Question Of Demarcation Research Articles

Demarcating the Social World with Hume

Where lies the boundary between the natural and social worlds? For the local constructionist, who wants to say that whilst global constructionism is false, nonetheless there remains a domain of socially constructed phenomena, there is going to be a demarcation question. In this paper I explore two initially plausible accounts of the boundary, based on mind-dependence and constructive mechanisms, and show that each is bound to fail. After further rejecting an explanatory account drawn from the work of Ásta, I look at Hume’s account of the artificial to develop a distinctly Humean account of the boundary, improving it with a necessity condition to deal with potentially pernicious counter-examples, and suggesting that it provides our best answer to the local constructionist’s demarcation question.

Lobbying et plaidoyer : la question de la démarcation entre activités communicationnelles stratégiques au service d’objectifs d’influence politique

Cet article questionne l’imprécision de la démarcation entre les pratiques de lobbying et de plaidoyer. Lobbying et plaidoyer sont définis conjointement comme la conception et la mise en œuvre d’un ensemble d’activités communicationnelles stratégiques à des fins d’influence politique. Une recension de la littérature est complétée d’une analyse des possibilités de diffusion des supports de communication à l’ère numérique et de la créativité des pratiques délibérément mises en œuvre et publicisées pour brouiller les lignes afin de revaloriser les métiers de l’influence politique au service d’intérêts privés (diplomatie et plaidoyer sociopolitique d’entreprise, grassroots lobbying, lobbying responsable ou d’intérêt général, travail coordonné entre lobbyistes et chargés de plaidoyer).

Science denial, post‐truth and our new dark age: Lee McIntyre interviewed by Richard Marshall

In this edited version of an interview run at 3:16 am earlier this year to mark the publication of his new book How To Talk To A Science Denier, Lee McIntyre discusses: science denial, its dangers, what to do about it, why it should not be tolerated; the demarcation question; whether social sciences are really sciences; why we should focus on the failures of science; post-truth; why philosophy of science is useful; whether scientific laws exist; falling short of certainty; anti-realism; induction and Bayes; whether he's a mad dog naturalist; and finally why we're in the dark ages of human behaviour.

How to Draw the Line Between Health and Disease? Start with Suffering

How can we draw the line between health and disease? This crucial question of demarcation has immense practical implications and has troubled scholars for ages. The question will be addressed in three steps. First, I will present an important contribution by Rogers and Walker who argue forcefully that no line can be drawn between health and disease. However, a closer analysis of their argument reveals that a line-drawing problem for disease-related features does not necessarily imply a line-drawing problem for disease as such. The second step analyzes some alternative approaches to drawing the line between health and disease. While these approaches do not provide full answers to the question, they indicate that the line-drawing question should not be dismissed too hastily. The third step investigates whether the line-drawing problem can find its solution in the concept of suffering. In particular, I investigate whether returning to the origin of medicine, with the primary and ultimate goal of reducing suffering, may provide sources of demarcation between health and disease. In fact, the reason why we pay attention to particular phenomena as characteristics of disease, consider certain processes to be relevant, and specific functions are classified as dys-functions, is that they are related to suffering. Accordingly, using suffering as a criterion of demarcation between health and disease may hinder a wide range of challenges with modern medicine, such as unwarranted expansion of disease, overdiagnosis, overtreatment, and medicalization.

Prekmursko vprašanje do podpisa Trianonske pogodbe – britanski pogled

In the article, the authors displayed the view of Great Britain considering the demarcation in Prekmurje at the end of First World War. In order to better understand the titular theme, they firstly presented the basic characteristics of this northeastern most part of Slovenian ethnic territory. Secondly, they focused their attention on the British understanding of interethnic conflicts in Hungary on the eve of the events of the war as well as their comprehension of the dangers of Bolshevism during the last phase of the war and afterwards. At the core of the article, they focused on the question of demarcation at the Paris Peace Conference, when it was determined Prekmurje should be included into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Edith Landmann-Kalischer on Aesthetic Demarcation and Normativity

