Defense Planning Research Articles

The evolution of NATO policy in the conditions of the russian-Ukrainian war

Abstract. The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of NATO policy within the context of the russian-Ukrainian war. The North Atlantic Alliance consistently demonstrates its commitment as a reliable guarantor of peace, security, and stability for its member countries. The foundation of NATO’s accomplishments lies in its dependable and effective institutional structure, well-regulated political consultation mechanisms geared towards consensus-building, and the aspiration to constantly maintain and improve the balance of transatlantic interests. The russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted a critical reassessment of NATO’s role and its development prospects, primarily regarding the imperative of strengthening the Alliance’s defensive potential, the expansion of its operational scope, and the refinement of its security missions. The new Strategic Concept outlined NATO’s priorities, core objectives, and approaches. It also identified the main threats to Euro-Atlantic security and proposed countermeasures for the next decade. The Alliance reacted to the kremlin’s aggressive intentions by activating its defence plans and deploying additional military formations on NATO’s eastern flank, backed by significant air and naval potential. Moreover, the Alliance enhances the reliability of nuclear forces, strengthens the operational capabilities of conventional armed forces and anti-missile defence assets, and reinforces the resilience of member countries for collective defence. An analysis of Ukraine’s relations with NATO amidst the large-scale russian aggression underscores that the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people could facilitate a quick accession of Ukraine to the Alliance following the end of the war. An invitation to Ukraine at the 2023 Vilnius Summit opens prospects for establishing long-term sustainable peace in Europe. Keywords: NATO, russian aggression, Strategic Concept, NATO expansion, Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine.

Последствия вступления Финляндии и Швеции в НАТО для национальной безопасности России

The accession of Finland and, in the foreseeable future, Sweden to NATO shapes a new strategic and international political reality in the Scandinavian-Baltic region. The “Nordic balance” and the idea of this space as a “region of eternal peace” are irretrievably becoming the things of the past, posing a set of new challenges and threats to the Russian Federation. Russia has always taken into account the gradual withdrawal of Sweden and Finland from the policy of neutrality/non-alignment and their transformation into de facto associate members of NATO, although considered the threat of formal Alliance’s northern expansion as insignificant in the short and medium term. However, it is obvious that since February 2022, the arguments of doubling the length of Russia’s border with the alliance and the compelled military-technical response in this case have ceased to be considered in Sweden and Finland as significant in foreign policy and defense planning. The purpose of the article is to analyze the current security situation in the Scandinavian-Baltic region, scenarios for the accession of Finland and Sweden to the North Atlantic Alliance, and possible consequences for Russia. The methodological basis of the article is scenario analysis. The first and the most likely scenario assumes more active relations with the Alliance (increase in the number and scale of military exercises, strengthening of the eastern border of Finland, expansion of the Baltic Air Policing mission to Finland, etc.) without a significant increase in military deployment and infrastructure. Two other scenarios, which are possible with the further deterioration of the European security system, allow the deployment of nuclear weapons in the region as the last resort, although this seems extremely unlikely today. However, even in the case of accession in accordance with the first scenario, the Russian Federation might face a whole range of threats and challenges, including, but not limited to, the deployment of missile defense infrastructure and nuclear-capable weapon systems, an improvement of the conditions for strengthening the NATO’s military activities in the Arctic, the possibility of transferring a large amount of Sovietdesigned military equipment to Ukraine by Finland, etc.

Planowanie operacyjne NORTHAG w okresie zimnej wojny

This article presents the defence planning of the NATO Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), with five corps from the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Belgium and the USA during the Cold War. It analyses – in the context of the threat at the time – the basic features of defence planning, air-land warfare, as well as the associated command and control processes, and discusses shortcomings and improvements in operational planning.

La “soglia di Gorizia” e la difesa del confine orientale italiano (1945-1955)

During the Cold War the “Gorizia Gap” was one of the keys to the defence of Western Europe against a hypothetical invasion by the Warsaw Pact. Taking this emblematic place as a starting point, this essay investigates the problems connected with the defence of the eastern Italian border in the first post-WW2 decade. The analysis starts at the end of 1945 and follows the evolution of the defence plans drawn up by the Anglo-American allies, the Italians and Nato to face first a localised Yugoslav aggression, and then a large-scale Soviet attack.

Optimized deep learning methodology for intruder behavior detection and classification in cloud

Apps, networks, frameworks, and services are all made possible by the cloud. In order to get the most out of the improved accessibility and computational capabilities, the Service Providers can offer an optimal use of current services. Application services have been revolutionised as their launch since they are useful and cost-effective for both suppliers and users. Increasingly, cyber defence is a vital research area in today’s environment, where networks are essential. The software and hardware of a network are constantly monitored by an intrusion detection framework (IDF), which is an essential part of any cyber defence plan. Many of the current IDSs are still struggling to improve detection performance, reduce false alarm rates and detect new threats. Based on parametric computation analysis, this study provides a deep learning approach to optimize cloud networks and to identify intruders. Results of suggested approach have been displayed from data compared to current methods in the conclusion section.

Wzmacnianie wschodniej flanki NATO w kontekście rosyjsko-ukraińskiego konfliktu zbrojnego

The 2014 crisis in Ukraine showed that the security environment in Central‑East Europe can no longer be perceived as stable and without threats. This situation has become a test for the entire North Atlantic Alliance, which must develop a comprehensive and long‑term strategy towards the Russian Federation, based on unity, deterrence and resilience. The full‑scale conflict in Ukraine, which began in February 2022, led to a decisive NATO response in the form of the expansion of forces in the eastern part of the Alliance. Building solid forces capable of defense and deterrence is to become one of the elements of a broader strategy towards Russia. The main purpose of the article is to trace the activities of the North Atlantic Alliance in the area of strengthening the credibility and real capabilities on its eastern flank. We are talking primarily about the deployment of troops and equipment, the strengthening of missile defense and the launch of defense plans for NATO’s eastern flank. The article will also include part of conclusions that summarize the text as a whole.

임진왜란기 조선의 對일 공수(攻守) 방안

The main focus of this article is upon how Chosǒn pursued ‘the ground and maritime joint defense’ as the main part of its anti-Japanese strategy and as the principle of its military collaboration with the Ming by actively taking advantage of its geographical terrain bridging Ming and Japan via Yellow Sea/Southern Coast. From the first half of 1593 to the first half of 1594, when the Ming army stationed in Chosǒn, the Chosǒn court proposed a joint operation between the Ming ground forces and the Chosǒn maritime forces for a complete repulse of the Japanese invaders who camped in the Southern Coast and sought to enter into Chǒlla Province and Yellow Sea. And, from the second half of 1594 to the second half of 1596, when the Ming army withdrew from Chosǒn, the Chosǒn court devised plans of a combined operation between the Chosǒn navy and the Ming navy in order to carry out a sea blockage and destroy the Japanese armies within Chosǒn. What is more, this ground and maritime joint defense plan, emphasizing the strategic importance of Chosǒn in geographical terrains, also concerned such practical matters as how to enhance firepower, replenish military strength, and increase the number of battleships. At this juncture, we can rethink the way Chosǒn strove to strengthen its anti-Japanese counterattack and to overcome the unprecedented national crisis. This approach will enable us to explore complex and multilayered contexts in a wider analytic methodology that redefines the war as an international war in East Asia.

The Total Defense Concept as the Embodiment of Sweden’s Strategic Culture

The article deals with the «total defense» concept considering it to be part of Sweden’s strategic culture and provides an overview of how this concept defines Sweden’s approach towards the defense cooperation within the EU. «Total defence» remains staple in the Swedish defence planning and the perception of risks to national security, but has not yet received sufficient attention from Russian researchers. The announced restoration of the effective total defense system potentially comparable to that of the period of bipolar confrontation is associated with significant difficulties due to the gradual reduction in defense spending after the end of the Cold War and the decentralization of the national crisis preparedness structures which was initiated in the early 2000s. The total defense itself also reveals tensions between the demands for consolidation and centralized decision-making and the liberal, open nature of the Swedish society and national economy, as well as the principles of responsibility, subsidiarity and similarity that underline the present Swedish emergency response system. The total defense, is, therefore, regarded as an attempt at creating an effective crisis preparedness system that would function successfully in a democratic society, both under the conditions of peace and potential armed conflict, without the need to declare an emergency and endow individual bodies or a selected group of individuals with exclusive powers. The Swedish strategic culture, therefore, stipulates that it is important not only to resolve a crisis effectively, but also to do so in a way which would not endanger the regular functioning of political institutions and the rule of law. Within the EU Sweden has earned credit for developing civilian or non-military elements of crisis management, while «more hardware» defense cooperation within PESCO and the European Defense Fund is defined by the pragmatic economic interests of Swedish defense companies rather than by strategic considerations. The Swedish Experience with «total defence» will continue to face the same dilemma – the need to rebuild a robust and self-reliant national defence while preserving the liberal principles in politics as well as in economy.

Chile, the United States, and the Korean War “Copper Problem”

On May 2, 1952, Chilean President Gabriel González Videla, a staunch U.S. ally, suddenly terminated the Washington Agreement governing the sale of copper to the United States, in effect, imposing an embargo and nationalizing the export of copper in the midst of the Korean War. For U.S defense planners, who had based their mobilization and rearmament program upon the strict control of copper, steel, and aluminum, the metals that enabled them to “control practically all production” in the nation, this was an unexpected and dangerous blow. “The loss that we would sustain by not having access to Chilean copper would be irreparable,” the head of the National Production Administration (NPA) Copper Division warned, “as there is no conceivable way whereby we could meet current programs.”1 Although it was always clear that the embargo was a negotiating tool rather than a belligerent act, subsequent threats to sell copper across the Iron Curtain and nationalize the mines lent the move additional gravity. This “copper problem” only ended when González Videla’s successor, Carlos Ibañez del Campo, under U.S. pressure, enacted a new copper law, the Nuevo Trato (“New Deal”), in 1955. The Nuevo Trato represented a triumph for rightists in Chilean politics, the failure of Chilean efforts to challenge the U.S. government and copper companies, and a temporary lull in efforts to exert control over Chile’s most critical industry.

“First gain the victory and then make the best use of it you can”: The Royal Navy in the Aftermath of the Falklands War

Abstract This article examines the Royal Navy (rn) in the aftermath of the Falklands War of 1982, focussing on the long-standing disparity between commitments and resources in UK defence planning. Two central arguments are developed. First, it is argued that the 1981 defence review failed to address the disparity between UK commitments with resources. Second, despite victory in the Falklands War, the UK naval lobby failed to reverse the long-term decline in the size of the rn although, in the long-term, the 1982 war reinforced the case for enhancing rn maritime aviation capabilities. This article presents a case of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the rn seeking, and failing, to resolve an insoluble problem. This analysis of UK naval policy demonstrates that British defence planning remains torn between a maritime strategy and a continental commitment to the present day.

The United States (US) Strategy of Pivot to Asia: Balancing the China’s Economic Power in Southeast Asia

Despite the US official statement that the purpose of its pivot to Asia is to rebalance the foreign policy towards Asia, it is also known that it aimed for the US to “rebalance” growing China's power in economy and military. Prospectively, the pivot to Asia aims to create a more balanced economy, security and diplomacy. However, it risks creating Chinese perceptions and suspicions that lead to a more competitive acquisition of the position of “superpower” in the region, especially in the economy. So how did the US implement the strategy concerned with China's economic growth in the region? Thus, this article aims to discuss the strategy of the pivot to Asia in facing the rise of China's economic activities in Southeast Asia. The study was qualitative by conducting library research, and the data were analysed using a thematic approach. The study highlights four strategies of economic elements, i.e. reducing the defence budget, new defence plans, engagement in Southeast Asia multilateral and regional institutions, and promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This article confirms that despite the aim to rebalance the policy to the Asia Pacific, all the economic strategies implemented concerned the rise of China as an economic power in the region. Overall, this study concludes that the pivot to Asia strategy only created another continuous rivalry between US-China and balanced the hegemonic superpower in Southeast Asia.

THE ROLE OF PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

European cooperation in the field of defence has registered significant progress in the last years, both from an operational perspective as well as in terms of developing security and defence capabilities. Against this background, several initiatives have been launched to address the issue of capabilities development by gearing multinational cooperation formulas towards filling the gaps identified in the defence planning under the aegis of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), an initiative launched on November 13, 2017, through the Joint Notification signed by the ministers of foreign affairs and defence from 25 EU Member States, plays a decisive role in the success of this endeavor. As an expression of the intergovernmental nature of the security and defence dimension at EU level, PESCO has rapidly evolved into a platform for cooperation between Member States in the development of defence capabilities, covering a wide range of areas. Thus, in less than five years, PESCO encompassed 60 cooperation projects. Moreover, at the end of February 2022, the first capability developed under this initiative was activated in an operational context. These aspects were meant to highlight the potential that the Permanent Structured Cooperation can employ in supportting the process of developing the EU’s security and defence profile and contribution.

Sistemele de arme autonome letale – tehnologie emergentă și potențial nimicitoare

"The renewal of the competition for the super power status has led to the revival of the emphasis on defense planning, by the great powers, on the capabilities intended for so-called high-end conventional, technological sophisticated warfare, which involves large-scale and high-intensity military actions. Weapons that can be linked to waging high-end warfare actually include the military uses of the lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) and artificial intelligence (AI). The connection between robotics, and autonomous systems and AI has the potential to change the nature of warfare. Theoretically, a lethal weapon system should be considered autonomous if it is designed so that it can modify its integrated programming, does not take into account the objectives initially set and modifies its rules of engagement without human intervention. Human judgment will remain essential, but the line between what humans and machines do best will constantly be shifting in the coming years. The most critical dimension of autonomy is the task the machine is performing. There are significant expectations and challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with LAWS across the full range of military operations. LAWS will influence military operations in the future and will have at least an evolutionary – if not revolutionary – effect."

Sistemele de arme autonome letale – tehnologie emergentă și potențial nimicitoare

"The renewal of the competition for the super power status has led to the revival of the emphasis on defense planning, by the great powers, on the capabilities intended for so-called high-end conventional, technological sophisticated warfare, which involves large-scale and high-intensity military actions. Weapons that can be linked to waging high-end warfare actually include the military uses of the lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) and artificial intelligence (AI). The connection between robotics, and autonomous systems and AI has the potential to change the nature of warfare. Theoretically, a lethal weapon system should be considered autonomous if it is designed so that it can modify its integrated programming, does not take into account the objectives initially set and modifies its rules of engagement without human intervention. Human judgment will remain essential, but the line between what humans and machines do best will constantly be shifting in the coming years. The most critical dimension of autonomy is the task the machine is performing. There are significant expectations and challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with LAWS across the full range of military operations. LAWS will influence military operations in the future and will have at least an evolutionary – if not revolutionary – effect."

"Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems – Emerging and Potentially Disruptive Technology"

"The renewal of the competition for the super power status has led to the revival of the emphasis on defense planning, by the great powers, on the capabilities intended for so-called high-end conventional, technological sophisticated warfare, which involves large-scale and high-intensity military actions. Weapons that can be linked to waging high-end warfare actually include the military uses of the lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) and artificial intelligence (AI). The connection between robotics, and autonomous systems and AI has the potential to change the nature of warfare. Theoretically, a lethal weapon system should be considered autonomous if it is designed so that it can modify its integrated programming, does not take into account the objectives initially set and modifies its rules of engagement without human intervention. Human judgment will remain essential, but the line between what humans and machines do best will constantly be shifting in the coming years. The most critical dimension of autonomy is the task the machine is performing. There are significant expectations and challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with LAWS across the full range of military operations. LAWS will influence military operations in the future and will have at least an evolutionary – if not revolutionary – effect."

SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT IN BIH COAL MINES - OBJECTIVE NEED OR A BURDEN

Safety risk management in Bosnian-Herzegovinian underground coal mines is not based on a systematic approach and standardized risk management methods. Mostly there is a traditional approach present, i.e. reaction to incidents/accidents that happen. This paper aims to point out the need for proactive approach introduction with an emphasis on importance of ventilation systems failure mechanism simulation analysis in planning of people and property defense and rescue in crisis situations. Based on ventilation parameters measuring results for a given research site (brown coal mine), a model was developed on which a simulation analysis was performed for three characteristic ventilation failure cases: spontaneous oxidation at the longwall exit, collapse at the entrance to the longwall and methane outburst - preparation of a new excavation field. VnetPC and CFD “Fluent” software packages were used to simulate mine ventilation. Keywords: risk management, brown coal mine, safety, ventilation system, longwall, simulation analysis, VnetPC, Fluent.

Spatial distribution of military bases and power of interest groups in an emergent democracy

Abstract Policies in liberal democracies can never be fully sheltered from the influence of interest groups. This is especially true for the flawed or immature democracies that can be found also in the post-communist world. In this study, we argue that the progress of democratization in Czechia has been accompanied by a growing influence of interest groups (local/regional governments, political parties, industrial corporations) on national defence strategy. Focusing on the spatial policy of military base distribution, the study documents deviations from a rational strategy of restructuring and relocations of military bases declared by the General Staff in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s in response to a changing geopolitical situation. The content analysis of the interviews with former actors of the defence planning and media analysis showed that one-third of current Czech military bases experienced an influence of interested groups.

WITHDRAWN: Missile Trajectory Defense Planning based on Distributed Neural Network

In this article, the development status, models and learning algorithms of distributed neural networks are investigated, conventional BP algorithms are analyzed, some improved algorithms are proposed, and the principle and structure of neural network PID controllers are discussed. In addition, a distributed neural network is used to predict the trajectory of the missile and develop an appropriate attack prevention plan. At the same time, the construction of the virtual world will be introduced by constructing the virtual sky and terrain in the simulation process, changing the perspective in the virtual world, and completing the ballistic counterattack plan of the missile. The purpose of the anti-attack plan is to provide technical reserves for the further development of the National Missile Defense Program, so that the Ministry of Defense can update the technology demonstration system of the existing bases, reduce risks and accelerate technological updates. In order to solve the problem of peculiar or drastic changes in the existing trajectory tracking deviation, we introduced a new method that takes the trajectory arc as the independent variable, and built a linear variable parameter system for trajectory tracking on this basis, and calculated a new automatic Tracking deviation under variable.

On robustness in nonconvex optimization with application to defense planning

We estimate the increase in minimum value for a decision that is robust to parameter perturbations as compared to the value of a nominal nonconvex problem. The estimates rely on expressions for subgradients and local Lipschitz moduli of min-value functions and require only the solution of the nominal problem. Across 54 mixed-integer optimization models, the median error in estimating the increase in minimum value is 12%. The results inform analysts about the possibility of obtaining cost-effective, parameter-robust decisions.

The Primacy of Politics? Arms Imports and Political Relations of the Visegrád Countries 1999–2020

International commerce can be determined by the political climate between the exporter and the importer. Arms transfers are a much complex process, where beyond economic factors, alliance ties, security perception and defence planning are also considered. Still, they might not be independent of political relations. This paper aims to capture the arms supplier–recipient relations between the Visegrád countries and Russia, the United States and Germany from 1999 to 2020. More specifically, how do the two factors affect each other: are good political relations necessary for arms deals? Or do arms deals facilitate a friendly political climate? Our conclusion is as follows. On the one hand, a cooperative political climate increases the probability of arms deals, but they are not a necessity, as mutual benefits and security perceptions can override the current political climate. On the other hand, however, arms transfers can deepen cooperation or alleviate the existing differences between the parties.