Deontic Notions Research Articles

Target Centred Virtue Ethics

<i>Target Centred Virtue Ethics</i>

Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms

Is logic normative for belief? A standard approach to answering this question has been to investigate bridge principles relating claims of logical consequence to norms for belief. Although the question is naturally an epistemic one, bridge principles have typically been investigated in isolation from epistemic debates over the correct norms for belief. In this paper we tackle the question of whether logic is normative for belief by proposing a Kripkean model theory accounting for the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions and using this model theory to show which bridge principles are implied by epistemic norms that we have independent reason to accept, for example, the knowledge norm and the truth norm. We propose a preliminary theory of the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions that has among its commitments bridge principles expressing how logic is normative for belief. We also show how our framework suggests that logic is exceptionally normative.

THE USE OF MODAL VERBS IN ENGLISH LEGAL TEXTS AND THEIR SERBIAN EQUIVALENTS

The aim of this paper is to examine and describe similarities and differences in the use and distribution of modal verbs by contrasting English and Serbian legal texts. The corpus consists of an English version of The Convention on the Rights of the Child and its official Serbian translation. We started from an assumption that modal verbs are more frequent in legal texts in English than in Serbian, where we expected to find examples of lexical items with modal meanings instead. In addition, we assumed that due to its specific use in legal texts of this kind, the English modal ‘shall’ will show the highest frequency of occurrence. A total of one hundred and twenty six (126) modal verbs and a semi-modal ‘need not’ were found in the source text. The results of the analysis support the initial presumption that ‘shall’ will stand out as the most frequent of all modal verbs (60% of all occurrences). Despite the high occurrence rate of the legalistic ‘shall’ in the source text, translation solutions in the target language only rarely take the form of the modal verb. Most often deontic notions of imperative directness and necessity in Serbian legislative writings are expressed by means of the present indicative. The analysis also indicates that translation solutions for the remaining English modal verbs most often take the form of a modal verb or a modal lexeme with a corresponding meaning in Serbian.

Defeasible Tolerance and the Sorites

I propose a novel solution to the Sorites Paradox. The account vindicates the tolerance of vague predicates in a way that properly addresses the normativity of vagueness while avoiding sorites contradiction, by treating sorites reasoning as a type of defeasible reasoning. I show how this can be done within the setting of a nonmonotonic deontic logic. Central to the proposal is its deontic interpretation of tolerance. I draw a key distinction between two types of tolerance, based on different deontic notions, and show how the account captures key differences between these types of sorites reasoning. I compare the resulting theory to various existing contextualist proposals and argue that it better accounts for the normative aspects of sorites reasoning.

Completely and partially executable sequences of actions in deontic context

The paper offers a logical characterisation of multi-step actions in the context of deontic notions of obligation, permission and prohibition. Deontic notions for sequentially composed actions (procedures or instructions) are founded on deontic notions for one-step actions. The present work includes a formal study of situations where execution of a multi-step action has been unsuccessful and provides normative analysis of such actions.

Nikolaj Nottelmann: Blameworthy Belief. A Study in Epistemic Deontologism

The theory of epistemic deontologism is an area of normative epistemology. It is concerned with the application of deontic notions such as obligation, permission, blame and praise in epistemic contexts. Nottelmann’s book ‘‘Blameworthy Belief’’ deals with the applicability of one of the central notions of epistemic deontologism, namely the concept of epistemic blameworthiness. But the study goes beyond the analysis and introduction of this concept. By introducing this notion Nottelmann establishes a theory of epistemic deontologism that is build upon epistemic blame and is of interest to epistemologists, moral philosophers and legal scholars as well. Nottelmann argues that the notion of epistemic blameworthiness is important to epistemologists because it is needed for justifying reactive attitudes of epistemic agents, such as resentment or indignation, towards their own beliefs and those of others (p. 3). Moreover, the notion of epistemic blameworthiness is important to explain moral blameworthiness and criminal liability of agents in cases in which a harmful action results from a false belief that is irresponsibly held by the agent. The book can be divided into three parts. The first part introduces the topic of epistemic deontologism and argues in favor of the importance of the notion of epistemic blameworthiness in general (Chapters 1–3). While Chapter 1 gives some motivation for the relevance of the notion of epistemic blameworthiness, Chapters 2 and 3 consist of some preliminary work for the subsequent analysis of the notion of epistemic blameworthiness. Nottelmann argues in favor of the fundamental character of the notion of epistemic blameworthiness with respect to other deontic notions like obligation, prohibition or praise in Chapter 3. He also claims that his

Regulating competing coalitions: a logic for socially optimal group choices

In Multi Agent Systems it is often the case that individual preferences are not compatible and coalitions compete to achieve a given result. The paper presents a language to talk about the conflict between coalitional choices and it expresses deontic notions to evaluate them. We will be specifically concerned with cases where the collective perspective is at odds with the individual perspective.

