Definite Descriptions Research Articles

The or That: Definite and Demonstrative Descriptions in Second Language Acquisition

Since Heubner's (1985) pioneering study, there have been many studies on (mis) use/ non-use of articles by L2 learners from article-less and article languages. The present study investigated how Persian L2 learners of English produce and interpret English definite descriptions and demonstrative descriptions. It was assumed that definite and demonstrative descriptions share the same central semantics of 'uniqueness', although they differ in the domain relative to which uniqueness is computed. While the book denotes the unique book in the discourse, that book denotes the unique book in the immediately salient situation. Persian has demonstratives and is partially marked for specificity, while English encodes definiteness. Persian L2 learners, due to lack of an equivalent for English definite marker 'the' in their language, use demonstratives as one of the compensating mechanisms to encode definiteness in definite descriptive contexts. A forced-choice elicitation production task and a picture-based comprehension task were used to examine Persian L2 learners' ability to distinguish definite and demonstrative contexts. The L2 learners were able to acquire both definite and demonstrative descriptions, but were more target-like regarding demonstratives than definite descriptions. The variability in choosing articles and demonstrative adjectives in one specific context (e.g. applying both the and that in contexts specific to the only or that only) shows that Persian EFL learners equate the demonstrative ān with both the and that. This also indicates that L1 transfer may determine the L2 learners' choices.

Homogeneity, Non-Maximality, andall

This paper develops a theory of the non-maximal readings of sentences with plural definite descriptions that treats them as a pragmatic phenomenon that arises from the context-dependent interaction of the well-known homogeneity property of plural predication on the one hand with independent pragmatic principles on the other. This allows us to, among other things, explain the dual effect of all: as a matter of its semantics, it removes the homogeneity property, but because that is one of the necessary ingredients for non-maximal readings, the function of all as a maximiser/“slack regulator” emerges as a consequence.

Two methods to find truth-value gaps and their application to the projection problem of homogeneity

Presupposition, vagueness, and oddness can lead to some sentences failing to have a clear truth value. The homogeneity property of plural predication with definite descriptions may also create truth-value gaps: The books are written in Dutch is true if all relevant books are in Dutch, false if none of them are, and neither true nor false if, say, half of the books are written in Dutch. We study the projection property of homogeneity by deploying methods of general interest to identify truth-value gaps. Method A consists in collecting both truth judgments (completely true vs. not completely true) and, independently, falsity judgments (completely false vs. not completely false). The second method, employed in experiment series B and C, is based on one-shot ternary judgments: completely true vs. completely false vs. neither. After a calibration of these methods, we use them to demonstrate that homogeneity projects out of negation, the scope of universal sentences and the scope of non-monotonic quantifiers such as exactly two, to some extent (i.e., in two out of three conceivable kinds of gap situations). We assess our results in light of different theoretical approaches to homogeneity—approaches based on presuppositions, scalar implicatures, and something like supervaluations, respectively. We identify free parameters in these theories and assess various variants of them based on our results. Our experimental paradigms may be of broader significance insofar as they can be applied to other phenomena which result in the failure of a sentence to have a definite truth value.

Testing accessibility: A cross-linguistic comparison of the syntax of referring expressions

<p>Focusing on the discourse conditions that license the use of null subjects (<em>pro</em>) in Greek and Italian, this paper shows that the distribution of referring expressions (RE, e.g., overt and null pronoun, clitic, definite description, etc.) does not only depend on the referents’ discourse status (alias accessibility). Syntactic constraints play an important role too.<strong></strong></p>

Non-Monotonic NPI-Licensing, Definite Descriptions, and Grammaticalized Implicatures

No abstract.

Null Complement Anaphors as Definite Descriptions

This paper develops the observation that, for many predicates, Null Complement Anaphora (NCA) is like anaphora with a descriptively empty definite description (Condoravdi & Gawron 1996, Gauker 2012). I consider how to distinguish this sort of NCA from pronouns theoretically, and then observe an unnoticed exception to the pattern. For verbs like "notice", NCA is neither like a definite description nor like a pronoun, raising a new puzzle of how to represent it

Implicit Arguments, Paychecks and Variable-Free Semantics

The present paper focuses on a particular class of implicit arguments – what have been termed anaphoric implicit arguments (AIAs) – and presents an account of AIAs in the variable-free (VF) framework introduced in Jacobson 1999, 2000. In particular, it is demonstrated how AIAs allow ‘paycheck’ (E-type) readings, an observation that goes back to Dowty 1981; it is shown that these readings follow naturally in the VF framework. The VF account is then compared and contrasted with some alternatives, including Condoravdi & Gawron’s (1996) proposal that AIAs pattern with definite descriptions.

