Deception Research Research Articles

Lessons From Pinocchio: Cues to Deception May Be Highly Exaggerated

Deception researchers widely acknowledge that cues to deception—observable behaviors that may differ between truthful and deceptive messages—tend to be weak. Nevertheless, several deception cues have been reported with unusually large effect sizes, and some researchers have advocated the use of such cues as tools for detecting deceit and assessing credibility in practical contexts. By examining data from empirical deception-cue research and using a series of Monte Carlo simulations, I demonstrate that many estimated effect sizes of deception cues may be greatly inflated by publication bias, small numbers of estimates, and low power. Indeed, simulations indicate the informational value of the present deception literature is quite low, such that it is not possible to determine whether any given effect is real or a false positive. I warn against the hazards of relying on potentially illusory cues to deception and offer some recommendations for improving the state of the science of deception.

Detecting Lies via a Theme-Selection Strategy

Most of deception research has focused on past events that were either completely truthful or a complete fabrication. However, people often tell a mixture of truths and lies. This could enable investigators to make within-subjects comparisons between different themes discussed in one interview, which we examined in the current experiment. Seventy-three participants took part in the experiment and were asked to either tell the truth about two themes, or to tell the truth about one theme and lie about the second theme in a HUMINT setting. Results showed that examining the differences in the amount of detail provided by the interviewees for each theme- obtained through a Theme-Selection strategy (a within-subjects measure)- yielded stronger results than examining differences between truth tellers and liars based on the entire interview without accounting for themes (between-subjects measure). The present study therefore highlighted the effectiveness of within-subjects measurements to both discriminate truth tellers from liars and to discover which section of a statement is false.

Introduction: Cons and Scams in Science and Medicine

Introduction:Cons and Scams in Science and Medicine Heidi Hausse (bio) science and medicine represent broad areas in which cons and scams can affect lives at every level of society. Within science, a scam can influence the ways in which we understand and treat the natural world around us. A medical scam, by contrast, can transform the way we understand and treat our own bodies. In both cases, the stakes for differentiating between evidence-based theory earnestly presented and the con intended to swindle could not be higher. The ramifications for failing to distinguish between the two can be broad or incredibly intimate: from ill-advised government policy and spending to what a person chooses to eat for breakfast. But how do we decide what is a scam in the fields of science and medicine? The waters here are murkier than they might initially appear. First, there is a way in which deceit is practiced in science and medicine that is fairly acceptable in routine ways. Many researchers argue that the use of deception to conduct clinical trials, for instance, is necessary to reach honest findings. Deceiving participants about whether the nature of the study will affect their behavior, particularly in double-blind studies of drug treatments, is an accepted protocol intended to prevent bias from skewing the results. One might argue that what separates the ethics of routine forms of deception in research from blatant charlatanism is the intention to establish truth through duplicity. [End Page 859] The question of intention, however, leads us to another way in which defining a scam is problematic: the existence of individuals who believe, or at least partially believe, in the "scientific" theory or miracle cure they are presenting to the public. Genuine belief on the part of those who are promoting a new idea or a new drug makes it all the more complicated for those around them to dismiss what is being presented. Is someone who believes in the truth or efficacy of what they are selling really scamming others? It would seem that while such things as wishful thinking, genuine belief, intentional deceit, and—of course—the drive for self-gain may all be part of our under-standing of what a con may look like, how these fit together, and what they mean for how we recognize a scam, are not so straightforward. Scamming in the fields of medicine and science is a multilayered issue that challenges us to scrutinize the categories we use to identify and discuss deception. The papers by Daniel Kevles and Nina Shapiro approach this challenge in quite different but equally fruitful ways. Both authors work from the implicit assumption that a scam, regardless of the knowledge or intentions of its author, promotes a theory or treatment that is either ineffective or harmful. Kevles's paper introduces readers to the problem of "scientific charlatanism" and efforts to unmask scientific charlatans in the United States during the second half of the nineteenth century. Particularly in his analysis of the geologist John Wesley Powell's battle to convince both government officials and the public that the arid lands of the American West were not conducive to settlement, Kevles reveals that recognizing and defining charlatanism is a process—an ongoing debate between supporters and detractors. In this debate, charlatanism becomes a moving target that does not develop into a fixed point generally agreed upon until enough time has passed to vindicate one side or the other. Kevles and Shapiro both cite the influencing factors of economic and even political pressure that might persuade scientists, medical professionals, and politicians to choose to advocate for what is desirable and convenient over a less appealing theory or set of data results. Shapiro's paper goes further to engage with the vulnerabilities of the [End Page 860] general public in the United States today that render the average person susceptible to scammers. Although Shapiro views a yearning for the strange and miraculous as a timeless and fundamental aspect of human nature, she shows that twenty-first century technologies of mass media and communication—whether a flashing banner on a webpage or a tweet from a celebrity—are spreading misinformation that is increasingly...

