Denial Of Autonomy Research Articles

Violations of the Persons with Disability in Kerala, the Need for Community Based Rehabilitation: A Comparative Approach

Disability is a human rights issue because those with functional difficulties endure stigmatization, discrimination, inequalities, violation of their rights, abuse, prejudice, and denial of autonomy. Since different demographic groups exist in a developing nation like India, rehabilitation institutions and C.B.R. models encounter several challenges and practical obstacles. Persons with disabilities lead a challenging life and belong to stigmatized groups. Therefore, people with disabilities suffer enormous difficulties throughout their lives, which also involve abuses of their human rights. Hence, this paper aims to examine human rights violations affecting persons with disabilities as a marginalized group living in Kerala, focusing on three aspects: • Institutionalization and follow-up process • The importance of a multidisciplinary team • The importance of C.B.R. within Kerala culture

The impact of proposed intimate image abuse offences on domestic violence and abuse

This article explores how proposed reforms to the law on intimate image abuse could address situations where intimate images are shared, or threats to share are made, in a relationship where there is domestic violence and abuse (DVA). In exploring the purposes and motivations behind the use of non-consensual intimate images in this context, the harmful impact is demonstrated to be the denial of autonomy and personhood that ‘entraps’ the victim in the relationship. It is essential that this harm, and the underlying motivations of those who use intimate image abuse for this purpose, is made visible under any relevant legislation to ensure that the criminal law effectively condemns and remedies conduct of this kind. It is for this reason that the article concludes that the Law Commission, in its 2021 consultation, was right to consider introducing an offence of ‘intentionally taking or sharing an intimate image without consent with the intent to control or coerce the person depicted’.1 It is further suggested that this fault element may better reflect the culpability of those who engage in threats to share intimate images and should be introduced not just where images are taken and shared, but also where threats to share such images are made.

What does my appearance have to do with my job? Vocational students on the sexual harassment from guests in the hospitality industry

Sexual harassment by guests is part of the vocational culture in many workplaces within the hospitality industry. In this study, we investigate vocational students' descriptions of sexual harassment by guests in the hospitality industry and how these instances can be understood in terms of objectification. The empirical material consists of focus group interviews with upper secondary school students who are training to work in the hospitality industry. The students describe four categories of sexual harassment: appearance comments, private and intrusive questions, leering, and physical contact. In the descriptions, men are sexually harassing female students or employees. The types of objectification in the descriptions are reduction to appearance, reduction to body, instrumental approach, denial of autonomy, denial of bodily integrity, and denial of subjectivity. Regardless of the type of objectification involved, a dilemma arises for the girls who have been taught that being courteous to guests is part of the professional role, while the guests are treating them as sexual objects.

The impact of proposed intimate image abuse offences on domestic violence and abuse

This article explores how proposed reforms to the law on intimate image abuse could address situations where intimate images are shared, or threats to share are made, in a relationship where there is domestic violence and abuse (DVA). In exploring the purposes and motivations behind the use of non-consensual intimate images in this context, the harmful impact is demonstrated to be the denial of autonomy and personhood that ‘entraps’ the victim in the relationship. It is essential that this harm, and the underlying motivations of those who use intimate image abuse for this purpose, is made visible under any relevant legislation to ensure that the criminal law effectively condemns and remedies conduct of this kind. It is for this reason that the article concludes that the Law Commission, in its 2021 consultation, was right to consider introducing an offence of ‘intentionally taking or sharing an intimate image without consent with the intent to control or coerce the person depicted’. It is further suggested that this fault element may better reflect the culpability of those who engage in threats to share intimate images and should be introduced not just where images are taken and shared, but also where threats to share such images are made.

Как сегодня должно пониматься уважение к достоинству человека?

Human dignity is acknowledged to be the core value for the ethics of human rights. At the same time, it is considered to be an empty signifier, which does not have its own meaning. The objective of the article is to find a clear sense for this principle which should be different to the meanings of other fundamental demo­cratic values: justice as equality, justice as fairness, autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, care or respect for persons. The author argues that we should under­stand respect for human dignity only as the anti-instrumentalization principle, which prohibits using a human being merely as a means. Accordingly, respect for human dignity is not violated when all subjects derive benefits from the rela­tionship of mutual instrumentalization. In the paper the other forms of the objec­tification of subjects (exploitation, violence, depersonalization, commodifica­tion, ownership, inertness, denial of autonomy) are also analyzed. The author concludes that in the first place many of these cases are based not on disrespect for human dignity, but on the violation of other principles.

