Deniable Authentication Research Articles

An efficient certificateless deniable authentication protocol without pairings

A deniable authentication protocol enables an intended receiver to identify the source of a given message, but the receiver cannot prove the source of a given message to any third party. It is very useful in some particular applications such as electronic voting, online negotiation and online shopping. However, many related protocols are lack of formal security proof which is very important for cryptographic protocol design. In this paper, we present a certificateless deniable authentication protocol. Our protocol is based on certificateless cryptography, which can solve the public key certificate management problem of public key infrastructure PKI-based cryptography and the key escrow problem of identity-based cryptography. Our protocol does not need the pairing operation which is the most time-consuming. In addition, our protocol can admit formal security proof in the random oracle model and resist key compromise impersonation KCI attack. Compared with the existing deniable authentication protocols, our protocol can be well applied in electronic voting system.

Security analysis of Kar's ID-based deniable authentication protocol

In 2013, Kar proposed a secure ID-based deniable authentication protocol whose security is based on computational infeasibility of solving Elliptic Curve Die-Hellman Problem(ECDHP). Kar claimed that

Authenticated Deniable Internet KeyExchange

We propose two public-key schemes to achieve deniable authentication for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Authentication in security had is the essential factor in the key establishment over Internet. The Deniable Internet key exchange protocol gives more value to the IKE standard. Our schemes can in some situations be more efficient than existing IKE protocols as well as having stronger deniability properties. Key-exchange, in particular Diffie–Hellman key exchange (DHKE), is among the core cryptographic mechanisms for ensuring network security. For key-exchange over the Internet, both security and privacy are desired. In this paper, we develop a family of privacy-preserving authenticated DHKE protocols named deniable Internet key-exchange (DIKE), both in the traditional PKI setting and in the identity-based setting. The newly developed DIKE protocols are of conceptual clarity and practical (online) efficiency. They provide useful privacy protection to both protocol participants, and add novelty and new value to the IKE standard.

Quantum deniable authentication protocol

The proposed quantum identity authentication schemes only involved authentication between two communicators, but communications with deniability capability are often desired in electronic applications such as online negotiation and electronic voting. In this paper, we proposed a quantum deniable authentication protocol. According to the property of unitary transformation and quantum one-way function, this protocol can provide that only the specified receiver can identify the true source of a given message and the specified receiver cannot prove the source of the message to a third party by a transcript simulation algorithm. Moreover, the quantum key distribution and quantum encryption algorithm guarantee the unconditional security of this scheme. Security analysis results show that this protocol satisfies the basic security requirements of deniable authentication protocol such as completeness and deniability and can withstand the forgery attack, impersonation attack, inter-resend attack.

Anonymous Electronic Voting Protocol with Deniable Authentication for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

This paper analyzes Chun et al.’s e-voting protocol for mobile ad-hoc network and modifies it based on blind signature technique to support anonymous voting property. Based on this property the trusted node cannot learn who has voted for whom. As the previous protocol, the modified protocol does not need any centralized administration. We analyze security and computation cost of the proposed protocol and show that it is well suited for mobile environments.

Plaintext awareness in identity-based key encapsulation

The notion of plaintext awareness ( $${\mathsf{PA}}$$ PA ) has many applications in public key cryptography: it offers unique, stand-alone security guarantees for public key encryption schemes, has been used as a sufficient condition for proving indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks ( $${\mathsf{IND}\hbox {-}{\mathsf{CCA}}}$$ IND - CCA ), and can be used to construct privacy-preserving protocols such as deniable authentication. Unlike many other security notions, plaintext awareness is very fragile when it comes to differences between the random oracle and standard models; for example, many implications involving $${\mathsf{PA}}$$ PA in the random oracle model are not valid in the standard model and vice versa. Similarly, strategies for proving $${\mathsf{PA}}$$ PA of schemes in one model cannot be adapted to the other model. Existing research addresses $${\mathsf{PA}}$$ PA in detail only in the public key setting. This paper gives the first formal exploration of plaintext awareness in the identity-based setting and, as initial work, proceeds in the random oracle model. The focus is laid mainly on identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms (IB-KEMs), for which the paper presents the first definitions of plaintext awareness, highlights the role of $${\mathsf{PA}}$$ PA in proof strategies of $${\mathsf{IND}\hbox {-}{\mathsf{CCA}}}$$ IND - CCA security, and explores relationships between $${\mathsf{PA}}$$ PA and other security properties. On the practical side, our work offers the first, highly efficient, general approach for building IB-KEMs that are simultaneously plaintext-aware and $${\mathsf{IND}\hbox {-}{\mathsf{CCA}}}$$ IND - CCA -secure. Our construction is inspired by the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform, but demands weaker and more natural properties of its building blocks. This result comes from a new look at the notion of $$\gamma $$ ? -uniformity that was inherent in the original FO transform. We show that for IB-KEMs (and PK-KEMs), this assumption can be replaced with a weaker computational notion, which is in fact implied by one-wayness. Finally, we give the first concrete IB-KEM scheme that is $${\mathsf{PA}}$$ PA and $${\mathsf{IND}\hbox {-}{\mathsf{CCA}}}$$ IND - CCA -secure by applying our construction to a popular IB-KEM and optimizing it for better performance.

Identity-based deniable authentication for ad hoc networks

Deniable authentication is an important security requirement for ad hoc networks. However, all known identity-based deniable authentication (IBDA) protocols are lack of formal security proof which is very important for cryptographic protocol design. In this paper, we propose a non-interactive IBDA protocol using bilinear pairings. Our protocol admits formal security proof in the random oracle model under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our protocol is faster than all known IBDA protocols of its type. In addition, our protocol supports batch verification that can speed up the verification of authenticators. This characteristic makes our protocol useful in ad hoc networks.

