Decisions Of Players Research Articles

Social tie strength and virtual goods purchase decisions of online game players

This paper investigates how social ties among online game players can influence their in-game purchase of virtual goods that are representative of the personalities and status of the players. Using the data provided by the operator of an online game, this paper finds that a player is more likely to purchase such a product if more of her peers (with either a strong tie or a weak tie) possess that same or similar product, with the strong-tie peers having a bigger influence on the purchase than that of the weak-tie ones. This paper also finds that, due to the product-sharing activities among strong-tie friends, a player is less likely to purchase a more expensive virtual good if more of his strong-tie friends already own a similar one. In terms of methodology, this paper uses generalised linear mixed models to identify strong and weak ties, and models customer purchase behaviours. This paper contributes to the literature of social connections and purchase decisions, and offers managerial implications on how to utilise social media that builds on the different strengths of social ties to promote consumer purchase.

Social tie strength and virtual goods purchase decisions of online game players

Social tie strength and virtual goods purchase decisions of online game players

Analysis of design options for the electricity market: The German case

The effectiveness of the energy-only market (EOM) in providing sufficient incentives for investments is intensively discussed in Europe. While supporters claim that an improved EOM can guarantee generation adequacy, energy suppliers in particular favor the introduction of a capacity market to finance power plant investments. However, there is a lack of quantitative assessment of market design options taking into account individual decisions of market players. Existing studies mainly include a system view based on a central planner optimization. This paper on the other hand is based on an agent-based simulation model for the German electricity market. This method can explicitly incorporate individual investment decisions and aggregate them to present a holistic view of the system.Our results show that an EOM extended with a strategic reserve can incentivize investments, and guarantee supply security in a market with high share of renewable energies. However, the generation adequacy can be more easily achieved with a capacity market. Furthermore, the cost advantage of an EOM diminishes in the long-term, as scarcity prices in the EOM lead to similar system costs as with a capacity market.

Leading the Game, Losing the Competition: Identifying Leaders and Followers in a Repeated Game.

We explore a new method for identifying leaders and followers, LF, in repeated games by analyzing an experimental, repeated (50 rounds) game where Row player shifts the payoff between small and large values–a type of “investor” and Column player determines who gets the payoff–a type of “manager”. We found that i) the Investor (Row) most often is a leading player and the manager (Column) a follower. The longer the Investor leads the game, the higher is both player’s payoff. Surprisingly however, it is always the Manager that achieves the largest payoff. ii) The game has an efficient cooperative strategy where the players alternate in receiving a high payoff, but the players never identify, or accept, that strategy. iii) Under the assumption that the information used by the players is closely associated with the leader- follower sequence, and that information is available before the player’s decisions are made, the players switched LF- strategy primarily as a function of information on the Investor’s investment and moves and secondly as a function of the Manager’s payoff.

Indirect Higher Order Beliefs and Cooperation

This paper experimentally examines why communication may matter for inducing cooperation in strategic interactions involving intermediaries. We consider a three-player centipede game in which the first and the third players do not interact sequentially, but only through the second player. We posit that the third player's decision to cooperate depends on his indirect higher order belief, that is, his belief about what the first player believes the second player would choose. The evidence demonstrates that communication between the first and the third player can effectively induce cooperation from the third player through shaping his indirect higher order belief.

Research or teaching oriented? Game theory models for the strategic decision-making process of universities with the external environment held neutral

A key choice that must be made by a new or young university is that of the selected balance between research and teaching on the continuum of options. We approach this choice from a strategic decision-making perspective, by implementing a game theory approach to analyse the selection process. Three main groups of players were identified: faculty members or academicians, university management members, and board of trustees’ members. The decisions of these players were then analysed by the use of a Fuzzy TOPSIS method. Our findings show how, in choosing from the options continuum, the players arrived at equilibria points that best satisfied their collective perspectives as to the required balance, for the purpose of achieving optimal benefit.