Dignity Denied: The Abu Zubaydah Case Study

Human dignity lays claim to multiple roles within the international political and legal order - the source or rationale of human rights, a goal of the UN Charter, the ‘ultimate value’ or ‘cornerstone’ of the international legal order, a right in itself and intimately interlinked with an array of other rights, with assessments of the impact of violations and the nature of reparation. The subjugation of human dignity is evident in much counter-terrorism practice in recent years, but epitomised by the case of rendition and torture victim Zayn al Abideen Mohammed al Hussein (Abu Zubaydah). By reference to diverse philosophical conceptions of dignity and its legal manifestations, this chapter explores the multiple dimensions of human dignity that were and are challenged in deep-rooted and wide-ranging ways by the extraordinary rendition and torture programme and on-going arbitrary detention at Guantanamo. These include the commodification of ‘high value detainees’, the centrality of dehumanisation, treating lives and liberty as dispensable, ‘civil death,’ and the link between the denial of autonomy, agency and the social dimensions of dignity. It considers in turn the role of reparation and accountability in the restoration of dignity. This extreme case invites us to reflect on the more pervasive neglect of human dignity in counter-terrorism practice and the long term implications of its demise in the name of human security.

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism, Autonomy and Entanglement

It was something of a dogma for much of the twentieth century that one cannot validly derive an ought from an is. More generally, it was held that non-normative propositions do not entail normative propositions. Call this thesis about the relation between the natural and the normative Natural-Normative Autonomy (or Autonomy for short). The denial of Autonomy involves the entanglement of the natural with the normative. Naturalism entails entanglement—in fact it entails the most extreme form of entanglement—but entanglement does not entail naturalism. In a ground-breaking paper “The autonomy of ethics” Arthur Prior constructed some intriguing counterexamples to Autonomy. While his counterexamples have convinced few, there is little agreement on what is wrong with them. I present a new analysis of Autonomy, one which is grounded in a general and independently plausible account of subject matters. While Prior’s arguments do establish shallow natural-normative entanglement, this is a consequence of simple logical relationships that hold between just about any two subject matters. It has nothing special to do with the logical structure of normativity or its relation to the natural. Prior’s arguments (along with several others) leave the fundamental idea behind natural-normative Autonomy intact. I offer a new argument for deep entanglement. I show that in any framework adequate for dealing with the natural and the normative spheres, a purely natural proposition entails a purely normative proposition, and vice-versa. But this is no threat to non-naturalist moral realism. In fact it helps ameliorate the excesses of an extreme non-naturalism, delivering a more palatable and plausible position.

