Defence Cooperation Research Articles

UKRAYNA KRİ Zİ SONRASI NATO’NUN AVRUPA GÜVENLİ K YAPISINA ETKİ Sİ

Although the US political and military-led NATO during the Cold War period was accepted as the undisputed keystone of European Defense, the policies of some EU member states on acceptance of NATO’s role in the aftermath of the Cold War have changed. In this process, the efforts to activate the Common Security and Defense Policy which constitutes one of the carrier columns of the European Security Structure have been accelerated. Based on the balance of threat hypotheses, to spill over the integration of the EU in the 􀏐ield of security and defense and to examine the struggle between the Atlanticist and the European wing of the EU in this regard; It is critical in understanding the impact of NATO on the development of CSDP, the breakpoints in that process and the reasons for the failures experienced, and the today and the future of the relationship NATO, the USA structured with EU member states. After the Cold War, a security environment was established in Europe based on the development of mutual relations between the great powers and the solution of problems with peaceful methods. The annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine by Russia, who lost the diplomatic war on Ukraine with the West, ended this peace environment. Russia has become a concrete risk and threat to European security with its actions. In order to balance the Russian threat and ensure the security of Europe, NATO and the EU have increased. In the study, the structure of the security relationship between the EU and NATO in the historical process and the direction of this relationship after the Ukraine crisis are examined. It is aimed to reveal the impact of NATO on the European Security Structure and to explain the scope and direction of the future security and defense cooperation between NATO and the EU. Keywords: European Security Structure, NATO, CSDP, Ukraine Crisis.

TOTAL WAR IMPLEMENTED IN DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: CASE STUDY OF THE RE-NEGOTIATION OF THE DEFENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (DCA INDONESIA-SINGAPORE)

<p>Total war is not always associated with power seizure using physical means, however, the real meaning is how a country could implement the whole of resources to fight for their national interest. This study is aimed to provide an understanding that total war could be implemented in all areas of activities. The study is conducted with a qualitative descriptive method through a case study approach, library study, interview, and observation in the field. It has been implemented in defense diplomacy accordingly without our awareness. For instance, in the case of the delay in the Indonesia-Singapore Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) renegotiation which unites all personnel from different agencies and institutions, as well as all professional fields to come up with the same directions for Indonesia national interest. This study concludes that a total war strategy could be implemented in defense diplomacy to get a maximum result to fight for Indonesia’s national interest.</p>

India–Vietnam Defence and Security Cooperation

Defence and security cooperation between India and Vietnam is an increasingly important area of the India–Vietnam ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’. This wide-ranging cooperation includes government-to-government dialogues, bilateral agreements, defence lines of credit, prospective defence procurements, maritime cooperation and multilateral cooperation. Cooperation has been formalised and expanded through a series of bilateral defence and security agreements to provide a basis for enhancing relations, which have been further developed through regular government-to-government dialogues. The defence and security dialogues and agreements have provided a framework for practical cooperation between the two countries’ militaries, which includes a focus on defence training, military exercises and discussions for the sale of different Indian arms equipment to Vietnam. Maritime cooperation between India and Vietnam has been the most significant element of bilateral defence and security cooperation, and both sides have found mutual convergences on cooperation in the South China Sea and the wider Indo-Pacific region. Relations between the two countries have also strengthened multilaterally on defence and security issues, including through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. There are opportunities to further strengthen the India–Vietnam defence and security relationship, both bilaterally and with third countries.

Vietnam and the United States: A Strategic Partnership in the Future?

After 25 years of normalisation, the Vietnam–US relation has developed and yet entered the new expectation to become the strategic partnership. Many motives and obstacles from both sides have had a strong impact on this development. In order to strengthen its presence in Asia and prevent the rise of China, the United States needs the support from the important partnership like Vietnam. Likewise, Vietnam also pays high attention to the United States, which is a potential market for the country’s exports, an investor, an advanced technology supplier and an important security supporter in the territorial disputes against China. Such reasons help both sides to be closer and to construct the scenario of new strategic partnership relations. However, the concretisation of this scenario has encountered many difficulties, mostly because Vietnam was not ready enough. Vietnam has not yet been persuaded to trust the United States on many issues; meanwhile, the differences among Vietnamese political groups about promoting the relations with the United States and especially the concern about China’s response to upgrading Vietnam–US relations were the main obstacles for Vietnam to pursue the strategic partnership relations, especially in security and defence cooperation with the United States.