Abstract Two perennial questions in aesthetics, among others, are the demarcation question, viz., what, if anything, distinguishes the aesthetic domain from the cognitive or moral domains, and the normative question, viz., what kind of normativity, if any, does the aesthetic domain involve. Although recent attempts to answer these questions can be found in contemporary literature, in this paper I examine the answers defended by the early phenomenologist Edith Landmann-Kalischer. I show that Landmann-Kalischer answers the demarcation question by blending together a cognitivist account of aesthetic judgment with an objectivist account of beauty, and that she builds an account of aesthetic normativity on this cognitivist and objectivist basis. I contend that her subtle and unified account of aesthetic demarcation and normativity has advantages over other competing hedonist and Kantian views and, as such, merits further consideration in contemporary debates.

Is law Science?

The question this contribution sets out to address is whether or not law can be regarded as a science. This notion is readily accepted by many, yet it is submitted that a proper theoretical justification for such an assumption is usually missing. The traditional primary sources of law, South African case law and legislation, distinguish between legal practice and legal science, but the basis of the distinction is not clear. However, an entire body of literature in the philosophy of science has developed around the question of when a discipline will amount to science. Various demarcation criteria proposed in the philosophy of science are considered. These include that science uses the scientific method, is susceptible to falsification, is puzzle-solving within a paradigm or renders beneficial results. None of these criteria offers a satisfactory solution to the problem. The proposition by a group of philosophers including Herman Dooyeweerd, Marinus Stafleu and DFM Strauss, that the answer to the demarcation question is to be found in modal abstraction, is then considered. Modal abstraction amounts to a consideration of reality (persons, things, theories and rules) from one or more defined point(s) of entry. It is an artificial and learnt manner of thinking as it approaches reality from the perspective of one of the modalities of being. For example, juridical abstraction would mean that a cow is considered as the object of someone's proprietary rights. An abstract idea of the cow's characteristics, from a juridical point of view, is formed and the rules of property law are applied. A number of South African legal philosophers, amongst others Van Zyl, Van der Vyver and LM du Plessis, have followed this approach. The South African legislature has also attempted to define the terms "science" and "research", mainly for funding purposes. These definitions are considered and the conclusion is that they do not provide the clear-cut answers one would expect. It will be argued that the nature of activities will determine whether an endeavour is scientific or not. The conclusion is that an alignment of the demarcation criterion developed by Strauss and others and the statutory definitions can provide a workable demarcation criterion. This "test" is then applied to the activities of law students, academics, practitioners and judicial officers to determine when they will be practising "science".

Abandoning Patchwork Approaches to Nature of Science in Science Education

The purpose of this commentary onHodson and Wong’s (2017, this issue) article is to clarify the merits of the expanded family resemblance approach (FRA) to science education, briefly alluded to in their article, and to discuss the implications of this approach relative to the question of demarcation they raise. In clarifying themerits of the expanded FRA, we describe its distinct features and how it relates to other approaches presented in their article. We discuss some limitations pertaining to their discussion of the demarcation problem in science education and conclude by pointing out the promising role an FRA approach might play in providing means for distinguishing more fromless scientific fields of inquiry.

Modeling Imaginary Worlds: Version 4 of the AMCP Format for Formulary Submissions

The question of demarcation between normal science and pseudoscience is critical to the discovery of new facts. The core elements supporting progress in science are: (i) empirically evaluable coherent theories and (ii) the testing of hypotheses through experimentation or systematic observation. If modeled or simulation-based claims for cost-effectiveness are to be accepted as a credible input to health care decision making than they must conform to these standards. Claims should be testable, falsifiable and replicable. If not then they are best seen as pseudoscience. This assessment of the latest version of the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP) Format for Formulary Submissions (Version 4.0; April 2016) concludes that, in their recommendations for cost-effectiveness modeling, the proposed standards do not meet those of normal science. Rather, in common with previous versions of the AMCP Format, the modeling framework proposed not only puts to one side the issue of testable claims, but supports the modeling of imaginary worlds or thought experiments where claims are immune to falsification. In consequence, the payer or other recipient of a modeled or simulated claim that follows the AMCP Format has no idea, in the absence of observation or experimentation, whether the claim is right or even if it is wrong. The claims are potentially misleading, possibly harmful, but to an unknown extent. They have no place in evidence-based medicine.
 Conflict of Interest
 None
 Type: Commentary

Is Law science?