Behavioral pricing of energy swing options by stochastic bilevel optimization

Holders of energy swing options are free to specify the amounts of energy to be delivered on short notice, paying a fixed price per unit delivered. Due to the complexity of potential demand patterns, risk elimination by replication of these contracts at energy exchange markets is not possible. As a consequence, when selling delivery contracts, the energy producer has to explicitly consider the risk emanating from fluctuations in supply cost. The impact of these risk factors can be mitigated by the contract seller, who is an energy producer, to a certain extent: Supply cost fluctuations can be absorbed by the own generation portfolio whereas demand uncertainties can be influenced by the choice of the strike price, implicitly changing the buyer’s behavior. Considering this, the determination of the optimal strike price can be formulated as a stochastic bilevel problem where the optimal decision of upper level player (price setting and production) depends on the optimal decision of a lower level player (demand depending on the price). We present a solution algorithm tailored to the resulting specific stochastic bilevel problem. We illustrate the effects of the behavioral pricing approach by studying behavioral price setting for natural gas swing options, highlighting in particular the influence of the seller’s production and contract portfolio as well as of the market liquidity on optimal exercise prices.

Interacting Information Cascades: On the Movement of Conventions between Groups

When a decision maker is a member of multiple social groups, her actions may cause information to to spill over from one group to another. We study the nature of these spillovers in an observational learning game where two groups interact via a common player, and where conventions emerge when players follow the decisions of the members of their own groups rather than their own private information. We show that: (i) if a convention develops in one group but not the other group, then the convention spills over via the common player; (ii) when conventions disagree, then the common player's decision breaks the convention in one group; and (iii) when no convention has developed, then the common player's decision triggers the same convention in both groups. We also show that information spillovers may reduce welfare and we investigate the surplus-maximizing timing of spillovers.

Stochastic adaptive dynamical games

In this paper, we consider two players zero-sum dynamical games in linear stochastic systems described by input-output model with unknown parameters, and with an ergodic output-tracking quadratic index. We combine the ideas of game theory and control theory as a modeling method, and investigate the corresponding stochastic adaptive game problems. There is few existing results related to such stochastic adaptive game problems, since uncertainty raises the difficulty of making decisions for both players. We attempt to cope with this problem by the ideas and methods of adaptive control. We will firstly use the standard least squares to estimate the unknown parameters, and then construct the adaptive strategy profile for both players by using the so-called ``certainty equivalence principle. We will prove that, the adaptive strategic profile makes the system globally stable, and that the action profile is an asymptotic Nash equilibrium solution to our game problem in a certain sense.

“Because if we don’t talk about it, how are we going to prevent it?”: Lucidity, a narrative-based digital game about sexual violence

This paper describes the development and evaluation of an interactive, narrative-based, multimedia game to promote learning and communication about sexual violence and health topics. High school-aged participants created the game concept in a three-week workshop, after which assets were assembled and refined by a university-based game design lab. The outcome, Lucidity, was a multimedia game with a nonlinear narrative that led to two different outcomes based on player decisions. The narrative followed the life of one character, an African American woman named Zaria who remembers and grapples with a sexual assault from her past. The player discovers parts of the story by reading comics, watching videos, navigating interactive websites and playing short videogames. The final evaluation consisted of gameplay, a post-game focus group and follow-up interviews. Twenty-four young people participated in three focus group discussions (n = 9, n = 5, n = 10); 23 participated in the follow-up interviews. Salient themes identified in the focus group discussions included: overall approval of the game, the acquisition of new knowledge and minimal past exposure to conversations or education about sexual violence. At follow-up, almost all (n = 22) had initiated a conversation about sexual violence with a parent, peer and/or teacher. Lucidity succeeded in engaging young people and facilitating communication with adults and peers regarding sexual violence and other sexual health topics. Ultimately, a game-based intervention such as this represents a feasible approach for introducing issues of sexual violence, with potential for future implementation in educational settings.

Evolving models of player decision making: Personas versus clones

The current paper investigates multiple approaches to modeling human decision making styles for procedural play-testing. Building on decision and persona theory we evolve game playing agents representing human decision making styles. Three kinds of agents are evolved from the same representation: procedural personas, evolved from game designer expert knowledge, clones, evolved from observations of human play and aimed at general behavioral replication, and specialized agents, also evolved from observation, but aimed at determining the maximal behavioral replication ability of the representation. These three methods are then compared on their ability to represent individual human decision makers. Comparisons are conducted using three different proposed metrics that address the problem of matching decisions at the action, tactical, and strategic levels. Results indicate that a small gallery of personas evolved from designer intuitions can capture human decision making styles equally well as clones evolved from human play-traces for the testbed game MiniDungeons.

Optimal Feed-In Tariff Policies: The Role of Technology Manufacturers

This paper models a multi-player environment comprising a grid operator responsible for meeting electricity demands, a photovoltaic (PV) manufacturer, customers who might install PV (solar) systems, and a regulator charged with setting an optimal feed-in tariff (FIT). The grid operator must meet exogenous electricity demand and also buy back all electricity (produced by PV systems) at the FIT set by a regulator, which seeks to minimize grid operator costs. Customers decide whether or not to invest in a PV system. Adoption rates affect the manufacturer and operator by (respectively) establishing the demand for PV and determining how much electricity is fed into the grid. The PV manufacturer's decision variable is the sales price per PV unit. The decisions of all players in the model are intertwined in a way that clearly affects their respective welfare. We demonstrate in particular how technology and market characteristics -- including PV manufacturing cost and market competition -- change the optimal decisions of players and thereby influence the effectiveness of FITs, the number of PV adopters, and the cost to provide the social benefit of on-demand electricity. Our findings confirm the importance of considering technology manufacturers when devising schemes to incentivize adoption of PV systems.

The Influence of Pre-Commitment and Associated Player-Card Technologies on Decision Making: Design, Research and Implementation Issues

This paper describes player knowledge, attitudes and practices associated with the use of cashless and card based gambling technologies in Australia and considers their influence on player decision making. The experience of gaming venues who have implemented these technologies is similarly considered. Factors that could maximise adoption success and deliver positive outcomes for these venues and their customers are explored. The evidence that unfolded during the two-stage qualitative study of these issues is presented with an emphasis on the implications of the findings for policy makers. Where appropriate, factors that might encourage partial and full use of these systems among players are highlighted. Finally, design, research and implementation issues related to mandatory and voluntary to use cashless and card based gambling schemes are discussed.

Transnational Sustainability Governance in the Global South: A Comparative Study of Producer Support in Brazil

A primary objective of transnational sustainability governance is to address governance failures in the global south. But little is known about the conditions under which producer groups in these countries participate in private regulation. To shed some light on this question, this article examines the decisions of key players in the Brazilian agriculture industry to support (not to support) transnational sustainability governance. Using a qualitative case study approach, the article explores how soybean producers first backed the Roundtable on Responsible Soy, but then decided to withdraw their support from the initiative. In the sugarcane sector, the dynamic was a very different one. After initial resistance, the principal industry association switched strategy and endorsed Bonsucro, making it the leading sustainability standard for sugarcane in Brazil. Through a within-in case analysis and cross-sector comparison, this article shows how southern producer groups responded to economic and regulatory changes in the global market place, in particular, a shift in trade flows and the adoption of public sustainability regulation in the global north.

Supply chain analysis under green sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract

In this paper, we explore supply chain coordination issues arising out of green supply chain initiatives and explore the impact of cost sharing contract on the key decisions of supply chain players undertaking green initiatives. Our motivation comes from firms conducting pioneering work in the area of carbon footprint reduction in their supply chains through product redesign. Through a game theoretic approach we show how product greening levels, prices and profits are influenced by cost sharing contract within the supply chains. We study two models of cost sharing – one in which the retailer offers a cost sharing contract and the other in which the retailer and manufacturer bargain on the cost sharing contract. We also study the impact of greening costs and consumer sensitivity towards green products. Our key contribution lies in modelling cost sharing contract and analysing its impact on a green supply chain. Our study contributes to the burgeoning field of green supply chains and collaboration between channel partners.

