De Anima Research Articles

Colloquium 1 Commentary on Gabor

Abstract This paper gives a brief discussion of the problem of ascribing authorship to ancient philosophical texts when there is evidence both for and against traditional ascription. The case in point is tradition’s claim that Simplicius is the author of the De Anima commentary. It is argued here that, while Gabor provides new and important methodological evidence for Simplicius’s authorship, we should not expect certainty. It is suggested that, in cases where historical fact may never be ascertained, we will be better served by the notion of credences.

Aristotle on the Unity of the Nutritive and Reproductive Functions

Abstract In De Anima 2.4, Aristotle claims that nutritive soul encompasses two distinct biological functions: nutrition and reproduction. We challenge a pervasive interpretation which posits ‘nutrients’ as the correlative object (antikeimenon) of the nutritive capacity. Instead, the shared object of nutrition and reproduction is that which is nourished and reproduced: the ensouled body, qua ensouled. Both functions aim at preserving this object, and thus at preserving the form, life, and being of the individual organism. In each case, we show how Aristotle’s detailed biological analysis supports this ontological argument.

Dividing Science by Ten

Abstract The Ġāyat al-ḥakīm (“the Aim of the Sage”), the Arab ancestor of the celebrated Picatrix on astral magic, includes a curious tenfold classification of the sciences, with five disciplines said to be compulsory “for the legislators” and five “for the philosopher”. This classification was once described by Hellmut Ritter and Martin Plessner as “ein Unikum in der umfangreichen Einteilungsliteratur”. This paper is a survey of medieval texts concerned with a tenfold classification of the sciences, ranging from a wide collection of sources including the world chronicles of Agapius and Girgīs al-Makīn, the Ādāb al-falāsifa, the Sindbādnāma, the Pseudo-Avicennian alchemical De anima, and Roger Bacon’s edition of the Secretum Secretorum. It appears from this survey that the Ādāb al-falāsifa certainly played a crucial role in the transmission of these traditions, but that other texts, in particular amongst the Pseudo-Aristotelian Hermetica, may have been influential as well. Regarding the ultimate origin of this material we are reduced to mere speculations, although various elements invite us to consider Middle Persian literature as a more plausible formative stage than Greek literature in the conception of tenfold classifications of knowledge.

Aristotle on God's Life-Generating Power and on Pneuma as Its Vehicle by Abraham P. Bos

Reviewed by: Aristotle on God's Life-Generating Power and on Pneuma as Its Vehicle by Abraham P. Bos Ignacio De Ribera-Martin BOS, Abraham P. Aristotle on God's Life-Generating Power and on Pneuma as Its Vehicle. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2018. vi + 333 pp. Cloth, $95.00; paper $29.95 One of the most intriguing and disputed questions in Aristotle is the nature of pneuma and the role it plays in his philosophy. In this book, against the widely accepted and longstanding standard interpretation, and recapitulating many years of personal research, A. P. Bos defends his novel view of the centrality of pneuma in Aristotle's philosophy as the "organic" (instrumental) body of the divine power in the sublunary sphere. The "organic body" that Aristotle refers to in his famous definition of the soul as entelecheia (see De anima 2.1), according to Bos's reading, is not the visible body equipped with organs (an interpretation for which Bos blames the ancient commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias), but rather pneuma itself. Pneuma, Bos explains, is neither one of the four terrestrial elements (it must be carefully distinguished both from natural fire and from air or breath) nor separated from them, but analogous to the fifth element, ether, in the astral sphere. It is not a sixth element either, but the instrument by which the divine power is present in the sublunary sphere "incognito," as Bos himself puts it. The book shows the advantages of Bos's novel interpretation of Aristotle. I will briefly point out some of them. First, it makes good sense of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's account of the soul: For Aristotle, the divine does not make, but rather begets, all things through its power, and there is a clear distinction between intellect and soul. Second, Bos's interpretation is able to bring together Aristotle's theology, on the one hand, and his cosmology and natural philosophy (in particular his account of generation and life), on the other, explaining why in nature we find teleology and a desire for the divine and immortality among lower, material beings. Third, Bos's interpretation makes good sense of passages such as Generation of Animals 2.3 (pneuma is different from fire and analogous to the element of the stars) and Physics 1.9 (matter desires form as the ugly desires the beautiful), which are more difficult to explain on the standard interpretation. Fourth, Bos's view makes room for the authenticity of two treatises (On the Cosmos and On the Life-Bearing Spirit), which, on the standard interpretation, have not been considered genuinely Aristotelian. Finally, Bos's account of pneuma [End Page 143] provides a compelling explanation of why Aristotle would attribute life to plants, which do not breathe, as well as to animal embryos from the moment of fertilization and long before they develop lungs and start to breathe: Life requires a specific body, but not necessarily, at its lowest (vegetative) level, a body equipped with organs; the soul, the entelecheia, is present in the pneuma as its proper instrumental body. These advantages notwithstanding, Bos's account of pneuma in Aristotle remains open to debate, because it relies heavily on Bos's interpretation of what "organic body" means in Aristotle's definition of the soul in De anima 2.1 and also on the authenticity of the treatises On the Cosmos (De Mundo) and On the Life-Bearing Spirit (De Spiritu). On both accounts, there is still room for discussion, which in a sense boils down to whether Alexander's reading or Bos's is the correct interpretation of Aristotle, an issue that does not appear likely to be settled. The reader will find textual evidence and careful argumentation in favor of the author's view in this book, remarkable in its comprehensiveness, very informative in the footnotes, and with a complete and updated bibliography including but not restricted to the more familiar English literature on Aristotle. Of particular value, I think, is the long chapter 10, which Bos dedicates to the nature of pneuma and in which he raises key questions to understand it, for example, whether pneuma is the material or...

Антіохійська школа та її педагогічні метафори

У статті розглянуто основні педагогічні метафори, які побутували в Антіохійській школі патристики. Дослідження засноване, насамперед, на матеріалі гомілій свт. Іона Золотоуста De inani gloria, Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae, In Matthaeum, Ad populum Antiochenum, а також на окремих творах Феодорита Кирського і Северіана Габальського. Ці твори проаналізовано крізь призму теорії метафори П. Рікера, докладені Н. Райтом та Р. Хейзом до вивчення життєсвіту релігійних громад. Такий аналіз допоміг виявити у творах Золотоуста та інших антіохійців співіснування двох основних педагогічних метафор різного походження. Метафора чистого аркушу, що походить з трактату Аристотеля De anima, розглядає процес освіти в категоріях активного формування педагогом ментальності вихованця. У Золотоуста ця метафора набуває вигляду складного палімпсесту, де первинний текст постійно записується новими шарами, редагується і відновлюється знову. До цього процесу взаємного навчання і редагування свт. Іоан закликає усіх своїх слухачів. Натомість метафора фортеці, укорінена в Павловій антропології і в Платоновій теорії анамнезису, імплікуючи значно більшу самодостатність особистості, застерігає від надмірного педагогічного конструктивізму. Ця парадигма представляє людський ум (νους) як храм або місто, збудоване за Божим задумом, що розвивається за законами, закладеними Творцем. Завдання педагога в такому сценарії – радше оберігати тонкий і складний внутрішній світ дитини від примітивної логіки оточення, щоб не перешкоджати її природному розвитку за Божим задумом. У Золотоуста, Феодорита та інших антіохійців співіснують обидві метафори, але метафора чистого аркушу – переосмисленого як палімпсест – докладається радше до просвіти дорослих християн, тоді як метафора фортеці застосовується стосовно виховання дітей.

Tabula rasa: the attempt to forget what cannot be remembered

The mind and the concept of tabula rasa are first linked together in Aristotle’s treatise De anima where he tells us, “… that thought is in a sense potentially what-ever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought? What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-table on which as yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with thought” (Aristotle, 1957, De anima, 3.4.429b31–430a2). This article explores how destructive aggression can wipe out the patient’s memory of an event or traumatic experience, resulting in the patient showing instead of knowing. Clinical material will illustrate this phenomenon in relation to Freud’s concept of repetition compulsion and how the forensic patient, unable to think about what they have done, may act out, or rather, re-enact the experience. I refer to this as the tabula rasa defence which is literally, an obliterative re-enactment. This will be explored further using Winnicott’s ideas about fear of breakdown, including how keeping memory locked away in the unconscious acts as a means of protecting against a breakdown which has, as Winnicott suggests “already happened”.

아리스토텔레스의 『영혼에 관하여』에서 도형-영혼 유비의 이론철학적 함의

본고의 목표는 아리스토텔레스의 『영혼에 관하여』 2권 3장에 등장하는 ‘도형-영혼의 유비’가 어떠한 이론철학적 함의를 정확히 어떤 범위 내에서 지니는지 밝히는 것이다. 이에 본고는 이 유비가 이론철학의 주요 과제인 ‘정의’에 관한 아리스토텔레스의 사유를 압축적으로 담고 있는 것으로, 영혼에 대한 정의 작업이 어떤 식으로 수행되어야 하는지 알림으로써 『영혼에 관하여』 전체의 구성적 특징을 예고한다고 주장한다. 그런 다음, 그렇다고 이 유비가 영혼 단일성을 설명하는 역할까지 맡는 것은 아니라 주장하면서, 그 설명을 위한 다른 한 가지 대안으로 ‘점의 유비’를 제시해 본다.

A Self-Forming Vessel: Aristotle, Plasticity, and the Developing Nature of the Intellect

ABSTRACT Highlighting the relations between De Anima II.5 and De Anima III.4, this paper argues that Aristotle held a surprisingly dynamic view of the intellect. According to this view, the intellect is in a constant development brought about by its own activity. This dynamic view distinguishes the intellect from both physical objects and from sense-perception. For Aristotle the intellect is a “nothing” that gradually becomes something by thinking. The paper traces the logic of this idea and its meaning. It defends the simple thesis that in the intellect alone first and second transitions are bound together: that every concrete thought is also a determination of the possibility of the intellect. This, I will suggest, was known to ancient commentators who distinguished between not two but three “intellects” in De Anima; not only the possible and actual intellects, but also the acquired intellect. It is the unique conceptual structure of the acquired intellect that this paper sketches.

The Lever, or How to Act at a Distance: A Backdrop to Theophrastus’ De sensibus

Abstract It is well known that when it comes to perception in the De anima, Aristotle uses affection-related vocabulary with extreme caution. This has given rise to a debate between interpreters who hold that in Aristotle’s account, the act of sense-perception nevertheless involves the physiological alteration of the sense organ (Richard Sorabji), and those think, with Myles Burnyeat, that for Aristotle, perception does not involve any material process, so that an Aristotelian physics of sense-perception is a “physics of forms alone”. The present article suggests that the dematerialisation of Aristotle’s theory of perception, which has a long story from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Brentano, may be in fact traced back to Theophrastus’ exegesis of Aristotle’s relevant passages in the De anima in his Physics, as we can reconstruct it on the basis of Priscian’s Metaphrasis in Theophrastum and Simplicius’ commentary of Aristotle’s De Anima. The reconstruction also provides a scholastic-theoretical frame to Theophrastus’ critical exposition of ancient theories about sense perception in his De sensibus, whether or not the discussion originally belonged to Theophrastus’ Physics.

The Principle that ‘Like Perceives Like’ in Theophrastus’ De sensibus

Abstract This paper considers Theophrastus’ use in the De sensibus of the principles that like perceives like and that unlike perceives unlike to criticise his predecessors. It is argued that the aporiai that arise from either position serve to motivate the view of perception articulated by Aristotle in the De anima.

Theophrastus on Perceiving

Abstract Many fragments from Theophrastus on perception are preserved by the late Neoplatonist, Priscian of Lydia. After preliminary source criticism concerning how to identify the fragments, I turn to Theophrastus’ discussion of perceiving and perceptual awareness. While he clearly rejects literalism, he also does not embrace “spiritualism”: he argues instead that we receive the defining proportions of perceptible qualities in the sense organ, though in different contraries than in the perceptible (thereby avoiding literalism). If Priscian’s report is faithful, Theophrastus also accepts a moderate capacity reading of De anima III.2, locating awareness in a central monitoring sense, common to the individual modalities; and this has further implications for the unity of consciousness. Theophrastus’ method, though aporetic in form, is nonetheless a constructive engagement with the same texts of Aristotle’s we have ourselves, in the service of a joint research program in psychology that he shared with his colleague and former teacher.

Structural Issues in the Doxography of De Anima i: a Proposal

The first book of the De anima contains Aristotle’s psychological doxography. It is usually divided into two sections: the mere listing of the previous theories on the soul (I.2) and their critical examination (I.3–5). Despite such apparent neatness, various discrepancies emerge and the structure of the doxography remains obscure. To account for such problems and for the general agenda of the psychological doxography, I shall propose a tripartite model, arguing that Aristotle’s grouping of his predecessors’ theories is based on three criteria (motion, cognition and incorporeality), all of which are to be referred back to one overarching criterion (primacy). After collecting some textual evidence in favour of this interpretation, I shall deal with an apparent difficulty faced by the suggested model, namely chapter 4. Based on the results thus reached, I conclude that the doxography of De anima i significantly contributes to the development of Aristotle’s own psychological theory and to defining its role within his wider philosophical project.

Dos momentos en De Ánima de Juan García Ponce: Ecfrasis y apropiacionismo

Este artículo analiza dos momentos en la novela De Ánima (1984) de Juan García Ponce, en los cuales se utiliza el recurso de la ecfrasis y el apropiacionismo. Me aproximaré a estas estrategias con el objetivo de observar su funcionamiento en la estructura narrativa, además del efecto de sentido que producen en una lectura que los considere. También pretendo detallar algunas cuestiones de la relación pintura-escritura para observar el tratamiento intermedial establecido por el autor. El primer momento revisa la relación de una obra del pintor Lucas Cranach el Viejo y el procedimiento narrativo utilizado por García Ponce para articular a Paloma, protagonista femenina. El segundo momento contempla el análisis de dos ecfrasis, cuyo origen es Le Déjeuner sur l'Herbe de Édouard Manet, desde dos perspectivas de la misma representación visual. Asimismo, prestaré atención al tratamiento apropiacionista y su efecto de sentido derivado. El artículo se apoya en la noción de ecfrasis de Luz Aurora Pimentel, Irene Artigas y James Heffernan; la estructura abismada de Helena Beristáin; el apropiacionismo de Juan Martín Prada; y el concepto ánima-animus de Carl Jung. Para las imágenes se hace referencia al Cranach Digital Archive.

É POSSÍVEL EDUCAR AS EMOÇÕES?

O artigo trata a possibilidade de educar as emoções existente graças à sua possibilidade de ouvir e obedecer à razão. O estudo é feito a partir das propostas da Ética a Nicômaco, recorrendo, quando necessário, ao De anima e à Retórica, textos que dedicaram atenção às emoções. Para defender essa proposta, a investigação parte do Livro I da EN, que indica a possibilidade de a capacidade desiderativa ouvir e obedecer a razão. Com isso, percebemos que Aristóteles não pretende excluir os elementos não racionais da vida ética, estando mais preocupado em encontrar formas capazes de conciliar as capacidades anímicas e de sentir emoções na quantidade adequada, com as coisas certas, nos momentos convenientes, em direção a quê e a quem é adequado. Essa interpretação é possível porque o filósofo compreende a alma como algo composto, pondo as emoções, que são da alçada do desiderativo em contato com a parte racional da alma. Por isso, é necessário entender que Aristóteles propõe partes da alma que quando associadas conjugam o bom exercício de todas as capacidades anímicas humanas, levando às virtudes. Interpretação viável pela apresentação de faculdades encadeadas à parte racional que pode tocar a emoção, desde seu despertar até quando for moderada com o auxílio da razão prática.

