Deontological Justification Research Articles

Moral reasoning and support for punitive violence after crime

In contexts marked by high violence and widespread impunity, how do citizens articulate and justify their preferences about crime and punishment? What kind of moral logic and reasoning do they employ when discussing punishments? Does support for punitive punishment derive from moralistic and deontological concerns that perpetrators need to be punished because it is right and proper? Or do people support punitive punishments because they feel they are effective? To address this question, we document and analyze stated preferences for punishment in response to crime from 62 in-depth qualitative interviews with individuals affected by violence in the Mexican state of Michoacán. We conduct a quantitative analysis of how different forms of moral justifications are related to preferred punishments for specific crime events, and a qualitative content analysis to investigate possible mechanisms. We find that two types of moral reasoning are more likely to be used to justify punitive violence: (1) consequentialist reasoning which involves weighing the costs and benefits of an action; (2) and reasoning that dehumanizes accused criminals. Deontological justifications about the right or just action, while extremely common, are used fairly equally across arguments for and against punitive violence. Our study sheds light on the diverse moral frames employed to justify the endorsement of punitive violence.

I am (not) sorry: Interpersonal effects of neutralizations after a transgression.

After a transgression, people often use neutralizations to account for their behavior, for instance, by apologizing or offering a justification. Previous research has mostly centered around the intrapersonal effects of neutralizations on actors. Consequently, we know very little of the interpersonal effects of neutralizations on observers' perceptions and judgments. Our overarching hypothesis is that neutralizations that contain an acknowledgment of wrongdoing (i.e., apologies and excuses) lead to more favorable perceptions of the transgressor and the transgression than neutralizations that do not (i.e., justifications). We report three studies (N = 800) to investigate the relationship between the type of neutralization used and observers' perceptions of actors and their behaviors. Our findings show that actor and behavior are evaluated differently depending on whether the neutralization used is an apology, an excuse, a consequentialist justification, or a deontological justification. Overall, justifications led to more negative evaluations (especially when invoking deontological reasoning), while apologies and excuses fostered more positive evaluations. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the social dynamics of norm violations and the social and legal implications for enforcing norm abidance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Is Innovation a sound justification for Medical Patents?

This essay will interrogate the legality of medical patents, arguing that one ought to reject the traditional utilitarian framework often used to justify IP law. Instead, this essay will turn to a more deontological justification for IP rights in UK law.

Disgust or Dignity? The Moral Basis of Harm Reduction.

Harm reduction has been advocated to address a diverse range of public health concerns. The moral justification of harm reduction is usually presumed to be consequentialist because the goal of harm reduction is to reduce the harmful health consequences of risky behaviors, such as substance use. Harm reduction is contrasted with an abstinence model whose goal is to eradicate or reduce the prevalence of such behaviors. The abstinence model is often thought to be justified by 'deontological' considerations: it is claimed that many risky behaviors are morally unacceptable, and therefore that we have a moral obligation to recommend abstinence. Because harm reduction is associated with a consequentialist justification and the abstinence model is associated with a deontological justification, the potential for a deontological justification of harm reduction has been overlooked. This paper addresses this gap. It argues that the moral duty to protect autonomy and dignity that has been advocated in other areas of medical ethics also justifies the public health policy of harm reduction. It offers two examples-the provision of supervised injection sites and the Housing First policy to address homelessness-to illustrate the argument.

Will Autonomous Vehicles Eliminate a Right to Drive?

In the future, autonomous vehicles are predicted to be much safer than current vehicles and affordable enough for all vehicle owners. At such a point, should we still allow people to manually drive non-autonomous vehicles? Can we say people who want to drive have a right to drive? In this paper, we first attempt a deontological justification of a right to drive, by trying to derive the right from more uncontroversial rights, like the right to freedom of movement, but fail. Looking at the right on consequentialist grounds, both in terms of paternalistic justifications of denying the right and the externalities caused by manual driving, we are able to justify a right to drive. However, the externalities caused by manual driving (especially the risks imposed on non-drivers and the property damage) are enough to limit this right to drive to non-public roads.

