Defendant's Case Research Articles

Analisis Efektivitas Persidangan Pidana Secara Elektronik

Electronic Trial is a series of processes of examining, adjudicating and deciding the Defendant's case by the Court which is carried out with the support of information and communication technology, audio visual and other electronic means based on the provisions of Supreme Court Regulation (PERMA) Number 4 of 2020 concerning the Administration and Trial of Criminal Cases in Electronic Courts. Carrying out administration and litigation in court through an electronic system to realize the creation of a litigation system that is more orderly, easier and in line with the needs of the times. This electronic court proceeding system is more familiar with the term e-Court. The method used in this writing is empirical juridical with an emphasis on juridical facts obtained by field researchers. The mechanism for conducting electronic hearings is based on the provisions of Article 1 Numbers 11 and 12, including electronic case administration, namely the process of delegating, receiving and numbering cases, determining the day of the hearing, determining the method of the hearing, sending summons/notifications, submitting objection documents, responding to objections, demands. , defense, replica, duplicate, verdict, excerpt of the verdict, sending a copy of the verdict to the Prosecutor and Investigator electronically via the E-court application system. The purpose of establishing electronic trials, known as e-litigation, is to support the effectiveness of a court in adjudicating and examining cases so that they can be effective in accordance with the principles of simple, fast and low-cost justice.

TINJAUAN HUKUM PENJATUHAN PUTUSAN PIDANA TERHADAP PELAKU TINDAK PIDANA JUDI ONLINE

This study analyzes the considerations by judges in imposing criminal decisions on perpetrators of online gambling crimes in Decision Number 111/Pid.B/2022/Pn Bkt. This research uses normative law research. Data analysis is used by interpreting the data and presenting it in sentences to answer problems in subsequent chapters. The results of this study are: 1) The panel of judges in deciding the considerations in the decision considers more juridical considerations that look at the defendant's background and life further. The judge should be able to give a more severe deterrent effect to the defendant, remembering the defendant is not just a number taker on gambling games online but acting as a bookie. 2) In imposing a criminal verdict, the public prosecutor and the Panel of Judges should also use the law on electronic transactions and information, considering that the defendant's case is online gambling, accessed using the network.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ANALYSIS OF ZTE WI-FI ROUTER THIEVERY

The crime of theft is regulated in Book II, Chapter XXII of Law Number 1 of 1946 concerning on the Criminal Code (KUHP) Articles 362 to Article 367. In this Chapter, five types of theft are regulated, such as Ordinary theft (Article 362) Criminal Code, Theft with weight (Article 363) of the Criminal Code, Minor theft (Article 364) of the Criminal Code, Theft with violence (Article 365) of the Criminal Code, and Theft in the family (Article 367) of the Criminal Code. The type of research used in this research is sociological or empirical legal research since, in this case, the researcher directly observes what is happening in society. Based on the research result, Surabaya District Court, which conducts criminal investigations and trials, has decided in the defendant's case, sentencing the Perpetrator of Theft of Zte Wi-FiRouter Based on Decision Number 2011/Pid.B/2022/PN Sby. According to panel of judges, the punishment imposed on the defendant as stated in the court decision has been deemed as appropriate and fair, both from the defendant's interests, society's interests, and the implementation of the law generally, that punishment is used as a last resort and not as an attempt to exact revenge for the perpetrator act.

Kewenangan Hakim Untuk Menetapkan Penangguhan Penahanan Sementara Terhadap Terdakwa Dalam Pemeriksaan Perkara Pidana Berdasarkan Kuhap

In order for the judge to be able to investigate the defendant's case, the judge has the authority to detain the defendant. In addition, the judge is in the best position to determine whether or not the defendant should have his or her detention suspended before the case is decided by the court. This authority comes from the judge's intimate familiarity with the case. The suspension of the detention of the suspect or defendant from his or her family, the existence of guarantees against the suspect or defendant in the form of money or people in the suspension of detention, and the judge's belief that, according to Article 21 paragraph (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the suspect or defendant will not flee, will not damage evidence, and will not commit the crime again are all factors that can lead to a judge granting a suspension of detention.