Alliance Embeddedness: Rodrigo Duterte and the Resilience of the US–Philippine Alliance

AbstractIn 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte pledged to radically reorient Philippine foreign policy by separating from Manila's longtime ally the United States. Yet, this vaunted break with America has failed to manifest. Joint US–Philippine military activities have continued with President Duterte even singing the praises of his American partners. To understand how this about-face in Manila occurred, I conducted a detailed analysis of the first eighteen months of the Duterte administration. Drawing on primary sources and interviews with government officials from both countries, I argue that the continued vitality of the US–Philippine alliance stems not from disenchantment with China nor personal relationship between Duterte and Trump, but rather from an underlying institutional affinity engendered over decades of defense cooperation. Specifically, institutionalized cooperation within the alliance has cultivated a strong reservoir of support for the alliance within key institutions inside the Philippine government. This case not only highlights the development of the Duterte administration but also illustrates the wider ability of alliances to weather political discord by cultivating support within national bureaucracies.

Sweden’s Collective Defence Obligations or this is Not a Collective Defence Pact (or Is It?): Considerations of International and Constitutional Law

Abstract This article analyses the content of the mutual defence obligation contained in the EU Treaty Article 42(7) in relation to the Swedish constitutional rule on the sending of armed forces abroad and the emerging ’deepened defence cooperation’ between Sweden and Finland. The article tries to understand the prevailing Swedish position in legal terms and suggests an alternative flexible way on Sweden’s part of conceiving the binding force of Article 42(7). The question is whether the EU Treaty contains an international obligation of a quality to activate a provision in the Swedish Constitution entitling the government to decide on its own, without having to seek the otherwise necessary approval by Parliament, to send Swedish armed forces to other countries for instance on a mission of collective self-defence. The possibility of looking at the EU Treaty and the Swedish Instrument of Government in this way is not considered in any of the Swedish official inquiries into the Swedish security and defence policy of which there have been quite a few recently.

Analyzing Security Subregions: Forces of Push, Pull, and Resistance in Nordic Defense Cooperation

Abstract How can we best analyze security subregions? The most commonly used theory of regional security in the discipline of international relations, the regional security complex theory, focuses on large regions, such as Europe, Asia, or the Middle East. It pays less attention to smaller regions within these. This is unfortunate, because the security dynamics of these subregions often are a result of more than their place in the larger region. At the same time, the security of subregions cannot be reduced to a function of the policies of the states comprising them either. In short, security subregions are a level of analysis in their own right, with their own material, ideational, economic, and political dynamics. To capture and understand this, we need an analytical framework that can be applied to security regions irrespective of where and when in time they occur. The aim of this article is to offer such an analytical framework that helps us theorize the forces forging regional security cooperation, by combining external push and pull forces with internal forces of pull and resistance. The utility of the framework is illustrated through the case of Nordic security cooperation. It allows for a systematic mapping of the driving forces behind it and the negative forces resisting it. The Nordic region thus becomes a meeting point between global and national forces, pushing and pulling in different directions, with Nordic Defense Cooperation being formed in the squeeze between them. Extrait Comment pouvons-nous analyser au mieux les sous-régions de sécurité? La théorie de sécurité régionale la plus communément exploitée dans la discipline des relations internationales, celle du complexe de sécurité régionale, se concentre sur de grandes régions, telles que l'Europe, l'Asie ou le Moyen-Orient. Elle accorde moins d'attention aux plus petites régions qui les constituent. Cela est regrettable, car les dynamiques de sécurité de ces sous-régions résultent souvent de bien d'autres facteurs que leur place dans la région. Dans le même temps, la sécurité des sous-régions ne peut pas non plus être réduite à une fonction des politiques des États qui les composent. En bref, les sous-régions de sécurité sont un niveau d'analyse à part entière, avec ses propres dynamiques matérielles, idéationnelles, économiques et politiques. Pour capturer et comprendre cela, nous avons besoin d'un cadre analytique pouvant être appliqué aux régions de sécurité, quels que soient le moment et le lieu où elles interviennent. Le but de cet article est de proposer un tel cadre analytique qui nous aide à théoriser les forces forgeant la coopération régionale de sécurité en alliant des forces externes de poussée et de traction à des forces internes de traction et de résistance. L'utilité de ce cadre est illustrée par le cas de la coopération de sécurité nordique. Il permet une cartographie systématique des forces motrices sur lesquelles elle repose et des forces négatives qui y résistent. La région nordique devient ainsi un point de rencontre entre forces nationales et internationales qui poussent et tirent dans différentes directions, la coopération de défense nordique se formant dans l'intervalle ainsi constitué. Resumen ¿Cuál es la mejor forma de analizar las subregiones de seguridad? La teoría sobre seguridad regional de uso generalizado en la disciplina de relaciones internacionales, la llamada Teoría de Complejos de Seguridad Regional, se centra principalmente en grandes regiones como Europa, Asia y el Medio Oriente y presta menos atención a regiones más pequeñas dentro ellas. Este aspecto es desafortunado, ya que la dinámica de seguridad de estas subregiones suele ser el resultado de otros factores además del lugar que ocupan dentro de estas regiones más grandes. Asimismo, la seguridad subregional tampoco puede reducirse a una función de las políticas de los estados que integran. En conclusión, las subregiones de seguridad merecen un nivel de análisis propio, con sus propias dinámicas materiales, conceptuales, económicas y políticas. Para captar y comprender esto, es necesario un marco analítico que pueda aplicarse a regiones de seguridad independientemente del lugar y el momento en el que suceden. Este artículo tiene como objetivo ofrecer ese marco analítico que ayude a teorizar los factores que forjan la cooperación de seguridad nacional al combinar factores externos de tensión y conciliación con factores internos de conciliación y resistencia. La utilidad del marco se explica a través del caso de la cooperación de seguridad nórdica. Permite realizar un mapeo sistemático de los factores subyacentes de impulso y los factores negativos de resistencia. La región nórdica, por tanto, se convierte en un punto de encuentro de los factores internacionales y nacionales de tensión y conciliación en distintas direcciones, y en el cual que se forma la cooperación nórdica de defensa.

