Islamic Defenders Research Articles

KONTRIBUSI IMAM AL-GHAZALI TERHADAP EKSISTENSI TASAWUF

In the first and second centuries of the Hijrah before the presence of Imam al-Ghazali, whose teachings of Sufism at that time were moral and practical, in the third and fourth centuries of Hijrah the teachings of Sufism developed towards philosophical understandings such as Ittihad and Hulul which are viewed by some scholars (theologians and fuqaha) have deviated from the teachings of Islam, as a result of which Sufism almost dies. In such a situation, in the fifth century AH, Imam al-Ghazali appeared to save him by trying to integrate between the teachings of Sufism with the teachings of fiqh and kalam, between fact and sharia, as can be seen in his book Ihya '' Ulum al-Din (Reviving the Sciences Religion), so he is often referred to as Hujjatul Islam (Defender of Islam) because of his efforts to harmonize the teachings of Islam in complete unity.

Georgia's Experiences with Foreign Fighters: Global Recruitment, Local Roots

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has attracted many foreign fighters from all over the world. ISIS has disseminated voluminous propaganda in painting itself as the defender of Islam. The core of ISIS messages is designed to have a global religious appeal. At the same time, ISIS has incorporated local issues and grievances into its propaganda message. The analysis of Georgia's experiences with foreign fighters reveals that ISIS has exploited local issues to attract recruits, demonstrating that, even though foreign fighter recruitment seems global, it inevitably draws on local roots.

Konsep Pendidikan Islam Anak Usia Dini Perspektif Al-Ghazali Dan Abdullah Nashih Ulwan (Studi Komparasi Pemikiran)

Abstract: Education is fundamental in improving the welfare of the nation, because education is a place for moral cultivation, good character, independence, and other knowledge. Al-Ghazali is one of the leaders of classical Islamic thought who is a Sufism thinker and many of the expertise he mastered, one of which is dubbed as Hujjatul Islam (defender of Islam) and Imam al-Murabbin (Expert in Education), while Abdullah Nashih Ulwan is a figure of modern thought in in the world of education. He was the first person to introduce Tarbiyah Islamiyah subjects which were used as basic lessons in school. This study aims to determine the similarities and differences of early childhood Islamic education from the perspective of Al-Ghazali and Abdullah Nashih Ulwan. This research was conducted using a qualitative approach. This type of research is library research (library research). Data collection techniques used were using the documentation method. Data analysis techniques using content analysis techniques. The results of this study are similarities and differences in the concept of early childhood Islamic education from the perspective of Al-Ghazali and Abdullah Nashih Ulwan.

Anti-Shia Mass Mobilization in Indonesia’s Democracy: Godly Alliance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Exclusion

This article examines violence against religious minorities, especially Shia groups in the democracy of Indonesia, focusing particularly on the case of the 2016 anti-Milad Fatimah (Fatimah Birth Commemoration) mass mobilization performed by IJABI (The all-Indonesia Assembly of Ahlul Bait Associations) in Bondowoso, East Java, Indonesia. This article finds that the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization involved alliances and conspiracy between Godly Muslim groups with a varied agenda. Sunni militant groups from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), FPI (Islamic Defenders Front), Wahabi/Salafi, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) groups, which merged into FOKUS (Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah Communication Forum), were the main protagonists who played a key role in driving mass mobilization. Unlike previous studies that understood the anti-Shia movement merely as a form of affirming Islamic orthodoxy, this study finds evidence that there were wider agendas than the theological ones. Excluding the Shia from capturing Islamic public space, and challenging religious authority and local power which was dominated by moderate Muslim groups, were the socio-political agendas which contributed to the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization. The involvement of radical Islamist groups such as the activists of the Tarbiyah and HTI is a sign that there is a strong political agenda behind mass mobilization. However, the ultimate goal of applying Islamic Sharia will never fade from the religious movements of Islamist groups.

Merebaknya Intoleransi (Hate Speech dan Hate Crime) dalam Politik Indonesia

Democracy provides a place for us to learn to live with the enemy because only democracy allows tension and paradox, which comes from freedom, to occur in society. In contrast to the New Order era, we can now enjoy freedom of opinion and association. This freedom can in turn produce tension. The relationship between elements of society with one another, or the relationship between the state and elements of society, can be tense because of differences in interests in regulating social and political order. Meanwhile, Indonesian society witnessed the paradox which also originated from freedom. This, for example, is shown by the emergence of intolerant groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Even organizations such as HTI are of the view that democracy is not in accordance with the teachings of Islam in terms of sovereignty in the hands of the people, what should determine that is the preogrative right of Allah SWT. The government in the view of HTI only implements sharia and determines administrative technical issues.

