Neutral Definition Research Articles

Neutrality of Planning Procedures in an Economy with Public Goods

Planning procedures for guiding and financing the production of public goods have been proposed by Dreze, de la Vallee Poussin [4] and Malinvaud [8]. Planning procedures are of particular interest in such a case since, as it is well known, the pure non-cooperative competitive mechanism generally leads to inefficient situations in the presence of public goods. Although the solutions proposed by these two procedures to the problem of production and exchange of private goods are very different, they both adopt the same rules for the revision of the public goods quantities. Therefore in the model with only one private good which is considered throughout this paper the two procedures coincide and we shall call it the MDP procedure. The MDP procedure enjoys two properties which justify its study. During the procedure a social surplus appears which can be redistributed among consumers so as to permit an increase in all utility levels-i.e. the procedure is monotonic. Moreover, under usual convexity assumptions the procedure converges to an efficient (or Pareto optimal) situation -i.e. it is stable. Knowing that an efficient situation will obtain if the MDP procedure is implemented, a further question arises. What efficient situations can be reached in such a way? This paper gives conditions under which the following answer holds. Every efficient situation which is preferred or equivalent to the initial situation can be reached by the use of the MDP procedure with a suitable choice of the distribution of the social surplus appearing during the procedure. This choice can be made before the beginning of the procedure and can be kept constant along the procedure. Therefore any negotiation taking place before the beginning of the procedure can legitimately be concentrated upon the choice of a distribution of this surplus. Nobody can object to the rules followed in the revision of the public goods quantities since these rules do not have by themselves any distributive implications. We can say that they are neutral . The model and the MDP procedure are described in Section 2. A precise definition of neutrality and the main results of the paper are presented and discussed in Section 3. Finally, the proofs are given in Section 4.

REPLY: TIME AND TAXES, AGAIN

Exploring the difference between the Chisholm model and the Thomson ? Goldstein model, this note argues that his applies to the variable interest rate case, ours to the constant case, but that each offers an accurate account of its particular domain. But we cavil a bit at his definition of neutrality, complain about the unduly narrow scope he offers for the application of our model and reaffirm our scepticism about Gaffney's contribution.

Neutrality and the Common Market: The Soviet View

The Soviet doctrine on the legal implications of neutrality is liberal with regard to the non-aligned nations in the third world but rigid with regard to the neutral states in Western Europe. On the one hand, Soviet jurists defend the right of neutral countries to pursue a highly active foreign policy. On the other, they contend that neither membership nor association with the Common Market is compatible with Swedish, Austrian, or Swiss neutrality. This inherent tension in the Soviet theory of neutrality is not resolved at the level of abstract definitions of neutrality and neutralism where the liberal interpretation tends to prevail.

Neutrality and the Common Market: the Soviet View

The Soviet doctrine on the legal implications of neutrality is liberal with regard to the non-aligned nations in the third world but rigid with regard to the neutral states in Western Europe. On the one hand, Soviet jurists defend the right of neutral countries to pursue a highly active foreign policy. On the other, they contend that neither mem bership nor association with the Common Market is compatible with Swedish, Austrian, or Swiss neutrality. This inherent tension in the Soviet theory of neutrality is not resolved at the level of abstract definitions of neutrality and neutralism where the liberal interpretation tends to prevail.

Harrod-Neutral Economic Growth with Hicks-Biased Technological Progress

The most useful concept of neutrality of technological progress for models of economic growth has proved to be that of R. F. [4, 82]. According to this view technological progress is neutral if the capital-output ratio remains unchanged for a constant rate of return on capital. In an alternative concept of neutrality provided by J. R. Hicks [5, 121], technological progress is neutral if the capital-labor ratio remains unchanged at a constant factor-price ratio. These two concepts are equivalent in a onesector model only if the elasticity of factor substitution is unity. In a two-sector model the relationship is more complex. Here, the concept of neutrality can be applied in two ways: (1) with respect to constancy of the aggregate capital-output ratio, or (2) with respect to constancy of a single sector's capital-output ratio. In either case, the value of the relevant capital-output ratio for a constant rate of return on capital depends in part upon the relative price of investment goods. It is the purpose of this article to examine the conditions of Hicksian bias in technological progress that are necessary for the existence of an aggregate Harrodneutral equilibrium growth path in the twosector model. The concern here is then with the first of the two alternative approaches to neutrality given above. The second, alternative, approach has been well investigated by Ronald Jones and Peter Diamond. Jones has presented a graphical exposition of the relationship between single sector Harrod neutrality and the relative price of investment goods that sets forth some of the conditions for this second type of neutrality [6, 848]. These conditions have been more extensively analysed in a mathematical framew rk by Diamond [3, 161]. In his article, Diamond concludes that, in effect, since the rate of return is in part a function of a decision variable s as well as given technology and resources, the concept of neutrality cannot be applied to the entire economy but, instead, only to the singl sectors separately. This conclusion is true only for a restricted sense of neutrality that defines a purely technological elationship with no economic adjustments included. But Harrod's original definition of neutral change does not imply any such restricti n. In fact, one of the reasons for the success of the definition of neutrality is that it defines neutrality with reference to a sta e of macro-economic equilibrium. In his article Harrod-neutral technological progress will be progress that leads to an equilibrium state where the aggregate capitalutput ratio is constant for a constant rate of return.

American Obstacles to Arbitration and Conciliation

First, he spoke of disarmament being dependent upon substitutes for war. He avoided the use of the phrase which has now become somewhat trite, Disarmament and security must go hand in hand. Admitting that, I think it is none the less true, and deserving of emphasis at this moment, that, failing anything like complete substitutes for war and adequate means of security, real steps towards world peace can be taken by partial measures of disarmament. I am confirmed in this judgment by the fact that a day or two ago, at a conference in Briarcliffe, a distinguished officer of the U. S. Navy, Admiral Pratt, said, criticizing someone who had taken the contrary position, that in his judgment it is true that armaments per se are causes of friction and indirectly causes of war; that therefore any measure of limited reduction, such as the Washington Conference, is a step in the right direction. Surely we ought not to forget that, while striving for substitutes for war and while studying means' to achieve security, we may take some very worthwhile half-steps. Second, Professor Shotwell referred to the need for continuing organizations to follow up any half-step toward disarmament. The Washington Conference was perhaps not a half-step; perhaps only a quarter-step. Whatever its value at the time, a large measure of its gains has since been lost because there was no follow-up. See p. 51. There was no repetition of the conference; there was no continuing body to determine in an objective and critical way whether the treaties were being lived up to. As a result you all know that our press, some months ago, was filled with tales of how Japan was violating the treaties, and doubtless the Japanese press was filled with equally graphic and inaccurate tales of how we were violating the treaties. The Washington Conference was interesting as an example of a concrete accomplishment. It was equally interesting as an example of a concrete failure, because the step was not followed up in the way which Professor Shotwell has suggested. Third, he suggested the need of a new definition of neutrality. I wonder how many of you realize that almost all of the serious attempts to achieve security in Europe since the war take as their basic concept something which in effect nearly abolishes neutrality. To put it in a different way, the insistence by the United States upon the old-fashioned rights of neutrality would either involve us in conflicts