At the same time that Nietzsche's work enjoys such enthusiastic attention, his political views seem to inspire only unanimous contempt. While Martha Nussbaum, for instance, will admit that "the resurgence of interest in Nietzsche at the present time is certainly a good thing in many respects," she feels compelled to conclude that "in political thought, however, let us simply forget about Nietzsche, except to argue against his baneful influence."1 Others consider Nietzsche's politics not dangerous but vacuous, including Tracy Strong who claims that "Nietzsche is available to a wide range of political appropriations, indeed perhaps to all." And Richard Rorty has gone as far as to use the words mad and crazy to describe Nietzsche because, writes Rorty, "extensive attempts at an exchange of political views have made us realize that we are not going to get anywhere."3 The first aim of this essay is simply to construct a meaningful political dialogue with Nietzsche. I will pursue this dialogue by means of a critical examination of a peculiar and recent response to Nietzsche, namely, the attempt by some of his apologists to excuse his anti-democratic remarks, to distance these remarks from the core of Nietzsche's thought, and to construct a new defense of democracy within the terms of Nietzsche's postmodern legacy. Specifically, I have in mind a position that wants both to adopt the Nietzschean language of power and to defend democracy as the arena for a rich and free expression of power. After a brief characterization of Nietzsche's critique, I will examine a recent piece of scholarship that tries to limit its implications for democracy. Then I will make use of Foucault's work to isolate the basic principles behind much of the contemporary discourse on democracy. And finally, I will argue that Nietzsche's critique is more resilient than has been acknowledged. Nietzsche's critique of democracy comprises two basic components, each of which is well enough known to require only a cursory rehearsal at this point. The first is a denial of the traditional, theological (or at least metaphysical) foundations upon which democracy has beenjustified, and the second is an analysis of democracy's effects, that is, its harmful effects, if Nietzsche is to be believed. In the first case, Nietzsche wants to part ways with the Enlightenment tradition that would found democratic theory upon a doctrine of equal rights. While such defenses of democracy may have been palatable when we were able to allow ourselves belief in God-it is easy, for instance, to understand why everyone should be treated equally if we understand ourselves to be made in the image of a perfect God-Nietzsche wants at least to encourage our mistrust of such transcendent or metaphysical explanations. Of course, not every doctrine of equal rights makes explicit appeal to a theology, but Nietzsche is prepared to argue that all must do so at least covertly. In short, modern liberalism is simply Christian morality grown ashamed of its religious heritage. To justify its democratic institutions it must rely upon any number of other idols-surrogate gods, if you will-each of which Nietzsche sets out to undermine. For instance, in response to those who wish to establish democratic theory upon a metaphysics of subjectivity, Nietzsche presents the autonomous subject to be a myth created for the protection of certain human interests and at the expense of others.4 And he offers similar arguments against other founding principles, including the common good and the social contract. It should be said that this first component of Nietzsche's critique is simply intended to expose a crisis in justification; it alone is not sufficient to undermine democratic theory as such. Nietzsche hopes only that by highlighting justificatory weaknesses he might focus attention on the consequences of democracy. The second component of Nietzsche's critique is his estimation that democracy leads to mediocrity or the leveling of human possibility. …