The Role of Defendant Race and Racially Charged Media in Canadian Mock Juror Decision Making

This study examined the influence of defendant race and race salience (manipulated via racially charged media) on Canadian mock jurors' judgements. Two hundred ten jury-eligible Canadian online participants read a racially charged (general or specific to the defendant's race) or neutral article followed by a trial transcript that involved dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and impaired driving charges against a White, Black, or Indigenous defendant. Diverging from previous findings, this study did not find effects of defendant race or race salience on verdict judgements or causal attributions. However, when race is not a central feature of the case, making race salient outside the trial may increase levels of racial bias for some mock jurors. When the defendant was Black, a race-specific article appeared to backfire, producing the harshest sentencing recommendation compared to race-neutral and general race articles. Conversely, for the Indigenous defendant, any mention of race produced harsher recommended sentences relative to no mention of race. Results do not seem to parallel those found in U.S. race-salience studies. Rather, this specific race-salience technique may be detrimental to a minority defendant's case in a Canadian context.

The influence of mitigation evidence, ethnicity, and SES on death penalty decisions by European American and Latino venire persons.

The purpose of the research was to determine whether European American and Latino mock jurors would demonstrate bias in death penalty decision making when mitigation evidence and defendant ethnicity and socioeconomic status (SES) were varied. A total of 561 actual venire persons acted as mock jurors and read a trial transcript that varied a defendant's case information (mitigating circumstances: strong/weak, defendant ethnicity: European American/Latino, and defendant SES: low/high). European American jurors recommended the death penalty significantly more often for the low SES Latino defendant when strength of mitigation evidence was weak. In addition, they also assigned this defendant higher culpability ratings and lower ratings on positive personality trait measures compared with all other conditions. Strong mitigation evidence contributed to lower guilt ratings by European American jurors for the high SES European American defendant. Latino jurors did not differ in their death penalty sentencing across defendant mitigation, ethnicity, or SES conditions. Discussion of in-group favoritism and out-group derogation, as well as suggestions for procedures to diminish juror bias in death penalty cases, is provided.

The impact of negative forensic evidence on mock jurors' perceptions of a trial of drug-facilitated sexual assault.

Legal concerns with regard to the adverse impact of a negative toxicological screening for date-rape drugs in a case of drug-facilitated sexual assault (DFSA) were the focus of a recent Canadian case (R. v. Alouache, 2003). To assess the impact of a negative forensic report, as well as the impact of expert testimony explaining the many factors that may contribute to a negative outcome, participants (N=171) received a written trial stimulus in which the forensic evidence (negative report, negative report plus expert testimony, no negative report and no expert testimony control) and the complainant's beverage consumption (alcohol, cola) were systematically varied. Results indicate that a negative finding in the absence of expert testimony produced greater verdict leniency and more favourable evaluations of the defendant's case. In contrast, no differences were found between the case in which the expert testified and a case in which the negative report and expert testimony were omitted.

Lost and Destroyed Evidence: The Search for a Principled Approach to Abuse of Process

This article examines the situation where evidence which the police were under a duty to obtain or retain, and which could have assisted the defendant's case at trial, is lost or destroyed. Its particular focus is the approach that should be followed when lost or destroyed evidence forms the basis for an application to stay proceedings as an abuse of process. The decision in R (on the application of Ebrahim) v Feltham Magistrates' Court; Mouat v DPP was a significant advance in this regard, for it clarified that the two categories of abuse case—cases where the defendant cannot receive a fair trial (Category 1) and cases where it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried (Category 2)—are analytically distinct, from which it follows that the defendant's right to a fair trial can be violated in the absence of any bad faith on the part of the police. An examination of the cases post- Ebrahim, however, reveals the same regrettable tendency that was evident in the pre- Ebrahim cases, namely a tendency to use the absence of bad faith as a justification for not staying the proceedings in a Category 1 case. On a more principled approach, it is the effects of the conduct of the police with which the court should be primarily concerned when considering whether the defendant can receive a fair trial, and the nature of this conduct which should be the focus when determining whether it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.