"Rape-Adjacent": Imagining Legal Responses to Nonconsensual Condom Removal

Abstract Nonconsensual condom removal during sexual intercourse exposes victims to physical risks of pregnancy and disease and, interviews make clear, is experienced by many as a grave violation of dignity and autonomy. Such condom removal, popularly known as stealthing, can be understood to transform consensual sex into nonconsensual sex by one of two theories, one of which poses a risk of over-criminalization by demanding complete transparency about reproductive capacity and sexually transmitted infections. Adopting the alternative, preferable theory of non-consent, this Article considers possible criminal, tort, contract, and civil rights remedies currently available to victims. Ultimately, a new tort for stealthing is necessary both to provide victims with a more viable cause of action and to reflect better the harms wrought by nonconsensual condom removal. INTRODUCTION Rebecca (1) is a doctoral student living in a university town. When she is not researching for her dissertation, Rebecca works for a local rape crisis hotline. In this role, she often hears from undergraduate students at the state college. Of these callers, a significant number describe upsetting sexual contact that they struggle to name. Their partners have, during sex, removed a condom without their knowledge. Their stories often start the same way: I'm not sure this is rape, but.... Their accounts resonate with Rebecca. A boyfriend did the same thing to her when she was a college freshman. (2) Victims (3) like Rebecca say they do not know what to call the harm and United States courts have not had occasion to address and name the practice. (4) Yet, despite a lack of legal recognition, the practice is widespread and known: an online sub-community of perpetrators has identified and dubbed the practice of nonconsensually removing condoms during sex stealthing. (5) The practice puts partners at risk for unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and, survivors explain, it feels like a violation of trust and a denial of autonomy, not dissimilar to rape. Nonetheless, the law is largely silent in the face of what this Article will argue is widespread violence. (6) In the first Part of this Article, I describe the problem, drawing on victim interviews. Survivors make clear that, as a result of the removed condoms, they experienced fear of STIs and pregnancy and also a less concrete but deeply felt feeling of violation. I also present writings from perpetrators, whom I did not interview directly, but who have provided explanations for their behavior on online forums, to demonstrate the gendered motivations for nonconsensual condom removal. After that, I consider two possible arguments for why such condom removal should be understood to vitiate consent to sex: first, that contact with the skin of a penis is distinct from contact with a condom, and so requires separate consent, and, second, that the greater risks associated with sex without a condom transforms the contact into a new type of act outside the scope of the initial consent. Ultimately, I warn against adopting the second line of reasoning, which may unintentionally promote rape by deception claims and overly punitive treatment of people with STIs. In Part III, I consider whether and how criminal law, tort law, gender violence civil rights actions, and contract law might provide remedy to nonconsensual-condom-removal victims. Finally, I consider possible drawbacks to remedies currently available at law and make the case for a new cause of action. I. The Phenomenon Interviews with people who have experienced condom removal and online accounts from victims indicate that nonconsensual condom removal is a common practice among young, sexually active people. Both men and women (7) describe having sex with male partners with penises who, during sex, removed the condom without their knowledge. …

Words don’t come easy: Al Jazeera’s migrant–refugee distinction and the European culture of (mis)trust

Al Jazeera’s August 2015 editorial decision to substitute ‘refugee’ for ‘economic migrant’ in its coverage of ‘the Mediterranean Migration Crisis’ provides an opportunity to re-frame the relationship between the politics of race, immigration and media representations of refugees. Situating the broadcaster’s publicly announced rationale for the decision within a critique of the migrant–refugee dichotomy enforced by European public policy, this article, first, demonstrates that the policy couplet mobilizes oppositional yet interdependent identities. The discursive distancing of ‘migrant’ from ‘refugee’ in news content does not dislodge their mutually reinforcing power to define the parameters of ‘inclusion’. Second, the article examines how the policy onus placed on refugees to justify their claim as ‘victims’ reproduces racialized codes of belonging that perpetuate the denial of autonomy. Persons seeking refuge in Europe must sustain an identity of ‘non-threatening victim’ if they are to gain recognition in a securitized culture of (mis)trust. Al Jazeera’s intervention strengthens the media representation of refugees as human beings without choice; yet, the broadcaster’s decision to ‘give voice’ by ‘challenging racism’ does not break the European political consensus on immigration and asylum that positions ‘non-Western’ peoples as victim/pariah, to be ‘saved’ and ‘suspected’. The media–policy–migration nexus ensures that refugee exclusion is always possible.