Pricing Competition and Channel Coordination in the Tourism Supply Chain with Optional Tours

The authors consider a tourism supply chain that consists of a tour operator in the source market and a local operator at the destination. The tour product is composed of predesigned tours and optional tours. Consumers are sensitive to the price and the availability of optional tours, represented as the ratio of optional tours. The authors analyse how the ratio of optional tours to predesigned tours affects each player's equilibrium decisions given three different consumer attitudes towards optional tours. They find that when the channel is coordinated and the ratio of optional tours is sufficiently large, the local operator may reduce commissions. To curb the impacts of lowering commissions, the authors introduce a tax mechanism aimed at optional tours. Numeral examples are provided to illustrate the pricing impacts of optional tours.

해석수준이론에 기반한 기능성 게임 효과 증대 방안 연구

최근 기능성 게임의 긍정적인 영향에 대한 결과가 부각되면서 그에 대한 연구와 개발이 활성화 되고 있다. 기능성 게임은 기획단계에서부터 의도적인 목적을 가진 게임으로, 이용자에 대한 설득과 그에 따른 의식과 행동의 변화를 추구한다. 따라서 그러한 설득 효과를 극대화하기 위해서는 기능성 게임에서 이용자들이 선택적 행위를 하는 과정 속에서 작동하는 심리적 요소들을 정리하고 이에 대한 효율적 방안을 제시할 필요가 있다. 그러나 이용자들의 선택과 관련한 관점들을 고려하고 그에 따른 태도와 행위의 결과를 이론적으로 접근한 연구는 부족한 상황이다. 본 연구에서는 이용자들의 심리적 거리 관념을 중심으로 그에 따른 행위에 중점을 두는 해석수준이론을 적용하여, 기능성 게임에 개괄적으로 적용할 수 있는

Decision support of Bad Player Identification in MOBA Games using PageRank based Evidence Accumulation and Normal Distribution based Confidence Interval

On-line game service is the hottest game genre today, and one of major on-line game is MOBA (multiplayer online battle arena) game. In MOBA games, the collaboration of team players and team strategy are vital elements together, besides the individual player's game control capability. Thus important issue for the MOBA service providers is to detect bad players showing abnormal plays or appearances in games with embedded malicious intentions. Previous approach had been presented to cope with such players; however they have not yet shown any promising results to judge each player. In this paper, we propose an efficient and automatic abnormal player decision support scheme using PageRank and normal distribution to find and judge bad players. Our scheme computes BPR (bad player ranking) for each user, and BPR can be used in service provider’s final decision to decide a specific user as an abnormal player. Our scheme has main advantage that it requires small computational efforts to identify bad players, because we utilize PageRank algorithm which shows efficient computation and information search capability.

Product Greening, Competition and Cooperation Under Environmental Regulations

In this paper we explore the effect of environmental regulations and costs of greening on firms. Our problem deals with the case of a single firm, a duopoly and the case of cooperation between them. We use these market settings to study the pricing and greening decision of players under environmental regulations and increasing costs. We also analyze their impact on consumers. Further, we explore several contracts between the players under competition. Through this problem we address the burgeoning challenges that firms face in the presence of competition and environmental regulations. This research lays the platform for future work in the area of ‘green’ product pricing, environmental contract design mechanisms and study of impact of environmental regulations on firms and supply chains.

Newsvendor Problem Experiments: Riskiness of the Decisions and Learning by Experience

We describe the results of three controlled (multi–rounds) experiments in which the players made decisions on purchasing products by fixed price and further selling under demand uncertainty. In our experiments we have introduced the competition; if a player has a lot of product ordered, he could win over buyers away from his competitor. We study the rationality of decisions and the learning by experience. Analysis shows that in each round the average decision of players was more aggressive (risky) than the optimal decision obtained under the assumption that the players maximize the expected profit. But by the end of the experiments the variance of the individual decisions decreased, so the choice of decision was more confident and conscious.