Oil Money recounts the evolution in U.S. relations with the petroleum-exporting monarchies of the Persian Gulf following the mid-1970s “oil revolution.” David Wight details the ways in which principals in the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidential administrations fretted about while ultimately adjusting to and, arguably, gaining from the new order of higher oil prices, the staged takeover of the western firms’ operations, and the vastly increased rents (“petrodollars”) that royals and revolutionaries now commanded. He handles a complex story dexterously. He makes great use of Treasury Department records, and, while concentrating on the Persian Gulf producers, takes us on a side-trip to mid-1970s Cairo where the Americans dreamed of petrodollar investments playing a lead role in the liberalization of the Egyptian economy. U.S. Secretary of the Treasury William Simon sold the Saudis and Kuwaitis on investing in Treasury securities. U.S. (and European) bankers chased after deposits to meet the insatiable global demand for loans to pay for oil. President Nixon and Crown Prince Fahd signed wide-ranging agreements in 1974 in support of Saudi Arabia’s defense and development, thus launching another so-called “special relationship.” Then there were the weapons. Arms exports to Saudi Arabia and Iran, which began in earnest in the 1960s, grew exponentially after 1973 as part of Nixon’s post-Vietnam era “twin pillars” strategy, where the two allies were to assume a greater share of the region’s security burden, soaking up more of those petrodollars in the meantime. American architects, bankers, contractors, crooks, engineers, and Fortune 500 executives would descend on the domains of the Al Saud in unprecedented numbers. Container ships loaded with building materials, cars, and consumer goods clogged the kingdom’s harbors, while the capital, Riyadh, expanded at dizzying speed.