Democratic Dyads Research Articles

Patterns of bilateral military alliances formation and political regimes in Central Europe, 1962-2003

This study examines the dynamics of political regimes as pivotal factors shaping bilateral military alliances (BMAs) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) from the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) to 2003. Using data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) and the Polity IV databases, the research investigates statistical correlations between the formation of military alliances, their typologies, and political regime-type dynamics. Research questions include exploring the key characteristics of BMAs, the political regime nature of dyads, correlations between alliance durability and democracy levels, and the impact of regime changes on alliance phases. A sample of 88 BMAs is analysed, exploring hypotheses on relationships such as alliance duration, political regime congruity, member asymmetry, treaty provisions, and changes pre- and post-Cuban crisis. Key findings indicate that less democratic dyads tended to sustain longer alliances, while the hypothesis on political regime congruity in military alliances received partial support. The study contributes to understanding how political regime dynamics influence alliance formation and longevity in a region historically shaped by the Cold War geopolitical dynamics.

The democratic embargo: regime type and proxy war

Democracies rarely fight interstate wars against one another, but democratic dyads frequently engage in hostile acts short of war, such as militarized interstate disputes and the backing of coups. Do democracies wage proxy war against other elected regimes by aiding rebels with weapons and other assistance? Scholars have found that democracies generally avoid doing so—a phenomenon we term the “democratic embargo.” However, the democratic embargo remains under-theorized. Using both datasets and close examination of purported instances of democratic aid to rebels fighting other democracies, we show that the democratic embargo is stronger than first thought. In addition, we explain the democratic embargo by arguing that strong democratic institutions prevent elected leaders from engaging in proxy war against sister regimes, and embargo violations tend to occur when democratic institutions are weak. We test our theory in two ways. First, using large-N qualitative analysis (LNQA), we examine all potential exceptions to the democratic embargo between 1945 and 2011 to establish the external validity of our claim. Second, we use case studies of the Irish decision not to aid rebels fighting the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland and Pakistan’s decision to support rebels fighting India in Kashmir to assess the internal validity of our theoretical logic. The results provide clear support for our institutional explanation of the democratic embargo. Our argument has significant implications for the democratic peace theory, the study of proxy wars, and the capacity of democracies to fight rebellions.

Peaceful dyads: A territorial perspective

ABSTRACT Many dyads develop peaceful relationships, avoiding war for long, historical periods. Are such dyads common? How many exist, and why have they never fought? This study provides a territorial perspective on peaceful dyads, defined as those that never fight a war over a given historical period. It compares two explanations for why peaceful dyads exist: the territorial peace and the democratic peace. A series of hypotheses test the relative ability of these two theories to account for peaceful dyads. The tests employ three samples – all dyads, politically relevant dyads, and grievance dyads – from 1816–2001, with an emphasis on the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Through our analyses, we produce three major findings. First, the absence of territorial conflict – but not democracy – predicts peaceful dyads. Second, the absence of territorial disagreements appears in the vast majority (i.e., 85–96%) of peaceful dyads. Finally, approximately, 93–98% of democratic dyads lack any territorial disagreements. This implies that democratic dyads are peaceful because they face different issues than non-democratic dyads – ones less likely to undermine the development of peaceful, dyadic relationships.

Robustness of Empirical Evidence for the Democratic Peace: A Nonparametric Sensitivity Analysis

AbstractThe democratic peace—the idea that democracies rarely fight one another—has been called “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.” Yet, some contend that this relationship is spurious and suggest alternative explanations. Unfortunately, in the absence of randomized experiments, we can never rule out the possible existence of such confounding biases. Rather than commonly used regression-based approaches, we apply a nonparametric sensitivity analysis. We show that overturning the negative association between democracy and conflict would require a confounder that is forty-seven times more prevalent in democratic dyads than in other dyads. To put this number in context, the relationship between democracy and peace is at least five times as robust as that between smoking and lung cancer. To explain away the democratic peace, therefore, scholars would have to find far more powerful confounders than those already identified in the literature.