Moral Readings of the Court: Discrimination Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court

What moral readings characterize contemporary U.S. Supreme Court opinions on discrimination by race; ethnicity; religion; gender; sexuality; and disabilities? John Rohr and the Constitutional School of Public Administration scholars have analyzed the Supreme Court’s decisions for moral insights in public affairs. The authors sought to take a modest step with analysis based on a more nuanced, empirical moral reading of the Court’s cases. First, the authors critiqued the case-study method of the Constitutional School, comparing these with moral readings of the Court’s opinion, including moral justifications that are teleological and nonteleological. Second, the authors analyzed selected opinions by the contemporary Supreme Court on discrimination by race; ethnicity; religion; gender; sexuality; and disabilities. Third, the authors analyzed patterns of teleological (utilitarian or virtue) and nonteleological (deontological) moral justifications and concluded the Supreme Court ordinarily uses ethical arguments, often teleological (utilitarian), with nonteleological (deontological) justifications in cases of perceived injustice. Virtue moral justifications are rare: only with a nonvirtuous litigant. Thus, the authors meld a more nuanced, empirical moral reading with the traditional case-study method of the Constitutional School of Public Administration, without assuming appeal to some universal moral faculty—instead deferring to each person in accepting or rejecting these moral justifications.

Deontological Conservatism and Perceptual Justification

Crispin Wright has advanced a number of arguments to show that, in addition to evidential warrant, we have a species of non-evidential warrant, namely, “entitlement”, which forms the basis of a particular view of the architecture of perceptual justification known as “epistemic conservatism”. It is widely known, however, that Wright's conservative view is beset by a number of problems. In this article, I shall argue that the kind of warrant that emerges from Wright's account is not the standard truth-conducive justification, but what is known as the deontological conception of justification. It will be argued that the deontological justification has features that make it a better candidate for representing a conservative architecture. These results will be reinforced by showing how the deontological framework can make better sense of a recent theory of justified (reasonable) belief that takes its inspiration from Wright's conservative account. Thus understood, we may see the liberalism–conservatism controversy as actually an extension of the older debate over which conception of justification, truth-conducive or deontological, can best represent the epistemic status of our belief-forming practices.

An ethical perspective on accounting standard setting: Professional and lay-experts’ contribution to GASB’s Pension Project

Abstract This study focuses on the Governmental Accounting Standards Board’s (GASB) Pension Project which, over 2009–2012, deliberated a highly contested issue over the “correct” discount rates to be used in the discounting of pension liabilities on government financial statements. We analyze the arguments used by participants to justify their preference and find that, despite the unprecedented economic consequences associated with changing the status quo discount rate, all groups of participants favor a deontological justification over a consequentialist or “mixed” line of reasoning. We use a mixed methods approach to determine the prevalence of particular argumentative styles, and to further examine the nature of the arguments made. This study increases our understanding of how “lay experts” – that is to say, citizens who have acquired knowledge in a particular technical domain, but who are not credentialized in the field – participate in policy making processes dominated by accredited “professional experts”. We argue that if lay citizens are absent from the debate and if lay-experts, far from playing a mediating role between lay citizens and professional experts, espouse or mimic the latter’s argumentative style, the benefit of widening participation in accounting standard setting processes – other than providing a thin layer of democratic legitimacy to the processes in question – is questionable.

Is Deontology a Moral Confabulation?

Joshua Greene has put forward the bold empirical hypothesis that deontology is a confabulation of moral emotions. Deontological philosophy does not steam from true moral reasoning, but from emotional reactions, backed up by post hoc rationalizations which play no role in generating the initial moral beliefs. In this paper, I will argue against the confabulation hypothesis. First, I will highlight several points in Greene’s discussion of confabulation, and identify two possible models. Then, I will argue that the evidence does not illustrate the relevant model of deontological confabulation. In fact, I will make the case that deontology is unlikely to be a confabulation because alarm-like emotions, which allegedly drive deontological theorizing, are resistant to be subject to confabulation. I will end by clarifying what kind of claims can the confabulation data support. The upshot of the final section is that confabulation data cannot be used to undermine deontological theory in itself, and ironically, if one commits to the claim that a deontological justification is a confabulation in a particular case, then the data suggests that in general deontology has a prima facie validity.

