Annalisa Coliva's Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense does On Certainty, and Wittgenstein generally, a great service: it is the first in-depth study of Moore and Wittgenstein that places On Certainty within current epistemology. By this I mean, that it discusses its content, reception and repercussions in the technical terms of current epistemology and in the midst of current epistemologists. But it also manages to do this without losing the non-specialist reader to the often bewildering jargon of epistemology, and without viewing hinge certainty as an epistemic certainty. There is much that I agree with in Coliva’s reading of On Certainty, but her view of hinges as both judgments and norms seems to me to go against the spirit and the letter of On Certainty. In what follows, I will be mainly concerned with that view, but will conclude by adding a few words on Coliva's rejection of foundationalism in On Certainty. In her Introduction, Coliva refers to my classification of the main four 'readings' of On Certainty: the framework; the transcendental; the epistemic; and the therapeutic readings1, and situates herself as a framework reader, but with a difference. She agrees that Wittgenstein takes hinge certainties to be rules rather than empirical propositions, and that they are therefore not truth-evaluable (2010, 6-7), but she finds this problematic: to say that 'Here is my hand' is neither true nor false when I'm holding it in front of my eyes in optimal cognitive circumstances sounds 'extremely weird', and some hinges, such as 'Nobody's ever been on the moon appear false to us' (2010, 7-8). The weirdness felt by Coliva is reminiscent of Moore’s discomfort upon hearing Wittgenstein's 'puzzling assertion that 3+3=6 (and all rules of deduction, similarly) is neither true nor false' (MWL 73, 80). But Wittgenstein himself warned that this would be ‘apt to give an uncomfortable feeling’ (MWL 73). Wittgenstein’s point in barring truth-evaluability from grammatical rules, of which mathematical ones2, is to insist on their normative (as opposed to descriptive or evaluative) status: '3+3=6 is a rule as to the way we are going to talk ... it is a preparation for a description' (MWL 72). So that grammatical rules (or as Coliva prefers to call them: meaning constitutive rules) can be said to be preparation for, or antecedent to judgment, rather than themselves (expressions/instances of) judgments. However – perhaps because of the 'weirdness' in saying that 'Here is my hand' is not true as I'm holding it in front of my eyes in
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