How much would it be worth to a young man entering upon the practice of law, to be regarded as a white man rather than a colored one? Six-sevenths of the population are white. Nineteen-twentieths of the property of the country is owned by white people. Ninety-nine hundredths of the business opportunities are in the control of white people. These propositions are rendered even more startling by the intensity of feeling which excludes the colored man from the friendship and companionship of the white man.... Under these conditions, is it possible to conclude that the reputation of being white is not property? Indeed, is it not the most valuable sort of property, being the master-key that unlocks the golden door of opportunity? --Albion W. Tourgee, Brief of Plaintiff in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson [emphasis in original] HISTORIANS HAVE LONG REGARDED THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S 1896 ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson as a landmark in American constitutional history. The Plessy suit also marked the last effort by surviving Radical Republicans of the Civil War generation to establish an interracial democratic public. At the time, the Court's upholding of Louisiana's so-called Separate Car Act seemed the final reconciliation of white supremacy with the Reconstruction amendments of the 1860s, amendments that had been designed to protect citizenship fights from racial discrimination. Yet the ideals that motivated the Plessy suit--those of an interracial democracy--lived on. The legal argument against segregation was persistently revived and refought by later civil fights activists, culminating in Brown v. the Board of Education (1954). Over the course of this process, both the legal rhetoric and the constitutional principles raised by the Plessy case went through many stages of transformation and reformulation, and they have continued to do so ever since. The Plessy case introduced several enduring legal principles and metaphors into the constitutional discourse about race, civil rights, and models of the ideal democratic public. The flood of popular and scholarly literature that revisited the Plessy case on its centennial anniversary in 1996 demonstrated the continued relevance of its central issues and the lasting power of the rhetoric it employed.(1) Of all the arguments advanced in the case, the one that most greatly continues to inform public debate on racial discrimination remains the assertion of color blindness before the law. In his famous Plessy dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan asserted, There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.(2) Legal scholars continue to debate what Harlan meant by this and whether or not this statement was intended as constitutional doctrine. What is too often forgotten in these debates, however, is that Harlan borrowed the metaphor of color blindness from a legal brief submitted by Homer Plessy's lead counsel in the case, Albion W. Tourgee.(3) Given the importance of the phrase color blindness and the complex arguments regarding it, there is a need to better understand its historical origins. Until now this concept has been examined mainly in terms of its enduring importance as legal doctrine; Harlan's dissent in Plessy has been the most influential use of the phrase for those who have deemed it a constitutional principle. Interestingly, however, Harlan seems never to have used it either before or afterward.(4) On the other hand, Albion W. Tourgee, who was lead attorney for Homer Plessy, first deployed the term in Plessy and had used it on several prior occasions on behalf of the struggle for civil rights. Indeed, Tourgee's first use of the legal metaphor of color blindness came decades before while serving as a Superior Court judge in North Carolina. One of the original Radical Republicans and an active participant in Reconstruction politics, Tourgee remained a controversial but respected voice within the Republican party from the 1860s until the McKinley administration. …