Japanese Honorifics as Emotive Definite Descriptions

No abstract.

Individual Concepts and Attitude Reports

This paper argues that <it>de dicto</it> reports of the form 'x believes [that ....[<sub>DetP</sub> the [<sub>NP</sub>...]] . . . . . ]' are <it>de re</it> reports where the <it>res</it> is the individual concept which corresponds to '[<sub>DetP</sub> the [<sub>NP</sub> . . . ]'. This claim is based on the observation that definite descriptions project existence from complement clauses of attitude reports, even in those cases where the reporter and the bearer of the attitude do not have the same description "in mind."

On the acquisition of maximality in free relative clauses and plural definite descriptions

Plural definite descriptions (e.g. 'the things on the plate') and free relative clauses (e.g. 'what is on the plate') have been argued to share the same semantic properties, despite their syntactic differences: both are non-quantificational expressions referring to the maximal element of a given set (e.g. the set of things on the plate). Experimental support for this semantic analysis is provided by the first investigation ever of children's interpretation of both constructions. A Truth-Value Judgment task, an Act-Out task, and a corpus study of children's linguistic input show that children are aware that the two constructions are different from quantificational nominals (e.g. 'all the things on the plate', 'some of the things on the plate') very early on (4 years old), despite the major difference in frequency in the input. Children acquire the adult interpretation of both constructions at the very same time, around 6-7 years old. We suggest that this relative delay depends on children's difficulties with the concept of the maximal element of a set or its association with specific linguistic constructions.

Frege on Existence and Non‐existence

AbstractDespite its importance for early analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege's account of existence statements, according to which they classify concepts, has been thought to succumb to a number of well‐worn criticisms. This article does two things. First, it argues that, by remaining faithful to the letter of Frege's claim that concepts are functions, the Fregean account can be saved from many of the standard criticisms. Second, it examines the problem that Frege's account fails to generalize to cases which involve definite descriptions and proper names. To deal with this the proffered analysis deviates from the letter of Frege's views, while remaining within its spirit. It proposes, in opposition to Frege, that expressions which grammatically look like singular terms should not always be read as referring to objects, but are sometimes best analysed as indicating functions.

Objectivity and understanding: a new reading of Carnap’s Aufbau

The paper proposes a new reading of the Aufbau, one that contends that Carnap’s epistemological project is not, or not only, to identify the conditions under which a system of purely structural definite descriptions can attain objectivity. Rather, the project is more ambitious: to determine the conditions that allow the concomitant attainment of objectivity and understanding. As such, it can, and perhaps should, be regarded as an attempt to refute a view elsewhere called Weylean skepticism, i.e. the view that objectivity and understanding are opposite epistemic ideals of science.

Incomplete Symbols — Definite Descriptions Revisited

We investigate incomplete symbols, i.e. definite descriptions with scope-operators. Russell famously introduced definite descriptions by contextual definitions; in this article definite descriptions are introduced by rules in a specific calculus that is very well suited for proof-theoretic investigations. That is to say, the phrase ‘incomplete symbols’ is formally interpreted as to the existence of an elimination procedure. The last section offers semantical tools for interpreting the phrase ‘no meaning in isolation’ in a formal way.

Rearming the Slingshot?

Slingshot arguments aim to show that an allegedly non-extensional sentential connective—such as “necessarily (_)” or “the statement that Φ corresponds to the fact that (_)”—is, to the contrary, an extensional sentential connective. Stephen Neale (Mind 104 (416): 761-825, 1995, 2001) argues that a reformulation of Godel’s slingshot puts pressure on us to adopt a particular view of definite descriptions. I formulate a revised version of the slingshot argument—one that relies on Kaplan’s notion of “dthat.” I aim to show that if Neale’s version of the slingshot argument is successful, then there is another slingshot available, parallel in structure to Neale’s, but independent of definite descriptions. So either (i) there is a version of the slingshot that succeeds independent of any particular theory of descriptions or else (ii) Neale’s slingshot was never threatening to begin with.

