On (Moral) Philosophy and American Legal Scholarship

Abstract

Why isn't contemporary moral philosophy more influential in contemporary U.S. legal scholarship? I am a legal scholar who tries to stay current with the academic literature on moral philosophy and to bring its insights to bear on legal issues. I have, for some time, been puzzled by the paucity of fellow travelers. A thought piece for a book on philosophy and American law seems to be an appropriate forum for me to ventilate a bit on the question. My focus here will be U.S. legal scholarship (and I'll henceforth generally drop the adjective U.S ., which will be assumed in what follows). I take it that many legal scholars have a general familiarity with moral philosophy, not just classical work (Bentham, Hobbes, Locke) but also famous modern work. They have read, or at least have heard of, the work of Robert Nozick, Derek Parfit, and John Rawls, and they aren't surprised by terms like consequentialism , veil of ignorance , difference principle , or side-constraint . But why aren't there more legal scholars who make it a point to remain well-versed in current developments in moral philosophy? Academic moral philosophers, housed in university philosophy departments, continue to work in the philosophical traditions to which Nozick, Parfit, and Rawls so notably contributed. Why do so few legal scholars try to stay abreast of that work?