Cooperation Failure or Secret Collusion? Absolute Monarchs and Informal Cooperation

Despite sharing attributes that scholars argue promote international cooperation, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have few formal international agreements with each other. Does this absence of formal agreements imply a cooperation failure? We argue that absolute monarchies frequently cooperate with each other but do so informally. At the domestic level, absolute monarchs pursue their personal interests by unilaterally and nontransparently developing and implementing policies. These norms of domestic policymaking engender an absolutist logic, which shapes how absolute monarchs selectively use informal and formal cooperation at the international level. When cooperating with each other, absolute monarchs maximize mutual private benefits through similarly unilateral and nontransparent policymaking, producing secret, cartel-like informal agreements. Using the 10 Million International Dyadic Events data, we develop a data set of informal and formal cooperation from 1990 to 2004. We find that joint absolute monarchy dyads have higher levels of informal cooperation and lower levels of formal cooperation than joint democratic dyads and dyads of mixed regime types. We also draw on the Continent of International Law dataset to demonstrate that, when absolute monarchs enter into agreements with leaders of other regime types, they strategically accept the formal design mechanisms necessary for optimal cooperation. We assess the causal mechanisms underlying the absolutist logic through an in-depth case study of the informal, secret 2014 Riyadh agreements that outlined security cooperation between the Gulf monarchies.

Four Ways We Know the Democratic Peace Correlation Does Not Exist in the State of Knowledge

Abstract Multiple studies have shown that when advanced-market “contract-intensive” economy is considered in a regression of fatal militarized interstate disputes, crises, or wars, the democratic peace correlation, the observed dearth of militarized conflict between democratic nations, becomes near zero and insignificant. Defenders of the existence of a correlation of democracy with peace claim these studies contain multiple errors. This article examines the state of evidence behind all claims in this debate. Four crucial facts are identified: (1) There is no report in print that shows democracy significant in a regression of fatal disputes controlling for contractualist economy that is unencumbered with controversial practices; (2) Every empirical defense of democracy has been rebutted, and the rebuttals remain uncontested; (3) There is no democratic peace in the nineteenth century, when there were no contractualist dyads but were democratic dyads; and (4) New analyses with revised direct data on contractualist economy covering 94% of observations over the largest-observed 1920–2010 period show that democracy without contractualist economy has a near-zero correlation with peace. Together, these facts inform us that there are no scientific grounds for deeming the democratic peace correlation as existing in the state of knowledge.

Civil Society and the Democratic Peace

We theorize that three distinct structures of democratic constraint explain why more democratic dyads do not engage in military conflict with each other. We build on earlier theories that focused on electoral and horizontal accountability. We add a new dimension—the social accountability provided by an active civil society. Using several new measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data set, we stringently test these explanations. We find social accountability to be the strongest and most consistent predictor of nonbelligerence in dyads, that horizontal accountability is still important, but that the independent role of electoral accountability has been somewhat overstated. However, we do find that social and electoral accountability work strongly together, to make for an even greater effect. The finding is robust to a range of specifications and in the face of controls for contending theories that challenge the democratic peace (e.g., the capitalist and territorial peace theories).

Bones of democratic contention: Maritime disputes

While no two democratic states have fought an interstate war against each other, democratic dyads experience militarized disputes with some frequency. Previous research suggests that a large percentage of militarized disputes between two democracies involve fishing and oil resources of the sea. Yet this research selects on cases where militarized conflict occurs, and fails to consider whether democracies have more frequent diplomatic conflicts over maritime areas relative to other regime pairings. Analyzing data from the Issue Correlates of War project, which includes diplomatic conflicts over maritime areas (1900–2007) in the Americas, Europe, Middle East, and Asia, this study finds that pairs of democracies have the highest chance of experiencing diplomatic maritime disputes among all pairs of countries in the same region or dyads involving major powers. Three theoretical explanations were empirically evaluated to account for this pattern: (a) greater opportunities for democratic maritime conflicts given higher levels of economic productivity and the sizes of fishing fleets in democratic states, (b) the increasing securitization of maritime issues, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and (c) variations in the number of democracies across regional contexts. Several illustrative case studies for each theoretical argument are presented. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for the democratic peace literature and the law of the sea regime.

Electoral incentives, term limits, and the sustainability of peace

One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autocracies, almost never fight each other. Recent empirical findings show that binding term limits invalidate this result: democratic dyads in which at least one country imposes term limits on the executive are as conflict prone as autocratic and mixed dyads. Moreover, in democracies with two-term limits conflicts are more likely during the executive's second term. To rationalize these findings, we model international relations as a repeated prisoners’ dilemma. We show that the fear of losing office makes democratic leaders less willing to start costly conflicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can run for re-election. Term limits thus make it harder to sustain peaceful relations.

