The public figure doctrine has become an anachronism. Current First Amendment protections for defamation1 defendants are centered on a simplistic and antiquated conception of the communications environment— one that would appear quaint were it not so pernicious. This outmoded view of communications media cannot account for the dramatic democratization of the means of mass communication spurred by modern technology. The dissimilarity between the contemporary communications environment and the media landscape that informed the public figure doctrine renders current First Amendment protections insufficient and reveals them as inconsistent with the very rationale that demanded their creation. The basic First Amendment framework for defamation suits announced in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.2 has changed little in the intervening decades.3 The Court’s consideration of defamation—a cause of action inseparably tied to the act of publication4—necessarily implicated its understanding of the means of mass communication. In 1974, “the media” was easily defined. Print publishers and broadcasters exhausted the universe of those capable of communicating to the masses.5 As a result, the