In Defence of Deontological Justifications of Intellectual Property

Intellectual property (IP) theories generally fall into two broad categories: consequentialist and deontological. The consequentialist, or utilitarian, theories justify IP based on the social welfare it produces. They argue, for example, that IP encourages innovation. The deontological theories, by contrast, justify IP on the basis that creators have a right to their creations, because for example, they have a right to the fruits of their labour. In his paper “Faith-Based Intellectual Property”, Professor Mark Lemley argues that the deontological theories are irrational because they are based on faith rather than evidence. Lemley’s point is not simply that the deontological theories are wrong but that they are outside the realm of rational discourse and reasonable disagreement. As he puts it, he and the deontologists “have nothing to say to each other. I don’t mean by that that I am giving up on you, deciding that you’re not worth my time to persuade. Rather, I mean that we simply cannot speak the same language.” Lemley is not making an argument against the deontological theories as part of an ongoing debate about justifying IP; he is rather saying that the deontological theories should not even be part of the debate. Lemley’s argument can be interpreted in two ways. I will argue that on one interpretation the argument commits an informal fallacy, while on the other interpretation it is based on the false premise that arguments have to be grounded in evidence to be rational. In either case, Lemley fails to establish that the deontological theories are outside the realm of rational discourse.

On the Utility of Religious Toleration

Brian Leiter’s Why Tolerate Religion? valuably clarifies the issues involved in granting religion-specific accommodations (and thus exceptions or exemptions) to laws and policies of general application. His arguments are careful, rigorous, and fair, and in rejecting the deontological arguments for religion-specific accommodations he seems to me largely correct. But when he turns to arguing against the utilitarian case for such accommodations, he employs a seemingly non-standard sense of utilitarianism in which demands of principled consistency constrain what would otherwise be utilitarian welfare-maximization. A more traditional and stronger version of utilitarianism, however, has room for seemingly unprincipled or even irrational distinctions as long as employing those distinctions is utility- or welfare-maximizing. And thus although Leiter’s arguments against the deontological justifications for religion-specific accommodations are largely successful, his arguments against utilitarian justifications, by relying more heavily on the notion of “principle” than a utilitarian should accept, are open to challenge.

Thoughts on the Divergence of Contract and Promise

This essay offers some brief thoughts on Seana Shiffrin’s recent work regarding the divergence of contractual and promissory norms. I conclude that Shiffrin does not do enough to separate and account for the different consequentalist and deontological justifications underlying each institution, and does not do enough to explain how promises give rise to the “moral” duties she posits. I suggest, instead, that the divergence between contract and promise is justified by the different roles each institution plays in our lives, and that, in fact, keeping strictly promissory duties outside the scope of state coercion actually facilitates a strong culture of responsible moral agency.

Ethics of the humanitarian intervention

The main subject of this paper are the ethical aspects of humanitarian military intervention. Author shows the weaknesses and difficulties of consequentialistic and deontological justification of humanitarian intervention. He points to the impossibility of a coherent moral theory of humanitarian intervention and argues that the humanitarian interventions of the nineties of the 20th century do not compliance just war. In his opinion, they represent an attempt of the quasi moral masking the real politics which lead the most powerful states in order to protect their national interests. .

International Debt: The Constructive Implications of Some Moral Mathematics

Present arrangements governing the accumulation and discharge of debt by states are difficult to justify fully on the basis of underlying normative considerations. States are different from individuals in important respects, and the deontological justifications that explain why individuals have a strong burden to abide by promises to repay do not straightforwardly apply to countries. Consequentialist considerations must play a central role in determining what norms should govern the accumulation and discharge of sovereign debt. Modified background norms for the accumulation and discharge of international debt which permit countries’ repayments to be made formally contingent on specific circumstances and the reasons that these circumstances have arisen are more likely to be morally justifiable than the existing rules, which in general require countries to repay their debts according to an inflexible schedule. Modified rules for the accumulation and discharge of international sovereign debt can codify the moral and legal basis for existing ad hoc deviations and present a justifiable framework within which international lending and borrowing can take place.