Measuring Deception: A Look at Antecedents to Deceptive Intent

Abstract A Deceptive Belief Inventory scale is developed and validated using 10 first-order factors to represent 3 second-order constructs (deception confidence, duping delight, and guiltless deception). A new theoretical model describing how deception confidence, duping delight, and guiltless deception may influence a person’s intent to deceive others is also tested. Traditional deceptive communication research has focused on situation-specific factors surrounding deception. This study focuses on understanding and assessing a person’s propensity to deceive others. The findings of this study can be used to better understand the factors that may influence a person’s reported propensity to deceive and ultimately be used to improve security procedures designed to protect critical information systems.

Deception and truth detection when analyzing nonverbal and verbal cues

SummaryIn this article, I present my view on the significant developments and theoretical/empirical tipping points in nonverbal and verbal deception and lie detection from the last 30 years and on prospects for future research in this domain. I discuss three major shifts in deception detection research: (a) From observing target persons' nonverbal behavior to analyzing their speech; (b) from lie detection based on differences between truth tellers and liars' levels of arousal to lie detection based on the different cognitive processes or strategies adopted to appear convincing; and (c) from passively observing target persons to actively interviewing them to elicit or enhance verbal cues to deceit. Finally, I discuss my ideas for future research, focusing on initiatives from my own lab. Hopefully, this will stimulate other researchers to explore innovative ideas in the verbal deception research domain, which already has seen so much progress in the last decade.

Registered Replication Report on Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008)

The self-concept maintenance theory holds that many people will cheat in order to maximize self-profit, but only to the extent that they can do so while maintaining a positive self-concept. Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008, Experiment 1) gave participants an opportunity and incentive to cheat on a problem-solving task. Prior to that task, participants either recalled the Ten Commandments (a moral reminder) or recalled 10 books they had read in high school (a neutral task). Results were consistent with the self-concept maintenance theory. When given the opportunity to cheat, participants given the moral-reminder priming task reported solving 1.45 fewer matrices than did those given a neutral prime (Cohen’s d = 0.48); moral reminders reduced cheating. Mazar et al.’s article is among the most cited in deception research, but their Experiment 1 has not been replicated directly. This Registered Replication Report describes the aggregated result of 25 direct replications (total N = 5,786), all of which followed the same preregistered protocol. In the primary meta-analysis (19 replications, total n = 4,674), participants who were given an opportunity to cheat reported solving 0.11 more matrices if they were given a moral reminder than if they were given a neutral reminder (95% confidence interval = [−0.09, 0.31]). This small effect was numerically in the opposite direction of the effect observed in the original study (Cohen’s d = −0.04).

The first direct replication on using verbal credibility assessment for the detection of deceptive intentions.

Verbal deception detection has gained momentum as a technique to tell truth‐tellers from liars. At the same time, researchers' degrees of freedom make it hard to assess the robustness of effects. Replication research can help evaluate how reproducible an effect is. We present the first replication in verbal deception research whereby ferry passengers were instructed to tell the truth or lie about their travel plans. The original study found truth‐tellers to include more specific time references in their answers. The replication study that closely mimicked the setting, procedure, materials, coding, and analyses found no lie–truth difference for specific time references. Although the power of our replication study was suboptimal (0.77), Bayesian statistics showed evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. Given the great applied consequences of verbal credibility tests, we hope this first replication attempt ignites much needed preregistered, high‐powered, multilab replication efforts.

Deception in Management Accounting Experimental Research: “A Tricky Issue” Revisited

ABSTRACTManagement accounting (MA) scholars generally accept that our subject matter requires a multidisciplinary approach. Broadly speaking, there are two main views from different base disciplines about experimental deception: “deception if necessary” (social psychology) and “deception should be banned” (experimental economics). We aim to develop a common understanding within the MA research community about what constitutes deceptive research practice. We review arguments supporting the two main views and analyze the transfer of their norms into MA research. We develop a framework that evaluates the need for and potential consequences of using deception. Our analysis implies careful consideration of the decision to employ deception and case-by-case editorial review of experiments employing deception are necessary. In the long run, the MA research community may consider if an explicit policy on the role of deception in MA research is warranted or whether a case-by-case approach, as advocated by us as an interim measure, is sufficient.

Deceptively dodging questions: A theoretical note on issues of perception and detection

Dodging questions pervades human interaction, including interpersonal interactions, relational conversations, media interviews and political debates. Variously referred to as equivocation, evasion, obfuscation, strategic ambiguity and topic avoidance, among other terms, the concept has a rich history in the communication literature. Covertly dodging questions presents serious social and political problems. This essay focuses on theoretical issues of dodging, specifically the ability for a person to change the subject with an irrelevant answer. Discussion primarily draws upon Grice’s theory of conversational implicature and deception research inspired by Grice. Theoretical impediments to detecting dodges are discussed, as well as barriers to accuracy from the perspective of discourse analysts and societal perceptions.

The Role of Consistency in Detecting Deception: The Superiority of Correspondence over Coherence

Inconsistency is often considered an indication of deceit. The conceptualization of consistency used in deception research, however, has not made a clear distinction between two concepts long differentiated by philosophers: coherence and correspondence. The existing literature suggests that coherence is not generally useful for deception detection. Correspondence, however, appears to be quite useful. The present research developed a model of how correspondence is utilized to make judgments, and this article reports on four studies designed to elaborate on the model. The results suggest that judges attend strongly to correspondence and that they do so in an additive fashion. As noncorrespondent information accumulates, an increasingly smaller proportion of judges make truthful assessments of guilty suspects. This work provides a basic framework for examining how information is utilized to make deception judgments and forms the correspondence and coherence module of truth-default theory.

Contextual Effects on Online Pragmatic Inferences of Deception

ABSTRACTWhere the veracity of a statement is in question, listeners tend to interpret disfluency as signaling dishonesty. Previous research in deception suggests that this results from a speaker model, linking lying to cognitive effort and effort to disfluency. However, the disfluency–lying bias occurs very quickly: Might listeners instead simply heuristically associate disfluency with lying? To investigate this, we look at whether listeners’ disfluency–lying biases are sensitive to context. Participants listened to a potentially dishonest speaker describe treasure as being behind a named object while viewing scenes comprising the referent (the named object) and a distractor. Their task was to click on the treasure’s suspected true location. In line with previous work, participants clicked on the distractor more following disfluent descriptions, and this effect corresponded to an early fixation bias, demonstrating the online nature of the pragmatic judgment. The present study, however, also manipulated the presence of an alternative, local cause of speaker disfluency: the speaker momentarily distracted by a car horn. When disfluency could be attributed to speaker distraction, participants initially fixated more on the referent, only later fixating on and selecting the distractor. These findings support the speaker modeling view, showing that listeners can take momentary contextual causes of disfluency into account.

A Teachable Ethics Scandal

In this article, I describe a recent scandal involving collusion between officials at the American Psychological Association (APA) and the U.S. Department of Defense, which appears to have enabled the torture of detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. The scandal is a relevant, complex, and engaging case that teachers can use in a variety of courses. Details of the scandal exemplify a number of psychological concepts, including obedience, groupthink, terror management theory, group influence, and motivation. The scandal can help students understand several factors that make ethical decision-making difficult, including stress, emotions, and cognitive factors such as loss aversion, anchoring, framing, and ethical fading. I conclude by exploring some parallels between the current torture scandal and the development of APA’s ethics guidelines regarding the use of deception in research.

Deception detection based on neuroimaging: Better than the polygraph?

Abstract Polygraph tests have been used to detect deception for almost a century. Yet for almost as long, the validity of these tests has been criticized. Over the last decade, the use of brain imaging – most notably fMRI - for the detection of deception has attracted increased attention. The expectation is that fMRI can overcome – at least some of - the shortcomings of the polygraph. In this review, we discuss whether this expectation is warranted. Based on our review of the empirical evidence, we argue that fMRI deception research has boosted the theory development of deception. But for practical purposes, fMRI research has thus far done surprisingly little to solve or circumvent the problems than have been associated with deception research for ages.

Deception in Management Accounting Experimental Research: A Tricky Issuee Revisited

Management accounting scholars generally accept the proposition that our subject matter requires a multi-disciplinary approach to study. The question of what are appropriate norms for conducting research in that environment is not as clear as it may be in more homogenous research communities. One research methods issue that has become more controversial in recent years in our literature is the appropriateness of the experimenter deceiving experimental participants. Broadly speaking there are two main positions about experimental deception: from a psychology perspective “deception if necessary” and from an experimental economics perspective “deception should be banned.” Our goal is to deepen and develop a common understanding within the management accounting research community about what constitutes deceptive research practices. We review the viewpoints and arguments supporting the views of the two base disciplines and the transfer of their norms to management accounting research. We develop a framework for analyzing the need for and potential consequences of using deception in management accounting research. Our analysis implies the need for careful case-by-case consideration, ex ante by researchers and ex post by journal editors, of experiments employing deception in light of the considerations raised in this article. In the longer run, our analysis suggests that the management accounting research community may need to consider if a more explicit policy statement on the role of deception in management accounting research is warranted or whether a case-by-case approach as advocated by us as an interim measure is sufficient.

Parental Deception: Perceived Effects on Parent-Child Relationships

Deception research has recently begun to examine its occurrence within parent-child relationships. The use and consequence of parental deception on the parent-child relationship remains unclear. The current study examined the effects of parental lies on the parent-child relationship. Questionnaires were provided to 276 participants that asked them to indicate their satisfaction with their parents, what kinds of lies parents have told, the seriousness of the lies, and how the lies affected their relationship. Findings revealed a negative correlation between parental deception and satisfaction, and parents were rated most likely to use white lies than any other types. The implications of the use of deception within parent-child relationships are discussed.

Market Research Deception

Market Research Deception

Can deception be desirable?

Critics of deception in research allege harm to society, the discipline of psychology, the researchers and participants. However, neither empirical findings nor a ‘reasonable-person’ test seem to support those allegations. By and large, researchers who use deception consider its costs and benefits, and the kind and degree of deceit that is typically used in psychology is of a benevolent type. Moreover, participants prefer to participate in deception research rather than its non-deceptive alternatives. In the light of these premises, we argue that deception can be desirable, especially when considering cost and benefits to research participants.

Strategic Interviewing to Detect Deception: Cues to Deception across Repeated Interviews.

Previous deception research on repeated interviews found that liars are not less consistent than truth tellers, presumably because liars use a “repeat strategy” to be consistent across interviews. The goal of this study was to design an interview procedure to overcome this strategy. Innocent participants (truth tellers) and guilty participants (liars) had to convince an interviewer that they had performed several innocent activities rather than committing a mock crime. The interview focused on the innocent activities (alibi), contained specific central and peripheral questions, and was repeated after 1 week without forewarning. Cognitive load was increased by asking participants to reply quickly. The liars’ answers in replying to both central and peripheral questions were significantly less accurate, less consistent, and more evasive than the truth tellers’ answers. Logistic regression analyses yielded classification rates ranging from around 70% (with consistency as the predictor variable), 85% (with evasive answers as the predictor variable), to over 90% (with an improved measure of consistency that incorporated evasive answers as the predictor variable, as well as with response accuracy as the predictor variable). These classification rates were higher than the interviewers’ accuracy rate (54%).

Love Slaves and Wonder Women: Radical Feminism and Social Reform in the Psychology of William Moulton Marston

In contemporary histories of psychology, William Moulton Marston is remembered for helping develop the lie detector test. He is better remembered in the history of popular culture for creating the comic book superhero Wonder Woman. In his time, however, he contributed to psychological research in deception, basic emotions, abnormal psychology, sexuality, and consciousness. He was also a radical feminist with connections to women's rights movements. Marston's work is an instructive case for philosophers of science on the relation between science and values. Although Marston's case provides further evidence of the role that feminist values can play in scientific work, it also poses challenges to philosophical accounts of value-laden science. Marston's work exemplifies standard views about feminist value-laden research in that his feminist values help him both to criticize the research of others and create novel psychological concepts and research techniques. His scientific work includes an account of the nature of psycho-emotional health that leads to normative conclusions for individual values and conduct and for society and culture, a direction of influence that is relatively under-theorized in the literature. To understand and evaluate Marston's work requires an approach that treats science and values as mutually influencing; it also requires that we understand the relationship between science advising and political advocacy in value-laden science.

Automated decoding of facial expressions reveals marked differences in children when telling antisocial versus prosocial lies

The current study used computer vision technology to examine the nonverbal facial expressions of children (6–11years old) telling antisocial and prosocial lies. Children in the antisocial lying group completed a temptation resistance paradigm where they were asked not to peek at a gift being wrapped for them. All children peeked at the gift and subsequently lied about their behavior. Children in the prosocial lying group were given an undesirable gift and asked if they liked it. All children lied about liking the gift. Nonverbal behavior was analyzed using the Computer Expression Recognition Toolbox (CERT), which employs the Facial Action Coding System (FACS), to automatically code children’s facial expressions while lying. Using CERT, children’s facial expressions during antisocial and prosocial lying were accurately and reliably differentiated significantly above chance-level accuracy. The basic expressions of emotion that distinguished antisocial lies from prosocial lies were joy and contempt. Children expressed joy more in prosocial lying than in antisocial lying. Girls showed more joy and less contempt compared with boys when they told prosocial lies. Boys showed more contempt when they told prosocial lies than when they told antisocial lies. The key action units (AUs) that differentiate children’s antisocial and prosocial lies are blink/eye closure, lip pucker, and lip raise on the right side. Together, these findings indicate that children’s facial expressions differ while telling antisocial versus prosocial lies. The reliability of CERT in detecting such differences in facial expression suggests the viability of using computer vision technology in deception research.