Degree Of Altruism Research Articles

The complexity of verifying popularity and strict popularity in altruistic hedonic games

We consider average- and min-based altruistic hedonic games and study the problem of verifying popular and strictly popular coalition structures. While strict popularity verification has been shown to be coNP-complete in min-based altruistic hedonic games, this problem has been open for equal- and altruistic-treatment average-based altruistic hedonic games. We solve these two open cases of strict popularity verification and then provide the first complexity results for popularity verification in (average- and min-based) altruistic hedonic games, where we cover all three degrees of altruism.

A Differential Game Approach to Investment in Greentech Innovation in a Duopoly with Network Externality

In this paper, we revisit a well-known differential game model to investigate the R&D activity for Greentech innovation in a duopoly market with network externality. In our study, firms carry out independent R&D or Cartel R&D for Greentech innovation which aims to reduce end-of-pipe emission and network externality effects play a role in the R&D activity via the inverse demand functions. Firms are concerned not only with their own profits, but also with the relative profits. At the steady-state equilibrium, the efforts for Greentech innovation under independent R&D are higher than that under Cartel R&D when the degree of altruism is higher than the degree of technological R&D spillover, and the network size under independent R&D is lower than that under Cartel R&D. Moreover, under a given market structure, whether profits under independent R&D are higher than under Cartel R&D depends on the initial network size, which means that at the initial moment firms can decide to undertake independent or Cartel R&D activities based on the initial network size.

Appealing to Americans' altruism is not enough to nudge them to accept novel vaccines.

The role of altruism in the acceptance of novel preventive healthcare technologies like vaccines has not been thoroughly elucidated. We 1:1 randomized n=2004 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participants residing in the USA into a control or treatment arm with vaccination decisions framed altruistically, to elicit their preferences for COVID-19 vaccination using web-based discrete choice experiments. We used conditional and mixed logit models to estimate the impact of framing decisions in terms of altruism on vaccination acceptance. Valid responses were provided by 1674 participants (control, n=848; treatment, n=826). Framing vaccination decisions altruistically had no significant effect on vaccination acceptance. Further, respondents' degree of altruism had no association with vaccination acceptance. The MTurk sample may not be representative of the American population. We were unable to ascertain concordance between stated and revealed preferences. Framing vaccination decisions in terms of altruism does not appear to significantly influence vaccination acceptance and may not be an effective nudging mechanism to increase the uptake of novel vaccines. Instead, a favorable vaccination profile appears to be the primary driver of uptake.

How does corporate altruism affect oligopolistic competition?

This paper examines firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) competition in a duopoly model with product differentiation. Firms exhibit different degrees of altruism, which is a characteristic positively valued by consumers; however, as each firm's degree of altruism (type) is private information, using CSR activities to signal the types becomes an additional tool for competition. We analyze a game where firms first signal about their types and then compete in standard price competition. Consumers observe the firms' CSR activities and infer their degree of altruism. Firms then simultaneously set prices, and consumers purchase goods from one firm or the other. In equilibrium, CSR is determined by the consumers' valuation of corporate altruism and the degree of product differentiation. The model examines the interaction between these two determinants, finding that more competition in the market (less product differentiation) might be detrimental to CSR when consumers' concern about firms' altruism is high enough.

Altruistic preferences in global emission games

This paper analyses the impact of altruism on the individual country goverments’ incentives to reduce global polluting emissions. The game theory perspective provides insights into the strategic decision-making processes of the governments regarding the problem of climate change. We propose a model of strategic interactions among countries in which each government is concerned with its own benefit, as well as with the benefits of all the other countries.The model is a vector-valued non-cooperative game that permits the representation of situations in which the preferences of the governments are incomplete and there is imprecision about the degrees of altruism. The focus is on the identification of the potential equilibria that will eventually be reached when the governments show different attitudes towards other countries or groups of countries. As a result, we show that the incorporation of altruism into the model produces equilibria with a positive effect on the reduction of emissions.

Incentives for prosocial behavior under reputation persistence and policy lags

In this paper we show that a policy based on incentives to promote prosocial activities can be counterproductive in a context where the agents’ reputation exhibits persistence over time and there exists a time lag between announcement of the policy and implementation. Reputation persistence in our model means that the reputation gained in past periods constrains the possibilities of changing reputation in the future. We present a two-period model in which agents use prosocial activities to signal their degree of altruism. If a subsidy is established for the second period, the set of agents that undertake social activities in that period enlarges. This worsens the reputation of the most altruistic agents, some of whom then react by decreasing their involvement in prosocial activities in the first period. We identify a condition under which subsidies cause a decrease in the global supply of pro-social activities.

Altruistic Hedonic Games

Hedonic games are coalition formation games in which players have preferences over the coalitions they can join. For a long time, all models of representing hedonic games were based upon selfish players only. Among the known ways of representing hedonic games compactly, we focus on friend-oriented hedonic games and propose a novel model for them that takes into account not only the players’ own preferences but also their friends’ preferences. Depending on the order in which players look at their own or their friends’ preferences, we distinguish three degrees of altruism: selfish-first, equal-treatment, and altruistic-treatment preferences. We study both the axiomatic properties of these games and the computational complexity of problems related to various common stability concepts.

Business Cycles in a Two-Sided Altruism Model

This study demonstrates that business cycles with complex periodic fluctuations may arise in an overlapping generations model with two-sided altruism. The structure of an equilibrium dynamical system strongly depends on the degree of altruism in the model. If either altruism of a generation to the parent or the child disappears, the study also demonstrates that complex periodic fluctuations never occur. In this sense, two-sided altruism is essential for a complex business cycle.

Optimal lockdown in altruistic economies

The recent COVID-19 crisis has revealed the urgent need to study the impact of an infectious disease on market economies and provide adequate policy recommendations. The present paper studies the optimal lockdown policy in a dynamic general equilibrium model where households are altruistic and they care about the share of infected individuals. The spread of the disease is modeled here using SIS dynamics, which implies that recovery does not confer immunity. To avoid non-convexity issues, we assume that the lockdown is constant in time. This strong assumption allows us to provide analytical solutions. We find that the zero lockdown is efficient when agents do not care about the share of infected, while a positive lockdown is recommended beyond a critical level of altruism. Moreover, the lockdown intensity increases in the degree of altruism. Our robust analytical results are illustrated by numerical simulations, which show, in particular, that the optimal lockdown never trespasses 60% and that eradication is not always optimal.

Fairness and Altruism Among High School Students - A Global Study in Behavioral Economics

Understanding differences in economic decision-making between populations is critical in a global economy. The purpose of this study was to determine what factors affect high school students’ (the next generation of leaders) altruistic tendencies. My hypothesis was that the economic system of a student’s country would affect their degree of altruism and fairness. Specifically, students living in socialist countries would tend to act fairer and more generously in economic decision-making since the basis of socialist ideology is economic equality. This novel study of teenagers globally was conducted using three classic behavioral economics experiments (the Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, and Third-Party Punishment Game) translated into an electronic survey including demographic questions. The anonymous surveys were distributed to teenage students in five countries with different socio-economic systems (Malawi, Taiwan, Tanzania, UAE, and USA). The analyses of the responses (n=201) supported my hypothesis. The mean altruism score of more socialist countries (18.3) was significantly higher than capitalist countries (11). Additionally, there were significant correlations between altruism and religiosity and gender. Those who reported practicing religion every day were significantly less altruistic than those that practiced religion infrequently. Data also showed that females in the study were more altruistic than males. These data indicate that country, religiosity, and gender affect perceptions of fairness and should be considerations in multi-national / multi-cultural negotiations, transactions and other interactions. A longitudinal study would further our understanding of how these differences may change as teenagers transition to adulthood and experience more economic and cross-cultural interactions.

Survival of altruistic gatekeepers: Kickbacks in medical markets

Abstract Patients often rely on the advice of their general practitioner (GP) to decide which treatment best fits their needs. Hospitals, in turn, might influence GPs’ referral decision through kickbacks. We present a model with a monopolistic hospital and competitive GPs who vary in the degree of altruism towards their heterogeneous patients and show that an equilibrium without crowding out exists that separates GPs into referrers and care providers. Naïve patients visit purely selfish (referring) GPs, while rational patients sort themselves between the two groups of GPs. Finally, we investigate the scope for regulation, including an optimal coinsurance rate.

Physician behavior and conditional altruism: the effects of payment system and uncertain health benefit

This paper experimentally investigates the altruistic behavior of physicians and whether this behavior is affected by payment system and uncertainty in health outcome. Subjects in the experiment take on the role of physicians and decide on the provision of medical care for different types of patients, who are identical in all respects other than the degree to which a given level of medical treatment affects their health. We investigate physician altruism from the perspective of ethical principles, by categorizing physicians according to how well their treatment decisions align with different principles for priority setting. The experiment shows that many physicians are altruistic toward their patients but also that the degree of altruism varies across patients with different medical needs. We find a strong effect of payment system that is overall unaffected by the introduction of risk and ambiguity in patients’ health outcomes. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity across individuals, in particular under the capitation payment system where physicians’ responses to the introduction of uncertainty in patient health are modulated by their own generic risk and ambiguity preferences.

Two-sided altruism as a motive for intergenerational transfer

Abstract This paper reconsiders the role of altruism as a motive for an intergenerational transfer and characterizes the relationship between intergenerational transfers and altruism. The main finding is that transfers to children do not disappear even if altruism from parents to children weakens. The paper also shows that as altruism from children to parents becomes stronger, a transfer to children initially decreases and then increases once the degree of altruism is beyond a certain level; in other words, transfers may increase even if altruism from the transferee to the transferor becomes stronger. These findings sharply contrast with the common assumption in the existing literature that an intergenerational transfer is motivated by altruism from the transferor to the transferee.

Altruism, environmental externality and fertility

AbstractWe investigate the interaction between environmental quality and fertility in an altruistic bequest model with pollution externalities created by the aggregate production. Despite the negative externality related to the endogenous childbearing decisions, parents may choose to have fewer children in the competitive economy than in the social optimum. To achieve optimality, positive taxes on childbearing are required even with an insufficient number of children, if the social discount factor equals the parents' degree of altruism. On the other hand, child allowances may constitute the optimal policy if the social discount factor exceeds the parents' degree of altruism.

Can One Promote a Delegation of the Bilateral Aid to Multilateral Donors to Improve Foreign Aid Effect on Economic Growth in ECOWAS (Note 1) Countries?

<p><em>This article analyzes the relationship between external aid and economic growth in the ECOWAS region, with a focus on bilateral and multilateral aid effects. The key idea behind this analysis is an argument of Svensson</em><em> </em><em>(2000)</em><em> that multilateral aid is more effective than bilateral aid because of the high degree of altruism of bilateral donors. He therefore suggested a delegation of bilateral aid to multilateral institutions. To appreciate his suggestion, this analysis used panel data from the 16 ECOWAS countries from the period 1984 to 2014. The results of the estimates, based on the dynamic least squares estimator (DOLS), show a negative effect of foreign aid on economic growth. This negative effect on economic growth persists when the components of aid are introduced into the model. In addition, results highlight that governance is a channel through which foreign aid affect positively economic growth. In these conditions, bilateral aid is more effective on economic growth than multilateral aid. These results about foreign aid received by ECOWAS countries invalidates</em><em> </em><em>Svensson’s</em><em> </em><em>(</em><a title="Svensson, 2000 #5" href="#_ENREF_1"><em>2000</em></a><em>)</em><em> theory. Therefore, a delegation of bilateral aid to multilateral institutions is not relevant because bilateral aid contributes more to economic growth if governance is taken into account.</em></p>

Firms’ Ownership, Employees’ Altruism, and Competition

The paper investigates how product market competition affects the firms' decision to hire altruistic or selfish employees in a mixed duopoly where a public and a private firm compete against each other on prices and quality. When firms offer similar services, so that product competition is fierce, both firms benefit from hiring altruistic employees even if it leads to lower prices. Conversely, when firms offer sufficiently differentiated services, the private firm prefers to hire selfish employees as starting a price war with the public firm is not profitable. However, the private firm would hire altruistic employees if it faced another private firm. Therefore, when firms offer differentiated products, customers may benefit from the privatization of the public firm, especially when the employees' degree of altruism is high.

On the Samaritan’s Dilemma, Foreign Aid, and Freedom

This paper presents an extension of the two-period Samaritan’s Dilemma in order to analyze the potential for foreign aid to promote freedom. An example is the United States’ recent opening towards Cuba. It is shown that a donor nation’s dual concern for economic reforms and greater freedoms can exacerbate the Samaritan’s Dilemma, even when economic aid is coupled with targets for freedom. By contrast, a policy that is focused on freedom alone can potentially resolve the Samaritan’s Dilemma. Such a policy requires the donor to temper the degree of altruism that motivates its provision of economic aid to the recipient nation.

Why do migrants remit?

AbstractThis paper examines primary incentives of remitting. Using estimated bilateral data on remittances, this paper demonstrates that a rise in the home (remittance‐receiving) country's gross national income (GNI) per capita leads to fewer remittances and that a rise in the host (remittance‐sending) country's GNI per capita motivates migrants to remit more. Real exchange rates and real interest rates have no effect on remittances. These results indicate that altruism is an important and critical component of motivations behind remittances. However, altruism alone does not appear to be a sufficient explanation of the motivations behind remittances. Other incentives such as loan repayment and investment play a non‐negligible role in this regard as well. The degree of altruism is higher for migrants from developing countries in comparison with migrants from developed countries, and it is higher when we define remittances as “personal transfers” rather than “personal transfers and compensation of employees.” The results of the vector error correction model show if remittances deviate from the equilibrium relationship, they will eventually revert.

A generalized parallel constrained choice model for intra-household escort decision of high school students

This paper presents an expanded and generalized formulation of discrete group decision-making model. The empirical model is developed for modelling high school student escort and travel mode choices. The development of the model uncovered issues with an existing group decision model, the multi-linear logit, that has recently been applied to similar decision contexts. The paper proposes an expanded formulation of parallel constrained choices logit model as an alternative to the multi-linear logit. The proposed model explicitly considers both the choice of mode of the students and commuting adults within the household and how those decisions change in response to household escort decisions. This structure is powerful as it allows both individual and group level decisions to be jointly modelled. The application of the model in this paper is generalized such that any number of adults can be accommodated within the modelling structure whereas previous studies have been limited to either two adults or two workers. The key findings of the analysis include a certain degree of altruism (or dedication) from adults to household children. This altruism which is captured indirectly within the modelling framework based on a lower utility weight for the adults in the household relative to the utility weight for household children.

The economics of altruism: The old, the rich, the female

ABSTRACTThis study examines whether people of different observed characteristics exhibit different degree of altruism. The article utilizes a National Mental Health Survey that gathered questions about respondents’ self-reported altruism along with their demographic, labor force, and income information. The empirical results revealed the following: (1) Older people are more altruistic. This could potentially be explained by the Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST) that the older people shift towards emotion-related goals that can be internally rewarding in the present. (2) Higher-income people are more altruistic. This could potentially be explained by the fact that higher-income people could better afford to be more altruistic compared to lower-income people. (3) Women are more altruistic. This could potentially be explained by either biological evolution or social imposition. The main results are robust once the potential endogeneity problem of the income variable is mitigated by the use of the instrumental variable estimation method.