Names Are Predicates

One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates in all of their occurrences; they are predicates that are true of their bearers. When a name appears as a bare singular in argument position, it really occupies the predicate position of what in this essay is called a denuded definite description: a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. Sloat provided good evidence for this. The definite article is sometimes pronounced with names in the singular: ‘The Ivan we all love doesn't feel well’. Sloat proposed a disjunctive generalization of when the definite article must be pronounced with a singular name. This essay shows that by slightly revising Sloat's generalization, we arrive at a simple, nondisjunctive, syntactic rule that governs the overt appearance of the definite article with singular names. But Ivan does not necessarily bear the name ‘Ivan’, so one might worry that the sentence “Ivan might not have had ‘Ivan’ as a name” would incorrectly be predicted false. This essay shows that Predicativism does not have this consequence by showing that incomplete definite descriptions in general and incomplete denuded descriptions, such as ‘Øthe Ivan’, in particular are rigid designators.

On the occurrences of anaphoric bare NPs in Japanese

AbstractIt is known that bare NPs can be interpreted as an indefinite description or a definite description in Japanese. A question arises as to whether a bare NP in Japanese can always obtain an intended anaphoric definite reading from the previous context. The present work attempts to answer this question. More specifically, we will explore the occurrences and nonoccurrences of anaphoric definite bare NPs in terms of the Givenness Hierarchy of

On the presuppositions of number sentences

This paper is concerned with an intuitive contrast that arises when we consider sentences containing empty definite descriptions. A sentence like ‘The king of France is bald’ appears neither true nor false, while a sentence like ‘My friend was visited by the king of France’ appears false. Recently, Stephen Yablo has suggested an account of this intuitive contrast. Yablo’s account is particularly interesting, since it has important consequences for the ontological commitments of number sentences like ‘The number of planets is even’. However, the paper argues that Yablo’s account is not convincing and that it can thus not establish these consequences. Further, it develops a Strawsonian account of the intuitive contrast. The developed account allows us to draw important conclusions regarding the correct analysis of definite descriptions and of existence sentences containing definite descriptions.

Proper Names: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives

Proper names play an important role in our understanding of linguistic ‘aboutness’ or reference. For instance, the name-bearer relation is a good candidate for the paradigm of the reference relation: it provides us with our initial grip on this relation and controls our thinking about it. For this and other reasons proper names have been at the center of philosophical attention. However, proper names are as controversial as they are conceptually fundamental. Since Kripke’s seminal lectures Naming and Necessity the controversy about proper names has taken the form of a debate between two main camps, descriptivists and non-descriptivists like Kripke himself. Descriptivists hold that there is a close connection between proper names and definite descriptions: the meaning or sense of a proper name can be given by a (bundle of) definite description(s). The satisfier, if any, of the definite description(s) that provide(s) the meaning of a proper name is its referent. Descriptivists can allow for empty proper names that are meaningful. They also have an initially plausible account of true informative identity statements (‘Marilyn Monroe is no one other person than Norma Jean Baker’). Their informativity is grounded in a difference in meaning-giving descriptions.

The Other Francis Bacon: On Non-BARE Proper Names

In this paper I provide novel arguments for the predicative approach to proper names, which claims that argument proper names are definite descriptions containing a naming predicate (the individual called X). I first argue that modified proper names, such as the incomparable Maria Callas or the other Francis Bacon cannot be handled on the hypothesis that argument proper names have no internal structure and uniformly denote entities. I then discuss cases like every Adolf, which would normally be interpreted as every individual named Adolf and show that the predicative approach to proper names can straightforwardly account for the distribution of a detectable naming component in proper names. Finally, I address the issue of proper names used as common nouns (such as a Rembrandt or the new Madonna) and plural proper names (e.g., the Beatles) and demonstrate that they do not form a homogenous group yet can be clearly distinguished on both syntactic and semantic grounds from proper names involving a detectable naming component.

Reference, Binding, and Presupposition: Three Perspectives on the Semantics of Proper Names

Linguistics and philosophy have provided distinct views on the nature of reference to individuals in language. In philosophy, in particular in the tradition of direct reference, the distinction is between reference and description. In linguistics, in particular in the tradition of generative grammar, the distinction is between pronouns and R-expressions. I argue for a third conception, grounded in dynamic semantics, in which the main watershed is between definites, which trigger presuppositions that want to be bound, and indefinites, which set up new discourse referents. On this view, proper names, indexicals, and definite descriptions are all analyzed as presupposition triggers.