De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes Research Articles

Has Egypt’s Exchange Rate Policy Changed after the Float?

The Central Bank of Egypt announced the flotation of the Egyptian Pound in January 2003. Yet, the somewhat stable exchange rate raises questions about its actual role in monetary policy. This paper assesses whether exchange policy significantly changed after the float. It first applies cointegration methodology using monthly data from 1981 to 2008 to show that there is a long-run relationship between the LE/US$ exchange rate and monetary fundamentals. A vector error-correction model shows that the speed of exchange rate adjustment to long-run equilibrium is slow and that there has not been a significant change in exchange rate determination after the float. Finally, Egypt’s de facto exchange rate regime could be classified as “fixed” for several years after the de jure float was announced.

Democracy and International Exchange Rate Regime Commitments

Are more democratic governments associated with a larger or smaller gap between their de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes? This paper argues that more democratic governments should be associated with a larger gap because they need to use exchange rate regime commitments and actual exchange rate stability as short-term political substitutes in order to response to divided societal pressure coming through both the voter/electoral channel and the special interest channel, unlike more autocratic governments that face only one-sided political pressure through the special interest channel. Using various country/year democracy indicators and two different de facto regime measures, the statistical results show that not only are more democratic governments associated with a larger absolute regime gap, they are also associated with a larger gap in both possible directions: more actual stability than expected when they have a more flexible de jure regime and less actual stability than expected when they have a more fixed de jure regime.

Exchange rate regime verification: An alternative method of testing for regime changes

This work proposes a change in persistence test for identifying de facto exchange rate regime changes. The results from 25 African countries show that this approach is able to identify some regime changes not captured by existing methods.

Responding to the global financial crisis: Vietnamese exchange rate policy, 2008–2009

The paper presents an analysis of exchange rate policy in Vietnam during 2008–2009. In early 2008, the country faced a sudden reversal of capital flows as signs of developing domestic vulnerabilities became evident. The downward pressure on the dong then intensified with the onset of the global financial crisis in the fall. In these environments, the Vietnamese authorities responded with various exchange rate policy measures. The paper documents a shift in Vietnam's de facto exchange rate regime, from a basket peg to a simple US dollar peg, when the domestic vulnerabilities became compounded by the evolving global crisis. The authorities utilized additional measures to relieve pressure on the parallel exchange rate. An event study methodology finds little evidence of systematic effectiveness for these policy actions; any effectiveness was short-lived. A close examination of individual actions suggests that the impact of foreign exchange market intervention appeared more consistent than any other type of measure and most effective when combined with other measures.

Identifying the De Facto Exchange Rate Regime for Moldova: A State-Space Approach

It has been noted that there is an inconsistency between the Moldovan monetary authorities' declared pursuit of price stability and the de facto exchange rate peg. This paper looks into the exchange rate regime of the Moldovan leu (MDL) aiming to identify the de facto regime, to test whether it differs from the de jure regime stipulated by legislation, whether it can be described by a basket peg (and, if so, to determine the composition of this basket), and whether the regime has been stable over time. The methodology used in our analysis is the celebrated Frankel-Wei regression, to which we apply a Kalman filter algorithm. We show that the MDL generally follows a peg to the US dollar with varying implicit weight and fluctuation bands. Surprisingly, despite the large share of euro-denominated transactions on the Moldovan exchange market, and an even larger share of euro-denominated assets, the euro has never exhibited any statistically significant weight.

Foreign Direct Investment and Exchange Rate Regimes

The paper uses a comprehensive data set with bilateral direct investment flows and establishes the influence of the de-facto exchange rate regime for FDI flows. We find a strong and significant effect from fixed rates on bilateral FDI flows in developed economies, but no significant effect for developing countries. There is thus no general and uniform impact of stable exchange rates on FDI. We provide several possible explanations for this difference.

Testing, monitoring, and dating structural changes in exchange rate regimes

Linear regression models for de facto exchange rate regime classification are complemented by inferential techniques for evaluating the stability of the regimes. To simultaneously assess parameter instabilities in the regression coefficients and the error variance an (approximately) normal regression model is adopted and a unified toolbox for testing, monitoring, and dating structural changes is provided for general (quasi-)likelihood-based regression models. Subsequently, the toolbox is employed for investigating the Chinese exchange rate regime after China gave up on a fixed exchange rate to the US dollar in 2005 and for tracking the evolution of the Indian exchange rate regime from 1993 until 2008.

De facto exchange rate regimes and currency crises: Are pegged regimes with capital account liberalization really more prone to speculative attacks?

This paper empirically examines whether de facto exchange rate regimes affect the occurrence of currency crises in 84 countries over the 1980–2001 period by using the probit model. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find that pegged regimes significantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises compared with floating regimes. By using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find interesting evidence that pegged regimes with capital account liberalization significantly lower the likelihood of currency crises compared with other regimes. These results are robust to a wide variety of samples and models. From the standpoint of the macroeconomic policy trilemma, we can conjecture that pegged regimes with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to speculative attacks because they can enhance greater credibility in their currencies by abandoning monetary policy autonomy.

Exchange rate regimes, capital controls, and currency crises: Does the bipolar view hold?

This paper empirically examines the link between de facto exchange rate regimes and the incidence of currency crises in 84 countries from 1980 to 2001 using probit models. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find no evidence that, as the bipolar view argues, intermediate regimes have a significantly higher probability of currency crises than both hard pegs and free floats. Using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find that hard pegs with capital account liberalization have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than intermediate regimes with capital controls and free floats with capital controls. Hence, the bipolar view does not strictly hold in the sense that intermediate regimes are significantly more prone to currency crises than the two extreme regimes. However, the fact that hard pegs with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to currency crises is worthy of note.

Implicit exchange regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: a first exploration

This paper attempts to identify implicit exchange rate regimes for currencies of the Central and Eastern European Countries vis-a-vis the euro. To that end, we apply a sequential procedure that considers the dynamics of exchange rates to data covering the period from 1977:01 to 2006:02. Our results would suggest that implicit bands have existed in many subperiods for almost all currencies under study. Once we detect de facto discrepancies between de facto and de iure exchange rate regimes, we propose a model in order to explain these decisions. Our results suggest a positive association between the previous inflation rate and the probability of a peg with the euro, and a negative association with past unemployment rate.

Fear of Floating and Pegging: A Simultaneous Choice Model of De Jure and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries

We present an analysis of the determinants of de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes based on a panel probit model with simultaneous equations. The model is estimated using simulation-based maximum likelihood methods. The empirical results suggest a triangular structure of the model such that the choice of de facto regimes depends on the choice of de jure regimes but not vice versa. This gives rise to a novel interpretation of regime discrepancies.

Estimation of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes: Synthesis of the Techniques for Inferring Flexibility and Basket Weights

This paper offers a new approach to estimate countries’ de facto exchange rate regimes, a synthesis of two techniques. One is a technique that the authors have used in the past to estimate implicit de facto weights when the hypothesis is a basket peg with little flexibility. The second is a technique used by others to estimate the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility when the hypothesis is an anchor to the dollar or some other single major currency, but with a possibly substantial degree of flexibility around that anchor. Because many currencies today follow variants of band-basket-crawl, it is important to have available a technique that can cover both dimensions, inferring weights and flexibility. We try out the technique on some 20 currencies over the period 1980–2007. Most are currencies that have officially used baskets as anchors for at least part of this sample period. But a few are known floaters or known simple peggers. In general, the synthesis technique seems to work as it should.

Testing the Hollowing-Out Thesis

In recent years, many economists have argued that governments are discarding pegged exchange rates in favor of alternative exchange rate regimes such as monetary unions and currency boards on the one hand, or floating exchange rates on the other. Capital mobility, such economists argue, has made pegged exchange rates costly to maintain for long periods, and thus the pegging option is being “hollowed-out.” Few, however, have tried to present evidence that capital mobility has a direct effect on exchange rate regime choices. I present two sets of tests using different measures of capital mobility that provide qualified confirmation that developing countries peg less as capital mobility rises. These tests indicate that direct measures of capital mobility have some correlation with de facto exchange rate regimes but not with de jure exchange rate regimes. Capital flows, a consequence of capital mobility, may have a direct effect on the choices of both de jure and de facto regimes. Governments do not make changes in their declared exchange rate policies in rational anticipation of the growing costs of pegging associated with increasing capital mobility. Rather, governments normally adapt their declared exchange rate policies after capital flows have increased and actual exchange rates have become more difficult to manage. The tests also indicate that hollowing-out has not only been the result of systemic factors such as increasing capital mobility and capital flows, but also due to domestic factors such as growing public sector indebtedness and the spread of democracy.