Islamist Buzzers: Message Flooding, Offline Outreach, and Astroturfing

Based on ethnographic research on Islamist buzzers – social media political operators tasked with making particular online conversation subjects trend – in Indonesia, this article details the process of how the proliferation of insensitive message in both the online and offline realms plays a role in mobilizing those sympathetic to religious fundamentalism. As this research shows, the interviewed buzzers were one of the driving forces behind the massive success of the fundamentalist Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) as they mobilized people to participate in the organization’s political rallies between 2016 and 2017. Driven by altruistic volunteerism and sense of community, these actors go beyond their duty as click-farmers. They maintain regular contact with sympathizers and convincing them to revive broken weblinks, hang banners on streets as part of astroturfing campaigns and gather masses to attend offline events. Detailing the activity and spatiality of buzzers in crafting new online and offline spaces as part of their innovative bottom-up propaganda management, this research concludes that right-wing political mobilization and radicalization are not simply the product of ideology but are catalyzed by technically and socially tedious, mediated messaging campaigns.

Copts and the Security State: Violence, Coercion, and Sectarianism in Contemporary Egypt

Copts and the Security State: Violence, Coercion, and Sectarianism in Contemporary Egypt

The Construction of the Reality of Coverage Media Television about the Islamic Defenders Front

The aim of this research is to analyze how the three national news television stations, MetroTV, KompasTV, and TVOne, tend to construct the news reality about Islamic organizations of Islamic Defenders Front in the period 2016-2017. The research method focuses on gathering, analyzing media content (framing studies), and mixing quantitative and qualitative data in one study or series of studies. The main premise is the use of mixed quantitative and qualitative approach, by providing an understanding of better research problems because it uses two approaches at once. The main instrument in this research was the researchers themselves who collected data through websites from three selected television media, in-depth interviews, participatory observation, and carried out relevant documentation studies related to objects of the research such as literature, BlogSpot, internet (online), e- journals, and reports of similar research results that are considered relevant. The results of this research show that the three news television stations studied, there were MetroTV, KompasTV, and TVOne has carried out construction on all the news that entered the newsroom, including news about the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). Constructivist approaches assess that partiality and certain values cannot be eliminated from media coverage. Ethics, moral choice, and journalist and media alignments are the integral parts of news production. Ethics and morals in many ways mean partiality to one group or partiality to certain values. And it is generally based on certain beliefs as well. In addition, there were framing models that tended to be carried out by MetroTV, KompasTV, and TVOne. The framing model that tends to be carried out by the three news television media also tends to be different. From the models, the message and meaning are different from the audience or television viewers.

Islamic Defenders Front Militia (Front Pembela Islam) and its Impact on Growing Religious Intolerance in Indonesia

AbstractThe processes of democratisation and liberalisation initiated during the course of the IndonesianReformasiera (1998-) generated a stronger porosity in the State's frontiers and led to the formation of certain semi-institutionalised organisations. The approaching 2019 presidential elections have enabled these organisations to position themselves as political and moral brokers. The Islamic Defenders Front militia (FPI) appears to be one of the main actors in this process. It has succeeded in imposing itself in the public sphere, channelling political support and utilising extensive media coverage.While avoiding providing direct opposition to the ruling government and the Constitution, this organisation promotes the social morals followed by a large part of the population and encourages radicalism and violent actions in the name of Islam. The organisation collaborates with a section of the regional and national political elites, some sections of the army and police, several groups that are—more or less—criminal in nature, a number of local communities in different areas, and a variety of violent Islamist groups. Thus, it is at the crossroads of multiple political, economic, social, and religious interests.At the same time, the organisation's leaders maintain their own political objectives. They manipulate the dynamics of the electoral decentralised system to their advantage by obtaining political concessions that serve their personal goals. The capacity of the organisation to impose its discourse on the public stage has led to an urgent need to interrogate both the institutional and ideological transformations initiated by the Indonesian decentralisation since 1999.

