Overt acquisition of nuclear weapons capacity by India and Pakistan in May 1998 signalled a tectonic shift in the nature of subcontinental conflicts. India’s military superiority in the region and its strategic depth got considerably weakened due to Pakistan’s attainment of strategic parity vis-à-vis India. In the wake of overt nuclearisation, the logic of nuclear deterrence in subcontinental security dynamics was also questioned because of continued security instability, evident in instances like the military impasse of 2001–2002. Hence, the subject of nuclearisation of subcontinental security began to capture wider spaces in the political debates in India. This strategic decision, having been taken by a coalition government, imparted enormous complexities to the domestic political exchanges over the security dynamics of the subcontinent. It also drastically transformed the nature and content of India’s domestic politics, as it brought strategic issues and foreign policy agenda of the government into the political parlance of the common people.
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