Economic and Socio-Political Determinants of de Facto Monetary Institutions and Inflationary Outcomes

In this paper we estimate a model where inflation, a measure of de facto central bank independence and an index of de facto exchange rate regime are simultaneously determined by a set of economic, political and institutional variables. De facto central bank independence is hampered by socio-political turbulence and benefits from the balance of powers between the executive and the parliament. Inflation is explained by de facto central bank independence, by the level and volatility of public expenditure and by the de facto exchange rate regime. Openness (real and financial) affects inflation through the exchange rate regime channel. Success in controlling inflation, in turn is crucial to sustain central bank independence and exchange rate stability.

Estimation of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes: Synthesis of the Techniques for Inferring Flexibility and Basket Weights

The paper offers a new approach to estimate de facto exchange rate regimes, a synthesis of two techniques. One is a technique that the authors have used in the past to estimate implicit de facto weights when the hypothesis is a basket peg with little flexibility. The second is a technique used by others to estimate the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility when the hypothesis is an anchor to the dollar or some other single major currency, but with a possibly-substantial degree of flexibility around that anchor. Since many currencies today follow variants of Band-Basket-Crawl, it is important to have available a technique that can cover both dimensions, inferring weights and inferring flexibility. We try out the technique on twenty-some currencies, over the period 1980-2007. Most are currencies that have officially used baskets as anchors for at least part of this sample period. But a few are known floaters or known simple peggers. In general the synthesis technique seems to work as it should.

Managing in the Middle: Characterizing Singapore's Exchange Rate Policy*

It is by now common knowledge that there can be a significant divergence in the de facto versus de jure exchange rate regimes operated by economies. Although much of the recent published literature in Asia has focused on the crisis‐hit economies, Korea and Thailand in particular, scant attention has been paid to Singapore, which officially targets its nominal effective exchange rate (around a band). The present paper examines the degree of exchange rate intervention for Singapore using various methods of assessing de facto exchange rate regimes. In the main, we show that although the Singapore dollar is primarily influenced by the US dollar, in keeping with its de jure classification of a basket pegged regime, other major currencies, such as the yen and the euro, also impact the Singapore dollar. There is also evidence to indicate that Singapore uses the nominal effective exchange rate strategically as a policy instrument to satisfy domestic inflation objectives.

EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND TRADE

A ‘new version’ of the gravity model is used to estimate the effect of a full range of de facto exchange rate regimes on bilateral trade. The results indicate that, while participation in a common currency union is typically strongly ‘pro‐trade’, other exchange rate regimes which lower the exchange rate uncertainty and transactions costs associated with international trade are significantly more pro‐trade than the default regime of a ‘double float’. They suggest that the direct and indirect trade‐creating effects of these regimes on uncertainty and transactions costs tend to outweigh the trade‐diverting substitution effects. Tariff‐equivalent monetary barriers associated with each exchange rate regime are also calculated.

Oil-Price Shocks and Macroeconomic Adjustments: Does the Exchange Rate Regime Matter?

The recurring oil-price shocks that hit all economies in the world provide an opportunity to empirically test Friedman's hypothesis that flexible exchange regimes better absorb real external shocks. Using a sample of nine of the OECD's major oil-importing countries and Reinhart and Rogoff's de facto classification of exchange rate regimes, this paper examines whether the response of real output, prices, interest rate, and the real exchange rate to real oil-price shocks differ across exchange rate regimes. The results show that price level and the real exchange rate exhibit smoother adjustment to their long-run equilibrium when the de facto exchange rate regime was flexible. The paper also finds feedback from the real effective exchange rate and inflation rate to the domestic-currency real oil-price, supporting the growing notion that oil-price shocks are not purely exogenous to developed economies.

Exchange rate regimes in Central and East European countries: Deeds vs. words

We analyze whether de facto exchange rate regimes match de jure regimes in six Central and East European countries. Our first approach is based on the analysis of volatilities of exchange rates, reserves, and interest rates. In the second approach, we analyze movements of the exchange rate compared to those of possible anchor currencies. Our results indicate that Slovenia followed a crawling peg to the Deutsche mark and later to the euro de facto, but the evidence is less clear for the Romanian regime. We confirm that the Polish and the Hungarian regimes are close to the announced ones de facto, although we find some degree of implicit euro targeting for the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (3) (2006) 467–483.

The interaction between capital controls and exchange rate regimes: evidence from developing countries

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the interaction between capital controls and exchange rate policies in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. We estimate a simultaneous-equations panel mixed logit model for the joint determination of two decisions. We find strong influences from de jure exchange rate regimes on capital account policies but somewhat weaker feedback impacts. With de facto exchange rate regimes the influences in both directions are similar to each other.