Islam and Indonesia's 2019 Presidential Election

Islam and Indonesia's 2019 Presidential Election Thomas Pepinsky (bio) Indonesia's 2019 presidential election pitted incumbent president Joko Widodo (Jokowi) against challenger Prabowo Subianto in a repeat of the 2014 presidential contest. As in 2014, both Jokowi and Prabowo campaigned on nationalist platforms that defended Indonesia's multireligious national ideology of Pancasila and sought to win votes from all Indonesians.1 But even more so than in 2014, the 2019 campaign saw growing differences between Islamist and pluralist camps in Indonesian politics. Jokowi's victory is a reassuring sign for pluralists concerned about rising Islamist forces in Indonesian politics, although the selection of the influential cleric Ma'ruf Amin as his vice president signals that Islam will continue to play an important role in Jokowi's second term in office. Digging deeper into the 2019 presidential election results reveals important trends in religion and politics in Indonesia. The most important of these has been a widening electoral cleavage based on religious identity rather than ideology. This cleavage, however, interacts with other types of political cleavages in this diverse multiethnic democracy. Electoral and demographic data from the most recent election helps reveal the contours of this emerging religious cleavage structure and provides clues about its implications going forward. Before turning to this data, I begin with a brief overview of religion, ideology, and partisanship in contemporary Indonesia. Islamists, Pluralists, and Party Ideology in Contemporary Indonesia One central cleavage in Indonesian politics is between Islamists and non-Islamists. Terminology is important here: by "Islamist" I mean parties, organizations, or movements that explicitly seek to align national politics with Islamic principles.2 Non-Islamists, then, are a broad category that includes religious Muslims who are comfortable with Indonesia's multireligious constitution, Muslims who hold a more liberal or pluralist [End Page 54] political orientation, secular nationalists for whom religion is a private matter, non-Muslims, and others. Accordingly, discussions of the Islamist cleavage vary in their understanding of what its true "other" is: nationalism, pluralism, liberalism, secularism, or something else altogether. In truth, the opposite of Islamism in Indonesia is all these to some degree. Plainly, not all Muslims are Islamists. Indonesia's population is nearly 90% Muslim, yet the Indonesian constitution grants no special rights to Islam over other religions and instead embraces a multireligious ideology known as Pancasila ("Five Principles"), which explicitly endorses the belief in God without using the word "Allah." Given Indonesia's demographics, this is only possible because a substantial number of Muslims do not support Islamism. Instead, since democratization in 1999, the country has seen vibrant contestation over the role of Islam in society as well as in public life, with Muslims on both sides. The largest political parties in Indonesia are either multireligious parties that are holdovers from the authoritarian regime of Suharto (the Golkar Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) or multireligious parties that were formed after democratization as personal vehicles for aspiring presidential candidates (such as the Democratic Party and the Great Indonesia Movement Party). Although Islamist parties exist, they struggle to earn the support that the pluralist or nationalist parties win. Nevertheless, Islamist forces played an essential role in Indonesia's 2019 presidential elections. Both Jokowi and Prabowo ran broadly nationalist campaigns designed to appeal to all voters, at least rhetorically. Each campaign earned endorsements from key Islamist parties: the United Development Party (PPP) endorsed Jokowi, and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the smaller Crescent Star Party (PBB) endorsed Prabowo. And yet, Islamist elites and civil society organizations sided overwhelmingly with Prabowo and against Jokowi, particularly hard-line Islamist groups like the Islamic Defenders Front. As a result, at least in popular understanding, the 2019 election pitted one candidate with a pluralist, multireligious platform and constituency against one endorsed by Islamists. This split between Jokowi and Prabowo, with Islamists lining up primarily behind the latter, mirrors the 2014 election campaign.3 Cognizant of the mobilizing potential of religious identity, Jokowi and his campaign also courted influential conservative Muslims and Islamists in the run-up [End Page 55] to the 2019 election.4 This culminated in the selection of Ma'ruf Amin, chairman of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) and...

Model Pemahaman Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Terhadap Al-Qur’an Dan Hadis

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is very famous for the amar ma'ruf and nahi mungkar movement, and launched the national anti-immoral movement. However their movement always seems to use violence, so there is a presumption that FPI's religious pattern shows the influence of petro Islam that rigidly and textually-dominated with a harsh understanding to the practice of violation on religious values. With the semantic approach to the Habib Riziq’s book entitled Dialog FPI-Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar, this paper prove that the FPI's interpretation to the Qur'an and hadiths which is the reference of their every action, has used a contextual approach, but seems that their understanding is less comprehensive.