Mock Trial: How Human Factors Experts Contribute to Civil Litigation

A mock trial format will be used to demonstrate how human factors consultants' expertise can facilitate the legal process. The following are two cases that will be “tried” in the mock trial sessions. These cases concern incidents that are commonly investigated by forensic human factors professionals: pedestrian accidents and product warnings. The trip and fall case is designed to depict how a human factors expert can contribute to a plaintiff's case; the warnings case is designed to demonstrate how a human factors expert can enhance a defendant's case. Participants will demonstrate the qualification process, and the direct and cross examination of experts. Experienced human factors professionals will serve as the experts, commentators, attorneys and judge. The commentators will highlight key issues and provide advice to those interested in a forensic human factors practice.

Judgment and Mercy

ion and formality of rules and principles with the rich complexity of real life. The featureless juridical person is contrasted with 'the concrete human being', rich in specific attributes.2 Very quickly we are shunted to the conclusion that juridical discourse 'mystifies' the concrete realities of social existence. An approach along these lines can be developed in at least two different ways. The dichotomy results from the simple fact that all rules and principles, and all conceptions of justice, abstract from the concrete circumstances of real life in so far as they treat certain features of those circumstances as morally relevant, and others as irrelevant. This was most famously pointed out by Marx in his Critique of the Gotha Programme: Right can by its nature only consist in the application of an equal standard, but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) can only be measured by the same standard if they are looked at from the same aspect, if they are grasped from one particular side, eg, if in the present case they are regarded only as workers and nothing else is seen in them, everything else is ignored.25 Thus the contrast between juridical abstraction and societal complexity can be employed in two different ways: ' A point made by Murphy, op cit, 173. 23 An alternative view would be that, when one pleads for mercy, one appeals to no feature of the case, but to the virtue of the judge. This is inadequate as an explanation, however. For, even if we accept that the plea for mercy is an appeal to the judge's virtue, there must be something in the defendant's case to which the exercise of mercy can be a response. Otherwise, mercy would seem to be entirely self-regarding and solipsistic: the particular case or defendant would simply provide an occasion for the exercise of mercy. This seems to detach mercy too severely from the belief that it is a manifestation of love or compassion for another. Even if the plea for mercy is an appeal to the judge's virtue, therefore, it must also be grounded in some feature of the defendant's situation: and if not some general feature, then perhaps the status of unique particularity. 24 I borrow the label for this rhetorical form from Leszek Kolakowski, but Kolakowski's treatment of it is very different from my own. See Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial (Chicago, 1990) 44. 25 Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', in The First International and After, (ed) David Fernbach (London, 1974). This content downloaded from 207.46.13.14 on Tue, 14 Jun 2016 07:14:48 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms SPRING 1993 Judgment and Mercy 61 (i) The criticism may be that some features of real situations are excluded as irrelevant by legal rules when in fact they are relevant. But criticism of this kind simply amounts to an attack on the conception of justice embodied in the existing rules, and the assertion of a rival conception of justice. Thus it might be claimed that disparities of wealth should be relevant to criminal responsibility, and that the law is 'mystificatory' in that it suppresses such differences by treating them as irrelevant. Since this argument offers a critique framed in terms of justice, it can cast no light on mercy as a value distinct from that of justice. (ii) On the other hand the criticism may be a more radical one, claiming that the nature of human subjectivity is such that it always and necessarily escapes adequate subsumption under the general categories of thought. Since this criticism entails a rejection of all rules and conceptions of justice (in line with Marx's argument) it can only be employed in the service of an antinomian anarchism or totalitarianism that will be attractive to few people. If something resembling the second of these positions is adopted, the value of mercy may be found significant as an indication of the extent to which, even within the context of juridical institutions, the concrete human being always partially escapes the all-pervading demands of justice: the subject is never fully subsumable under the categories of law. What the position also reveals, however, is the way in which the 'concrete human being' may be identical with an idea to which it might at first seem radically opposed: the Kantian 'noumenal self. Precisely in escaping all general categories and characterizations, that which is irreducibly concrete turns out to be featureless and irreducibly abstract. We will see a further development of this point in a moment.