On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic

There are two fundamental classes of terms traditionally distinguished within moral vocabulary: the deontic and the aretaic. The terms from the first set serve in the prescriptive function of a moral code. The second class contains terms used for a moral evaluation of an action. The problem of the relationship between the aretaic and the deontic has not been discussed often by philosophers. It is, however, a very important and interesting issue: any normative ethical theory which takes as basic one set of these concepts should justify such choice and establish, at least implicitly, the logical relation with the other set. This paper is organized around the criticism of Stocker’s ‘sameness thesis’ (Stocker 1973): the claim that ‘good’ or ‘right’ mean the same thing. It is first presented in Stocker’s own formulation and criticized as implausible in that form. Some friendly modifications to his idea are suggested and then further discussed with the skeptical conclusion: no matter how close we bring deontic and aretaic notions, the gap between them will remain and any attempt to define or even explain one set of terms in another will leave something behind.

Constraint rule-based programming of norms for electronic institutions

Norms constitute a powerful coordination mechanism among heterogeneous agents. In this paper, we propose a rule language to specify and explicitly manage the normative positions of agents (permissions, prohibitions and obligations), with which distinct deontic notions and their relationships can be captured. Our rule-based formalism includes constraints for more expressiveness and precision and allows to supplement (and implement) electronic institutions with norms. We also show how some normative aspects are given computational interpretation.

Mill's Ambivalence about Duty

Consequentialists agree that deontic notions such as obligation, permission, and prohibition should be understood in terms of evaluative notions about the good. For instance, duty or obligation should be understood as serving or promoting the good in some way. In a familiar slogan, consequentialists believe that the good is prior to the right (Rawls, 1971). Utilitarians are consequentialists who conceive of the good in terms of happiness or well-being. Within the constraints set by consequentialist and utilitarian essentials, there are important family disputes. Consequentialists, in general, and utilitarians, in particular, disagree over the justification of consequentialist and utilitarian essentials, the proper conception of the good, in general, and happiness or well-being, in particular, and the exact relation between the good and the right.

The Semantics and Pragmatics of Irrealis Mood in Nyulnyulan Languages

The languages of the small Nyulnyulan family of the far northwest of Western Australia all exhibit a grammatical category traditionally dubbed irrealis. In this paper we describe the grammatical expression of this category, and its range of meanings and uses. It is argued that these can be accounted for as contextual senses or pragmatic inferences based on a single encoded core meaning, that the referent situation is construed by the speaker as unrealized. This semantic component remains invariant across all uses of the category, and is not defeasible. Contra claims by some investigators, the realis-irrealis mood contrast is fundamental, and encapsulates a viable conceptual contrast between real and unreal events; epistemic and deontic notions of probability, necessity, desirability, and the like are secondary pragmatic inferences. The irrealis is thus a modal category that can grammaticalize in human languages; indeed, it is a communicatively useful category. We explicate the nature of the conceptual contrast between the construed real and unreal. It is further argued that the notion of scope is essential to an understanding of the irrealis, and its interaction with other mode-like categories. Finally, we situate the Nyulnyulan irrealis in the wider cross-linguistic context of irrealis.

A rule-based approach to norm-oriented programming of electronic institutions

Norms constitute a powerful coordination mechanism among heterogeneous agents. We propose means to specify and explicitly manage the normative positions of agents (permissions, prohibitions and obligations), with which distinct deontic notions and their relationships can be captured. Our rule-based formalism includes constraints for more expressiveness and precision and allows the norm-oriented programming of electronic institutions: normative aspects are given a precise computational interpretation. Our formalism has been conceived as a machine language to which other higher-level normative languages can be mapped, allowing their execution, as we illustrate with a selection of examples from the literature.