The Cart and the Horse Redux: The Timing of Border Settlement and Joint Democracy

Do democratic dyads handle their disputes more peacefully than non-democratic dyads, or have they cleared the most contentious issues (that is, unsettled borders) off their foreign policy agenda before becoming democratic? This study compares the conflicting answers of the democratic peace and the territorial peace and examines the empirical record to see which is more accurate. It finds that almost all contiguous dyads settle their borders before they become joint democracies. Furthermore, the majority of non-contiguous dyad members also settle their borders with all neighboring states before their non-contiguous dyad becomes jointly democratic. Such findings are consistent with the theoretical expectations of the territorial peace, rather than the democratic peace. They also weaken a core argument of the democratic peace, for this analysis finds that one reason democratic dyads may handle their disputes more peacefully than non-democratic dyads is not because of their institutions or norms, but rather because they have dispensed with the disputes most likely to involve the use of military force prior to becoming democratic.

Generalized Social Trust and International Dispute Settlement

ABSTRACTWhat determines the success of a peaceful settlement attempt of a border dispute? In order to fully understand why decision makers choose to put an end to an ongoing conflict, it is necessary to consider the social trust levels of the general populations in both states. International conflict settlement requires public support at the domestic level. If a state’s general population perceives the potential dangers of a settlement as too severe, the conclusion of a peace agreement will be difficult. We argue that high levels of social trust allow citizens (1) to favor more conciliatory foreign policies and (2) to be more optimistic about the future behavior of other states. In democratic settings, these public attitudes serve as powerful constraints for decision makers. As a result, high aggregate levels of social trust should be directly related to concession-granting behavior by democracies as well as effective dispute settlement among jointly democratic dyads. We test these expectations with a new aggregate-level measure of social trust and find mixed support for our hypotheses: While trust does not influence the behavior of challenger states, it does have strong effects on democratic target states and jointly democratic dyads.

External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism

Scholars widely recognize that democratic dyads are associated with lower hazards of armed conflict and more efficient conflict resolution. Many attempts have been made to challenge the notion of democratic pacifism, but perhaps the most significant is the argument that the Democratic Peace is epiphenomenal to territorial issues, specifically the external threats that they pose. The presence of an external threat might be the mechanism by which democratic dyads, owing to audience costs and resolve, fail to decide contentious issues non-violently. This study seeks to answer the question: “Under what conditions do democratic dyads lower the likelihood of armed conflict?” To do this we propose a hard test of the Democratic Peace. Using an updated global sample of cases, we model joint democracy’s ability to lower the likelihood of armed conflict in the presence of direct external threats in the form of strategic rivalry and territorial contention. The empirical evidence we uncover systematically shows the Democratic Peace to be more limited than previously observed. When we control for each external threat with a simple right-hand-side variable, joint democracy continues to reduce conflict propensities. But when democracies face external threats (i.e. the interaction of democracy and threat), the pacifying effect of democracy is less visible.

Pugnacious Presidents: Democratic Constitutional Systems and International Conflict

How do domestic political institutions affect international conflict? Democratic peace theorists argue that jointly-democratic dyads are less likely to engage in war than other types of states, but these explanations cannot account for the large number of militarized conflicts that fall short of full-scale war among democratic states. We hypothesize that presidential democracies place fewer constraints on the executive’s ability to use force and are, therefore, more likely to engage in international conflict than other types of democratic states. Using standard international relations datasets on conflict, we demonstrate that jointly-presidential democratic dyads are over two times more likely to become involved in militarized interstate disputes than other jointly-democratic dyads. Moreover, we find that when it comes to lower-level conflicts, jointly-presidential dyads are statistically indistinguishable from nondemocratic dyads. These results have important implications for our understanding of democratic peace theory and the causes of international conflict.

Trusting Publics

Under which circumstances do two democracies involved in a dispute decide to pursue binding conflict management? I argue that the existing literature is incomplete. In order to fully understand why democratic decision makers choose arbitration or adjudication over alternative strategies, it is necessary to consider the social trust levels of the general populations in both states. During arbitration and adjudication, states give up sovereignty in a crucial domain of foreign policy. This loss of control should be less problematic for high-trusting societies than their low-trusting counterparts. If citizens are generally optimistic about the behavior of strangers, they are more likely to place their country’s interests under the control of others. Furthermore, since the general population poses smaller constraints on decision makers in nondemocratic settings, I expect the effect of trust to be strongest in democratic dyads. An empirical analysis with a new data set of social trust provides support for this hypothesis.

Foundations for integrating the democratic and territorial peace arguments

The democratic and territorial peace arguments explain interstate peace via distinct mechanisms. Yet they can be integrated. I theoretically derive both the unique domains in which each argument might operate and the ways in which the two arguments might reinforce one another. An analysis of the period 1816–2001 demonstrates support for a more integrative approach. Within contiguous dyads, border settlement significantly reduces conflict, even for non-democratic dyads. Democratic dyads, however, experience no such effect in the absence of border settlement. Nonetheless, the democratic peace functions strongly in non-contiguous dyads, and even the most peaceful, contiguous dyads require both democracy and border settlement. Such findings offer a foundation for further theoretical development that integrates the two arguments.

Modeling the coevolution of international and domestic institutions

While much previous research has examined the relationship between interstate military alliances and the structure of domestic regimes, existing findings point in contradictory directions. Some have argued that democracies attract each other as alliance partners, and thereby generate international peace as a consequence of their domestic regime type, while others have argued that the causal relationship is reversed, and that international pacification creates the necessary space for international alliances and domestic democratization. To disentangle this difficult empirical relationship, this article presents an empirically grounded simulation model of the dynamic coevolution of interstate military alliances, international conflict, and domestic democratization, demonstrating a statistical approach which accounts both for the complex interdependencies generated by coevolving multiplex networks of interstate ties and for their reciprocal influence on the coevolution of domestic political regimes, over the period 1920–2000. The results show that international institutions and domestic institutions are mutually constituted, with both ‘selection’ effects and ‘influence’ effects operating simultaneously. In particular, the evidence indicates that states with similar regimes are more prone to ally with each other, mutually democratic dyads are less inclined to engage in militarized disputes, and states that form international alliances with democratic partners are more likely to develop domestic democratic institutions. Tests of out-of-sample predictive accuracy, across multidecade prediction windows, further demonstrate that the coevolutionary model consistently outperforms specifications that ignore coevolutionary effects, in predicting subsequent patterns of military alliances, military conflict, and domestic democratization.

Democratic Peace or Hegemonic Stability? The Imia/Kardak Case

Democratic peace theory (DPT) and hegemonic stability theory provide different explanations for cooperation among (democratic) states. The Imia/Kardak crisis took place between Greece and Turkey, two democratic, nonnuclear, and interdependent states in the post-Cold War era, thus, offers rare insights into these theorized processes. During this crisis, democratic actors and issues contributed to escalation, whereas war was prevented in the last minute by the coercive diplomacy of the USA. Based on our archival research in Greece and Turkey, our findings pose a challenge to the validity of the DPT for democratic dyads with territorial conflicts.

DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autoc- racies, very rarely fight each other. We examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two po- litical regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can deter democratic leaders from engaging in military con- flicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, implying that democracies in which the executives are subject to term limits should be more conflict prone. To assess the validity of our predictions, we construct a large dataset on countries with executive term limits. Our analysis of inter-state conflicts for the 1816-2001 period suggests that electoral incentives are indeed behind the democratic peace phenomenon: while democratic dyads are in general less likely to be involved in conflicts than any other dyads, this result does not hold for democracies in which the executive faces binding term limits; moreover, the dispute patterns of democracies with term limits depend on whether the executive is in the last or penultimate mandate.

Under Construction: Development, Democracy, and Difference as Determinants of Systemic Liberal Peace

The widely documented dyadic democratic peace observation has led to optimism that the spread of democracy might prove pacifying even outside of democratic dyads. Yet, tensions between the logic of liberal peace in dyads and systems suggest that economic development may be better suited than democracy as a determinant of systemic liberal peace. In particular, regime type heterogeneity (difference) stands to increase conflict at the system level. We argue that there exists a systemic developmental peace, in which increased wealth encourages powerful developed nations to discourage other countries from fighting, even as these same developed states continue to use force in service of their own private objectives. We also separate out the effects of aggregate democracy from regime type difference in our analysis. Systemic and cross-level statistical tests support the following propositions: greater systemic development encourages peace, difference propagates war, and increased systemic democracy has no consistent impact on interstate conflict.

The Democratic Peace through an Interaction of Domestic Institutions and Norms

In an attempt to explain the democratic peace phenomenon, existing studies postulate institutional and normative models but treat them as contending and mutually exclusive explanations. This approach is both theoretically and empirically flawed. Extant institutional models fail to acknowledge that institutional factors have an impact only in the presence of requisite normative factors. Similarly, normative models fail to acknowledge that normative factors have the hypothesized impact only in combination with institutional factors. Since the possibility of such an interaction effect is overlooked, existing empirical models of the democratic peace are misspecified. This study fills the gap by introducing a multiplicative interaction model. This study presents evidence that, ceteris paribus, for democratic dyads in which the interaction effect of institutional and normative constraints is high, the likelihood of interstate disputes is lower than for nondemocratic dyads. Consequently, the democratic peace phenomenon should be seen primarily as an outcome of institutional and normative constraints working together.