The question this contribution sets out to address is whether or not law can be regarded as a This notion is readily accepted by many, yet it is submitted that a proper theoretical justification for such an assumption is usually missing. The traditional primary sources of law, South African case law and legislation, distinguish between legal practice and legal science, but the basis of the distinction is not clear. However, an entire body of literature in the philosophy of has developed around the question of when a discipline will amount to Various demarcation criteria proposed in the philosophy of are considered. These include that uses the scientific method, is susceptible to falsification, is puzzle-solving within a paradigm or renders beneficial results. None of these criteria offers a satisfactory solution to the problem. The proposition by a group of philosophers including Herman Dooyeweerd, Marinus Stafleu and DFM Strauss, that the answer to the demarcation question is to be found in modal abstraction, is then considered. Modal abstraction amounts to a consideration of reality (persons, things, theories and rules) from one or more defined point(s) of entry. It is an artificial and learnt manner of thinking as it approaches reality from the perspective of one of the modalities of being. For example, juridical abstraction would mean that a cow is considered as the object of someone's proprietary rights. An abstract idea of the cow's characteristics, from a juridical point of view, is formed and the rules of property law are applied. A number of South African legal philosophers, amongst others Van Zyl, Van der Vyver and LM du Plessis, have followed this approach. The South African legislature has also attempted to define the terms science and research, mainly for funding purposes. These definitions are considered and the conclusion is that they do not provide the clear-cut answers one would expect. It will be argued that the nature of activities will determine whether an endeavour is scientific or not. The conclusion is that an alignment of the demarcation criterion developed by Strauss and others and the statutory definitions can provide a workable demarcation criterion. This test is then applied to the activities of law students, academics, practitioners and judicial officers to determine when they will be practising science.

Normative Pragmatism and the Language Game of Music

In his project of normative pragmatism, Robert Brandom1 rejected the naturalist concept of knowledge as based exclusively on reliable differential responsive dispositions and replaced it with a complex, linguistically- and socially-oriented picture in which understanding is not reduced to the ability of reliable responses to external impulses that we share with parrots, lichens, and thermometers, but is elevated, in a roughly Hegelian way, to a complex social status of undertaking inferential commitments and being recognized as such by others. Hence, a parrot's crying out the word might be as reliable response as possible, but it still would not qualify as a sign of understanding because a parrot does not commit himself to anything in the sense that he is not prepared to infer, e.g. that red things are also colored but not green, and, more importantly, nobody expects him to do so. In Brandom's (and Sellars's) idiom, it is exactly the participation in this game of giving and asking for reasons that distinguishes sapient from mere sentient creatures and reliable responding devices.Taking advantage of this explanatory frame, Andrew Bowie, in his book on modernity and music, transposed it to the context of art, arguing that, as far these traditional domains of sapience are concerned, are serious difficulties in Brandom's project.2 Such an accusation, of course, might be somewhat misplaced since Brandom - in the best tradition of analytic philosophy, as Bowie does not forget to mention - favors theoretical philosophy (particularly logic and semantics) to that of aesthetics, to the extent of leaving the problems of art completely aside.But this is exactly what seems to be Bowie's point. If we take into account, as he suggests, a singing bird instead of a talking one, the question arises as to what exactly it is that bird has not committed itself to (as opposed to a singing human), and there seems to be no suitable answer since music and art in general are forms of articulation which something intelligible that resists translation into discursivity.3 Hence, there might exist creatures sapient in the traditional, but not in Brandom's discursive, sense; as a result, his criterion of sapience appears to be inadequate.I work on the assumption that to deal with the problems of art - like the one mentioned by Bowie - within the framework of Brandom's normative pragmatism, one has to take into account its self-proclaimed twofold role of heir to both the normatively-oriented transcendentalism of Kant and Hegel and the naturalistically-based classical pragmatism of James and Dewey. This requires considering not only the demarcation question, which is the above-mentioned problem of the definitional difference between sentient and sapient creatures, but also the emergence question, which concerns the possibility of transition from sentience to sapience.According to Brandom4, these questions5 are more easily answered individually, as transcendentalism did by finding demarcation in a priori structures of our reason without bothering to explain their naturalistic origin, or, inversely, as shown in the classical pragmatism that, in his account of experience as an evolutionary process of adaptation to the environment, left completely aside the vast qualitative difference in capacities between sentient and sapient beings. The real challenge is to answer the questions of both demarcation and emergence at once because an easy solution to one makes the other more difficult.In the light of this, my paper has two interconnected goals: The first is to sketch the possible answer to both demarcation and emergence questions as transposed to the field of art, with particular focus on music. The second is to show how this answer relates to Brandom's game of giving and asking for reasons as a combination of the rationalist criterion of sapience with the pragmatist concept of knowledge as a specific kind of practice (namely, that of inferentially articulated claiming and asserting). …