STRATEGI GERAKAN DAKWAH FRONT PEMBELA ISLAM ACEH

This study discusses the Strategy of FPI Dakwah Movement in Aceh. The problems studied in this research are formulated in a problem formulation: How is the understanding of the mission movement of FPI in Aceh ? How is the strategy of the mission movement of the FPI in Aceh ?, What are the opportunities and challenges of the mission movement of the FPI in Aceh? This research is field research with data collection technique through interview technique and documentation study. The research method used is descriptive research method qualitative analysis, which is trying to describe the systematic facts or characteristics of a particular population or specific field in actual and accurate. The results showed, among others: Understanding propaganda movement according to FPI in Aceh, namely amar makruf nahi munkar. FPI is an Islamic organization that Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah (Aswaja) faith who using Imam Syafi'i mazhab and aqidah Asy'ariyah Maturidiyah, and based on bilhikmah, mau'idatul hasanah and mujadalah. Strategy of mission of FPI in Aceh, in addition to seeking new followers, Rely on recruitment of members who come from pengajian participants, jama'ah mosque, or students in boarding schools run by FPI leaders. The mission of FPI by way of hisbah, the demonstration and sweeping of the eradication of immoral place, the dakwah of billisan, bilqalam and bilhal The opportunity of FPI preaching in Aceh has been well known by the community, especially the dayah ulama who give full support to FPI, even some heads of regions Preaching of FPI in Aceh. While the main challenge of FPI preaching in Aceh is the role of mainstream media that tends to exploit the negative side of the reporting of FPI Aceh's activities, the weakness of government and police efforts to enforce the law against the violation of Islamic Sharia in Aceh, as well as the violent FPI dakwah. Keywords: Strategize, Movement, Dakwah, and Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front)

Rematch: Islamic politics, mobilisation, and the Indonesian presidential election

ABSTRACTIndonesia’s 2019 presidential election brings a rematch between incumbent Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, though against a backdrop of increasingly active conservative Islamic movements. Analyses of this contest – as well as of contemporary Indonesian politics more generally – are often based on assumptions around which constituencies matter and which political factions they support. This paper examines those assumptions using an original dataset of fine-grained returns and census data, including a latent variable to capture the independent effect of Islamic conservatism. We find that conservative Muslim areas overwhelmingly supported Prabowo in 2014, but turned out in relatively low numbers. By contrast, rural poor areas turned out heavily for Widodo. This suggests that the conservative vote was under-mobilised and has a greater electoral potential than previously demonstrated. Given the recent mobilisation by conservative segments in society, observers should be prepared for significant shifts in the Indonesian electorate in 2019 and beyond.Abbreviations: NU: Nahdlatul Ulama; FPI: Islamic Defenders Front

The Quest for Sharia in Indonesia: The Mobilization Strategy of the Forum of Islamic Society

The majority of Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia that emerged immediately after the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 such as HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or the Liberation Party of Indonesia) and FPI (Fron Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front) have received considerable scholarly attention. In contrast, FUI (Forum Umat Islam or Forum of Islamic Society), which was established in 2005 as a coalition movement that consists of a number of Islamic elements, has thus far been insufficiently studied. This is unfortunate because, like the other Islamic revivalist movements, FUI also actively engages in social movement activities such as mass rallies, public gatherings, and media statements. Through the lens of social movement perspectives, this article aims to examine the emergence of FUI and how it mobilizes its organizational resources. The article suggests that the role of what is referred to as a movement’s ‘entrepreneur’ is crucial to the sustainability of FUI in the country’s social and political milieu.

THE BRITISH MUSLIM BARON

This contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium on xenophilia documents and discusses the life and work of an important but neglected early British convert to Islam, the fifth Baron Headley, Rowland George Allanson Allanson-Winn (1855 – 1935), and also comments on the nature of the kind of xenophilia that can lead to conversion. The essay argues that Lord Headley's attraction to the Muslim world and his religious conversion in 1913 were typical of a small minority of Britons who chose Islam with the guidance of Indian Muslim missionaries in the first half of the twentieth century. But it also shows that Headley's privileged social position enabled him to become a leader of the nascent British Muslim community and an international ambassador for Islam between the wars. A staunch defender of Islam and Muslims, Headley was not wholly uncritical of them and made public pronouncements especially about the spread of sectarianism in Islam and about how that faith needed to be practiced differently in the West.

Is Islamofascism even a thing? The case of the Indonesian Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI)

Is Islamofascism even a thing? The case of the Indonesian Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI)

TINJAUAN KRITIS DAN MENYELURUH TERHADAP FUNDAMENTALISME DAN RADIKALISME ISLAM MASA KINI

The purpose of this research is to present a historical review and critique of the actions of radicalism on the basis of fundamentalism in Indonesia. This research is motivated by the development of discourse related to fundamentalism and radicalism which is often identified to Islam group with negative connotation in Indonesia. The methodology used in this research is a qualitative descriptive approach with a historical-critical study method. Data were collected through literature studies and related literature of several Islamic organizations consisting of; Darul Islam Or Islamic State of Indonesia (NII); Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI); Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI); and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). The results show that fundamentalism and radicalism is a verbic word whose roots are not contained in the language of Muslims in various Arabic speaking countries. Fundamentalism by term is the assertion of certain religious activists who define religion absolutely and literally. Fundamentalism as a reaction to modernism emerged in the nineteenth century. At that time, modernism appeared very fiery in the United States. In the era of the 1990s, there was a change of format and fundamental strategy in radical Islamic movement in Indonesia. If in previous years this movement runs latently and always confronted by the State so as to generate political fear for Muslims then in the era of the 1990s radical Islamic movement appears openly, as seen in the movement Laskar Jihad, Jamaah Islamiah Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah, Ikhwanul Muslimin, Mujahidin Jamaah, Nurul Fikr, Islamic Defenders Front and Hizb ut-Tahrir Based on the results of research, author concluded that Fundamentalism and radicalism is not a term derived from Islam but the term of Christianity which is today used for Islam. Both fundamentalism and radicalism potentially exist to any group, whether religious, social, or political. It occurs in any religion. Fundamentalism can be a virtue if it is not performed by the action of radicalism. Therefore, the solution to the value of tolerance in fundamentalism is a deep understanding of belief or religion.

Reconcilingshariawith “Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia”: The ideology and framing strategies of the Indonesian Forum of Islamic Society (FUI)

This study attempts to examine the ideologies and framing strategies of an active yet insufficiently studied Islamic revivalist movement in Indonesia that seeks to implement sharia (Islamic law) called Forum Umat Islam (FUI, or the Indonesian Forum of Islamic Society). Research in Islamic revivalist movements that emerged after the demise of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 has been largely focused upon movements such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, or the Indonesian Party of Liberation), Forum Pembela Islam (FPI,or Islamic Defenders Front), and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, or the Council of Indonesian Holy Warriors). This is unfortunate because since its emergence in 2005, FUI has been playing an active role in social movement activities such as mass protests, public gatherings, media statements, and so forth. The study analyzes the ideology and framing strategies of FUI as it engages in a contestation of meaning in the country’s contemporary socio-political milieu. Based upon qualitative fieldwork in Indonesia, this study suggests that the manner in which FUI frames its pro- sharia issues is deliberately oriented toward convincing the Indonesian public that its pro- sharia programs and agendas are indeed for the betterment of the Republic of Indonesia—“NKRI” (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia which is The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). This is done through, for example, reinterpreting and redefining Pancasila (Five Principles), which serves as the basic philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia.

Pemikiran Pendidikan al-Ghazali

There are many controversial views in assessing Al-Ghazali thought. For example, there is an opinion that the reason of Islam deterioration is caused by his categorisation of fard 'ain for Religious Studies, and fard kifayah for others. Abdulloh Mas'ud said that the dichotomy in education today can be traced to his categorisation. On the other hand, there are many defenders declared that al Ghazali is not responsible for this dichotomy, but he is the true defender of Islam. Even al-Zubaidi, he said that If there is a prophet after Muhammad, he would be al - Ghazali. Based on these controversies, this article will describe al-Ghazali's ideas about education in his two books, Ihya Ulumuddin and Ayyuhal Walad. This article concluded that al-Ghazali's ideas can not be separated from its socio-cultural context. With this perspective we can get a whole picture of al-Ghazali. He lived in a period of the emersion of various sects and schools (mazhab) in Islam, the deterioration of the Abbasid dynasty, and the golden age of the dynasty Saljuk until its collapse. Al-Ghazali's educational thought is an integral part of this dynamics Islamic civilization in general. Thus, Islamic education also should not be alienated from the economic, political and social conditions that affect and determine the direction and the shape of Islamic civilization.

Sex and Sexualities in Contemporary Indonesia: Sexual Politics, Health, Diversity and Representations eds. by Linda Rae Bennett and Sharyn Graham Davies

Reviewed by: Sex and Sexualities in Contemporary Indonesia: Sexual Politics, Health, Diversity and Representations eds. by Linda Rae Bennett and Sharyn Graham Davies Annemarie Samuels (bio) Linda Rae Bennett and Sharyn Graham Davies, eds. Sex and Sexualities in Contemporary Indonesia: Sexual Politics, Health, Diversity and Representations. London and New York: Routledge, 2015. 328 pp. In June 2014 I watched waria dancers perform traditional feminine Acehnese dances on stage in Banda Aceh. It was a splendid performance in which the dancers' techniques, dress, and cosmetics betrayed a high degree of professionalism and many hours of training. It was also a courageous performance. Although the audience consisted mainly of sympathetic students, activists, and NGO workers, a raid by the radical Islamist FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front) and the police was a serious risk. Surveillance of sexuality in general and denunciation of LGBTI in particular has increased in Aceh in the past years, especially in the capital where the government openly joins forces with FPI and related groups. Yet the performance for a crowd of activists took place in a hopeful atmosphere where people embraced diversity, and which may be equally characteristic of the past decade's blooming NGO scene and democratization process. While Aceh cannot be considered representative of the rest of the archipelago, the range of developments taking place in the province resonates with the assessment of the edited volume Sex and Sexualities in Contemporary Indonesia: Sexual Politics, Health, Diversity and Representations. As the editors, Linda Bennett and Sharyn Davies, note in their introduction to the volume, in terms of sexual politics, the post-Suharto era is characterized by "the constant vacillation between diverse voices—some progressive, some conservative and many in between" (10). A decade and a half after the fall of Suharto, the editors asked a highly experienced and multidisciplinary group of researchers to take stock of the dynamics of sex and sexualities in Indonesia. The result is a collection of fifteen insightful and often surprising chapters that address a broad range of topics using data from a wide variety of sources and places. The book is divided into four sections: sexual politics, sexual health, sexual diversity, and sexual representations. An encompassing introduction by the editors and a sparkling afterword in the form of a dialogue with two important gay activists/academics, Dédé Oetomo and Tom Boellstorff, provide general reflections on the volume's central issues and point at new directions for research. The volume's strength lies not only in its timeliness and the high quality of the individual chapters, but also in the broad scope of the compilation that makes several significant contributions to the study of sex and sexualities in Indonesia. It does so in three major ways. First of all, this collection of studies and perspectives offers an assessment of current developments in the field of sex and sexualities. By analyzing discourses, public sentiments, health concerns, and limits and possibilities of diversity, among other topics, the chapters together provide a rich view on (mostly) [End Page 91] recent historical developments and the present state of affairs, forming an important addition to earlier scholarly work in this field.1 A major topic of interest in this respect is the rise of Islamic conservatism and the increasing public presence of radical Islamic groups that influence sexual politics. Tracing relations between Islam and gender politics in Indonesia since the period of the New Order regime, Kathryn Robinson (chapter two) points out that both the New Order ideology and the Islamist discourses that have gained ground in the Reformasi era have promoted a patriarchal, heteronormative gender order. Despite Islamic political parties not being successful during elections, radical Islamic groups have pushed conservative agendas by mobilizing public opinion, such as the mass support for the adoption of 2008's anti-pornography bill, the highly mediatized demonstrations against Lady Gaga's 2012 visit, and the growing public agitation and protests against LGBTI Indonesians.2 Interestingly, as Robinson notes, it is exactly the democratic space opened up by Reformasi that has enabled radical Islamist discourses to thrive. Yet, this same space has also enabled progressive women's activists to be heard, most successfully in 2006's adoption of the...