The European Commission’s new role in EU security and defence cooperation: the case of the European Defence Fund

ABSTRACT European Defence is in a new and formative phase in which the European Union’s long list of defence acronyms has steadily grown. One of the most noticeable new policy initiatives is the European Commission’s European Defence Fund (EDF). This article consequently investigates and outlines the establishment of the European Defence Fund and the European Commission’s new role within the field of security and defence through the lens of revised neofunctionalism. This article thus asks how and through what steps did the EDF come about; and secondly how can neofunctionalism explain the dynamics involved in the establishment of the European Defence Fund. The analysis uses a process-tracing method and draws on interviews with relevant policymakers and officials in Brussels as well as official EU documents. The conclusions argue that the ever-increasing involvement of the European Commission in a policy field close to national sovereignty is starting to blur the traditional dichotomy between intergovernmental and supranational decision-making. In this way, this study contributes to the growing literature on the weakening of intergovernmentalism within the EU security and defence policy field.

India’s Role as a Determinant in Pakistan-US Relations (2005-2015)

The United States adopted a policy of de-hyphenation in its relations with India and Pakistan in the post-09/11 period which continued to be operational in the period 2005-2015. This policy apparently meant that the United States would deal each of the two South Asian adversaries, India and Pakistan. The main reason for this phenomenon was that the policy-makers in the US saw India as a heavy-weight to counter the rising economic, political and military power of China in Asia. Pakistan could not be fitted in this strategic calculus. The United States changed its previous position on Kashmir and instead of calling for resolving this issue according to the United Nations resolutions, it stressed on bilateral negotiations. Similarly, the United States endorsed Indian stance that Pakistan was backing terrorist outfits that perpetrated acts of terrorism in India. Strategic partnership between The US and India extended cooperation in civil nuclear technology, missile defense, space technology and defense production. No such cooperation could be extended to Pakistan. Permanent membership in the UN Security Council for India was endorsed despite Pakistan’s objections.

Changes in International Security Environment and Paradigm Shifts in Overseas Dispatch of Korean Troops:

After being admitted to the United Nation (UN) in September 1991, South Korea began dispatching units of engineers on Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) to Somalia in 1994. Since then, it has been involved in promoting national interests and international peacekeeping operations such as armistice monitoring, reconstruction and disaster relief activities by dispatching troops and individuals to conflict zones around the world. In addition, starting with the dispatch of the Zaytun Division to Iraq, South Korean troops have experienced new battlefield environments through Multi-national Force Peace Operation (MNF PO) and secured momentum for improving their ability to carry out independent operations and strengthening the capacity to perform combined operations with the allies through the dispatch of such troops as the Akh Unit to non-conflict zones for Defense Cooperation Activities (DCA). In particular, with changes in the international security environment, where the number of non-traditional security threats such as international terrorism increases in addition to disputes between countries in the global era, the role of the Cheonghae Unit in ensuring the safety of its people from piracy, performing joint maritime operations with major countries and contributing to international maritime peace and security in the face of conflicts between the US and Iran has been highlighted again. Therefore, in the future, flexible approaches are needed for the diversification of overseas dispatch to perform additional missions in the temporarily expanded operation areas as in the dispatch of the Cheonghae Unit, a multi-national force. In this regard, this paper proposes major tasks and paradigm shifts for overseas dispatches in consideration of the expansion of roles and missions of multi-national forces such as PKO and Cheonghae Unit in the changing international security environment, and the current national defense and security environment characterized by reductions in the armed forces due to low birthrates. In the light of national defense and security environment at home and abroad in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, it is desirable to actively review the diversification of dispatching Korean troops, such as expanding tech-oriented troop contribution, breaking away from the conventional engineer-oriented dispatch.

„I did it my way”: Czy to koniec współpracy Zjednoczonego Królestwa i Unii Europejskiej w sprawach zagranicznych, bezpieczeństwa i obrony?

31 December 2020 marks end of the “transition period” indicated in the Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Until the end of this period, the subject of future cooperation in foreign affairs, security and defence has not been negotiated within the BREXIT negotiations. It results in lack of its elaboration in a form of a written agreement on future relations between both Parties in this area. The main objective of this publication is to discuss cooperation between the United Kingdom and the EU in foreign affairs, security and defence as of 1 January 2021, following the end of “transition period” stipulated in the Agreement, considering that it has not been negotiated between the Parties. In this publication, the author discusses negotiation strategy adopted by the United Kingdom, the EU proposal of regulating future relations in foreign affairs, defence and security, as well as presents the forms of cooperation with third states applied so far by the EU. The publication indicates the impact of the BREXIT for the future cooperation in foreign affairs, defence and security. The author argues that the strategy of negotiation adopted by the United Kingdom on future cooperation in the foreign affairs, defence and security was well planned, and does not constitute an obstacle for deepening the future relations between the United Kingdom and the EU.

The France’s security strategy for the Indo-Pacific and implications for Vietnam

Recently, many European countries are increasingly paying attention to the Indo-Pacific region. With its military potential, strategic partnership and defense cooperation, France initially introduced policies towards this important geostrategic area, in order to strengthen cooperation and partnership with countries in a large region, in which multilateralism benefits and respect for national law will be essential for regional peace and security. In the context of that the new world order is being shaped, the strongly moving regional landscape presents many opportunities for Vietnam to contribute to the general rules of the game in accordance with international law and regulations and national interests. This article aims to analyze the content and impact of the French Indo-Pacific strategy on the region and Vietnam, thereby making policy recommendations for Vietnam to exploit the positive impacts and limit the negative effects of this policy.

From Strategic Partnership to Strategic Interdependence: The Pak-China Duo

China and Pakistan are frequently touted as “strategic partners” based on the historic journey that has fused both states in a resilient partnership. The bilateral relationship is multisectoral based on diplomatic, defence and socio-economic cooperation. If focus of the bilateral ties is to be pinpointed, it would be defence and security cooperation that has been the defining factor of the relationship. However, the equation transformed with the transformation in the geopolitical context of the South Asian region post-2011. Pakistan signed a major economic venture with China; the China Pakistan Economic Corridor besides opening up to Russia as well. After the launch of CPEC in 2015, the defence centric bilateral relationship between Pakistan and China changed into a mega economic partnership. The paper has attempted to understand this transformation between the two countries and make a case for “strategic interdependence” rather than strategic partnership. Since, interdependence takes a deeper meaning than partnership.

Finding its way in EU security and defence cooperation: A view from Sweden

This article addresses Sweden’s more ambitious and forward-looking approach to EU security and defence cooperation. This approach represents, in part, an adaptation by Sweden to the post-Brexit political landscape. However, Stockholm is also reacting to the more ambitious policy initiatives coming out of Brussels. This article will look at some of the major developments and initiatives on the EU level and discuss how Sweden has reacted and tried to influence them. It argues that 2021 could be another watershed year for EU security and defence cooperation as the process of developing the Union’s new Strategic Compass is in a formative phase. It concludes that it is welcome news that Stockholm is raising its level of ambition and actively attempting to influence this process.

German–Norwegian relations in security and defence: What kind of partnership?

The article contributes to the debate on European defence cooperation and integration by analysing the German–Norwegian security and defence partnership. I define this partnership as being based upon mutual interests and values, and one in which the minor partner has important resources to contribute which accord with the larger partner’s interests and values. The article analyses this partnership within the framework of European integration and Atlantic cooperation, and in terms of how the discourse on strategic autonomy shapes the partnership. The article discusses two specific areas of cooperation, the High North and German–Norwegian collaboration on defence procurement. When analysing this relationship, I argue that Norway applies strategies such as acting as an external resource, adaptation and shielding to influence German policies vital to Norwegian security.

Navigating between Pragmatism and Principle: Australia’s Foreign Policy Response to the 2017 Rohingya Crisis

Abstract The escalation of violence by Myanmar’s military forces against ethnic Rohingya populations in Rakhine State in 2017 served as a test case for Australia’s commitment to R2P, and its capacity to protect populations from widespread and systematic atrocities in its own regional neighbourhood. Australia’s response to the crisis in Myanmar was mixed; it co-sponsored a UN Human Rights Council resolution to establish the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar that was instrumental in determining the extent and nature of violence committed by Myanmar’s armed forces during the so-called ‘clearance operations’, and provided substantial humanitarian aid for affected Rohingya populations. Australia has, however, been criticised for not doing enough to pressure the government of Myanmar on the issue, for maintaining defence cooperation with Myanmar throughout the crisis, and for its reluctance to accept Rohingya refugees fleeing the violence. This article examines Australia’s response to the Rohingya crisis in the areas of international, regional, and bilateral diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and defence cooperation. It asks why Australia did not take a more proactive role in confronting atrocities committed by the Myanmar government, and identifies lessons learnt and recommendations for strengthening Australia’s atrocity prevention architecture that is consistent with Australia’s pragmatic approach to regional assistance and its principled international advocacy.

India, Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific: Economic–Security Strategic Partnership and Expected Utility Theory

The China–India border dispute has witnessed escalations recently with China making fresh claims along the disputed border and deaths of Indian military personnel. This study examines the likelihood of a strategic partnership between India and Taiwan. We begin by assessing India’s ‘Act East Policy’ and Taiwan’s ‘New Southbound Policy’ for any points of congruence between these two policies. We then propose an expected utility model of India’s decision calculus. Using the theoretical implication of the model, we then examine the likelihood of a strategic partnership along two dimensions—an economic and a defence–security partnership. This study argues that the value added by an economic strategic partnership between the two countries may be substantial, and the likelihood of such a partnership may be significant. However, the likelihood of a defence–security partnership is substantially less in the bilateral sphere, although at the multilateral level there are areas where defence cooperation can occur.

Defending European integration by (symbolically) integrating European defence? Germany and its ambivalent role in European security and defence policy

ABSTRACT For many German policymakers, a commitment to European integration in defence is a necessary means to further the end of European integration in general – in stark contrast to French leaders who see European integration as the means to reach the end of a stronger European defence. Although there is general support for European defence cooperation and even integration among the German public and state elites, other ideational factors, most notably wide-spread anti-militarist attitudes, military planners’ traditional embeddedness in NATO planning procedures, and a deep commitment to parliamentary control of the armed forces, present manifest hurdles for real capacity-building on the supranational level. As a result, German efforts to integrate defence policy within the EU have been largely symbolic, while real progress takes place in other (bilateral or minilateral and often German-led) frameworks. Berlin has thus contributed considerably to the increasing institutional fragmentation and territorial differentiation in European defence.

The populist challenge to European defense

ABSTRACT This article assesses the consequences and implications of the rise of European populist parties for European defense cooperation. Focusing on six of the most prominent populist parties in Europe today, we examine their positions along three important defense-related issues: recommended national force posture; integrated military forces; and main national security threats. To determine their position on these three issues, we examine every party manifesto and, if available, official party document on security and defense policy since 2010. We argue that the rise of populism in Europe does not represent an inflection point for the future of European defense cooperation. Instead, our analysis reveals the following three findings: European defense cooperation will continue to be essentially ad hoc, functionally driven, and issue specific; populist parties’ attitudes and preferences regarding European defense cooperation both overlap with and diverge from those of other populists and non-populists in the EU; and populism over time may contribute to a shift in domestic preferences toward a Europe that more readily embraces military power.

Revision of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation in 2015: Determinants and Decision-Making Processes

Revision of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation in 2015: Determinants and Decision-Making Processes