On Norms and Social Practices: Brandom, Dewey, and the Demarcation Question

I discuss Robert Brandom’s contention that his “analytic” or “linguistic” pragmatism is, as his book Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary argues, a “way forward from the ideas of American pragmatists.” In this connection, I compare Brandom’s and Dewey’s answers to the demarcation question (how are linguistic practices distinguished from nonlinguistic ones) in order to show that Brandom’s linguistic “exceptionalism” departs from one fundamental contribution of the pragmatic tradition, namely the idea that discursive normativity emerges from previous, already linguistic practices through the development of inquiry as a practical, social achievement (an idea summarized in Dewey’s claim that “logic is a social discipline”). I contend that Dewey’s distinction between two meanings of “language”—as a medium of communication and as an agency of inquiry—puts us in a better position to give an account of how discursive norms came into existence within language, and of what are they good for.

MENTAL CAPACITY AT THE MARGIN: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN TWO ACTS

Developed legal systems commonly provide special powers to intervene in the medical care and treatment of people with mental disorder. Typically, this intervention will take the form of involuntary hospitalisation and treatment, and the law is used to specify the point at which otherwise unlawful interference or coercion becomes lawful. However, by making an exception of mental disorder and providing special powers of intervention in relation to it, the law has not only to specify the nature and limits of those powers, but it must also identify the population to whom they apply—people with mental disorder. This question of demarcation can cause difficulties and uncertainties at the interface between mental disorder and physical disorder, for example, or between mental disorder and deviance, or between mental disorder and mental incapacity. While the interface between mental disorder and deviance or anti-social behaviour has proved notoriously problematic over the years and will no doubt continue to do so,1 it is the interface between mental disorder and mental incapacity that is currently causing most practical concern in England and Wales. And it is with this interface that the present article is primarily concerned.