The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value

According to an influential tradition in value analysis, to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. If it is fitting to favor an object for its own sake, then, on this view, the object has final value, that is, it is valuable for its own sake. If it is fitting to have a pro-attitude toward an object for the sake of its effects, then its value is instrumental. And so on. Disvalue is connected in an analogous way to contra-attitudes instead. Apart from the linkage between value and attitudes, what is distinctive for this kind of analysis, at least on some of its readings, is that it establishes a connection between the axiological and the deontic notions: value on this approach is explicated in terms of the stance that should be taken toward the object. That it is fitting to have a certain attitude, that there are reasons to have it, or that the attitude in question is appropriate or called for, are different ways to express this deontic claim. Consequently, an important advantage of the “fitting-attitudes” analysis, or the FA analysis for short, is that it removes the air of mystery from the normative ‘compellingness’ of values. (Less)

A Role Based Model for the Normative Specification of Organized Collective Agency and Agents Interaction

In this article we propose a role based model for the specification of organized collective agency, based on the legal concept of artificial person and on the normative perspective of organizational systems. We focus on the analysis of groups of agents (humans or not) that want to act collectively in a (more or less) permanent basis, and in a stable and organized way, as it is the typical case of organizations. We argue that in those cases such groups of agents should give rise to a new agent, that we call of institutionalized agent, with its own identity, whose structure is essentially defined through the characterization of a set of roles and whose behavior is determined by the acts of the agents that play such roles. We also present a deontic and action modal logic that captures the concept of acting in a role and relates it with the deontic notions of obligation, permission and prohibition. This logic is used in the formal specification of institutionalized agents and of societies of agents and in the rigorous analysis of them. We pay particular attention to the interaction between agents through contracts or other normative relations. A high level specification language is also suggested.

Collaborative process patterns for e-Business

The basic notions in computer supported work coordination in e-Business are communicative, institutional, and deontic notions such as obligation, responsibility, and trust. The Language Action approach that has a significant impact within CSCW, therefore, seems to be a most promising framework for designing e-Business systems. However, the penetration of the Language Action approach in industrial practice is still limited. We discuss some reasons for this state of affairs by identifying a number of problems that hinder an effective application of the Language Action approach. We propose modeling techniques and methodological guidelines that can contribute to the solution of these problems. These techniques and guidelines are based on three building blocks: a business model describing the values exchanged in an e-Business process, a formal and executable language based on communicating state machines, and an automated designer assistant that guides a user from a business model to an executable process model.

A formal description of evolving software systems architectures

A discussion of the evolution of software system configurations should have some formal basis in order to make the concepts applicable in a broad environment. Formal definitions should be provided for a number of notions associated with this topic including the notions of software system architecture, the restrictions of the software system configurations and the mechanisms used to control the evolution of the structural and functional descriptions. The basis for the logical formalism is a formal description of the transitions that might occur in the software change process, the purpose of the formalism being to allow deductions to be made about the validity of such transitions. Transitions are represented as actions with deontic notions to allow the statement of “permission” and “obligation”. Actions apply to a state model of a change process scenario. This model describes some of the essential features of a configuration management system, that is, versions, and module and subsystem families. Predicates are defined for this model essentially as invariants describing, for example, the relationship between a concrete interface and an abstract interface. We argue the generality of the logical formalism by illustrating its applicability to the expression of change processes in general software descriptions.

Deontic Logic and Legal Knowledge Representation*

Abstract. The current literature in the Artificial Intelligence and Law field reveals uncertainty concerning the potential role of deontic logic in legal knowledge representation. For instance, the Logic Programming Group at Imperial College has shown that a good deal can be achieved in this area in the absence of explicit representation of the deontic notions. This paper argues that some rather ordinary parts of the law contain structures which, if they are to be represented in logic, will call for use of a reasonably sophisticated deontic logic.

Some Deontic Logicians

I shall discuss the preceding papers by Aqvist, Sellars, and Anderson, and also Castanfeda's deontic calculus.' Many of the logical properties ascribed to deontic notions in deontic calculi are exhibited in payoff calculi with less problematic interpretations. A preliminary exposition of a payoff calculus will make certain logical points easier to grasp. A payoff machine has a Start lever, a Stop (or Payoff) lever and an array of buttons numbered 1, 2, 3, . . . N. One puts the machine through one cycle by pulling the Start lever, pushing any of the buttons, and finally pulling the Payoff or Stop lever. Then the machine drops money out of a slot to you. The amount is determined solely by which buttons you pushed (and did not push). Each partition of the buttons into pushed and unpushed has its payoff, characteristic of the machine. A canonical description of a payoff machine includes a specification (by numeral) of the number of buttons and a specification (similarly explicit) of the payoff function-i.e. of what payoff accrues to each partition. Consider a machine with three buttons and the following payoff function: