Definition Of Marriage Research Articles

Sound the Shofar in Luxembourg

In March of 2017, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) received a preliminary reference from the Constitutional Court of Romania seeking guidance on the proper implementation of Directive 2004/38/EC, commonly known as the Citizen’s Rights Directive, and its applicability to same-sex spouses. This Article is the first to argue that a proper decision by the ECJ would force Member States to recognize—to an extent necessary for purposes of providing and protecting the fundamental EU Citizen’s right to free movement—marriages and equivalent partnership recognitions conducted and legally recognized in other Member States. This unique argument derives from a comparative analysis of Israeli jurisprudence, most notably the Israeli High Court of Justice’s ruling in Ben Ari v. Director of Population Administration. This Article explores the interpretation of Directive 2004/38/EC, which stipulates the freedom of movement for workers within the Member States is a fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens so long as certain employment criterion is met. This right, in general, extends to the immediate family and dependents of the worker who is asserting that right, meaning that in a heterosexual marriage, the husband or wife of a worker who decides to relocate to another EU Member State to work can move with their partner and live without major legal problems or immigration status concerns. While EU law currently guarantees these spousal rights, the definition of marriage is left to the individual Member States. In balancing the limitations of EU competences in the realm of family law against the need to protect fundamental rights of EU citizens, this article argues the ECJ could be guided by the Israeli High Court of Justice, which crafted an opinion mandating that the Israeli government record same-sex couples legally married abroad as “married” in the official population registry. This recording entitles the partners to prima facie evidence of their marital status, thus affording them the rights of married couples under Israeli law without constituting an official “marriage” under the laws of Israel. By combining the wisdom of the Israeli decision with the unique limitations of the EU, this article argues that the ECJ should require all Member States to acknowledge the prima facie validity of cross-border legal same-sex marriages only to the extent necessary to allow the Member State to provide the rights and protections guaranteed as fundamental under EU law.

Bernard Shaw's Marriages and Misalliances

Bernard Shaw's Marriages and Misalliances

MENGKAJI PASAL-PASAL BIAS GENDER UU PERKAWINAN: Tawaran Pencegahan Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan

Man is created into a man and a woman. Both have equal rights in the perspective of God (Surat AtTaubah [9]: 71-72). But, as a matter of fact women often become marginalized person. One example is as illustrated in the contents of several articles of Indonesian marriage laws which are still gender- biased and discredit women. This applies in the definition of marriage which inferiorly disparages women; women's marriage age should be easier than men; legalized polygamy; the inferior position of the wife in the point of view of the husband and many other problems. This article is trying to see those problems from the perspective of religion, however violating the religious ideals that require justice. Therefore the solution of the problems is sought to fit with the ideals of religion. Through the approach of Islam, the above mentioned examples are contradictory to the teachings of Islam, because it is not in line with the vision of religion as a religion of justice, equality and glorification of women.

Sound the Shofar in Luxembourg: Cross-Border Recognition of Same-Sex Spouses in the European Union and Israel's Ben Ari V. Director of Population Administration

In March of 2017, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) received a preliminary reference from the Constitutional Court of Romania seeking guidance on the proper implementation of Directive 2004/38/EC, commonly known as the Citizen’s Rights Directive, and its applicability to same-sex spouses. This Article is the first to argue that a proper decision by the ECJ would force Member States to recognize—to an extent necessary for purposes of providing and protecting the fundamental EU Citizen’s right to free movement—marriages and equivalent partnership recognitions conducted and legally recognized in other Member States. This unique argument derives from a comparative analysis of Israeli jurisprudence, most notably the Israeli High Court of Justice’s ruling in Ben Ari v. Director of Population Administration. This Article explores the interpretation of Directive 2004/38/EC, which stipulates the freedom of movement for workers within the Member States is a fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens so long as certain employment criterion is met. This right, in general, extends to the immediate family and dependents of the worker who is asserting that right, meaning that in a heterosexual marriage, the husband or wife of a worker who decides to relocate to another EU Member State to work can move with their partner and live without major legal problems or immigration status concerns. While EU law currently guarantees these spousal rights, the definition of marriage is left to the individual Member States. In balancing the limitations of EU competences in the realm of family law against the need to protect fundamental rights of EU citizens, this article argues the ECJ could be guided by the Israeli High Court of Justice, which crafted an opinion mandating that the Israeli government record same-sex couples legally married abroad as “married” in the official population registry. This recording entitles the partners to prima facie evidence of their marital status, thus affording them the rights of married couples under Israeli law without constituting an official “marriage” under the laws of Israel. By combining the wisdom of the Israeli decision with the unique limitations of the EU, this article argues that the ECJ should require all Member States to acknowledge the prima facie validity of cross-border legal same-sex marriages only to the extent necessary to allow the Member State to provide the rights and protections guaranteed as fundamental under EU law.

Same Sex but Not the Same: Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and France and the Universalist Narrative

Jurisdictions around the world are increasingly adopting, or considering the adoption of, legislation to legalize same-sex marriage. The dominant approach in analyzing these reforms has been universalist. According to this view, same-sex marriage represents a legal trend at the global level and will eventually become a global norm. This description lumps together different family law reforms and depicts them as contributing to a broader convergionist global dynamic. This Article argues that universalism has theoretical and practical shortcomings, since it tends to downplay the diversity of processes of legal change by isolating law from local cultural and political dynamics, and, in so doing, obscures arguments and social dynamics that perpetuate the marginalization of gays and lesbians and their families. Using the pluralist socio-legal framework that sees law as a cultural and political artifact, this Article compares two such legal reforms, one in the United States and one in France. It argues that four aspects distinguish these two reforms: First, the different roles played by rights and equality-based arguments, the divergent understandings of law in relation to gay and lesbian historical marginalization and social change, the focus of the debates (on the definition of marriage in the United States and on filiation in France), and finally, the type of expertise underpinning the legal arguments. Pointing to these differences allows us to better appreciate the political, legal, and cultural processes that drive legal change and the obstacles to achieving equality for gays, lesbians, and their families.

Same-Sex Marriage and Language Appropriation Practices of Lesbians

ABSTRACTLegal marriage has vacillated between being a private agreement made by two individuals and an agreement of social significance under the state’s control (Nokov, 2008; Smart, 2013). Presently, we are without a definition of marriage that serves our diverse population. The discourse surrounding same-sex marriage in the United States is a topic of interest, as explicit attention to communication in reference to these relationships has rarely been documented (Land & Kitzinger, 2005; Richman, 2014). Using a qualitative framework and semistructured interviews, this study investigated the relationship between marriage equality and its impact on language appropriation for 20 lesbians in varying parts of the United States. Analysis employing grounded theory and constant comparative method indicated that for this sample, access to legal marriage did not serve as a determinant for the adoption of language traditionally associated with marriage. Additionally, it indicated that marriage equality hinges on more than the support of the law.

THE RIGHTS OF LAND IN MARRIAGE AGREEMENT OF MISCENEGATION BY SUBSQUENT THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISION NUMBER 69 / PUU-XIII 2015 BASED ON THE CUSTOMARY LAW PERSPECTIVE

<p>The definition of marriage is provided in Article 1 that: "Marriage is a mental bond between a man and a woman as husband and wife with the aim of forming a happy, eternal, (family) family based on the One Supreme God." The meaning of marriage under the law, Law Number 1 Of 1974 is a marriage has a very close relationship with religion, spirituality, so that marriage not only has the element of birth / body, but the element of spirit / rokhani also has a very important role. The legal consequence of a marriage is the position of a woman who becomes a wife and a man becomes a husband, hence the rights and obligations assumed by both after the legal act of marriage. For those who marry most do not think about the effects of marriage, on their wealth, some of them only think that the consequences of marriage are only the union of two families, and the continuity of their marriage in order to be eternal and happy. Marital Laws Article 35 to Article 37 regulate about the field of marriage property for husbands and wives, Affirmation of Article 35 states that marriage property becomes a common property. While the property of each luggage as a gift or inheritance, is under the control of each. Unless otherwise specified in order to serve as joint property, for this other determination the husband and wife are allowed to make "marriage agreement", this marriage agreement contains about marriage property. Likewise to the perpetrators of miscenegations. Indonesian citizens who marry foreign citizens, not knowing that there are legal consequences of such miscenegations, there is a right to be lost as a result of miscenegation. The rights in question relate to the marriage agreement, which if the perpetrator of a miscenegation does not enter into a marriage agreement will impact on land rights , and it is also known under costumary law.</p>

The Brown Moment in Taiwan: Making Sense of the Law and Politics of the Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case in a Comparative Light

The Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC) recently issued a landmark decision in Interpretation No. 748 (the Same-Sex Marriage Case), declaring the definition of marriage as a gender-differentiated union of a man and a woman under the Civil Code unconstitutional and setting the stage for Taiwan to become the first in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage. This decision has been compared to Obergefell v. Hodges. However, reading Obergefell in the broad context of the gay rights movement and the role of judicial review in Taiwanese constitutional politics, we challenge this analogy. Due to the discrepancy between the social movement and the law in the fight for constitutional rights for gays and lesbians in Taiwan, the Same-Sex Marriage Case is Taiwan’s Brown v. Board of Education moment in her constitutional law and politics. To make sense of the law and politics of the Same Sex Marriage Case, we evaluate its political context and the text and style in its reasoning. We observe a discrepancy between law and politics in the pursuit of the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians in Taiwan. The rise of same-sex marriage to the top of the antidiscrimination agenda resulted from the continuous effort of gay rights activists, while the TCC watched this movement from the sidelines until the Same-Sex Marriage Case. This case thus mirrors Brown in two respects. First, the role of the TCC has been publicly questioned after its Brown-like contentious decision on the issue of same-sex marriage. Second, the text and style of the Same-Sex Marriage Case is evocative of the exceptional brevity, managed unanimity, and scientific rationality in Brown. Echoing the Brown Court, the TCC attempts to manage judicial legitimacy, anticipating and answering the political reaction to its ruling in light of its intervention in gay rights issues by tackling the fundamental question of same-sex marriage head-on.

The Future of Religious Liberty Protections in Illinois: Harmonizing Religious Exercise and Legitimate Government Concerns

Americans are generally supportive of religious freedom, especially compared with people in other countries. However, some Americans are worried about what they see as a growing threat to religious freedom — and no wonder. The news is replete with stories of religious individuals and institutions pushing back against an ever-expanding administrative state that sometimes brings into tension the demands of faith and the law. Witness the widespread public outcry over the contraceptive coverage mandate under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which ultimately led to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the government cannot force closely-held, family-owned corporations to cover drugs and devices that they believe “cause the demise of” a human. Clashes over competing views of marriage erupted after the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges extended the right to marry to same-sex couples. Across the country, marriage registrars, magistrates, and judges — individuals who facilitate the state’s monopoly over marriage — have refused to assist with same-sex marriages, leading to resignations, firings, and even jail time. Most famously Rowan County, Kentucky, clerk Kim Davis barred her staff from issuing marriage licenses to anyone because doing so “would conflict with God’s definition of marriage” and “violate [her] conscience.” Federal Judge David Bunning tossed Davis in jail for contempt of court and ordered her deputies to issue marriage licenses or go to jail, too. That controversy followed hot on the heels of Indiana’s and Arkansas’ recent debacles enacting state RFRAs, which critics characterized as “licenses to discriminate.” While RFRAs offer much-needed protection against government impositions on religion, especially for small religions, prominent religious liberty scholars believe that RFRAs would not absolve religious believers of duties to comply with non-discrimination laws. That fact, however, did not prevent the NCAA and others from boycotting Indiana. To be sure, the norm that the law should leave room for religious believers whenever possible is likely to weaken as the number of Americans identifying with a religion continues to plummet. But, as the government continues to expand and its nature changes, clashes between religious belief and government will expand. More importantly, whether and how to respect religious beliefs will continue to spark raging debates, as it did after Hobby Lobby. Still, religious freedom has been a bedrock of our democracy since the founding and is one thing that Americans of all stripes agree upon, perhaps because it protects all Americans. This chapter discusses the three ways in which religious freedom is commonly protected — constitutional protections, generalized statutory protections for religious freedom, and specific statutory protections. It then reviews existing religious liberty protections under Illinois and federal law and suggests how religious liberty protections in Illinois can be further enhanced while respecting the dignity of all individuals.

Who's Your Daddy?: The Marital Presumption of Legitimacy in the Modern World and its Application to Same‐Sex Couples

Recently, the definition of marriage has been significantly altered. No longer do we find ourselves exclusively in the midst of “traditional marriage” between one man and one woman. Instead, everywhere we experience different kinds of marriages and diverse, nontraditional families. The United States has finally caught up to many advanced democracies in universally recognizing same‐sex marriage through the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. However, the next question remains unanswered: what about families of same‐sex couples? This Note explores the nature of same‐sex couples, their families, and in particular, their children. It addresses the issue of the marital presumption of legitimacy and encourages its application to all legally recognized married couples regardless of sexual orientation and biology. Even though prior to Obergefell some states were unwilling to apply the presumption, since the implementation of marriage equality, the next logical step would be to utilize the presumption to ensure that all parents, regardless of gender, are recognized and families are preserved.

“I Do, I Don’t”: The Benefits and Perils of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage in the United States—One Year Later

In 1970, a gay male couple applied for and was given a marriage license in Minnesota. The license was eventually rescinded by court order. Forty-five years later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, limiting the federal definition of marriage to consist of one man and one woman, was unconstitutional. The result was the legalization of same-sex marriage in the United States. The purpose of this article is to discuss the importance of establishing the right for same-sex couples to legally marry. It outlines the benefits and costs to LGBT communities one year after the establishment of same-sex marriage in the U.S. This paper explores the limits of utilizing a rights-based approach when advocating social change. The recommendation is for LGBT individuals, communities and allies to shift tactics to adopt a capabilities approach to organizing and mobilizing people, groups, and organizations around issues of injustice. A capabilities framework addresses the complexities of individual and community needs while providing a foundation for coalition building and lasting positive social change.

Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego Stanów Zjednoczonych jako autonomiczne źródło tworzenia norm konstytucyjnych

The landmark decisions of the Supreme Court change the ethos of adjudicating. The substantive due process doctrine allowed the Court to become an actual lawgiver. This doctrine widely extended the understanding of the due process clause of the 5 th and 14 th Amendments. Increased power of statutory construction corresponded with the doctrine of loose constructionism (living constitution). Decisions like Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade created new constitutional rights, emanating from the radical liberal anthropology. Adjudication became a field of an ideological battle in the culture war over anthropology determining the law’s content . In the classical and Christian understanding, being free is considered as having one’s identity discovered as an ontological constant, thus allowing an individual to develop himself according to the nature’s essence . The liberal anthropological revolution defines freedom as a power of self-creation, serving individual’s preferences. The liberal elites, employing ideas of social engineering, attempt to enforce rules based on coexistence and relationship of equal rights. Individual rights emanate from the autonomous, personal choice of life values, the key of the constitutional interpretation. The wider this right of self-definition , the wider the scope of the state’s intervention. In Griswold v. Connecticut the right to privacy signified deep cultural change rooted in such an anthropology. This “emancipation project” is thus built on an axiology destroying relations, becoming a kind of a religion of secular salvation. The state serves here as a demiurge and is sacralized. This causes an increasing abyss between the elites and the rest of the citizens, with a corresponding social disintegration of it’s public life. For instance Obergefell v. Hodges enforces a new anthropological definition of marriage, beginning to delegitimize creeds and actions of religious communities. This reflects a global phenomenon of connecting individual liberal rights with politics of identity and the post-modern culture of right understood as autonomous will without reasoning about its ontological, universal basis. The Supreme Court decisions are not separated from wider culture, but based on the new anthropological understanding of man as a consumer, with his individual will becoming the very basis of rights.

“This is a Great Mystery”: Sacramental Families Formed by Cosmic Liturgy

“This is a Great Mystery”: Sacramental Families Formed by Cosmic Liturgy Veronica A. Arntz (bio) When John Paul II called for the New Evangelization, he was thinking primarily of those Catholics who were poorly catechized and distanced from the richness of the Catholic faith. The New Evangelization was to be a “re-evangelization,” for many of these Catholics were already baptized and confirmed, but could not articulate Church teaching or perhaps did not know the Real Presence in the Eucharist.1 This lack of catechesis was a real problem within the Church, one that needed to be addressed as John Paul II did. But, since John Paul II’s time, have we seen a true rekindling of the faith? It seems that we need to re-evaluate how we are pursuing the New Evangelization. While we need not entirely abandon its cause, we also need to focus on the heart of evangelization, which is the unchangeable truth of Jesus Christ, who is the “same yesterday and today and forever” (Heb 13:8).2 Within this context of the New Evangelization, I would like to address two issues in the Church that have received much attention due to the confusion surrounding them: marriage and family, and the liturgy. If the family is, according to many Church documents, [End Page 39] “the first and vital cell of society,”3 and the liturgy is called “the source and summit of the whole Christian life” by Lumen Gentium,4 how can we be so confused over them? For both marriage and liturgy are deeply connected, and their restoration is not mutually exclusive: the restoration of one is necessary for the restoration of the other. It is perhaps no coincidence that the radical liturgical changes in the Church and the sexual revolution of the 1960s occurred around the same time.5 Thus, it is necessary that we have a proper understanding of both marriage and liturgy as a Church if we wish to see them restored and reverenced according to their proper values. First, I shall address two misconceptions concerning marriage and family that strikingly parallel two reductionist practices of the liturgy, while then showing the proper understanding of each. Second, in looking at how the restoration of liturgy is necessary for the restoration of marriage and family, I shall offer some practical suggestions for beginning that restoration. [End Page 40] PART ONE: THE SACRAMENT OF MARRIAGE 1. Marriage Strictly as Relationship While there has been much development in the theological understanding of family as the “domestic church” since Vatican II, 6 some have taken an approach that does not follow in the Church’s tradition. Margaret Monahan Hogan is an advocate for this first reductionist view of the family, which emphasizes the relationship aspect in marriage, although she believes that she is responding to perceived developments of marriage as a relationship within the magisterial tradition, arguing her perspective from sources such as St. Thomas Aquinas, Pius XI, and John Paul II. Thus, it is necessary to look carefully at her arguments to see the actual incongruities with Church teaching. Hogan gives the following definition of marriage in her work, Marriage as a Relationship: “It is, essentially, an intimate personal union which is to supply the matrix of conditions for procreation and the perfection of the partners of the union.”7 In other words, the essential component of marriage as a relationship of two people enables the other two aspects, namely, children and the flourishing of individuals. This emphasis on union allows for a better understanding of conjugal intercourse, which, according to Hogan, was lacking in previous explications of the sacrament of marriage. Reflecting on the tradition presented in recent Church documents, Hogan opines that it is incorrect to argue for the inseparability of the unitive and procreative ends of the conjugal act.8 For this reason, she considers the unitive end to be “intrinsic-necessary,” [End Page 41] while the “realization of offspring is an intrinsic-contingent end.”9 This means that while “marriage is always a union”10 and “the conjugal act is always unitive,”11 offspring or even the openness to offspring is not required for the marital union. Union is essential...

Understanding the 2015 marriage referendum in Ireland: context, campaign, and conservative Ireland

ABSTRACTOn 22 May 2015 the marriage referendum proposal was passed by a large majority of Irish voters and the definition of marriage in the constitution was broadened to introduce marriage equality. This referendum is remarkable for a number of reasons: (1) it is uniquely based on an experiment in deliberative democracy; (2) the referendum campaign was unusually vigorous and active; and (3) the voting patterns at the referendum point to a significant value shift along the deep seated liberal conservative political cleavage of Irish politics. This article provides an overview of the background to the referendum initiative, the campaign prior to the referendum, and the key factors that drove voter turnout and preference. Based on a post-referendum survey, we find that while support for the government of the day, political knowledge, and social attitudes have the same effects as commonly found in other referendums, the variation among social classes was less prevalent than usual and door-to-door canvassing by the two sides of the campaign impacted through turnout rather than vote preference. The voting behaviour of the different age groups suggests strong generational effects.

Proxy Politics, Economic Protest, or Traditionalist Backlash: Croatia’s Referendum on the Constitutional Definition of Marriage

This article sheds light on the popular sources of opposition to the extension of gay rights in Eastern Europe by analysing the results of the 2013 Croatian referendum on the constitutional definition of marriage—the first referendum of this kind in Europe. Contrary to popular interpretations, our aggregate-level analysis reveals that the referendum results primarily reflected the pattern of support for the two principal electoral blocs, rather than communities’ traditionalist characteristics or grievances stemming from economic adversity. The article thereby stresses the importance of embedding the issue of contention over gay rights in Eastern Europe into the context of conventional political competition.

Mixed Matches: Transgressive Unions in Germany from the Reformation to the Enlightenment, edited by David M. Luebke and Mary Lindemann

Mixed Matches: Transgressive Unions in Germany from the Reformation to the Enlightenment, edited by David M. Luebke and Mary Lindemann. New York, Berghahn Books, 2014. vi, 246 pp. $95.00 US (cloth). Mixed Matches: Transgressive Unions in Germany is part of the Spectrum series and published under the auspices of the German Studies Association; these are affiliations from which the book benefits, as the transatlantic character of the association and the dissemination of its ideas, are fostered throughout. Publishing the results of this German-American collaboration in the English language also makes it accessible to a broader range of students and scholars. By focusing on the shifting boundaries of acceptable marriage partners in exceptional and contested unions, the various contributions also illuminate broader changes in systems of regulation, including the law, the political system, and not least religious codes and practices during the early modern period. As David Luebke tells readers in the introduction, this volume should resonate not only with those interested in early modern history but also those engaged with contemporary issues about transgression. Same-sex marriage, mixed-race relationships, and binational unions are examples of contemporary debates that demonstrate the need to be mindful of the shifting boundaries of marital propriety, validity, legality, and definition. Given contemporary concerns about the definition of appropriate unions, this volume provides an important reminder that current debates on race, religion, sexuality, and gender in the context of marital and non-marital unions are not unprecedented but derive from early modern origins. The essays in the collection generally follow a chronological order and are organized in clusters related to a number of topics. They include the impact of the Protestant Reformation on the definition of marriage (chapters one to three); the issue of social status (chapters four and five); confessional barriers to marriage (chapters six to eight); race (chapter nine); and shifting understandings of the incest taboo (chapters ten and eleven). Marriage is placed at the intersection of private and public, and all of the contributions speak to the centrality of the institution to social organization. By examining relationships on the margins, the contributions to this volume make an in-depth exploration of the changes in power relations between the religious and secular context possible, while also pointing out the intersections that existed between the two frameworks. In particular, changing attitudes about sexual morality were at the heart of many deliberations related to suitable unions. Acknowledging sexuality as a fundamental aspect of the human condition also prompted the church and state to try channelling and thereby limiting sexual expression in officially sanctioned and narrowly defined marital unions only. Because the cases discussed in these chapters--clerical marriage, marriage across rank, inter-confessional marriage, cross-racial marriage, and incest--are those on the margins of propriety and acceptability at the time, they also generated attention. Thus, contributors to this volume have been able to draw on a rich cache of sources, among them theological tracts, court records, travelogues, and personal correspondence. One of the most prominent examples of a prospective transgressive union in this volume is discussed by Daniel Riches. His work traces the fifteen-year-long debate that ultimately failed to produce a marital partnership between Queen Christina of Sweden and Elector Wilhelm of Brandenburg. Opponents to the union deemed the prospective spouses an ill fit due to their differences in rank and religion. They also accused the queen of transgressing the norms of dominant sex and gender roles. As Riches points out, however, it was not just naysayers of the alliance who appropriated rhetoric of difference as justification, but those who were supportive of the union did as well. …

Toward inclusive understandings of marriage in an early childhood classroom: negotiating (un)readiness, community, and vulnerability through a critical reading of King and King

This collaborative classroom research study examines the ways in which preschoolers made sense of same-sex marriage through a critical reading of the book King and King by De Haan and Nijland. Acknowledging the importance of community in doing critical and political work, this article details the ways in which a preschool teacher and a group of four-year-olds collectively problematized and expanded narrow and exclusive definitions of marriage. Through their words and actions, these preschoolers invite readers to reconsider the centrality of lesbian and gay issues in the early childhood curriculum. Building on work that posits that lesbian and gay issues are an elementary school issue, this article proposes that they are an early childhood issue as well. Weaving reflection and description and theorizing from practice, this article seeks to shed light on the power and possibility of engaging in work that leads to inclusive understandings of marriage with young children in early childhood classrooms. Why? Because, as a four-year-old stated, ‘That’s fair and that’s how it works.’

Young Women and Social Change in Japan: Family and Marriage in a Time of Upheaval

ABSTRACTThis paper focuses on the changing definition of marriage for young women in Tokyo over the last 10 years. Based on fieldwork research conducted in Tokyo, I examine why women are delaying or refusing marriage, arguing that women’s decisions can best be understood in relation to work. I discuss how young women negotiate their conception of marriage by articulating their desires for self-realization, a career, and participation in society, within the context of a flexibilization of work and the transformation of family in contemporary Japan.

Obergefell, Locke, and the Changing Definition of Marriage

Obergefell, Locke, and the Changing Definition of Marriage

The Use and Abuse of Definitions in Constitutional Law

Abstract Justice Roberts′s dissent in Obergefell v Hodges - the case in which the US Supreme Court found a constitutional right for same sex couples to marry - rested on the premise the Court cannot invoke the right to marry as a basis for changing the definition of marriage. But his argument works only if the Court has no obligation to find a constitutional meaning for the term. I argue here that it has such an obligation. I argue further that an analogy with the concept of ‘person’ throws light on how that obligation should work. And finally, I argue that the most plausible constitutional definition would include same sex couples.