L’intellect agent, la lumière, l’hexis. Averroès lecteur d’Aristote et d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise

This article examines Averroes’ interpretation, found in his Long Commentary on the De Anima, of a famous passage in Aristotle’s De An. III 5 (430a14‑15) which presents the intellect “producing all things, as a kind of positive state (hexis), like light”. Averroes, clearly heir to Alexander of Aphrodisias for whom hexis refers not to the intellect “agent” itself but to its product, defends nevertheless, via the comparison with light, the conception of the agent intellect (a substance purely in act by itself ) as an hexis, which leads us to the inevitable consequence that the agent intellect is the prime object of the material intellect, acting as a condition for all subsequent thoughts.

«Всеобщее есть ничто, либо последующее»: вопрос о конституции и первенстве сущего как такового в перипатетической метафизике

As a subject of the first philosophy, the being as being is defined as the most universal and primary one. However, Aristotle proves in the Metaphysics that neither One nor being are substances, therefore they do not exist separately. Furthermore, in the De Anima he claims that those that are said to be universal are "either nothing or posterior", because they cannot be on its own in separation from the particular things. How, then, the universal being which can be named nothing or posterior postulated as the subject of first philosophy that is most worthy of knowing? And, on the other hand, if the being as universal is not a substance, on what ground it has it's unity? In order to answer these questions, I will consider Alexander of Aphrodisias' Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics and also the Quaestio I.3 and I.11 of his Quaestiones.

The réflection seconde through duplex cognitio. Thomist basis of Gabriel Marcel’s thought

La distinción entre misterio y problema en la filosofía de Gabriel Marcel implica una doble manera de acceder a esas dos regiones del Ser: reflexiones primera y segunda. Esta doble vía de acceso al Ser comparte caracteres esenciales con la teoría de la duplex cognitio de anima de Tomás de Aquino. La intención del artículo es mostrar esas coincidencias a partir de la lectura del artículo de Jaume Bofill Para una metafísica del sentimiento.

Francis Bacon and the Aristotelian Tradition on the Nature of Sound

Centuries II and III of Francis Bacon’s posthumous natural history Sylva Sylvarum are largely dedicated to sound. This paper claims that Bacon’s investigation on this topic is fruitfully read against the background of the Aristotelian theory of sound, as presented in De anima commentaries. I argue that Bacon agreed with the general lines of this tradition in a crucial aspect: he rejected the reduction of sound to local motion. Many of the experimental instances and more theoretical remarks from his natural history of sound can be elucidated against this wider concern of distinguishing sound from motion, a theme that had been a staple of Aristotelian discussions of sound and hearing since the Middle Ages. Bacon admits that local motion is part of the efficient cause of sound, but he denies that it is its form, which means that sound cannot be reduced to a type of local motion. This position places him outside subsequent developments in natural philosophy in the seventeenth century.

인간 지성의 발전단계에 대한 신플라톤주의적인 해석 -리디아의 프리스키아노스 (위僞-심플리키오스)의 『영혼론 주해』를 중심으로 -

인간 지성의 발전단계에 대한 신플라톤주의적인 해석 -리디아의 프리스키아노스 (위僞-심플리키오스)의 『영혼론 주해』를 중심으로 -

CAN THERE BE A SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY? ARISTOTLE’S DE ANIMA AND THE STRUCTURE AND CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENCE

Abstract This article considers whether and how there can be for Aristotle a genuine science of ‘pure’ psychology, of the soul as such, which amounts to considering whether Aristotle’s model of science in the Posterior Analytics is applicable to the de Anima.