The Parameters for Analysis of Windfall Recoveries in the Corporate Setting

In 1903 when Dean Roscoe Pound, who was then Commissioner of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, decided that a corporation which was wholly owned by one stockholder could not sue the person from whom the present stockholder had purchased his stock, for mismanagement and waste allegedly committed before the purchase, he wrote: It is not the function of courts of equity to administer punishment. When one person has wronged another in a matter within its jurisdiction, equity will spare no effort to redress the person injured, and will not suffer the wrongdoer to escape restitution to such person through any device or technicality. But this is because of its desire to right wrongs, not because of a desire to punish all wrongdoers. If a wrongdoer deserves to be punished, it does not follow that others are to be enriched at his expense by a court of equity. A plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own case, not on the weakness of the defendant's case. It is his right, not the defendant's wrongdoing, that is the basis of recovery. When it is disclosed that he has no standing in equity, the degree of wrongdoing of the defendant will not avail him.

Toward Effective Criminal Discovery in California--A Practitioner's View

In 1957, John Dyson Powell sought and was granted by the Supreme Court of California the right to inspect and copy his own signed statement to the police and a typed transcript of another statement allegedly made by him at the police station.' In 1965, less than ten years later, the defendant in People v. Bazaure2 asserted and secured the right to inspect the statements of some 35 people who might have had some knowledge of the murder with which he was charged. During the intervening period, California courts expanded the right to criminal discovery in an ever-widening manner. Today, we are told, in Cash v. Superior Court,3 that in certain respects this right is inherent in the concept of a fair trial. Tomorrow, arguments will be joined as to what extent discovery is constitutionally required and how effective such discovery must become to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection. In civil litigation there is both a statutory framework for discovery and a general acceptance of its processes.4 Each party may compel the other to disclose the evidence on which he proposes to rely, and failure to comply with such disclosure is discouraged by multiple sanctions.5 But in criminal litigation, the defendant may claim his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and the reluctance of prosecutors to divulge their secrets without a reciprocal right to discover the defendant's case is understandable. Equally predictable, perhaps, is the

Post-Conviction Due Process regarding Insanity Claim Prior to Execution

s of Recent Cases Right to Retain Out of State Counsel in Criminal Proceedings-In Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F. 2d 119, (2d Cir., 1950), the appellants had been tried and convicted of murder in a state court of New Jersey. Following the conviction New York lawyers were secured at the appellant's request to handle the appeal, which resulted in reversal. The trial judge, however, refused to permit the out-of-state counsel to handle the case on retrial. The appellants then sought an injunction in the federal district court to prohibit the trial judge from proceeding with the trial until he recognized the out-of-state attorneys, claiming that the trial judge's action deprived them of due process of law. The district court dismissed the complaint and appeal was made to the United States Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit. The appellant's argument was based primarily on the case of U. S. v. Bergamo, 154 F. 2d 31, where the Third Circuit Court held that the right to counsel in a federal criminal proceeding included the right to out-of-state counsel. The appellants contended that since the Bergamno case held this right to be an element of due process under the Fifth Amendment, it must also be protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The question confronting the court, then, was not merely whether a man charged with a crime has the right to counsel, but whether he has the constitutional right to choose his counsel. If such a right did exist, it admittedly serve to limit the control of the states over the persons licensed to practice before its courts. The court, however, declined to face this problem, deciding the case on the grounds that once an out-of-state attorney has been admitted to try a capital case it is for the entire and he can not be arbitrarily removed without depriving his client of his constitutional rights. Assuming that these accused persons could not have claimed representation by out-of-state lawyers as a constitutional right, the representation was granted and may not, without cause, be taken away. Refusal of Witness to Testify on Grounds of Self-incrimination Can Not Be Used to Prejudice Defendant-In Billeci v. United States, 184 F. 2d 394 (D.C., 1950), the defendants were convicted of carrying on a lottery. Their appeal was based on the trial court's failure to give proper instructions in sixteen different instances. One of the instructions requested by the defendant was to the effect that the failure of certain witnesses to testify on the grounds of self-incrimination could not be considered as prejudicial to the defendant. The court not only denied the instruction, but permitted the prosecutor in his summation to ask the jury to infer that the testimony of these witnesses, if given, would be . . . damaging to the defendant's case. This was found to be erroneous, the Circuit Court noting that the right of a witness to refuse This content downloaded from 157.55.39.191 on Tue, 11 Oct 2016 05:20:40 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms