Nikolaj Nottelmann: Blameworthy Belief. A Study in Epistemic Deontologism

Abstract

The theory of epistemic deontologism is an area of normative epistemology. It is concerned with the application of deontic notions such as obligation, permission, blame and praise in epistemic contexts. Nottelmann’s book ‘‘Blameworthy Belief’’ deals with the applicability of one of the central notions of epistemic deontologism, namely the concept of epistemic blameworthiness. But the study goes beyond the analysis and introduction of this concept. By introducing this notion Nottelmann establishes a theory of epistemic deontologism that is build upon epistemic blame and is of interest to epistemologists, moral philosophers and legal scholars as well. Nottelmann argues that the notion of epistemic blameworthiness is important to epistemologists because it is needed for justifying reactive attitudes of epistemic agents, such as resentment or indignation, towards their own beliefs and those of others (p. 3). Moreover, the notion of epistemic blameworthiness is important to explain moral blameworthiness and criminal liability of agents in cases in which a harmful action results from a false belief that is irresponsibly held by the agent. The book can be divided into three parts. The first part introduces the topic of epistemic deontologism and argues in favor of the importance of the notion of epistemic blameworthiness in general (Chapters 1–3). While Chapter 1 gives some motivation for the relevance of the notion of epistemic blameworthiness, Chapters 2 and 3 consist of some preliminary work for the subsequent analysis of the notion of epistemic blameworthiness. Nottelmann argues in favor of the fundamental character of the notion of epistemic blameworthiness with respect to other deontic notions like obligation, prohibition or praise in Chapter 3. He also claims that his