How Science Textbooks Treat Scientific Method: A Philosopher's Perspective

This paper examines, from the point of view of a philosopher of science, what it is that introductory science textbooks say and do not say about ‘scientific method’. Seventy introductory texts in a variety of natural and social sciences provided the material for this study. The inadequacy of these textbook accounts is apparent in three general areas: (a) the simple empiricist view of science that tends to predominate; (b) the demarcation between scientific and non-scientific inquiry and (c) the avoidance of controversy—in part the consequence of the tendency toward textbook standardization. Most importantly, this study provides some evidence of the gulf that separates philosophy of science from science instruction, and examines some important aspects of the demarcation between science and non-science—an important issue for philosophers, scientists, and science educators. 1. Scientific Method in Science Textbooks 1.1. Textbook selection 1.2. Topic frequency Part I: Preliminaries 2. Science versus Non-science 2.1. Subjective experience/bias 2.2. Too many unmeasurable variables 2.3. Non-phenomenal objects 2.4. Falsifiability 3. Scientific Method in Everyday Activities? 4. When Did Science Begin? 4.1. Greek science? 4.2. Seventeenth-century origins Part II: Components 5. Formal Logic 5.1. Deduction: ‘if–then reasoning’ 5.2. Induction 6. Hypotheses, Theories, Laws, Models 6.1. Description and explanation 6.2. Models 6.3. ‘Only a theory’ 6.4. Simplicity Part III: Dynamics 7. The Generation of Hypotheses 8. The Testing of Hypotheses 8.1. Proof/verification/confirmation 8.2. Why is confirmation inconclusive? 8.2.1. Inductive generalization 8.2.2. Alternative hypotheses and the hypothetico-deductive method 8.3. Disproof/falsification 8.4. Why is falsification inconclusive? 8.4.1. Saving a hypothesis through ad hoc exceptions 8.4.2. Revising/correcting a hypothesis 9. Experimental Controls and the ‘Broken Lamp’ 10. Conclusion 10.1. Different sciences, different concerns 10.2. Simple empiricism 10.3. The demarcation question 10.4. Textbook standardization and the avoidance of controversy

Demarcation and the Scientistic Fallacy

Abstract. For many theologians and philosophers, scientism is among the greatest of intellectual sins. In its most commonly cited form, scientism consists in claiming that science is the only source of real knowledge and, therefore, that what science does not discover does not exist. Because the charge of scientism is frequently levied, it is important to be clear about what exactly is being claimed in its name. I argue that scientism can best be understood as a fallacy, specifically as a kind of category mistake. Being clear about this requires an examination of the relationship of scientism to the question of demarcation between science and nonscience, a question that has potential implications for theology.

Signposts of Fictionality: A Narratological Perspective

have been drawn, withdrawn, retraced, and re-effaced on various grounds-logical, ontological, phenomenological, pragmatic, speechactional, deconstructive, semantic-without looking to the discipline that has dug most deeply into the ground of narrative itself. There is a certain poetologic justice to this snub: narratologists themselves have, to a quite astonishing degree, ignored the question of demarcation between fiction and nonfiction. One can hardly deplore this omission in studies that openly (by way of title, subtitle, and/or prefatory remarks) limit their area of investigation to fictional narratives (Chatman 1978; Rimmon-Kenan 1983). But most narratological studies, including such classics of the discipline as Barthes's Introduction to the Structural Analysis of (1977 [1966]) and Genette's Narrative Discourse (1980), don't explicitly restrict their field, and some even quite expressly announce that they intend to encompass nonfiction as well (Bal 1985; Prince 1982b). In the absence of counterindications of any sort, a narrative poetics of this overarching kind leads one to believe that the entire panoply of conventions, the figures, structural types, and discursive modes it identifies, applies equally within and without fiction, even when-as is nearly always the case-its textual exemplifications are drawn exclusively from the

The Logic of Research and the Scientific Status of the Law of Effect

The scientific status of the law of effect and applied research that involves the law of effect are examined through a falsificationist analysis of the logic of research and the demarcation question, that is, what should be regarded as scientific. Some logical and epis-temological problems of a nonfalsificationist, inductivist conceptualization of science are reviewed. A falsificationist demarcation criterion is discussed as an alternative that is free of such logical and philosophical difficulties. A brief review of the history of the law of effect and criticisms of the law of effect is presented. It is concluded that the law of effect is in principle falsifiable and, hence, it is scientific. However, questions are raised regarding the extent to which the law of effect actually has been tested, given the Duhem-Quine thesis and problems with independent and valid means of identifying reinforcers. Minimally, practical questions are raised regarding what the law of effect is and how it is to be tested.