International Debt: The Constructive Implications of Some Moral Mathematics

Present arrangements governing the accumulation and discharge of debt by states are difficult to justify fully on the basis of underlying normative considerations. States are different from individuals in important respects, and the deontological justifications that explain why individuals have a strong burden to abide by promises to repay do not straightforwardly apply to countries. Consequentialist considerations must play a central role in determining what norms should govern the accumulation and discharge of sovereign debt. Modified background norms for the accumulation and discharge of international debt which permit countries’ repayments to be made formally contingent on specific circumstances and the reasons that these circumstances have arisen are more likely to be morally justifiable than the existing rules, which in general require countries to repay their debts according to an inflexible schedule. Modified rules for the accumulation and discharge of international sovereign debt can codify the moral and legal basis for existing ad hoc deviations and present a justifiable framework within which international lending and borrowing can take place.

International Debt: The Constructive Implications of Some Some Moral Mathematics

Present arrangements governing the accumulation and discharge of debt by states are difficult to justify fully on the basis of underlying normative considerations. States are different from individuals in important respects and the deontological justifications that explain why individuals have a strong burden to abide by promises to repay do not straightforwardly apply to countries. Consequentialist considerations must play a central role in determining what norms should govern the accumulation and discharge of sovereign debt. Modified background norms for the accumulation and discharge of international debt which permit countries' repayments to be made formally contingent on specific circumstances and the reasons that these circumstances have arisen are more likely to be morally justifiable than the existing rules, which in general require countries to repay their debts according to an inflexible schedule. Modified rules for the accumulation and discharge of international sovereign debt can codify the moral and legal basis for existing ad hoc deviations and present a justifiable framework within which international lending and borrowing can take place.

Medical Research on Trial: A Reply to Steiner

We consider a particular attempt to justify medical research and the practice of medicine as moral imperatives; in doing this we are led into a comparison of consequential and deontological justifications of intention and action. We conclude that the justification of research and medicine is consequential.

The concept of epistemic justification

The thesis of this paper is that there are two distinct notions of epistemic justification, namely, deontological and non-deontological justification that work together in a full account of epistemic justification that is necessary for knowledge. These two notions apply to different beliefs. The non-deontological justification applies to first-order beliefs, while the deontological justification applies to second-order beliefs (metabeliefs). From the external perspective, although a subject, S, needs not to have any metabeliefs that are the subject of the deontological justification in order to be said to know something, yet whenever S claims that she knows something she thereby expresses a meta-belief that is subject to deontological justification. Thus, knowledge claims that one ascribes to oneself or to others are always associated with such metabeliefs and hence with the deontological justification. If successful, this proposal would have explanatory power with respect to the clash between externalist and internalist intuitions in epistemology. It seems that these intuitions have its place and can be reconciled in one complex notion of epistemic justification.

Deontology and Defeat

It is currently fashionable to hold that deontology induces internalism. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology. I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat-a requirement that many externalists impose on knowledge-guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that have a chance at inducing internalism. Given this compatibility of externalism and deontology, we may safely conclude that deontology by itself doesn't lend support to internalism.

The Morality of Terrorism

In this paper (a sequel to ‘What Is Terrorism?’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 7 [ 1990]) I discuss both consequentialist and deontological justifications of terrorism. In the consequentialist context, I look in particular into Leon Trotsky’s classic defence of the ‘red terror’, based on the argument of continuity of war, revolution, and terrorism, and the claim that the distinction between the guilty and the innocent, combatants and noncombatants, is not relevant to modern warfare. On the deontological side, I discuss Virginia Held’s recent attempt at justifying terrorism in terms of basic human rights and distributive justice. The conclusion reached is that terrorism remains almost absolutely morally impermissible.