ID-based non-interactive deniable authentication protocol

Non-interactive deniable authentication protocol can enable the receiver to identify the source of a received message and prevent a third party from identifying the source of the message,which is very suitable to be used in E-commerce and E-government.Based on computational Diffie-Hellman assumption,using bilinear pairing,a new identity-based deniable authentication protocol was constructed.The security of the scheme was proved under the random oracle model.The analytical results show that the new proposed protocol can resist the forgery attack,spoofing attack,middle attack and replay attack.This protocol is identity-based,which means it needs no certificate and has a simple key management.On the other hand,it is efficient in communications and computation,and its implementation is simple,so that it could be implemented in mobile devices with low power and small processor.

Selectively unforgeable but existentially forgeable signature schemes and applications

This paper gives definitions, constructions and applications of signature schemes, which are selectively unforgeable but existentially forgeable (SUEF). We formalize the special notion under conditions of chosen message attack (CMA) and known message attack (KMA). Then two general constructions are presented with two concrete examples. We apply the SUEF secure signature schemes to an elementary authentication mechanism, the challenge-response mechanism, to obtain a basic deniable authentication method. The method is presented as a deniable message transmission (MT) authenticator in the extension framework of Raimondo.

Deniable message transmission authenticator based on weak signature schemes

This study shows how to use signature schemes for deniable authentication. Deniable authentication means that a message receiver R, although receiving a message m from a sender S, cannot convince a third party that the sender S has sent R the message m. If signature schemes are secure against selective forgery, the authors can construct a full deniable authentication protocol. The protocol is presented in the extension framework of Raimondo et al. as a deniable message transmission authenticator.

The Deniability Analysis for a Deniable Authentication Protocol

The notion of deniable authentication is introduced by Dwork et al., deniable authentication protocols allow a sender to authenticate a message for receiver, in a way that the receiver cannot convince a third party that such authentication ever took place. Raimondo et al. present authentication protocol λProj and deniable version Den-λProj by adding challenge-response mechanism. In this paper we prove the protocol λProj without challenge-response is deniable against malicious verifier under subset witness assumption.

Cryptanalysis and Improvement of Robust Deniable Authentication Protocol

A deniable authentication protocol enables a receiver to identify the source of a given message, but the receiver cannot prove the source of the message to a third party. Recently, Yoon et al. (Wirel Pers Commun 55:81---90, 2010) proposed a robust deniable authentication protocol based on ElGamal cryptosystem. Although they proved that their protocol satisfies the deniable authentication, mutual authentication and confidentiality, we show that their protocol does not satisfy the deniable authentication property. The receiver can prove the source of a given message to a third party. In addition, we propose an improved protocol that removes this weakness.

Cryptanalysis of a Deniable Authentication Protocol based on Bilinear Pairing using Single Sender and Group Sender

The aim of an efficient deniable authentication protocol is to enable a receiver to identify the source of a given message but not to prove the identity of the sender. Lu and Cao [7,10] confirmed that the previous protocols had a common weakness in which any third party can impersonate the intended receiver to verify the signature of the given message, and they proposed a new protocol based on bilinear pairing using single sender and sender group. They claimed that their protocol could provide complete security and properties of a deniable authentication protocol based on bilinear pairing using single sender and sender group, we will point out that the protocol in two papers is unable to prove the source of the given message to any third party, even if he/she fully cooperates with the third party.

Cryptanalysis of a Non-interactive Deniable Authentication Protocol Based on Factoring

A deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to transfer an authenticated message to a receiver in such a way that the receiver cannot prove to a third party about the source of the message. In recent years, many deniable authentication protocols have been proposed. In 2005, Lu et al. proposed a secure and non-interactive deniable authentication protocol based on factoring. Although Lu et al. claimed that their protocol could provide complete security and properties of a deniable authentication protocol, we will point out that Lu et al. protocol is unable to achieve the second requirement of being the deniable authentication protocol.

A New Protocol for Deniable Authentication

A New Protocol for Deniable Authentication

Confidential deniable authentication using promised signcryption

In a deniable authentication protocol, a receiver is convinced that a received message is indeed from a particular sender, but cannot prove this to any third party. Deniable authentication protocols satisfy deniability and intended receiver properties. Among the proposed deniable authentication protocols, non-interactive protocols are more efficient than interactive protocols by reducing communication cost. The Hwang and Ma, and the Hwang and Chao non-interactive protocols provide sender anonymity. Recently some interactive protocols provide confidentiality while no non-interactive protocols do. However, the transferred data may damage sender or receiver anonymity. To provide confidentiality and anonymity efficiently, the first promised signcryption scheme is proposed. Using our promised signcryption scheme, we propose the first efficient non-interactive deniable authentication protocol with confidentiality, sender anonymity, and sender protection.

Automatic Verification of Deniable Authentication Protocol in a Probabilistic Polynomial Calculus with Cryptoverif

Automatic Verification of Deniable Authentication Protocol in a Probabilistic Polynomial Calculus with Cryptoverif

Computationally Sound Mechanized Proofs for Deniable Authentication Protocols with a Probabilistic Polynomial Calculus in Computational Model

Computationally Sound Mechanized Proofs for Deniable Authentication Protocols with a Probabilistic Polynomial Calculus in Computational Model

Automatic Proofs of Deniable Authentication Protocols with a Probabilistic Polynomial Calculus in Computational Model

Automatic Proofs of Deniable Authentication Protocols with a Probabilistic Polynomial Calculus in Computational Model

A Non-interactive Deniable Authentication Protocol based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem

A Non-interactive Deniable Authentication Protocol based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem