Female philosopher Kym Maclaren, in her article, “Emotional Metamorphoses: The Role of Others in Becoming a Subject,” explores a phenomenological view on emotion as being-in-the-world as well as the ethical implications of understanding emotion in opposition to the moralistic view. In the first part of this paper, I provide an exegetical assessment of Maclaren’s thesis; in the second I introduce a critique of Maclaren’s argument and argue a claim of my own which explores perception and autonomy in the human body along with its implications in the context of Maclaren’s phenomenological account of emotion. I discuss the necessity of both emotion and reason in morality and argue that the traditional definition of autonomy is not plausible when considered through Maclaren’s phenomenological view of emotion. Finally, I work to creatively explore a new definition of autonomy that does cohere with this view. In her article, “Emotional Metamorphoses: The Role of Others in Becoming a Subject,” Kym Maclaren explores a phenomenological view of emotion as being-in-the-world as well as the ethical implications of understanding emotion in opposition to the conventional moralistic view. She introduces three premises: that emotion is “the experience of a tension within reality which brings into question our place within reality;” that expressions of emotion are displays of an individual’s attempts to make sense of her reality with the limited existential resources he possesses; and that others play an essential role in both the ruling out and lending of existential resources with which one can make sense of the world. Maclaren concludes that, “emotion is not opposed to reason, but is rather an essential element of our rational development toward 1 Kym Maclaren, “Emotional Metamorphoses: The Role of Other in Becoming a Subject,” Embodiment and Agency eds. Sue Campbell, Meynell and Sherwin (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 42. Res Cogitans (2015) 6 Grimm | 172 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans autonomous ways of being.” She ultimately proposes that the moralistic attitude is fundamentally dismissive of other’s emotional struggles and may therefore prove harmful to the development of an individual as a subject. This discussion serves to persuade readers into considering a phenomenological view of emotion, particularly in the treatment of other’s expressions of emotion. In the first part of this essay, I provide an exegetical assessment of Maclaren’s thesis; in the second I introduce a critique of Maclaren’s argument and argue a claim of my own which explores perception and autonomy in the human body along with its implications in the context of Maclaren’s phenomenological account of emotion. I discuss the necessity of both emotion and reason in morality and argue that the traditional definition of autonomy is not plausible when considered through Maclaren’s phenomenological view of emotion.