Definition Of Religion Research Articles

Spirituality in public service

This paper argues that the deep moral values inherent in the world’s religious and spiritual traditions are both appropriate and needed in the public sector work place. It provides definitions of religion and or spirituality then discusses the influence of positivist law and practices prevalent there. This paper raises the following questions: What is spirituality? How does it differ from religion? Is spirituality now present in the public sector work place? Is it possible? Is it desirable? Is it relevant? What might be the implications of a work place where spirituality flourishes and is affirmed?

Adjusting the Religious Autobiography Course for the Postmodern Classroom

Religious autobiography as an introductory course is popular yet problematic. Often, it lacks methodological breadth and functions to ensconce Western notions of subjectivity which elide difference, locatedness, and the reality of multiple or shifting identifications. These problems can be addressed by incorporating into the course a community‐based learning exercise in which each student is paired with a local senior citizen, conducts a series of interviews with the elder, and then writes an (auto‐)biography based on the interviews. Students are thus given a real‐life situation in which to test the applicability of theories and definitions of religion, as well as a relationship to a subject whose locatedness and relatively unprivileged “I” allow for the problematization of autobiography as a genre as well as an appreciation for the contextual nature of religiosity. This exercise transforms the religious autobiography course into a pedagogically fruitful, intellectually defensible, and institutionally savvy introductory course.

Review Symposium: Benson Saler's Conceptualizing Religion the Definition of Religion: an Analytical or Hermeneutical Task?

Review Symposium: Benson Saler's Conceptualizing Religion the Definition of Religion: an Analytical or Hermeneutical Task?

Methodological remarks on studying prehistoric Greek religion

This paper presents a methodological approach to the study of Greek religion of the period which lacks written documents, i.e. prehistory. The assumptions and interpretations of religion of that time have to be based on archaeological material. How do we define religion and cultic activity on the basis of primary archaeological material from this period, and which are the methodological tools for this difficult task? By asking questions on the nature and definition of religion and culture scholars of religion have provided us with some methodological apparatus to approach religion of the past in general, but there are models developed by archaeologists as well. Critical combination of these methodological tools leads to the best possible result. Archaeology studies the material culture of the past. History of religion studies the spiritual culture of the past. In the background the two have important theoretical and even philosophical speculations since they both deal with meanings (of things or practices) and with interpretation.

In or Out? the Relationship Between Religion, Philosophy, and the Science of Religions

cultures. In order to deal systematically with the problem raised here, a provisional general definition of both factors is needed. In a tenta tive way, is here taken to be a reflective activity of human beings making use of (or claiming to make use of) the re sources of human thinking alone. A definition of religion is, as every scholar in the field knows, a notoriously vexed one. A satisfac tory definition is therefore not attempted here, nor is a definition taken from the catalogue of the already existing ones; for our pur poses it may suffice to settle with the following: it is here assumed that religion, in its reflective dimension, makes use—in contradistinc tion to philosophy—of purported or real supernatural or revelatory components or influences. I am fully aware that even this open, preliminary definition is again culture-relative and possibly philo sophically questionable. These tentative definitions presupposed that philosophy can fulfil a variety of functions in relation to religion. It can itself take over religious functions or the functions of theological reflection by at tempting to establish religious truths with the help of argument, or it can propagate religious standpoints by making them accessible to reasonable reflection and insight. Philosophical reflection can per form the systematic task of worldview construction or complement already existing religious worldviews by providing for them a rational justification. In relation to religion, philosophy can also fulfil impor tant social functions such as representing the secret wisdom of reli gious traditions by making suitable elements of it accessible to the

Secular Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Secularization Analysis

The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has generated great controversy and received virulent criticism from people on both sides of the constitutional debate. The Court's analysis attempts to delineate the boundaries between and secular society, raising fundamental questions about the role of in the lives of individuals and in the public sphere. Such constitutional determinations strike at the very core of the American identity, potentiallyjeopardizing long-held traditions. Furthermore, these issues beg metaphysical questions about the definition of religion and the role of both and history in the evaluation of potentially unconstitutional practices. As part of this legal challenge, the Supreme Court has engaged in the controversial task of ascertaining whether seemingly religious practices and symbols are in fact religious, or whether history and collective experience purged them of their religious significance. By distinguishing practices that are religious from those that have lost any true religious significance,' the Court has engaged in a secularization of religious practices and symbols. Examples include

The Islamization of the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict: the case of Hamas

'The Palestinian cause is not about land and soil, but it is about faith and belief. This statement by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat almuqawama al-Islamiyya, or Hamas, its acronym) reflects an important development in the Arab-Israeli conflict, that of Islamizing it. Taking Clifford Geertz's definition of religion as a symbolic structure that generates meanings for people, a world view capable of providing answers to human problems, and an ethos telling people how they should act,2 the Islamization of the conflict, then, entails several consequences: a certain conceptualization of the conflict's causes and sources through religious-Islamic lenses; a perception of the desirable solution; and the provision of the motivation and justification for a specific mode of conduct in order to achieve that goal. The Arab-Israeli conflict has gone through several phases, each adding a different dimension to it. It began as a conflict between two national movements - Zionism and Palestinian nationalism - which claimed possession of one land, but since the 1936 Palestinian rebellion it came to encompass the various Arab states. From the 1950s it was perceived as a struggle between Israel and pan-Arab nationalism, which regarded Israel as a bridgehead of western imperialism, designed to splinter Arab territorial integrity and prevent Arab unity. In addition, it became an arena of the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union. The decline of panArabism and the growing power and legitimacy of the territorial states in the Middle East have transformed the conflict from a zero-sum game between rival national movements into a conflict between states, subjected to the rules of raison d'etat, and, therefore, capable of being managed or resolved. The Islamization of the conflict, on the other hand, portrays it as a battle between two rival religions, Islam and Judaism, or between two opposing absolutes. The religious idiom has always played an important role in the evolution of Palestinian nationalism and in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In the past, however, it was mostly the nationalist Palestinian elites - the notables during the British Mandate and the Fatah movement since the early 1960s - that employed Islamic symbols and themes in order to mobilize popular support for the national cause, whose aims were largely political

Rationality in Religion

Religion can be defined narrowly as belief in anthropomorphic supernatural beings. For Levy-Bruhl this meant that prelogical ‘mystic participation’ preceded true religion. For Donald Wiebe and others it means that philosophical-scientific rationality has been struggling to replace religion since the axial age. A broader definition of religion interprets rational post-axial theology as a development within religion, not a replacement of true religion. Both definitions are legitimate. The narrow definition highlights a tendency to superstition in religion. The broader definition recognizes the possibility of an evolution of religious thought.

China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry (review)

Reviews 213 pounded in die Chinese classic The Book ofChanges, there is constant and eternal change that affects both die physical world and the human world. Yet, as the twenty-first century is approaching, more and more people have come to realize that no universal pattern ofchange applies to all cultures and societies. In today's ever-changing world, where many cultural identities are striving for recognition, the new Norton will unquestionably serve as a beneficial intercultural undertaking in world literature, which, as Goethe had hoped in 1827, will promote and bring about greater harmony and communication among nations. H. R. Lan Amherst College H. R. Lan is an assistantprofessor ofChinese language and literature. NOTES1. Stephen Owen, "Poetry in the Chinese Tradition," in Heritage ofChina, ed. Paul Ropp (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1990). 2. Stephen Owen, Readings in Chinese Literary Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 331. M Richard Madsen. China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry. A Philip Lilienthal Book. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. xxiii, 262 pp. Hardcover $27.50, isbn 0-520-08613-9. There are many ways one can benefit from engaging in philosophical debates about "foreign" relations. One way is to exercise precision in defining commonly used words and their interrelationships. Another is to contemplate how recent international events have affected our view of today's world. In China and the American Dream, Professor Madsen does both by examining die interrelationships ofreligion, institutions, diversity, culture, morality, the liberal myth, geopolitics , and democracy. He uses twenty-five years ofSino-American relations, from 1970 to 1995, as a context for refining the meanings ofthese terms. He addresses the reasons for and die ramifications of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. Madsen endeavors to demonstrate that Sino-American interactions were in no© 1996 by University small way responsible for Tiananmen and that the interactions reveal much about ofHawaii Pressthe extent to which Americans "know" themselves. In addressing die educated public, he asserts that die American Dream, once an organizing principle for American society, has outiived its usefulness. 214 China Review International: Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1996 Perhaps the most important point that Madsen makes is tiiat many Chinese who were once committed to the Tiananmen democracy movement now are antisocial individuals who prefer to concentrate on making money. Madsen relates this phenomenon to the fact that Americans were overzealous in their interactions with Chinese beginning in me 1970s, and this caused irreparable damage to the self-confidence of Chinese nationalists. While fhe nationalists originally believed that their special contributions to the world were the virtues of self-discipline and social responsibility, after the Americans struck with dieir culture of competition and consumption, the nationalists could no longer find even one positive attribute about Chinese culture. Madsen maintains tiiat Americans, represented tiirough many diverse institutions, ignored the dynamic qualities of democracy in the United States and did not try to understand the Chinese context: we did not try to learn about ourselves before we exported our values, and this caused great harm to thousands of Chinese citizens. Before examining Madsen's definitions ofreligion, institutions, diversity, culture , morality, the liberal myth, geopolitics, and democracy, I acknowledge writing a doctoral dissertation on the Sino-American scientific and technological exchanges that occurred between 1972 and 1982. In my research, I assumed that "modernization" dirough the transfer of technology from the United States to China was bodi possible and desirable. Thus, reading Madsen's discourse about the American scholarly elite and their representative institutions was particularly enlightening, including how tiiree China groups—the National Committee on U.S.-China relations (composed ofthe elite establishment, whose membership was by invitation), the Committee for Scholarly Communication with die People's Republic of China (which also was exclusive), and the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (which had open membership and attracted a diverse group but consisted primarily ofyoung, middle-class graduate students)—developed and declined. In addition, Madsen placed into perspective for me the controversy over Steve Mosher's dissertation research that led to his expulsion from Stanford University. While the above topics are of great concern to scholars, they probably will not interest the educated public in America. In the remainder of...

Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West: Essays on Magic, Religion and Science

Introduction Part I. Beginnings: l. A definition of religion, and its uses Part II. Mainly Critical: 2. Neo-Tylorianism: sound sense or sinister prejudice? 3. Levy-Bruhl, Durkheim and the scientific revolution 4. Back to Frazer? 5. Professor Winch on safari 6. Judaeo-Christian spectacles: boon or bane to the study of African religions? Part III. Mainly Constructive: 7. African traditional thought and Western science 8. Paradox and explanation: a reply to Mr Skorupski 9. Tradition and modernity revisited Postscript.

Competing Theories of Religion and Law in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Hasidic Case

AbstractThe meaning and application of the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution are currently a matter of intense and increasingly intractable public debate. The academic study of religion can make a positive contribution to this debate by inviting its participants into a conversation about human religion that is already struggling with problems of definition and of language and that wishes to affirm the existence and importance of human religion without establishing a particular definition of religion, without unconsciously theologizing. A close examination of the legal debate can, in turn, serve the purposes of scholars of religion. The politically charged context of First Amendment jurisprudence provides an interesting laboratory in which to test theories of religion.

Religion, Historical Method, and Historical Forces: A Rejoinder

Although Henry Heller has largely misunderstood the principal points I was trying to make in my review essay, Putting Religion Back into the Wars of he has raised some very important issues concerning historical method which are worth discussing. To someone who was given the task by the editors to survey the field of recent work on the Wars of Religion, however, the comments of Heller seem a bit like shooting the messenger who brings bad news. Nowhere does he suggest I misrepresented the direction of current work in the field, nor does he deny that his own book runs counter to this direction; therefore, I can only assume that he disagrees with the other authors whose work I reviewed as much as he disagrees with me. Nevertheless, I think the readers of this journal, most of whom are not specialists of the sixteenth century, might gain much more from a general discussion of these larger historical issues than from a systematic, point by point rebuttal of Heller's criticisms against me. (Should any reader prefer the latter, I would be happy to respond.) There are three areas upon which I wish to focus: the definition of religion and its role or function in society, on which I think Heller and I largely agree; historical method and approaches to the past; and historical forces. On these latter two topics we clearly do not agree. Despite Heller's concentration on religion in his reply and his insistence that this is where our disagreements lie, it is not the issue of religion but of historical method and historical forces where we part company. Heller has misunderstood my main argument. I clearly did not write, nor did I intend or imply, as he contends, that religion in the

Emptiness as a Paradigm for Understanding World Religions

Frederick Streng's understanding of emptiness in Mahayana tradition as category that can be profitably used in study of all world religions is one of his great accomplishments. Work is left to be done, however. A rationale for taking central tenet of one religious tradition and using it to analyze others must be clearly articulated. Further, articulation must be done in language that will make sense to Western (and other) thinkers not familiar with Mahayana argumentation. Frederick Streng was pioneer, for his Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning,1 published in 1967, was first English-language book on Mahayana emptiness readily accessible to Western readers. He then proceeded to study and write about world religions in light of understanding of emptiness developed therein. Later, in his 1973 Ways of Being Religious, his 1986 Buddhist-Christian Dialogue, and especially in his 1969 Understanding Religious Life, widely used introduction to study of religion,2 Streng presents phenomenological typology of world religions that is based on his earlier study of emptiness. In discussing import of his work, I attempt first an evaluation of his accomplishment and then turn to recommendation for its furtherance. STRENG'S ACCOMPLISHMENT In his Understanding Religious Life, perhaps his most widely read book, Streng looks at religion as a means to ultimate transformation. He explains that the definition of religion [in his book] focuses on role of various processes of change through which people bring into their lives what they consider life's highest values (p. 2). The approach is to see traditions in their effective power to enable person to experience most authentic or deepest reality. This echoes Streng's theme in Emptiness, where he explains that, in Indian Madhyamika, knowledge was considered to be valuable insofar as it transformed life (p. 103). This Madhyamika understanding of religion subsequently becomes Streng's leitmotiv. Buddhist-Christian Studies 16 (1996). ? by University of Hawai'i Press. All rights reserved. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.120 on Wed, 14 Sep 2016 05:53:29 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Symbols of power and communication in pre-Confucian China (on the anthropology ofde) preliminary assumptions

If Clifford Geertz's definition of religion as a culturally determined system of symbols is valid, then it can be argued that the religious ideology of pre-Confucian—Early (or Western) Zhou—China is centred around the symbols of power and communication. Heaven, sacrifice, and gift-decree are some of the categories of this religious system, the majority of them reducible to the themes of a sacred hierarchy and communicative relationship between its subjects. The crucial position in this context is occupied by the concept of.

Theravāda Buddhism and the definition of religion

La tradition Theravāda du bouddhisme ne s'accorde pas aux types absolus et theistes qui permettent une definition de la religion. Cette tradition ne comporte pas de source de l'etre. En tant que religion non theiste, la tradition Theravāda echappe aux caracterisations occidentales. S'il existe une fin dans cette tradition, ce n'est ni Dieu, ni un etre. Il est vrai que si le Bouddha a des analogies avec Dieu, il n'en reste pas moins qu'il se confine a parler. Le Theravāda affecte le champ de definition dans la mesure ou il represente une frontiere avec les conceptions du monde non religieuses

Religion as an identifiable traditional behavior subject to natural selection

This article puts forth a definition of religion that refers only to identifiable elements. Previous definitions typically refer to beliefs in supernatural—i.e., unidentifiable—phenomena. These definitions neglect the fact that beliefs in general may be just as difficult to identify with the senses as the content of religious beliefs, i.e., alleged supernatural beings and powers. This article thus argues that the only thing identifiable that is distinctly religious is a certain type of behavior; more specifically, a certain type of talk. Further, although a statement about the existence of something supernatural is necessary for talk to be considered religious, such a claim by itself is not identifiably religious. Religious behavior can rather be defined as the communicated acceptance of a supernatural claim, a claim whose accuracy cannot be demonstrated by the senses. The accuracy of this definition can be tested by examining whether it is consistent with the way the words “religion” and “religious” are actually used. If this definition is found to be consistent with the use of these words, the study of religion becomes subject to the scientific principles used to study other forms of behavior. These principles include the theory of evolution by natural selection.

Comments on Religious Freedom

Here, at very beginning of our conference, it may be useful for me to restate summarily some of main themes in The Meaning of Religious Freedom as I understand them. Professor Gamwell begins with what he calls the modern political problematic. Regarded from a religious point of view, problematic is how a religious person (who, in accordance with author's definition of religion as an answer to the comprehensive question, might be a systematic atheist) can logically avoid either denying political relevance of his faith and spurning public debate; or else entering into public debate, but insisting without argument on truth of that faith and in that way seeking, at least implicitly, its official establishment. Regarded from a political point of view, problematic is: how can religious people, with their nonrational faiths, be admitted into political realm-a realm open to all regardless of diverse faiths and therefore necessarily based on rational powers we all have in common-without fatally compromising principled openness of public life? It is a crucial premise of Professor Gamwell's argument that a mere modus vivendi cannot be an adequate answer to this problematic; only a theory of justice will suffice. A second major theme of Professor Gamwell's book is that modern political problematic cannot be resolved if religion is essentially nonrational. This conclusion is reached through exhaustive analyses of some of major efforts of our time to sustain principle of religious freedom while assuming nonrational character of religion-those of John Rawls, John Courtney Murray, and Kent Greenawalt. In every case, it is argued, one of two untenable positions must be taken. Religion may be construed as essentially unconnected with political matters, which is directly contrary to necessarily comprehensive nature of any answer to comprehensive question. If that alternative is rejected, then public realm is perforce opened up to religion-that is, to nonrational faith; but thus scope of reason is abridged and public realm is left without any coherent definition of its public character.

Benson Saler, “Conceptualising Religion”

In this book, Saler focuses his attention on the problems attending the definition of religion in various academic discourses. In the introduction, he begins his exploration of the conceptual options regarding religion by contrasting essentialist and nominalist approaches to the task of definition which lead, respectively, to the use of digital and analogue scales in representing religions. In chapters 1 and 2, he pays particular attention to the role of the notion of the transcendent. He reviews the nature and value of various types of monothetic definitions. In the final three chapters, Saler attempts to provide an alternative way of putting the notion of religion to use

Comments on Scott Lowe's Response

With regard to the nature of definitions, I believe that only real definitions should be taken seriously. Lexical definitions are derivative, while stipulative definitions may be tOOeclectic. If I state that for me religion is listening to Beethoven, or watching the soccer world cup, who can criticize me for my definition? Yet, language, however imperfect, must be taken seriously. A true (real) definition of religion must be based on observation of what people in the world practice. That already implies an initial concept of the nature of religion, but it is a sort of hypothesis, a starting point.

Buddhism and the Definition of Religion: One More Time

The belief in and reverence for superhuman beings cannot be understood as the chief distinguishing characteristic of religious phenomena. The consideration of Buddhism has always been central to the discussion of what religion is, and this paper focuses on the limitations of the human-superhuman dichotomy as it might be used to apply to Buddhist traditions. 1.Buddhism and reverence for superhumans. 2.Is atheistic buddhism a religion? 3.Buddhism and nonduality. 4.Implications for the social scientific study of religion