IntroductionThe provision of humanitarian aid to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has been a challenge to many aid providers, due in large part to the ways in which the country has chosen to interact with the outside world. Despite chronic problems of child malnutrition and mortality,1 aid providers are provided with virtually humanitarian space to access vulnerable populations and monitor for effective operations.2 While large aid providers such as the World Food Programme (WFP) sticking to a no access (to monitoring), policy,3 most other organizations have not been able to enjoy the same level of access.This study shows how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were able to overcome political sensitivity and channel aid to specific targeted groups within the DPRK. NGOs in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) were selected as cases in this study, not only because the international aid community knew rather little about them, but also due to their difficult position as a by-product of unstable inter-Korean relations. Despite signs of easing tension during the early 2000s, the fact that the two Koreas were still theoretically at war also meant that South Korean aid providers had faced substantially more scrutiny than their non-Korean counter-parts.4The ROK presented both advantages and disadvantages as an aid provider to North Korea. It enjoyed minimal cultural and linguistic barriers with the North, as well as a relatively low cost of transportation of food and other supplies. Despite these advantages, this study concludes that it was by harnessing their links with partners outside the Korean Peninsula that South Korean NGOs managed to sideline some of the tough restrictions and made DPRK a more workable environment.South Korean NGOs and Their Operating Environment in the NorthThe DPRK government first appealed to the international community for humanitarian assistance in 1995 to alleviate its food crisis. This crisis resulted from decades of misguided development under the juche ideology,5 which required the country to be self-sufficient in food despite environmental limitations such as a mountainous terrain and a short growing season. A decline in food production first resulted from heavily mechanized agriculture, which caused land and water degradation.6 Short of foreign exchange, the loss of partners in barter trade after the collapse of the Soviet Union7 made it difficult to import food into the country. Eventually, floods in 1995 led to a reported damage of 2 million tons of grain and 330,000 hectares of cropland.8 The Public Distribution System (PDS), which used to guarantee access to food by individuals, also broke down as a result of the food shortage.9 According to Lee (2008), North Koreans bought about 70 percent of their food from the market after the food rationing.10South Korean NGOs started supplying the North with relief goods in 1998, when the ROK established an Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Fund as part of the Sunshine Policy of President Kim Dae-jung. About 59 percent of the $720.6 million in aid delivered by the ROK between 1995 and 2001 was routed through NGOs, including the ROK Red Cross.11 After the inter-Korean summit in June 2000, the ROK government took up the responsibility of directly sending food aid to the North, while the focus of NGO efforts in food security shifted to the recovery of the agricultural sector.12 As of 2009, at least fifty-six organizations from the ROK had provided assistance of various amounts to the DPRK, in areas including but not limited to food security.South Korean NGOs had a reputation for putting more emphasis on trust building rather than hewing closely to humanitarian principles,13 so they were subject to questions of effectiveness and transparency. The ways in which they tried to remain accountable might thus present useful learning for members in the international community operating in such difficult environments as the DPRK. …