insights into the neural correlates of utilitarian and deontological responses to moral dilemmas across the lifespan. To this purpose, younger (n = 30), middle-aged (n = 29), and older adults (n = 29) completed moral dilemmas during an EEG recording. Behaviorally, groups did not differ in the number of utilitarian responses and reaction times. However, at the neural level, older adults had higher Error Positivity (Pe) amplitudes than younger adults after utilitarian responses. As this effect was specific to utilitarian responses, it suggests that utilitarian decisions may induce increased conflict in the older group. These findings highlight that older adults may be more aware of the harmful outcomes of utilitarian decisions during moral decision-making.

Forty-Eight Classical Moral Dilemmas in Persian Language: A Validation and Cultural Adaptation Study

Abstract Moral dilemmas are a useful tool to investigate empirically, which parameters of a given situation modulate participants’ moral judgment, and in what way. In an effort to provide moral judgment data from a non-WEIRD culture, we provide the translation and validation of 48 classical moral dilemmas in Persian language. The translated dilemma set was submitted to a validation experiment with N = 82 Iranian participants. The four-factor structure of this dilemma set was confirmed; including Personal Force (Personal, Impersonal), Benefit Recipient (Self, Other), Evitability (Avoidable, Inevitable), and Intentionality (Accidental, Instrumental). When comparing moral judgments of Iranian participants to those of Spanish and Italian participants’ from previous research with the same dilemma set, differences emerged. Iranian participants’ moral judgments were more deontological (i.e., they refrained from harm), than Spanish and Italian participants. Religiosity made participants’ moral judgments more deontological, and also dysphoric mood resulted in a more deontological response style.

Dual-process reflective equilibrium: rethinking the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning

ABSTRACT Dual-process theories of the mind emphasize how reasoning is an interplay between intuitive and reflective thinking. This paper aims to understand how the two types of processing interact in the moral domain. According to a ‘default-interventionist’ model of moral reasoning intuition and reflection are conflicting cognitions: intuitive thinking would elicit heuristic and deontological responses, whereas reflection would favour utilitarian judgements. However, the evidence for the default interventionist view is inconclusive and challenged by a growing amount of counterevidence in recent years. The recent empirical findings favour an interdependent rather than conflicting view of the two types of information processing in the moral domain. In this view, which I call dual-process reflective equilibrium, intuition and reflection cooperate in moral reasoning to reach a reflective goal, which is supposedly normative justification. In sum, on the one hand, the scope of moral intuitions extends to selecting relevant information and calling for reflection whenever a problem presents conflicting aspects; on the other hand, the purpose of moral reflection is to rationalize pre-reflective intuitions to provide articulated and accessible reasons.

It’s easier to kill a baby to save oneself than a fat man to save other people: the effect of moral dilemma and age on Russian-English bilinguals’ moral reasoning

ABSTRACT Previous research has shown that bilinguals respond differently to moral dilemmas posed in each of their languages, tending to make deontologically-based decisions (based on right or wrong) in their first language and utilitarian decisions (bringing about the most good) in their second language. In the present study, we tested several predictors of bilinguals’ moral reasoning: language (L1 Russian or L2 English), gender, proficiency, age, and dilemma. We included two different personal moral dilemmas: one involving saving the lives of others (by killing a fat man) and one involving saving one’s own life (by killing a baby). Russian-English bilinguals responded to one of these dilemmas in Russian and the other in English. The results showed only two significant predictors of responses: dilemma and age. The bilinguals made more deontological decisions for the dilemma about saving others and more utilitarian decisions for the dilemma involving saving their own lives. The participants who gave deontological responses were slightly older than those who gave utilitarian responses. We argue that factors other than language may be more important in bilinguals’ moral reasoning.

Emotion emphasis effects in moral judgment are moderated by mindsets

In two studies, emotion emphasis effects on moral judgment are demonstrated. The studies indicate that emphasizing negative consequences in trolley-type dilemmas with emotional language produces more utilitarian responses if such emphasis is on the consequences of the deontological option, and more deontological responses if it is on the consequences of the utilitarian option. This effect was moderated by action-phase related mindsets. Individuals in an implemental mindset were less susceptible to the emotion emphasis effect than individuals in a deliberative mindset (Studies 1, 2). By also using an eye-tracking task in Study 2, we demonstrated that our implemental mindset participants’ visual attention was more focused—in particular on goal-directed means—than that of the deliberative mindset participants.

Consequences, norms, and inaction: A critical analysis

AbstractGawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf and Hütter (2017, GACFH) presented a model of choices in utilitarian moral dilemmas, those in which following a moral principle or norm (the deontological response) leads to worse consequences than violating the principle (the utilitarian response). In standard utilitarian dilemmas, the utilitarian option involves action (which causes some harm in order to prevent greater harm), and the deontological response, omission. GACFH propose that responses in such dilemmas arise in three different ways: a psychological process leading to a deontological choice, a different process leading to a utilitarian choice, or a bias toward inaction or action. GACFH attempt to separate these three processes with new dilemmas in which action and omission are switched, and dilemmas in which the utilitarian and deontological processes lead to the same choice. They conclude that utilitarian and deontological responses are indeed separable, and that past research has missed this fact by treating them as naturally opposed. We argue that a bias toward harmful inaction is best understood as an explanation of deontological responding rather than as an alternative process. It thus should be included as an explanation of deontological responding, not an alternative response type. We also argue that GACFH’s results can be largely explained in terms of subjects’ unwillingness to accept the researchers’ assumptions about which consequence is worse and which course of action is consistent with a moral norm. This problem is almost inherent in the attempt to switch act and omission while maintaining equivalent norms. We support this argument with data from experiments with new and old scenarios, in which we asked subjects to judge both norms and consequences. We also find that GACFH’s results are not as consistent as they appear to be in the paper.

The intuitive greater good: Testing the corrective dual process model of moral cognition.

Building on the old adage that the deliberate mind corrects the emotional heart, the influential dual process model of moral cognition has posited that utilitarian responding to moral dilemmas (i.e., choosing the greater good) requires deliberate correction of an intuitive deontological response. In the present article, we present 4 studies that force us to revise this longstanding "corrective" dual process assumption. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants had to give their first, initial response to moral dilemmas under time-pressure and cognitive load. Next, participants could take all the time they wanted to reflect on the problem and give a final response. This allowed us to identify the intuitively generated response that preceded the final response given after deliberation. Results consistently show that in the vast majority of cases (+ 70%) in which people opt for a utilitarian response after deliberation, the utilitarian response is already given in the initial phase. Hence, utilitarian responders do not need to deliberate to correct an initial deontological response. Their intuitive response is already utilitarian in nature. We show how this leads to a revised model in which moral judgments depend on the absolute and relative strength differences between competing deontological and utilitarian intuitions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Hume’s Deontological Response to Scepticism

Hume’s Deontological Response to Scepticism

The effects of physical contact and decision type on moral decision making: A study of harm to save moral behavior

This study examined the relationship between physical contact and decision type in predicting “harm to save” behavior. Participants were assigned to making either a judgment or a choice involving moral dilemmas. All participants were presented with dilemmas that either required or did not require having physical contact with potential victims. Participants were asked to decide whether to sacrifice fewer people to save more (utilitarian responses) or not to do so and thus more people would die (deontological responses). The study sample included 345 participants who completed a set of self‐report measures. Results indicated an interaction between physical contact and decision type. In the choice condition only, participants reported significantly less utilitarian responses to the dilemmas that required having physical contact with the person to be harmed than to dilemmas that did not require physical contact. This difference was not found in the judgment condition. These results contribute to a greater understanding of the nature and potential malleability of human morality.

Examining the unfolding of moral decisions across time using the reach-to-touch paradigm

Recent theories of decision making are characterised by a growing emphasis on understanding the cognitive mechanisms that produce decisions. This has seen a growth in methods that allow for the continuous collection of data during reasoning. Current applications of these methods to complex decision making have been limited in their ability to examine the dynamics of responding across time. In the current study we address this issue by examining the online dynamics of moral decisions. Participants were required to respond to moral dilemmas that differed according to harm or intention by reaching out and touching one of two response panels. Utilitarian and deontological responses to personal moral dilemmas were found to differ across time. Utilitarian decisions did not emerge more slowly overall, but rather emerged across a wider (less consistent) time period. Importantly, this result did not generalise to a set of standardized moral scenarios. Taken together these findings highlight how dilemma-specific variables can significantly influence moral reasoning and emphasize the importance of using well controlled stimuli together with a measure capable of examining decisions as they unfold over time.

Not just bad actions: Affective concern for bad outcomes contributes to moral condemnation of harm in moral dilemmas.

Moral dilemmas typically entail directly causing harm (said to violate deontological ethics) to maximize overall outcomes (said to uphold utilitarian ethics). The dual process model suggests harm-rejection judgments derive from affective reactions to harm, whereas harm-acceptance judgments derive from cognitive evaluations of outcomes. Recently, Miller, Hannikainen, and Cushman (2014) argued that harm-rejection judgments primarily reflect self-focused-rather than other-focused-emotional responses, because only action aversion (self-focused reactions to the thought of causing harm), not outcome aversion (other-focused reactions to witnessing suffering), consistently predicted dilemma responses. However, they assessed only conventional relative dilemma judgments that treat harm-rejection and outcome-maximization responses as diametric opposites. Instead, we employed process dissociation to assess these response inclinations independently. In two studies (N = 558), we replicated Miller and colleagues' findings for conventional relative judgments, but process dissociation revealed that outcome aversion positively predicted both deontological and utilitarian inclinations-which canceled out for relative judgments. Additionally, individual differences associated with affective processing-psychopathy and empathic concern-correlated with the deontology but not utilitarian parameter. Together, these findings suggest that genuine other-oriented moralized concern for others' well-being contribute to both utilitarian and deontological response tendencies, but these tendencies nonetheless draw upon different psychological processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Reflecting on God's will: Reflective processing contributes to religious peoples' deontological dilemma responses

Religious people tend to reject harm on moral dilemmas where causing harm maximizes outcomes, which is consistent with deontological but not utilitarian philosophy. Past research suggests that non-reflective processes drive deontological judgments, such as affective reactions to harm or heuristic application of moral rules. Yet, for religious people, reflective processes may also play a role in driving deontological judgments. We examined this possibility in three studies. Unlike most research, which treats deontological and utilitarian responses as diametric opposites, we employed process dissociation to assess them independently. Religiosity was associated with increased deontological and reduced utilitarian response tendencies—but time pressure (Study 1) and cognitive load (Study 2) reduced deontological tendencies among religious people. Increasing the salience of religious values attenuated this effect, without impacting utilitarian tendencies or the responses of less-religious people (Study 3). Thus, reflective consideration of religious values may contribute to deontological response tendencies among religious people.

Clarifying Gender Differences in Moral Dilemma Judgments: The Complementary Roles of Harm Aversion and Action Aversion

Moral dilemmas entail situations where decisions consistent with deontological principles (following moral rules) conflict with decisions consistent with utilitarian principles (maximizing overall outcomes). Past work employing process dissociation (PD) clarified that gender differences in utilitarianism are modest, but women are substantially more deontological than men. However, deontological judgments confound two motivations: harm aversion and action aversion. The current work presents a mega-analysis of eight studies (N = 1,965) using PD to assess utilitarian and deontological response tendencies both when deontology entails inaction and when it requires action, to assess the independent contributions of harm aversion and action aversion. Results replicate and clarify past findings: Women scored higher than men on deontological tendencies, and this difference was enhanced when the deontological choice required refraining from harmful action rather than acting to prevent harm. That is, gender differences in deontological inclinations are caused by both harm aversion and action aversion.

Paradoxical Effects of Power on Moral Thinking: Why Power Both Increases and Decreases Deontological and Utilitarian Moral Decisions

The current research explores the role of power in moral decision-making. Some work suggests that power increases utilitarianism; other work suggests power increases deontological judgments. Conversely, we propose that power can both increase and decrease both deontological and utilitarian decisions by building on two recent insights in moral psychology. First, we utilize the moral orientation scale to assess four thinking styles that jointly predict moral dilemma decisions. Second, we employ process dissociation to assess deontological and utilitarian judgments as orthogonal rather than opposite constructs. We conducted two preregistered confirmatory studies that replicated exploratory findings. In Study 1, power increased three moral thinking styles: integration, deliberation, and rule orientation. In Study 2, these decision-making styles simultaneously mediated the effects of power on utilitarian and deontological responses in opposing ways, leading to null effects overall. These results reconcile previous findings and demonstrate the complex yet systematic effects power has on moral decision-making.