The centenary of the First World War has brought forward a veritable creeping barrage of books on its battles and campaigns. The concussive effect of all this makes an operational pause welcome, and allows one to contemplate the significance of the various studies, original and synthetical, which have issued forth from the cannon's mouth, so to speak. Rob Johnson's new book stands out from the mêlée—as one would expect from the director of the Changing Character of War research programme at Oxford University—as a carefully considered reappraisal of the Great War in the Middle East from a strategic perspective. Tipping his hat at Clausewitz, Johnson sets out ‘to identify, assess and explain the most significant themes of that theatre, not as a “military history” of manoeuvres and experiences but as a “study of war” which illustrates the interactions of decision-making with the prevailing concepts, context and changing conditions’ (p. viii). Moreover, he follows a Clausewitzian line of operations when he states that ‘war is not merely “an extension of politics”: war is a dynamic interaction of its actors, and the product of the friction of violent events. Contemporaries struggled with those dynamics, and tried to adapt their responses accordingly’ (p. viii). Read like this, the Great War in the Middle East becomes more than the usual portrayal of a pointless slugging match in Mesopotamia or Gallipoli. This was a war fought on multiple fronts, from the Somalilands to the Caucasus, and from the Western Desert of Egypt to the Afghan borders of British India. Johnson is adept at making the strategic connections between these campaigns and the greater war effort, especially when it came to command decisions over the allocation of men, munitions and material to the various fronts. He is acute in his emphasis of the technological context of the war, and especially the power that this gave early on, in 1915–16, to the defensive position in depth, of trench lines protected by barbed wire and machine guns, of strongpoints and killing zones for directed fire. He cites Lanchester's law, stating that an attack rarely succeeds unless the attacker enjoys a 3:1 superiority in infantry and firepower. This helps explain British failures at Ctesiphon and in the attempted relief of Kut, Gallipoli and the first and second Gaza battles. The British did not have enough troops or artillery to make the required breakthroughs in 1915–16. He points out that sound strategy depends on ‘the sinews of war’, adequate logistics and resources in men and material. By the third Gaza battle in 1917, General Allenby's Egyptian Expeditionary Force could deploy ten infantry divisions, four mounted divisions and 116 heavy guns, as well as squadrons of the new Bristol fighter plane. The British had aligned ‘ends, ways and means’ to shatter the Ottoman front in Palestine. Johnson makes clear that the Ottomans, despite their operational victories at Gallipoli and Kut, could simply not compete because of their lack of war industrial capacity and infrastructural weaknesses.
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