Writing the Naked Body: Sex and Nudity in Nuala Ní Chonchuír’s Nude

Introduction John Berger says about the female nude in painting: is not naked as she is. She is naked as the spectator sees (1972: 50). Berger's work directly addresses the differences between nakedness and nudity, especially when connected with voyeurism, and was one of the first efforts to bring awareness to the phenomenon of objectification--i.e. treating a subject as an object--of women in art. Sexual objectification has been analysed repeatedly from different perspectives, but probably the feminist approach remains the more interesting, even despite the high level of diversity and occasional confrontations deriving from each analysis within the feminist methodological paradigm. Laura Mulvey also established a cornerstone in the critical analysis of the male gaze and objectification of women in Hollywood's classic cinema with her 1975 essay Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema. (1) A couple of decades later, Martha Nussbaum (1995) defined the basic ingredients in the production of objectification in her analysis of texts by several authors, ranging from D.H. Lawrence to James Joyce or Henry James. Nussbaum cited seven key factors or notions for a process of objectification to be complete: instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility, violability, ownership, and denial of subjectivity (1995: 257). In between Mulvey's and Nussbaum's essays other feminists released their own analyses of objectification in contemporary cultural manifestations. This was the case of Andrea Dworkin and her book Pornography: Men Possessing Women (1979), or Catherine Mackinnon's Pornography and Civil Rights: A New Day for Women's Equality (1988), written in collaboration with Dworkin. The topic I would like to focus on in this essay, however, is not so much pornography as objectification and the way(s) in which the latter is connected to the representation of nudity, as exemplified in Nuala Ni Chonchuir's (2) collection of short stories Nude (2009). (3) Far from shying away from such a delicate subject-matter, Ni Chonchuir boldly explores the possibilities of representing/narrating the naked body (both male and female), in tight connection with a preference for the sexual reading of the body as it is gazed upon by a far from innocent gendered gaze. It is precisely this particular way of depicting and interpreting the naked body that interests me, for both sexual objectification and the (fe)male gaze are combined in Nude to produce a piece of literature that unexpectedly reverses the orthodox normative dichotomies concerning nudity and at the same time blurs gender differences between male and female ways of seeing. Can we, therefore, identify a 'genuine' non-objectifying gaze in Ni Chonchuir's stories? Probably the best way to find an answer to this question would be to briefly examine some aspects of both (sexual) objectification and the male gaze, in order to reach some insight for the analysis of these evasive stories. The Sexualized Gaze: Objectified Bodies Much has been written about the 'male gaze' as regards the process of objectification of women--especially regarding the representation of women in cinema. Although the work I intend to analyse is a literary piece and not a film, the theoretical framework on the 'male gaze' may prove useful for the purposes of my research: thus, it is my contention that Ni Chonchuir plays with the representation of the naked body in an ambiguous way in order to bring out a heteronormative discriminatory approach found both in literature and in the visual arts. By so doing she manages to turn conventional assumptions around nudity and nakedness into a scenario filled with dysfunction, consequently establishing a new ground for a non-normative--and non-discriminatory--representation of both women and men. Laura Mulvey and John Berger, as has already been stated, devoted some of their finest reflections to explain the way in which women are objectified in Hollywood cinema and in European visual arts, respectively. …

Psychic wounds and the social structure: An empirical investigation

Empirical linkages between structure and agency, or system and life world, have traditionally not been overabundant in sociology, though work emerging in the field of the sociology of emotions does offer some illumination on this topic. This article uses data obtained in a project which investigated the impact of the Howard government’s dual reforms in the industrial relations and welfare policy arenas. In this article, we seek to explore in some depth how a system that is underpinned by the notion of dignity and rights produces shame in its supposed beneficiaries, based on the evidence in the data collected. As well, we attempt to expose the processes by which shame is produced and how it manifests among the participants in the study. The first part of the article focuses upon the broader structural context, while the second proceeds to examine how this impinges upon agents at the microsocial level. Workfare recipients are constructed as dependants, in a society that privileges independence and ignores the crucial fact of our mutual interdependency. The transcripts reveal that the denial of autonomy and respect are key mechanisms by which dignity is injured. In exploring these phenomena, the purpose of the article is to demonstrate the usually veiled connections between individuals and their larger social context.

Basic Income and the Labor Contract

Abstract The paper starts by exploring the negative contingencies that are associated with the core institution of capitalist societies, the labour contract: unemployment, poverty, and denial of autonomy. It argues that these are the three conditions that basic income schemes can help prevent. Next, the three major normative arguments are discussed that are raised by opponents of basic income proposals: the idle should not be rewarded, the prosperous don’t need it, and there are so many things waiting to be done in the world. After demonstrating that proponents of basic income stand in no way empty-handed when facing these objections, a third part considers basic income in functional terms: would its introduction help to resolve problems of social and economic order that are unlikely to be resolved in more conventional ways?

Basic Income and the Labor Contract

The paper starts by exploring the negative contingencies that are associated with the core institution of capitalist societies, the labor contract: unemployment, poverty, and denial of autonomy. It argues that these are the three conditions that basic income schemes can help prevent. Next, the three major normative arguments are discussed that are raised in opposition to basic income proposals: the idle should not be rewarded, the prosperous don't need it, and there are so many things waiting to be done in the world. After demonstrating that proponents of basic income stand in no way empty-handed when facing these objections, a third part considers basic income in functional terms: would its introduction help to resolve problems of social and economic order that are unlikely to be resolved in more conventional ways?

Two Notions of Objectification

This essay aims to compare two notions of objectification: on the one hand, Buber's distinction between I-thou relations (which he models on the appropriate treatment of humans) and I-it relations (which he models on the treatment of objects),1 and on the other hand, the contemporary notion of objectification. When discussing Buber's notion of objectification one can rely, of course, on Buber's work. Notwithstanding the common use of the contemporary notion, however, it has received relatively little scholarly attention and analysis till now. I will mostly rely here on Martha Nussbaum's seminal and pioneering Objectification, where she suggests a very helpful analysis of the notion and its uses.2 Perhaps the most noticeable difference between the notions has to do with their basic features. Nussbaum presents seven distinct ways of behaving introduced by the term: (1) Instrumentality-using others as a means; (2) Denial of autonomy; (3) Inertness-treating others as lacking agency or activity; (4) Fungibility-treating others as interchangeable; (5) Violability-treating others as lacking boundary integrity, or as such that it is allowed to break or harm; (6) Ownership-treating others as such that can belong to one; and (7) Denial of subjectivity.3 Nussbaum does not consider this list exhaustive,4 and I believe that at least two more features should be added. The first is denial of rationality: people are frequently distinguished from objects by the ability to think. The second is worth: people are usually taken to have certain a priori worth or importance simply by virtue of their being human. This is not so with objects, which are viewed as less important than human beings. Buber's list of features is similar to the modern one in some aspects. Thus, he too discusses instrumentality5 and denial of autonomy.6 However, he does not mention the treatment of others as inert, as fungible, as violable, as owned and as lacking subjectivity, rationality and importance. On the other hand, he mentions other features that do not appear in the contemporary list: non-reciprocity;7 relating through the past rather than the present;8 acting through rules, laws, and set procedures and norms rather than spontaneously;9 and relating to others with only part (rather than the whole) of one's being.10 Part of the difference between these two lists is not coincidental. Buber's orientation is primarily spiritual-emotional, and he calls for a connected, spontaneous, dynamic, and open attitude to the world and its beings. The contemporary account, on the other hand, is primarily moved by ethical-legalistic concerns, and hence mainly demands from individuals not to harm each other, and not much more than that. Moreover, highly informed by liberal presuppositions, it is atomistic and individualist in nature. Hence, relating to others through the past rather than the future, or with part rather than the whole of one's being, or through rules, laws, and set procedures, would not be considered objectifying in the modern account. For Buber, in contrast, relating to others through set laws and procedures, or with only part of one's being, or through the past rather than the future, may hinder the open, connective and spontaneous spiritual relation that he is aiming for. On the other hand, relating to others as lacking in rationality, which is more likely to lead to harm in a modern transactional world, will be objectifying for the contemporary account, but not for Buber's. Another significant difference between the two accounts is that the contemporary one poses a much lighter challenge to those who wish to refrain from objectifying than does Buber's. According to the contemporary notion, treating people as people does not mean that they will not be treated, to a certain extent, also as objects. For example, we can use others as instruments to a certain extent without objectifying them. They should not be treated as a means only, but treating them instrumentally to a certain degree need not objectify them. …

Closure or Critique?: New Directions in Legal Theory

In this book, Norrie tackles the many diverse theoretical traditions within modern law which force legal theorists to ask complex philosophical questions about the basis of law and its relationship to society, morality and ethics. Norrie's focus around the issue of either closure (the presentation of law as an autonomous rational phenomenon) or critique (the denial of autonomy, rationality and formalism) allows the reader to consider such questions logically. Leading legal academics in the US and the UK discuss autopoiesis, critical legal studies, Foucault, semiotic and rhetorical analyses of law and feminism, amongst other topics. Broadly-based and up-to-date, this book aims to both explain and unify the diversity within legal theory today.