Belief in the inevitability of World War III may well be a factor in bringing on that catastrophe. Certainly the way the crisis is expected to end will affect in some degree the course and outcome of the struggle between the Russian and non-Russian world. On the Soviet side there is dogmatic and unanimous assertion that world communism will “inevitably” triumph. The expectations prevailing in the other camp are strikingly different. In place of dogma and uniformity there are doubt, variety, and confusion. No single voice commands enough authority to speak for everyone, but there is extensive doubt of the “inevitable” spread and eventual triumph of the liberal outlook. Confidence in the inevitability of progress has been shaken, but the expectation of progress remains as a working hypothesis or at least as a declaration of faith, hope, and purpose. In other words, neither victory nor defeat of the liberal outlook is inevitable, and the shape of things to come depends in large measure on how the leaders of the liberal world shape them. Part of the shaping, if it is to be successful, will include the adoption of policies toward the Soviet Union which will modify Soviet expectations of inevitable progress through catastrophe. What are some of the practical means of accomplishing this end? If the non-Soviet world is to take practical steps, what modifications must be made in its own long-range expectations?